At this point arises the question which to my mind is important
whether we should undertake transactions of this kind only on condition
that transfer to Germany is assured, or whether we should let
Italy have these goods if it should no longer be possible to forward
them to us. I think that the latter solution is the correct one. If
strategic commodities originally destined for us cannot be shipped to
Germany, they should at least bring some benefit to the economy of our
ally. I am convinced that Italy would be glad if Germany were to
give this kind of support to her increasingly apparent resolution to
1 Not printed (2290/483422-24). a See document No. 33.
get the country ready for war economically, too, within the shortest
possible time. I recommend this solution all the more because it
entails no economic drawbacks whatsoever for Germany.
With cordial regards,
Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc., v, MACKENSEN
No. 150
233/156148-49
The Charge cFAffaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
BUENOS AIRES, September 28, 1939 12 : 35 a. m.
No. 488 of September 27 Received September 28 8 : 30 a. m.
From numerous talks which I initiated with leading figures in
Argentine politics and business, the following may be useful for an
evaluation of Argentine neutrality: Very large groups stress the
wish for maintaining and defending neutrality as well as continuing
trade with Germany; in doing so they are thinking primarily of
Argentina's own economic interests. In this connection an alleged
statement by President Ortiz is cited, which indicates that Argentina's
neutral position in relation to contraband questions will be brought
out clearly at the Panama Conference ; it also makes reference to the
intensified diplomatic exchange between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay
during the past few days which is said to point to joint action
especially in respect to the export of foodstuffs to belligerents and
neutrals. The great majority of these same groups and of the public,
which has long been worked upon by the local press and radio, are,
however, politically opposed to us notwithstanding the outwardly
correct observance of the principles of neutrality. One frequently
encounters here the foolish but accepted notion that expansionist ambitions
would make Germany a territorial and general threat to South
America after the victorious conclusion of the war. There is general
failure to understand Germany's policy, which usually is represented
as disruptive of peace, except among a few intellectuals in the army
and in business who are reasonably familiar with European issues.
In particular the anti-British sentiment of the younger generation
must not be construed as being pro-German. The great sympathy for
France, which is expressed almost without exception, is the fruit of
clever cultural propaganda carried on for many years. German
culture continues to be highly regarded by its friends, but it is not
identified with the new Germany which is viewed as anti-cultural if
only because of its supposed threat to the Catholic Church ; it must be
Minister Funk has agreed vis-t-vis Minister Clodius to an increase
of at least 2,000,000 tons a year in coal deliveries to Italy. The
quantity previously agreed upon amounts to approximately 9,200,000
tons.
Since the acquisition of the mines in the former Polish part of
Upper Silesia, the satisfaction of Italian coal requirements by Ger
many is no longer a question of production but merely a question of
transportation. In this respect everything possible to assure delivery
is being done in cooperation with the Reich Economics Ministry and
the Reich Transportation Ministry.
WIEHI,
To be submitted to the Foreign Minister via the State Secretary.
WEBHL
No. 193
P15/024r-021
Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics *
October 4, 1939.
The undersigned, being duly empowered thereto by the German
Government and the Government of the USSR, pursuant to article I
of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty concluded in Moscow on September
28, 1939, between Germany and the USSR,2 have agreed upon
the following :
I
The boundary line between the respective national interests in the
territory of the former Polish state shall have the following course :
Beginning at the point located on the Igorka River at the mouth
of a nameless brook which comes before the village of Pschetok and
which flows into the Igorka River at a distance of about 2,300 meters
northeast of the intersection of this river with the Shondowy-
Kopzewo road, the boundary shall run in a southwesterly direction,
on a straight line to be determined, to the point located on the Tschernaja
Gantscha River opposite the northwestern edge of the village
of Shondowy.
Thence the boundary ascends along the Tschernaja Gantscha River
to the mouth of the Marycha River. From this mouth the boundary
shall follow a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined,
to the northern shore of Jedryno Lake. Thence the boundary
shall follow a straight line to be determined to the point located opposite
the mouth of the Wolkushanka River on the Tschernaja
Gantscha River, and further, ascending this latter river, to the point
lying south of the village of Ostrynske. Thence the boundary shall
run at first in a southwesterly and then in a northwesterly direction
along the ravine to its northwestern end and then, on a straight line
1 The spellings of all Polish place names in this document are those used in the
printed German text.
"Document No. 157, and Appendix VI.
234
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
5. The remaining balance of ca, 500 million RM would be liquidated
by capital goods deliveries over a period of several years. A plan for
large-scale capital goods deliveries has been drafted.1
III. Joint German-Soviet economic planning. German technical
assistance in raw material production and industrial expansion, agricultural
conversion (soybeans), forest leases, fisheries at Murmansk,
etc.
IV. Transport and transit questions.
V. Execution of the agreement of August 19, 1939.
SCHSTUBBE
a This may refer to enclosure 3 (not printed: 13G&/357060-66) to the document
printed in footnote 2 of document No. 82. In this draft the following items
were listed: railroad rolling stock (deliveries beginning 1943), railroad installations,
extension of other forms of transportation, road building machinery,
locomotive and automobile factories (deliveries beginning 1943), equipment for
port development, mining and metallurgical facilities, chemical plants, war
materials and planes, synthetic rubber factories, telephone and telegraph installations,
technically-equipped clinics, irrigation systems for cotton, sheep for
breeding, etc.
No. 209
4.63/22S&82
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 482 of October 7 WASHINGTON, October 7, 1939 1 : 38 a. m.
Received October 7 11 : 59 p. m.
The press and radio here are giving wide circulation to Associated
Press and United Press reports from Berlin stating that semi-official
German spokesmen indicated the German Government's willingness
to accept a truce proposal by Roosevelt and, if need be, even participate
in a peace conference at Washington. In the event that Roosevelt
should be prepared to mediate, the German Government would submit
additional peace proposals.
Without indicating any connection with these reports, Pittman,
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that
Roosevelt would not be disposed to undertake such mediation until
the belligerent powers have shown a sincere desire for coming to an
understanding. Roosevelt was not very likely to undertake anything
at the present moment, since an unsuccessful intervention might possibly
be interpreted so as to place upon him part of the responsibility
for the continuation of the war.
I would appreciate guidance for my conversations.
THOMSBK
OCTOBEE 1939 235
No. 210
173/869*75'
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TiRGEisrT THE HAGUE, October 7, 1939 2 : 57 p. m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Received October 7 4: 15 p. m.
No. 332 of October 7
The Foreign Minister said to me today that British comment on
the Führer's speech, both because of its careful formulation and
because of the fact that Poland was not mentioned, seemed to him to
be leaving the door open for a peaceful settlement. In his opinion
it was now a question of easing the way for a possible shift in the position
of the British Government by conditioning British public opinion.
The large British newspapers were more intransigent than (group
garbled) and it would be difficult to induce them to change their
attitude. In his opinion the best way to alter public opinion in
England would be to push the disarmament question quite prominently
into the foreground, making detailed proposals as early as possible,
and thereby dispel the strong British suspicions of the ultimate objectives
of German policy. He could imagine that if an adroit person
sent by Germany were to appear in London with disarmament proposals,
such a step would make a great impression on public opinion
in England and also facilitate a change of attitude on the part of the
British Government in the Polish question, which he believed caused
the greatest difficulty at present. He did not wish to make any proposal
regarding the person to be entrusted with such a mission. He
did not know of anyone in Holland suitable for it. Under present
conditions it might perhaps be best to choose an Italian. At any rate
he considered it of crucial importance that something be done as soon
as possible along the line he had suggested in order to keep matters
in flux and not let them first become solidified.
ZECH
260090 54
236
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 211
10S/111680-&1
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
IMMEOXCA'XE BERLIN, October 7, 1939 [9 : 25 p. m.]
MOST URGENT
No. 518
I am receiving reliable reports from Istanbul * to the effect that
Kusso-Turkish negotiations apparently are leading to the signing of
a mutual assistance pact. Hence I request you to call on M. Molotov
immediately and to emphasize strongly once more 2 how much we
would regret it if the Soviet Government were unable to dissuade
Turkey from concluding a treaty with England and France and to
induce her to adopt an unequivocal neutrality. In the event that the
Soviet Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance
pact with Turkey, we would regard it as quite obvious that she would
make a reservation in the pact whereby the pact would not obligate
the Soviet Government to any kind of assistance aimed directly or
indirectly against Germany. Indeed, Stalin himself promised this,3
Without such a reservation, the Soviet Government, as has been previously
stressed, would commit an outright breach of the Non-Aggression
Pact concluded with Germany, It would, moreover, not suffice
to make this reservation only tacitly or confidentially. On the contrary,
we must insist that it be formally stipulated in such a manner
that the public will notice it. Otherwise a very undesirable impression
would be created on the public, and such an act would be apt to
shake the confidence of the German public in the effectiveness of the
new German-Russian agreements.
Please take this opportunity to inform yourself on the other details
concerning the status of the Russo-Turkish negotiations and to find
out what is to be agreed upon between the two Governments in regard
to the question of the Straits,4
Report by wire. (FOREIGN MINISTER)
* In telegram No. 362 sent to Ribbentrop personally on Oct. 4 by Albert Jenke,
his brother-in-law, who was assigned to the Embassy (96/108039-40). Jenke
reported on the basis of conversations he had with influential Turkish personages
that Saracoglu was expected to bring back from Moscow a nonaggression
pact.
a Cf. document No. 116.
8 See document No. 81.
4 Unsigned note : "I communicated the contents of the foregoing instruction to
Count Schulenburg this afternoon by telephone. The transmission was very
good. Count Schulenburg said he had just come from Molotov, who had told
him that he had not talked with the Turkish delegation since Sunday. Hence
our warning certainly arrived in time. I replied that Count Schulenburg should
nevertheless lose no time, as it was a matter of decisive importance, and the
reports received here pointed to a rather advanced stage in the negotiations.
Accordingly, Count Schulenburg is to call on Molotov again tomorrow morning."
OCTOBER 1939 237
No. 212
The Ambassador m Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT TOKTO, October 7, 193910: 15 p. m.
No. 558 of October 7 Received October 7 6 : 55 p. m.
PoL VIII 1616.
For the State Secretary.
With reference to my telegram No, 550 of October 5.1
The following reasons contributed to the granting of Ambassador
Oshima's repeatedly submitted requests to be allowed to resign.
The increasing influence of the new pro-British Deputy Foreign
Minister 2 (group garbled) has intensified the effort to remove supporters
of the policy of German-Japanese alliance from key positions.
This development has been accelerated by the revolt in the Foreign
Ministry reported in the telegram cited above, which gave the Foreign
Minister the further pretext, under the guise of "maintaining the
authority of the Government," to undertake sweeping personnel
changes.
The Army could not maintain its previous opposition to Oshima's
desire to resign, because its political influence has decreased considerably
as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the
military reverse at Nomonhan, The publication which the Army was
forced to make of the high casualties at Nomonhan (18,000) made a
deep impression on the public.
The Army is at present in the process of being removed from
politics, in which connection all leading and politically active officers
are being shifted to new assignments, as, for example, General
Machijiri, who has been very active in working for the alliance.
The recall of the Berlin Military Attache is likewise imminent
(see telegram No. 559 of October 7 from the Military Attach^).
3
Finally, the General Staff expressed the opinion that Oshima, embittered
by the events, would hardly be able to do any fruitful work
between Tokyo and Berlin in reorienting friendly German-Japanese
relations. This would remain the unaltered objective of the Army and
could be carried out when the Foreign Minister's attempt at a settle-
1 Document No. 198.
* Masayuki Tani.
* Not found.
238
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ment with America failed. The Army expects this all the more since
the present revolt of about 300 officials in the Foreign Ministry must
in the long run impair the Foreign Minister's power of action.
Orr
No. 213
409/214482
The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland
Telegram
MOST URGENT BjRRLiN, October 7, 1939.
(1) To Tallinn, No. 257
(2) To Riga, No, 328
(8) To Helsinki, No. 318
Exclusively for the Minister personally.
Supplementing our telegrams No. 241 to (I),
1 No. 303 x to (2) and
No. 305 to (3),
2 1 am communicating the following to you in strict
secrecy and for your personal information only :
During the Moscow negotiations with the Soviet Government the
question of delimiting the spheres of interest of both countries in
Eastern Europe was discussed in strict confidence, not only with reference
to the area of the former Polish state, but also with reference
to the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. At the
same time the delimitation of the spheres of interest was agreed upon
for the eventuality of a territorial and political reorganization in
these areas. The borderline fixed for this purpose for the territory
of the former Polish state is the line designated in article 1 of the
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28
and publicly announced. Otherwise, the line is identical with the
German-Lithuanian frontier. Thus it follows that Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, and Finland do not belong to the German sphere of interest
in the sense indicated above.
You are requested to refrain, as heretofore, from any explanations
on this subject
THE FOREIGN MINISTER
1 Document No. 184.
Not printed (1569/379910).
OCTOBER 1939 239
No, 214
121/119553-54
Memorandwm*. ~by an Official of the Political Department
BERLIN, October 7, 1939.
The author of the letter to the Führer,
1 Dr. Fritz Spieser, is one of
the leading personalities of the so-called autonomist movement and the
consciously Volksdeutsch elements in Alsace-Lorraine. His views
seem to be backed by a numerically not very strong but still notable
and, above all, very active portion of the Alsatians and the Alsatian
youth movement. His address to the Führer ought to be given some
weight because it represents the first initiative of this kind coming
from the population of Alsace, which today holds French citizenship.
As the address shows, however, Dr. Spieser, as do a number of other
very prominent Alsatian autonomists, resides at present outside the
borders of France, i. e., in Germany.2
As regards the substance of the address, it must be noted that to
accept his proposals would be out of the question. After the Führer's
exceedingly categorical statement on the problem of Alsace-Lorraine
in his speech yesterday,
3 this problem cannot be opened up if there
should still be any chance of putting an end to the present state of wax*
between Germany and France before the outbreak of serious hostilities.
It is impossible to tell today how the Alsace-Lorraine problem
will appear if the war should develop into a life-and-death struggle
between Germany and France.
Herewith to the Director of the Political Department through the
Deputy Director.
V. RrNTTELEST *
1 Not printed (121/119557-64). The author of this letter, after presenting a
long indictment of French rule in Alsace-Lorraine, requested Hitler's protection
for "this hard-pressed ancient German border province." In case of a German
victory, Alsace-Lorraine ought to be returned to Germany outright : even if
France, under the impact of the German victories in the East, should decide to
withdraw from the war, Germany at least ought to insist that a plebiscite be held
on the question whether Alsace-Lorraine should remain under Prance or become
independent, "perhaps in the shape of a Protectorate like Bohemia and Moravia
or merely like Slovakia, e. g., strongly dependent on Germany economically. . . .*'
3 The letterhead indicates that the letter was sent from an address in East
Prussia.
8 In his Reischstag speech of Oct. 6 (see Editor's Note, p. 227) , Hitler had made
the statement that ever since France had returned the Saar Territory to Germany
there had been no further German demands on France, nor would there
be any in the future. "I have refused even to raise the issue of Alsace-Lorraine,
not on account of any pressure brought to bear on me, but for the reason that this
is not at aU a problem that could ever again interfere with Franco-German
relations."
4 Marginal note : "Please postpone the matter. The Foreign Minister requests
that it be submitted again in the event that full-scale hostilities with France are
resumed in the near future." (W[eizsacker], [October] 12.
240
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 215
1793/403541-42
The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
BERLIN, October 7, 1939.
No. 322 Sent October 81 : 00 a. m.
zu Pol, VI 2250 * and 2251.2
For the Minister.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 270 2 and 271.
I. For guidance in conversations:
The Finnish Minister called on me today and in accordance with his
instructions expressed apprehension regarding the impending Soviet
Russian-Finnish negotiations, asking whether we knew the Russian
demands on Finland, I replied that we had no information whatever
about them. The meaning of the invitation to Moscow could probably
only be that the Soviet Union had certain wishes vis-&-vis Finland.
I did not believe, however, that there was any occasion for serious
anxiety. The Minister said in conclusion that we should maintain
our good will toward Finland, whereupon I wished him a happy outcome
of the negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The Finnish Minister also inquired, on instructions, about the significance
of the fact that Finland was not mentioned in the Führer's
speech. I replied that Finland was in very good company, since for
example, Rumania, Bulgaria, Japan, Spain, and Luxembourg were
not mentioned either. Therefore, no significance could be attributed
to the fact that Finland was not mentioned.
II. For your information :
In view of the present situation we cannot possibly intervene in the
impending Russian-Finnish arguments.
1
Pol. YI 2250 (telegram No. 271) : Not printed (1793/408538). In this telegram
Bliicher reported that immediately after Hitler's speech of Oct. 6, Erkko had
asked him why Finland had not been mentioned and whether Finland ha.d been
discussed during Kibbentrop's visit to Moscow the previous week.
'Document No. 206.
OCTOBER 1930 241
No. 216
91/100078-79
The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry
Radio Telegram 1
SECRET DTJBLIX, October 8, 1939.
Kb. 85 of October 7 Received October 8 12 : 50 p. m.
The declaration of Irish, neutrality and, according to past observation,
the careful, consistent adherence to it, have the support of the
great majority of the Irish population, despite the undermining efforts
of certain pro-English circles. It has visibly strengthened Irish
national self-consciousness. It has also caused the Irish Republican
Army,2 without basically changing its attitude, to recognize the danger
of premature activity and to stand by inactive for the time being,
although supposedly determined to intervene if the neutral attitude is
abandoned. The IRA is said to be continuing acts of sabotage in
England, but otherwise to be confining its cooperation exclusively to
the Irish in America. The arrest of nearly 100 of its members in
Ireland went off without incident. The Irish Army is supposedly
ready to defend neutrality in all directions, in spite of the presence of
pro-British elements. The feeling with reference to our pact with
Russia, especially in view of the sympathy for Catholic Poland which
has had a fate similar to Ireland's, is to a large extent anti-German
but at the same time strongly anti-British ; certain pro-German trends
exist particularly in the country, where the German radio is especially
effective. The Irish press is strictly controlled, but the
British press gets through. The Catholic Church is obeying the Government's
appeal for a neutral stand. The personal attitude of the
Government toward me is definitely friendly.
The leading British statesmen and officials, probably Eden too, are
said not to have any objections to Irish neutrality; other British
groups with a certain amount of influence do object, however, so that
the position of the Irish Government has become somewhat more
difficult in London. Previous bad experience on the part of the
British in British-Irish conflicts, as well as regard for America and
the Dominions, may impede the consideration of possible steps against
1 The telegrams from the German Legation in Dublin during this period, besides
being written in extremely condensed telegraphic style, contain many
garbled words and groups. * The Irish Republican Army, a secret, semi-military organization having as its
object the union of Northern Ireland with Eire and the separation of Ireland from
the British Commonwealth. It had engaged in widespread terrorist activities
both in Ireland and in Great Britain and in June 1939 the Government of Eire had
declared the IRA an unlawful organization.
242
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ireland. However, there Is fear of British demands for Irish harbors
and airports especially if the war situation should become more
acute although there do not appear to be any concrete indications
to that effect so far. The further danger of possible utilization of
economic difficulties, especially as regards raw materials intended
for important Irish industries (group garbled) negotiations with
England are in progress on this score at the present time.3 John
Maffey, who has just been named the first British diplomatic representative
to Ireland,
4 was educated partly in Germany, is a former
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies and Governor General of
the Sudan, and the author of reports on the Ethiopian conflict that
were favorable to Italy. The first impression is good ; thus there is
hope of useful mediation, but on the other hand there is concern on
the part of nationalist circles. The Government is hoping that he
will be appointed Minister, which would signify the recognition
sought by Ireland of her special position with reference to the Commonwealth.
Irish neutrality is said to be watched very closely in the
United States of America; conversely, a possible abandoning of
American neutrality would constitute a threat to Irish neutrality. We
should continue to support consolidation of Irish neutrality and independence
on a broad national basis, which is also important in its
effect on the Dominions, India, and America as symptom of the loosening
of the ties of Empire. Consequently :
1. Any active interference in Irish internal conflicts, which could
only do harm at the present time, should be avoided.
2. Submarines should avoid Irish territorial waters, or at least
where this is avoidable [unavoidable?] the greatest caution should be
exercised.
3. The greatest possible consideration should be accorded Ireland
in the blockade even with reference to imports of raw materials from
countries other than England, if necessary in return for the assurance
that they will not be re-exported. I am reserving the details on this
point.
4. The Irish question should be handled very carefully by the radio
and the press; that is, in so far as possible, only facts should be given
without direct exploitation for propaganda against England. It
should be kept in mind that Ireland strictly rejects (2 groups garbled)
belonging to the Empire and recognizes only a loose connection with,
it in matters of foreign policy.
I confirm reports 18SO, 1845, and 1868 5 of September 12, (group
garbled) and September 25, which were sent via America.
HEMPEL
3 Because of the garbled state of the text the meaning here is uncertain.
4 Sir John Maffey's title was "British Representative in Ireland."
* These dispatches have not been found.
OCTOBER 1939 43
No. 217
2931/566993-94
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
October 8, 1939.
zu Pol. VIII 1645.1
My view regarding the Chinese suggestion for German mediation
in the Japanese-Chinese conflict is as follows :
1. The preliminary question is whether at the present time it is in
the interest of Germany to bring about peace between China and Japan.
As long as there was hope of getting Japan to conclude an alliance
with Germany, the question could be answered in the affirmative
without further ado. There was then an immediate possibility that,
after the adjustment with the Soviet Union which we sought, Japan
would turn resolutely against England. The present attitude of Japan
does not indicate that this objective will be attained in the near future.
As things stand today there is no very clear danger, to be sure, but
nevertheless there is a possibility that in the course of a long German-
British-French war Japan might also line up on the other side. From
this viewpoint it would be to our interests for Japan to continue to
tie up her forces in China.
Naturally Japan will be further weakened by Chinese entanglements,
so that her value as a possible ally will thereby be reduced. As
long as Japan's attitude is as ambiguous as it is today, however, this
consideration could scarcely be decisive.
2. If the mediation or the "good offices" of a third party come into
question, then German action would be better for us than that of a
third power, for example the United States. Such action should^ of
course, never assume the aspect of an interference in Japanese policy.
But this possibility is eliminated from the very start.
3. The essential question regarding mediation or any similar action
is whether Japan is prepared to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek or
not. Parallel with this is the question whether the Soviet Union
will abandon Chiang Kai-shek or continue to support him. There are
no indications either that Japan will come to terms with Chiang Kaishek
or that the Soviet Union is abandoning him.
Consequently, at the moment the only questions on which Japan
could be sounded out would be :
(a) Whether Japan is willing to come to an understanding with
Chiang Kai-shek at all, and
(b) Whether she would welcome our good offices.
I believe that at the present time the answer from Tokyo would be
in the negative, which would then bring the entire action to a standstill.
In the present situation, such a step by Germany would only
cause annoyance in Japan. I therefore believe that for the present
we should refrain even from a cautious feeler on this point.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary.2
1 Pol. VIII 1645: Document No. 201.
a Marginal note : "Director Political Department : It is my view also that we
ought to let this matter rest. W[eizsacker], Oct. ID."
244
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 218
F2/O&L8
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet
Union to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
SECRET Moscow, October 8, 1939.
MR. AMBASSADOR : I liave the honor hereby to confirm x that in connection
with the Secret Additional Protocol,
2 concluded on September
29 [SB], 1939, between the U. S. S. K. and Germany, concerning
Lithuania, the following understanding exists between us:
1) The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the Protocol and marked
on the map attached to the Protocol shall not be occupied in case
forces of the Bed Army should be stationed [in Lithuania] ;
2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for the implementing
of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of
the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory.
Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration.
W. Moixxrow
A See document No. 196. The letter printed here repeats verbatim, except
for the customary formal differences, Schulenburg's letter of the same date
to Molotov (F2/0317). a Document No. 159.
No. 219
10S/111684:
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT Moscow, October 9, 1939 12 : 30 a. m.
No. 493 of October 8 Received October 9 3 a. m.
Witii reference to your telegram No. 518 of October 7.1
Molotov stated this evening at 9 p. m. that since October 1 no
meeting had taken place 2 with the Turkish Foreign Minister and
that the outcome of the negotiations cannot as yet be surmised. Molotov
expressed the view that in all likelihood a mutual assistance pact
with Turkey would not be concluded. But under all circumstances the
interests of Germany and the special nature of German-Soviet relations
would be taken into account. Molotov explained that the Soviet
Government was pursuing the aim of inducing Turkey to adopt ftill
neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in maintaining
peace in the Balkans.
SOHOTJ&NBTJRG
a Document No. 211.
'The words "taken place" were garbled in transmission. They are taken
from the draft in the Moscow Embassy files C37Q/207803-Q4) .
OCTOBER 1939 245
No. 220
8129/E582031-3S
The Charge cPAffawev m the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 491 of October 9 WASHINGTON, October 9, 1939 4: 35 a. m.
Received October 10 6 : 30 a. m.
Pol. IX 2106.
Official circles here expect that in the event the arms embargo is
repealed by Congress Germany will lodge a protest against this unneutral
act committed after the outbreak of war. The probable American
reply to such a protest is being anticipated in the inspired press
as follows :
1. Under international law neutrals have the same right as belligerents
to modify their laws during a war in order to adapt them
to a new situation.
2. Repeal of the arms embargo was, as a matter of fact, introduced
in Congress before the outbreak of war. The decision to repeal
after the outbreak of war therefore constitutes a confirmatory act.
3. Germany herself set a precedent (note of April 4, 1915) * when
she asked the United States 8 months after the outbreak of the World
War to abandon its position and change its neutrality policy.
What matters for the immediate appraisal of the situation is primarily
the spirit in which the arms embargo is repealed. If the advocates
of repeal were confronted with the clear-cut question whether
the embargo would also be repealed if such a step were to benefit Germany,
they would have to answer "no." The debates in Congress between
isolationists and interventionists actually evade the real issue,
since the interventionists, out of regard for public opinion, are still
reluctant to admit openly that they let themselves be guided less by
a concern for American interests than by a desire to assist England.
Every American argument to validate the repeal of the embargo
is weakened by the fact that prior to the time the threat of a war
between Germany and England arose, the same Administration and
the same Congressmen who are now fighting the embargo with all
possible means, time and again gave unqualified praise to the existing
law and the arms embargo in particular and described it in superlatives
as the surest means for keeping America out of a European
war. In August 1936 (Chautauqua speech) Eoosevelt pointed out,
recalling the experiences of the World War, that the export of arms
with all its possible consequences was delusive economically and a
1 The note is printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1915, Supplement: The World, War (Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1928), pp. 157-158.
246
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
threat to America's peace politically. Hull and Pittman publicly
stated only this year that any change in the neutrality law after the
outbreak of war "would be against the rules of the game." The
overwhelming majority in Congress considered that fixing American
neutrality policy in peacetime was the surest means for averting
America's involvement in a European war. These same statesmen
and politicians now show no compunction about abandoning their
former principles when it is a question of helping England.
We are undoubtedly justified in regarding a repeal of the embargo
as an unfriendly and unneutral act, because it contradicts traditional
American policy in all points. In its reply 2 to the note referred to
under [paragraph] 3, as also in the instruction to the American Embassy
in Vienna,3 the American Government during the World War
explicitly took the position that from the standpoint of international
law it could not be asked or expected to change its neutrality policy
after the outbreak of war.
With respect to any steps that might be undertaken by us it should
be borne in mind that, after the creation of additional production
facilities and provision for American armament requirements, it will
in actual practice take considerable time for a repeal of the arms
embargo for the benefit of the Allies to take full effect; moreover, the
wide circulation given by press and radio to the report cited above
about the anticipated German protest is obviously calculated to prove
the correctness of the American argument that the effect of the embargo
would be to discriminate in favor of Germany, with her supposedly
superior armament industry, against the Allies.
THOMSEW
* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement: Tne World War,
pp. 160-162.
tf., pp. 794r-798.
No. 221
4(95/233366
Memorand^Mn 1>y the State Secretary
St.S No. 793 BERT-IN, October 9, 1939.
The Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the Foreign
Minister. On the latter's instructions I received M. Wuorimaa this
afternoon. He presented the following facts :
By virtue of the developments in the Baltic States, Russia had now
penetrated so far into the Baltic that the balance of power there had
been upset, and predominance threatened to pass to Russia. Germany's
desinteressement had attracted attention in Finland, since
there was reason there to assume that Russia intended to make demands
on Finland identical with those made on the Baltic States.
OCTOBER 1939 247
The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorinaaa that he find
out whether Germany remains indifferent to Russia's forward thrust
in this direction and, should that prove not to be the case, to learn
what~ stand Germany intends to take.
The Minister added that, on her part, Finland had tried her best
during the last few weeks to regulate her commercial relations with
Germany and maintain them on a normal basis and to carry out the
policy of neutrality desired also by Germany.
I answered the Minister in the sense of the enclosed instructions to
Helsinki.1 Wuorimaa asked me to call him if we had anything
further to add.
From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that the Finnish
Government was rather disturbed over the Russian demands and
would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and Latvia.
As regards this attitude on the part of the Minister I merely said
that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle matters with Russia
in a peaceful manner.
WEIZSACKER
1 Document No. 225.
No. 222
888/242223
Memorandum l)y the State Secretary
St.S. No. 794 BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
The Italian Ambassador called on me this afternoon and inquired
about the status of the peace action.
I returned the question and asked to hear his opinion.
Attolico stated the following : The reaction of the enemy countries
up to now was not very favorable. One should not become impatient,
however, but should let time have its effect. First, Chamberlain
would have to make a public statement. This statement would probably
not be purely negative. Then the moment would have arrived
for further diplomatic efforts in order to prepare the ground more
thoroughly.
Attolico did not have any sort of instructions. He also told me
clearly that Rome would not make a move so long as we did not express
a wish to that effect, for Ciano had left here with the impression that
an initiative by Rome was not desired here for the time being. Furthermore,
it had been arranged here that the reaction of other countries
to the Führer's speech would first be awaited, and not until then would
Berlin and Rome confer once more. Thus Rome was waiting for us,
but would surely be glad to act if we wished it.
WEIZSACELER
248
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 225
1793/408557
Memorandum 6y the State Secretary
St.S. No. T95 BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
Pol. VI 2303.
The Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that a very
serious situation would arise in the Baltic region if Eussia were to
make demands on Finland which threatened the independence and
autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished to inform me of the preceding
with reference to the close relations between Sweden and
Finland. It should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and
Latvia, strong and vigorous forces were in power in Finland, who
would not submit to Russian oppression.
I replied to the Minister that nothing was known to me about the
probable Russian demands on Finland. To my knowledge the word
Finland had not been mentioned during the visit of the Eeich Foreign
Minister to Moscow. The situation was that we had not put forth any
claims to any interests east of the known line. I should suppose,
however, that Russia would not set forth any too far-reaching requests
regarding Finland and that, therefore, a peaceable solution could be
found.
WEIZSACKER
Nuremberg document 062-C
Exhibit GB-10S
No. 224
Fuhrer's Directive
CHEPSACHB BERUCN, October 9, 1939.
TOP SECRET MILITART OKM AI Op. 283/39.
The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacfot
OKW No. 172/39 g. K Chefs. WFA/L
By officer only
DIRECTIVE No. 6 FOB THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
1. If it should become apparent in the near future that England,
and, under England's leadership, also France, are not willing to make
an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively
without great delay.
2. If we wait much longer, not only will Belgium and perhaps also
Dutch neutrality be lost, to the advantage of the Western Powers,
OCTOBER 1930 249
but the military strength of our enemies will grow on an increasing
scale, the neutrals* confidence in a final German victory will dwindle,
and Italy will not be encouraged to join us as a military ally.
3. Therefore I give the following orders for further military
operations :
a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation on the
northern wing of the Western Front through the areas of Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out with
as much strength and at as early a date as possible.
b. The purpose of this attacking operation will be to defeat as strong
a part of the French operational army as possible, as well as the allies
fighting by its side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as
possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France as a base for
conducting a promising air and sea war 1 against England and as a
protective zone for the vital Ruhr area.
c. The timing of the attack depends on the readiness of tanks and
motorized units for use this must be speeded up by every possible
effort, also on the weather conditions then prevailing and the weather
prospects ahead.
4. The Luftwaffe is to prevent the Anglo-French air force from
attacking our own Army, and, if necessary, to give direct support to
the Army's advance. In this connection, it will also be essential to
prevent the establishment of the Anglo-French air force in Belgium
and Holland, as well as British troop landings there.2
5. The Naval Command must concentrate for the duration of this
attack entirely in giving direct and indirect support to the operations
of the Army and Luftwaffe.
6. Apart from these preparations for starting the attack in the West
according to plan. Army and Luftwaffe must be ready at any time and
with increasing strength, to meet an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium
as far forward on Belgian territory as possible, and to occupy as
much of Holland as possible in the direction of the West Coast.3
7. The camouflage used for these preparations must be that they
are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration
of French and English forces on the Franco-Luxembourg
and Franco-Belgian borders.
8. I request the Commanders in Chief to give me, as soon as possible,
detailed reports of their plans on the basis of this directive and
1 Marginal note in Raeder's handwriting: "No" [NicJit].
2 Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "It will also be up to the Luftwaffe
to cut the supply lines of those English troops which have already landed. The
employment of U-boats in the Channel will soon cease because of heavy losses."
'Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "This kind of procedure would be
more desirable in every respect."
250
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to keep me currently informed, via the OKW, of the state of the
preparations.
4
ADOLF HITLER
4 Gen Keitel on Oct. 15, recorded that certain questions of OKH regarding
plans for war in the West had been discussed with the Ftihrer. It had been
decided that protection of the Ruhr through air defenses as far forward as possible
in Netherlands territory was of importance for the conduct of the war as a
whole and that this consideration should be taken into account by the Army
in its planning. Such planning would be based on proposed occupation of Netherlands
territory to the Grebbe-Maas line with additional areas as necessary
(Nuremberg document 062-C, exhibit GB-106).
No. 225
The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
No* 326 BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
Sent October 10 12 : 00 noon,
Pol. VI 2827.
Witt reference to our telegram No. 322.1
The Finnish Minister, who will calj today at the Foreign Ministry,
is to receive the following answer :
Our relationship to the three Baltic States rests, as is known, on the
nonaggression pacts ; our relationship to Denmark likewise. Norway
and Sweden have declined nonaggression pacts with us, since they do
not feel endangered by us and since they have hitherto not concluded
any nonaggression pacts at all. Finland, to be sure, has such a pact
with Russia, but declined our offer nevertheless. We regretted this
circumstance, but were and are of the opinion that our traditionally
good and friendly relations with Finland do not require any special
political agreements.
Given this absence of problems in German-Finnish relations it is
very easy to understand why in his utterances of Octbber 6th concerned
for the greater part with our neighbors the Führer did not
mention Finland at all, just as he did not mention many other greater
and smaller states. From this it only follows that between us there
are no points of difference.
In Moscow, where in the negotiations of the Reich Foreign Minister
German-Russian relations were discussed in broad political outline
and where a treaty of friendship came into being, the definitive line
of demarcation was fixed, as you know. West of this line lie the
German interests, east of it we have registered no interests. We are
1 Document No. 215.
OCTOBER 1939 251
therefore not informed as to what requests Russia intends to make of
Finland. We presume, however, that these requests will not be too
far-reaching. For this reason alone a German stand on the question
becomes unnecessary. But in view of the developments described
earlier, we would hardly be in a position, in any case, to intervene
in the Russo-Finnish conversations.
WEIZSACKER
No. 226
1793/408553
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST tjBGENT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 5 : 31 p. m.
No. 284: of October 10 Received October 10 7 : 30 p. m.
Pol. VI 2300.
The excitement which has prevailed here for a week in connection
with further developments in Finnish-Russian relations has greatly
increased during the last few days. After Russia's action in the
Baltic countries they are preparing for the worst. Mobilization is
continuing on an increasing scale. Evacuation of hospitals and
schools for military purposes has begun. The German school wi.ll
be closed tomorrow and be used as quarters for the military. The
public is in a state of panic ; many are leaving Helsinki and going to
West Finland. The banks are having difficulty in coping with mass
withdrawals. Partly as a result of encouragement through Anglo-
French propaganda by word of mouth, the conviction has already
become nearly universal that Germany has sold Finland to Russia.
Anti-German sentiment is steadily increasing. The excitement (group
garbled) [has] already led to hostile acts by individuals against
Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche ; in numerous cases it has resulted
in dismissals.
Appeals for help are being pressed on me from all sides. Political
and military leaders understand that we cannot give any armed assistance
as in 1918 ; they only desire that we may not leave them entirely
without support and counsel in Moscow. I request that the possibility
be considered of granting this wish in one way or another, without
departing from our basic policy.
It is said that American and Swedish official demarches in Moscow
in behalf of Finland are impending.
Bl/CJCEOBR
260090 54
252
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 227
Minister in Finland to the Foreign* Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT HELSINKI, Get )-5 I 31 p. m.
No. 285 of October 10 Received October 10 6 : 30 p. m.
Pol. VI 2289.
The Foreign Minister submitted to me a question formulated as
follows : "Will Germany refrain from disturbing Sweden if Sweden
should come to the aid of Finland militarily ?
"
Please send a telegraphic reply immediately.
No. 228
8485/E59683S
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TOGEOT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 1 : 47 p. m,
No. 286 of October 10 Received October 10 8 : 20 p. m.
Pol. VI 2293.
Any promise not to prevent Sweden from supporting Finland
militarily should, in my personal opinion, be made only on the
condition that Sweden guarantee the continuation of ore deliveries
and refrain from, any measures giving the British and French access
to the Baltic.
BlAJCHJSB
No. 229
6S5/242495
The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 271 of October 10 SOFIA, October 10, 19399 : 00 p. m.
Received October 11 2 : 00 a. m.
For the Air Ministry, Attach^ Group.
I am telegraphing in advance the following important points from
my two-hour conversation with the King :
There is extreme concern over difficulties in connection with the
transport through Yugoslavia of the promised war material,
1 and
also over the possibility of obtaining supplies later.
* On Sept. 9, Richthofen had telegraphed that transports of war material
t(> Bulgaria had been "sabotaged" in transit through Yugoslavia
OCTOBER 1939 253
The general political situation in the Balkans calls urgently for
military strengthening of Bulgaria* In my opinion this is the only
way the peace here can be maintained if the war should be prolonged.
The King proposed that further transports and later deliveries of
supplies be routed via Rumania, since interference is less likely to be
expected there.
The King is afraid that if it should be impossible to eliminate the
difficulties very soon he would be compelled to obtain the most urgently
needed war material from Russia, a step that the Bang would like
to avoid on account of the danger of becoming exposed to political
influences.
SCHOENEBECK a
RlCKTHOFEN*
1 Lt. Col. von Schoenebeck, German Air Attach^ in Bulgaria.
No. 230
1793/408550
TJie Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTRGENT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 9 : 30 p. m.
No. 287 of October 10 Received October 10 12 midnight.
Pol. VI 2291.
All indications are that if Russia does not confine her demands to
islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer armed resistance.
The consequences for our war economy would be grave. Not only
food and timber exports, but also indispensable copper and molybdenum
exports from Finland to Germany would cease. For this
reason I suggest you intercede with the Russian Government to the
effect that it should not go beyond a demand for the islands.
?{ BLfTCHER
No. 231
588/242225-26
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST XJKGBNT ROME, October 10, 1939 11 : 50 p. m.
No. 663 of October 10 Received October 115 : 45 a. m.
The following is worth noting from today's conversation with
Ciano :
254
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1. Ciano asked once again that the negotiations on the South Tirol
be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible.
1 For political reasons
the Duce attached great importance to having a final agreement
reached during my present stay in Rome and having the agreement
signed before my departure. Ciano pointed out in this connection the
impression which the prospective swift resettlement of Germans from
Latvia made on public opinion in Italy. I rejected this comparison^
stressing the entirely different circumstances. I emphasized that a
swift settlement of the South Tirol question depended mainly on the
Italian authorities concerned abandoning their petty treatment of
justified German wishes with regard to the implementation of the
transaction. Ciano promised to exert his influence in this sense.
2. After conversations with Ambassador Giannini and the appropriate
Ministers, I asked Ciano once more to do his utmost to ensure a
maximum increase of Italian raw material deliveries to Germany and
to have the Italian Government expedite in all possible ways the transit
of foreign ship cargoes through Italy to Germany, without exaggerated
legalistic considerations or exaggerated demands for foreign exchange
from us. I pointed out what a bad impression it would mafce in
authoritative quarters in Germany if just at the critical moment at the
beginning of the war the Italian deliveries of raw materials should
decrease or we received the impression that Italy was not doing everything
that was in her power to facilitate transit. Ciano promised to
make his political influence felt with regard to these points, too.
Because of its particular importance for the German war economy, I
have also simultaneously had the question brought directly to the
attention of the Duce by other Ministers concerned in a more unofficial
form, especially with regard to transit deliveries of copper, tin, nickel,
rubber, and fats.
3. Moreover, I carried out with Ciano the Foreign Minister's instructions
to request that Italy adopt a more energetic attitude vis-&-vis
England with regard to ship searches and control points, drawing up
of black lists, etc. I pointed out that it was not possible to carry
through the above-mentioned transit deliveries without vigorous political
defense against British encroachments. Furthermore, the attitude
of other countries on the European continent not involved in the war
would be decisively influenced by Italy's conduct. After all, the
Italian Government itself had already suggested via Attolico that it
assume somewhat the role of a leader in this fight against British
1 The teclmical and financial arrangements for implementing the German-Italian
agreement of June 23, 1939, on South Tirol (see vol. vi, document No. 562) had
run into difficulties ; on Oct. 4 conversations had been resumed in Rome on tliis
subject, with Olodius charged with their conduct on the German side. See also
document No, 275 and footnote.
OCTOBER 1939 255
encroachments. Ciano answered that the Duce and he were willing in
principle to stiffen the Italian stand against the British conduct of
naval warfare and to exert their influence in the same direction on the
neutral states. He only wished to await for a few more days the
development of the political situation after the Führer's speech, and
would then continue the discussion with me. He added that naturally
one must avoid permitting Italy herself to be stamped as a neutral by
virtue of joint action with the neutrals. As in the past, the Duce laid
great emphasis on the fact that Italy was not a neutral power. He
himself, Ciano, was fully convinced that sooner or later the moment
would come for Italy herself to enter the war.
I answered that in our deliberations about more vigorous steps by
Italy against the British blockade we, too, naturally proceeded on the
supposition that these would not take such a form as to underline
Italy's neutrality, but on the contrary would give proof of Italy's
resolve not to submit to the blockade, but to combat it with all possible
political and economic means.
4. During the conversation Ciano mentioned the fact that England
and France had tried at first to place large orders in Italy for war
equipment, including guns, tanks, and more than 1,000 airplanes.
Italy had naturally refused.
CLODITTS
MACKEKSE3S*
No. 232
B18/B005090
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
No. 328 BERLIN, October 10, 1939.
Euro RAM 522,
For the Minister.
According to a report received here, [former] President
Svinhufvud is said to be planning to come to Germany on his own
initiative in order to win support for Finnish policy against Soviet
Russia.
Please take appropriate steps to prevent any trip by the President,
pointing out that Germany is not concerned with Kusso-Finnish
problems; Germany can only recommend a direct Kusso-Finnish
understanding.
BIBBEOTROP
256
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 233
B2iyB005138
The State Secretary to the Embassyin the United States
Telegram
No. 428 BERLIN, October 10, 1939.
zu Pol. II 3950.1
With, reference to your telegram No. 482 of October 7.2
You are requested to maintain extreme reserve with respect to presa
reports there about the possibility of an American mediation and,
if necessary, to say that you have no instructions. The German press
also will express no opinion on the matter. WEIZSACKER
1 Pol. II 3950 : Not found.
* Document No. 209.
No. 234
51/3898-900i
Circular of the Foreign Ministry l
October 10, 1939. W V 2766 II.
With reference to our letter W V 2580 of October 4, 1939.2
In the course of the negotiations carried on with the Danish Government
by the German Legation in Copenhagen according to instructions,
an agreement concerning the treatment of Danish food
ships sailing to England has been reached on the basis of the German
proposals ; it is to go into force on Wednesday, October 11, at 6 : 00 a. m.
The following can be said on the various points of the settlement
reached :
1. Denmark has accepted our basic standpoint, which is that we
are dealing with a de facto situation that can be abrogated at any time.
We ourselves merely agreed that, subject to emergency measures which
we might be forced to take because of action by the enemy, we would
give the Danes sufficient notice before ending the present arrangement,
but that we could not at this time bind ourselves to any definite
period.
2. The Danes assured us that full agreement has been reached with
England regarding the question of fodder imports to Denmark. The
Danish-English negotiations now going on regarding this point are
concerned only with questions of formulation relating to the period
for giving notice. They say England has accepted the Danish standpoint
according to which even now, during the Anglo-Danish ne-
1 Copies were sent to the principal military and economic offices concerned
with economic warfare.
* Not found.
OCTOBER 1939 257
gotiations, England is releasing all goods destined for Denmark, in
particular fodder.
3. At the. request of the Danes we agreed that the term "food"
should include not only the usual staples but also certain luxury goods
such as canned food, condensed milk, meat, and beer; on the other
hand, Denmark agreed to see that only foods are shipped in one cargo.
4. The Danes promised to submit a general list of the ships which
are available for transporting foods, and to inform us immediately of
any change in this list; they also promised to mark the ships in a
special way. The Danes have in the meantime informed us of the
markings and the information has been passed on to the Naval High
Command. Moreover, the Danes will inform the German Legation
in time of the names, cargoes, and dates of departure.
5. At Danish request we abandoned our stipulation that the ships
in question leave from only one port of departure.
6. It was agreed with regard to the three Danish food ships already
brought to Hamburg that these ships will be released as a special
German favor. The cargoes are to remain in Germany, however, and
will be paid for by us via the German-Danish clearing account. In
return the Danes gave the assurance that food acquired by Germany
in this way will not be counted as part of the normal food exports
from Denmark to Germany, so that the acquisition of these foods has
the effect of an increase in our food imports from Denmark.
By order:
WDEHL
No. 235
7433/E539982-88
Unsigned Note
October 10, 1939.
Subject: Conversation with B faron] d[e] HCopp].1
B[aron] d[e] R[opp] first took the position that the outbreak of
war between England and Germany was inevitable because of the
chauvinistic attitude of the English people. He was convinced that
the result would be only the decline of the West, of the Aryan race,
and the era of the bolshevization of Europe, including England.
I thereupon asked him first just to let me express my purely personal
opinion and then later to explain my mission. In my opinion,
the question was an entirely different one, namely, whether the Aryan
race would in future be represented by the two nations jointly or only
by Germany. The German nation was determined to accept the fight
forced upon it by England.
B. d, R. was amazed to learn that all the hatred was directed against
England.
I told him that the German people were now convinced that, while
invoking God, freedom, and otherwise prostituting ethical questions,
1 See document No. 203.
258
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
England thought only of money and that for this reason Germany
had for decades not been able to find peace. In the German view,
there was no question at all as to whether Germany or England would
triumph, but simply of the time that would be needed to force the
British Empire to its knees. They were of the opinion that the attempts
to reach an understanding with England had finally come to
an end after six years of interminable effort. Although I was now
speaking with him at the direction of Christian,2 in order to make one
more attempt to save the British Empire, I was convinced that
this step on the part of Germany was completely unpopular. It
was being taken only from the very broad perspective of the preservation
of the strength of the Aryan race and the general significance
of Europe. It was fortunate for the Aryan race and for Europe
that we had the Führer, who was in a position and had the power to
guide the will of the people in Germany. The question was only
whether the British nation has already become too old to realize
its duties.
B. d. R. declared that the Germans were making a mistake if they
considered the English nation superannuated.
I told him that British policy was undeniably superannuated and
that I, too, hoped and believed that the English nation would still
prove to have vitality. But it had to give the answer to this now,
for, if blood really started flowing, the die would finally have been
cast. I sincerely desired the preservation of the British Empire because
in the European area the German nation had such tasks to fulfill
as the representative of the Aryan race, that I did not wish it to
my children and grandchildren, to these generations, namely, to have
to assume also the tasks of the English nation.
His anxiety concerning the bolshevization of Europe was entirely
unfounded. I was convinced that, just as Poland had fallen much
more rapidly than I had expected, so the British Empire would also
collapse very much more rapidly than the world considered possible
today, because of our new weapons, with which England would very
soon become acquainted. Germany, even after several years of war
with England, was still strong enough to meet any danger she feared
from the East. The Vistula-San line was actually predestined to
create an even stronger eastern wall than our present West Wall ; from
there it would be possible to advance offensively at any time. I believed,
however, that we were so strong that we did not even need
to go to the trouble of constructing an eastern wall. He must also not
forget that, after the collapse of England, France would fall in line
very quickly. She was today being only artificially goaded on by
England to assume the tasks of her previous history, and for this she
was much too tired already.
* This refers apparently to Rosenberg.
OCTOBER 1939 259
B.d.R. thought he perceived difficulties in Germany in the fact that
the political swing in German policy toward Russia could not be
made comprehensible to the German people. He still recalled how
last year at Nuremberg Bolshevist Russia had been called the seat of
infection that had to be eradicated.
I told him that many of our foes are getting themselves worked
up about this. That was probably because they could not understand
that the German nation had through National Socialism obtained a
new ideology and a new faith. A person who believed, in a way that
was comparable only to belief in a religion, needed no explanation,
but rested in this belief. He must also not forget that the Führer
had not achieved power through the entire German people, but
through a minority, though a fanatical one, which did not even comprise
all party members. This minority had believed in the Führer
and continued to follow and believe in him. Those of them who also
reasoned it out clearly were convinced that we were no longer the
nation of the so-called "Deutsche Michels? who pursued a goal just to
give the opponent every opportunity to set traps for him on the way.
It was first only a matter of finally breaking the power of the rootless
forces which managed the democracies. He must also not forget that
Stalin had now ousted the Jews from all posts. I know from our
negotiators in Moscow that, to their amazement, they found only non-
Jews still acting as negotiations partners while in previous years only
Jews functioned as such. Also he must not forget tliat the German
people had always had great sympathy for the Russian people and
that Christian had therefore been bitterly assailed by many Germans
outside the movement as the exponent of the irreconcilable attitude
toward Soviet Russia.
It was also incomprehensible to me why the British believed they
could conquer us by economic means. In order not to create unnecessary
tension since I spoke very strongly I emphasized the fact that
I was a citizen of Hamburg and therefore believed that I knew
England well also through my trips abroad. I had always known the
Englishman to be a careful calculator, but now I was always reading
that the world with its raw materials was open to England and France
and also that Germany had no gold. Well, what was the actual situation?
! In 1914, Germany's industrial capacity was a third less than
that of England and France combined. Today she was stronger than
the two countries and even without Poland and Moravia in the
ratio of 33 to 37. Germany did not lack even 20 percent of her supplies.
It was also to be taken into account that as of Sepember 1 of
this year the tremendous peacetime projects, construction, etc., were
stopped and that the raw materials needed for them from abroad
therefore no longer needed to be imported. All deliveries to countries
overseas, moreover, were stopping. Germany could therefore
260
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
concentrate on the countries of Europe that were important to her and
within easy reach in making deliveries in payment of raw materials.
Also, Germany's great anxiety about the shortage of labor was relieved
for the same reasons. Surprisingly small forces were needed
for the Army. It had to be remembered that in 1914 we had had
over 3400 kilometers of front, while today we had in the West only
250 kilometers, which, moreover, were so strongly fortified that they
required a correspondingly smaller number of troops. As a result,
ev&a on September 1, when the armies still had to be employed in
Poland, no mobilization had been necessary. He would be able to
convince himself in Germany itself that the best age classes, between
25 and 35, were still entirely civilians in the Reserve.
In the matter of raw materials we were also in a position to start
exporting on a large scale because we had what was worth much
more than gold the raw materials from which the most important
raw materials could be derived, whether it was gasoline, rubber, or
other things. I mentioned coal and our gain through Poland, lumber
in connection with Poland, Finland, and Russia, potatoes as feed.
We were therefore not only in a position to feed our people adequately
for years to come, but would also be able to supply the neutral countries
with the raw materials vital to them, and thereby create a bloc
in Europe that would be able to supply itself adequately. The industrial
capacity of Germany was also very great and the requirements
of the Army, because of the small front, were by no means
comparable to those of the World War, so that as a result, Germany
was already in a position now to concentrate her entire industry on
exports. It was therefore not surprising that now, since the 1st of
September of this year, instead of offering delivery terms up to two
years as heretofore, we could, to the amazement of the neutrals, make
immediate deliveries. Moreover, all the conditions now exist that
will make it possible to develop the Four Year Plan at an entirely
different tempo, since the stoppage of the peace-time construction
projects.
What, on the other hand, is England's situation? England had
to import nearly 70 percent. The pound was not backed by gold.
B. d. R. shared my view on this entirely. Credits, as in the World
War, were also entirely unlikely. England, like Germany, therefore,
had to pay for her imports in counter-deliveries. But the trouble
here was the lack of self-sufficiency and the small industrial capacity
of England. I therefore failed to understand how the sensible
Englishman could think that the blockade of Germany would be
successful, instead of merely considering whether or not the blockade
of Germany with its new weapons would enable England economically
to wage war any longer.
OCTOBER 1939 261
It must therefore become clearer and clearer to the sensible Englishman
that in view of all the difficulties already existing in the way
of the preservation of the British Empire, he was committing suicide
if he risked his whole Empire for the sake of Poland. The distribution
of forces was also so unequal that even for the average Englishman
it must now become clear that this was, indeed, not an English
policy at all, but the policy of the rootless elements which alone
could profit by a war even if the Empire fell in the process. Poland
surely must be a serious warning.
B. d. R. thereupon stated that he could now say frankly that in
England it had only been expected that Poland would resist for three
weeks.
I then stated that the policy of England had thereby become even
more incomprehensible to me. I would like to wish that, for the
sake of the strength of the Aryan race, the English nation at the very
last moment would come to its senses. It had to realize, however,
that it was in Germany's power to decide whether the British Empire
was to be preserved or not and that with the exception of Christian
and the F. she considered it a settled fact that the end of the British
Empire had now come. On the streets of Berlin people were, indeed,
saying that China was falling to Japan, British India to
Russia, Africa to Germany, etc. The only hope, therefore, was
Christian, who from very broad perspectives was advocating the
preservation of the Empire.
B. d. It. stated that he realized this fully and continued, saying that
he expected nothing of Ribbentrop, whose name I had never mentioned.
Meanwhile the telegram had arrived from Fred in London saying
that he considered a talk with leading Germans premature at present.
Although I had stated at the first conversation that if the die had now
been cast, the last word had been spoken, I stated that I naturally
did not wish to assert that it would never again be possible.
B. d. R. therefore gave me the following statement which I should
like to present to Christian :
The British Air Ministry was of the same view as we had discussed
it. It by no means wished to be a party to the present policy of
England of waging the war to the finish. There were too many
British Empire experts in the Ministry not to know the dangers to
the Empire itself. It [the Ministry] was not yet strong enough
today, however, to assert itself. There was no practical value in
convincing Chamberlain alone, since he was dependent upon the exponents
who today wished a war to the finish. But the Air Ministry
believed that it would constantly gain in political power at home.
It was convinced that the war would be decided by the Luftwaffe. It
therefore depended on the Air Ministry to explain to the British
Government that, in view of the losses it had sustained, it no* longer
262
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
found itself in a position of being able to continue the war. But it
was necessary first to await the first clash and the resulting losses.
He hoped that in the interest of the Aryan race, Germany's Luftwaffe
would be so victorious as to create this basis. It was horrible to
think that on both sides it was just the most valuable forces that
would be lost in the process. He thought, however, that it would be
desirable, if the war began now, to review the contact in four to six
weeks. He also asked that contact continue to be maintained. He
wished to remain in Switzerland for the following reason :
Mr. Daniels, the former Times correspondent, whom Christian
knew, had, since September 1 of this year, assumed the post of Press
Attache at the British Legation in Bern, in order in this way to participate
again in politics. Daniels was of the same opinion as we,
even if he could not say so officially. He was, therefore, also of the
opinion that the war was madness for England and had to be ended
in shortest order. Daniels had excellent connections with the Foreign
Office and was now, as Press Attache, also constantly posted as to
present developments.
It was arranged that if B. d. R. considered a new discussion of the
situation expedient, he should write to the previously used address
about "excursions" ["Aus-ftuff&nP']. If Fred wired him, however,
that the Air Ministry now felt strong enough to be justified in hoping
that it would prevail and the conditions were therefore created for
his going to Berlin, he would write about "snow."
As far as he personally was concerned, he was prepared to go to
Berlin at once. But he took the position that he could come only if
he had prospects of success in London.
He also advised that German propaganda should hit England in
her weakest spot. It was, indeed, not so much the question of inconsistency
in England's proclaiming that she wished to raise Poland
up again without declaring war on Russia. The English nation could
be persuaded that Russia Tiad taken only non-Polish territory. England,
however, now declared as her war aim the destruction of the
regime in Germany. If England attained this goal, however, it would
be necessary to ask the Englishman whether, then, it was Kaiser Wilhelm
II or Bruning who would return? This thought was totally
absurd. The successor could only be Bolshevism. If Germany became
Bolshevist, however, so would, in short order, Europe and the
whole of England. Therefore even if the war aim were completely
achieved at tremendous sacrifice on the part of England, she would
only accomplish her own downfall.
I took cognizance of this without mentioning that probably out of
consideration, for Russia we could not employ such propaganda at all.
In conclusion, B. d. R. told me the following :
You may be right, indeed, in saying that this war of the rootless
OCTOBER 1939 263
elements against Germany is in reality not at all a war between
English and German interests. I too believe now that the question
is still only whether or not the British Empire can be preserved in the
interest of the Aryan race.
No. 236
229O/48338S
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECBET ROME, October 10, 1939.
No. 664 Sent October 11 12 : 20 a. m.
Also for the High OcKoanmnd of the Wehrmacht.
Today I had a look into the secret survey of Italy's reserves of
liquid fuels5 which is accessible only to the Ministers concerned and the
military chiefs. The total stocks including residues amounted to
930,000 metric tons on October 8. Of this 25,000 tons is aviation gasoline,
119,000 tons is automobile gasoline, and 260,000 tons is heavy oil
for Diesel engines. The Navy is not included in the figures ; it has its
own stocks, and according to trustworthy assurances by a member of
the Government has sufficient supplies for a year. However, the supply
of the Army from the above-mentioned stocks is assured for a
month at the most, in the opinion of experts.
CLODIUS
No. 237
84/24105>-06
The Embassy in the Soviet Union, to tJie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 09 of October 11 Moscow, October 11, 1939 5 : 31 p. m.
Received October 11 11 : 10 p. m.
The following is a comprehensive report on the negotiations so far
and on the current situation :
*
x ln telegram No. 498 of Oct. 4 (1369/357067-68), Ribbentrop instructed
Schulenburg to inform Molotov of Ms decision to send Ambassador Ritter to be
present with Schnurre at the opening of the economic negotiations. Schulenburg
was also instructed to notify Molotov of the German desire for prompt agreement
on an immediate program to last about 6 months.
An economic delegation headed by Hitter and Schnurre arrived in Moscow
on Oct. 7. A list of Oct. 17 showed it to include 37 members, representing the
Foreign Ministry, the Ministries of Transport, Food, and Economics, the Reichsbahn,
the Chief of Transportation for the Wehrmacht, the Hamburg America
Line, the Reichsgruppe Industrie, I. G. Farben, the Benzolverband, the Otto
Wolff firm, the Reich Grain Office, the Deutsche Werft at Hamburg, the
Ruhrchemie, the Gutehoffnung iron works, the Stahlunion-Export, the Flachshandel,
the Theodor Thorer firm, and the Wotirag Company (1369/357054).
264
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1. We submitted our proposals in general form and with, more em*
Shasis
on the political aspect to Molotov Sunday night, and in all
etail to Mikoyan, on Monday night. Mikoyan gave us a tentative
and partial reply Tuesday night.
2 The over-all impression left by
this initial response is that the other side is willing on the whole to
make a serious effort to meet our proposals, but their attitude with
respect to the total volume is not yet satisfactory.
2. As regards the listed metals and the rubber, the other side is
prepared to buy the specified quantities for us abroad. Preliminary
instructions concerning the purchases and the chartering of the required
cargo space in Japanese, American, and Dutch vessels have
already gone out. The other side is to be told that purchases from
America should be shipped via Murmansk. They believe that some
caution must be exercised here. The payment for the purchases
abroad, however, will necessitate sharp discussions*
3. As regards the purchases of raw materials and foods in Russia
proper, during the first phase of the agreement the other side wants
to maintain the level of maximum Russian deliveries in the past, but
has intimated that the question of larger deliveries in a subsequent
phase is open. The other side explains this on the grounds that they
want to avoid promises they are not absolutely sure at present they will
be able to keep. We havelndicated that the past maximum is insufficient
and have reserved the right to maintain our proposals in further
discussions of separate points.
4:. As regards particular points, the tentative reply shows that we
can probably count on approximate fulfillment of our demands for
feed grains. With respect to the delivery of Russian ores, the other
side wants to study their own requirements before making any statement
regarding our proposals. Platinum will be delivered in the full
quantity requested. No statement has yet been made regarding our
proposals for German compensatory deliveries. There seems to be
interest in the hydrogenation plant.
5. Concerning transit shipments from Iran, Afghanistan, and the
Far East, all necessary instructions have already been issued to the
competent local Russian agencies that the quantities specified by us
must be forwarded without delay. The other side has again stressed
that this transit is being permitted only as an exception and only to
Germany. Therefore please bring this to the attention of the interested
German firms once more and [have them] desist from further
circular letters regarding transit. Our first inquiries indicate that the
shipment of soybeans on the trans-Siberian railroad will cause no particular
difficulties.8
3 Detailed memoranda of these conversations have not been found.
"According to a memorandum of Oct. 31, the German delegation in Moscow
sought at first to arrange for a margarine factory in Manchuria in order to
reduce freight charges by shipping only the finished product, but gave up this
project when it appeared that satisfactory freight rates on soybeans could be
obtained (1369/357015-16). In an exchange of letters between Schnurre and
Mikoyan on Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1939 (1369/356980-81), the Soviet Government
agreed to grant until Dec. 1, 1940, a 50 percent reduction in freight rates on
all soybean shipments from the Far East.
OCTOBER 1939 265
6. The connecting railroad Rumania Cernau^i
Rumdnien Czernowitz] will not be converted to a different gauge for
the time being.
4
7. The experts who have arrived here have been put in touch with
the competent Russian authorities for commercial negotiations.
8. A separate telegraphic report concerning several secret points
will follow.6
RlTTBR
SCHULBNBURG
4 On Oct. 3, Clodius had noted the following : "The Foreign Minister requests
that care be taken in the negotiations at Moscow to insure that the tracks of
the railway line to Rumania via Lw6w are not changed over to the Russian
gauge." (1369/357058)
* Not found.
No. 238
73/52085-86
The Minister in Hwigary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 421 of October 11 BUDAPEST, October 11, 1939 6 : 25 p. m.
Keceived October 11 11 : 10 p. m.
The Foreign Minister told me confidentially that the inner Cabinet
Council, composed of the Regent, the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, and the
Chief of the General Staff, had decided to fortify the Hungarian
frontier against Russia and Rumania by three lines [of fortifications],
the third to run along the Tisza River. For political reasons the
fortifications were to be built as covertly as possible and they were a
defensive measure against the Russians. The frontier with Rumania
was to be fortified in order to conceal the true purpose and also [to
guard] against the eventuality that the Russians might overrun Rumania
and then attack Hungary from the East.
At this session of the Cabinet Council the Regent had gravely
emphasized that Hungary had the greatest interest in an early German
victory, which would avert chaos.
The Foreign Minister asked me to point out to the Reich Foreign
Minister that he had kept the promise given to him to bring about a
detente in Hungarian-Rumanian relations.1 The Hungarian Minister
to Berlin being ill, Csdky repeats herewith once more the request of
the Chief of the General Staff 2 regarding the release of German arms
shipments to Hungary.
1 See document No. 30.
* General Henrik Werth.
266
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Minister further requests that the Polish soldiers and
civilians interned here, at least the women and children, be taken over
as soon as possible, in so far as their homes are in the German sphere
of interest. Such removal of propagandists injurious to us is also in
our interest (cf. dispatch No. 1404 of October 7) .
3
The Hungarian Minister to Moscow would present the same request
with reference to Poles from the Russian sphere of interest.
The Foreign Minister added that the Hungarian Minister in Moscow
would shortly propose the conclusion of a good-neighbor agreement
between the Soviet Union and Hungary for the purpose of
regulating border traffic and similar questions. So far the Soviet
Union had not requested the agrement for the Minister to Budapest
ERDMANNSDOBFF
8 Not found.
No. 239
406/214504
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST UKGENT Moscow, October 11, 1939 6 : 43 p. m.
TOP SECRET Keceived October 11 11 : 20 p. m.
No. 510 of October 11
For the Foreign Minister personally.
Potemkin told me today that he was instructed to express to me
the astonishment of Stalin and Molotov at the fact that we were evidently
promoting a panicky emigration of the Germans from Latvia
and Estonia. Such a "flight" by the Germans would of necessity
seriously compromise the action of the Soviet Government. There
was no occasion for precipitating the matter, since the Germans were
threatened neither economically nor in any other way.
Potemkin asked me to communicate this to my Government at once.1
SCHUUENBUKG
'In a further telegram of Oct. 13, Sehulenburg reported: "Potemkin has
just approached me again with the urgent instruction to tell me that the concern
of the Soviet Government because of the evacuation of the Germans from Latvia
and Estonia is becoming ever greater ; in the harbor of Riga there are at least
ten German ships, German schools are being closed, German physicians are leaving
in droves, etc. Potemkin reminded me of his demarche of the day before
yesterday, and requested me to learn the attitude of the Reich Government."
(406/214509)
OCTOBER 1939 267
No. 240
1850/422691-92
The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
TJBGENT BEKLTN-, October 11, 1939.
Sent October 12 6 : 15 a. m.
No. 330 zu Pol. VI 2322.1
For the Minister personally.
With reference to your telegrams 284, 285, 286, 287.2
1. We have no indications that the Soviet Union will make demands
on Finland that would necessarily result in military complications.
We are therefore of the opinion that it is first necessary to wait and
see what demands Moscow will make. The suggestion made in Helsinki
that we bring influence to bear on the Russian Government to
keep it from going beyond a demand on Finland for islands, cannot,
therefore be followed.
2. We request that you avoid, as in the past, any commitments
such as would be involved in a reply to the question put by the Finnish
Foreign Minister regarding our attitude toward Sweden. You
are therefore requested not to return to the matter of your own accord ;
if the Foreign Minister should speak to you about the matter again,
please confine yourself to pointing out that we do not consider that
any basis for such a question exists.
3. For your information : As you know, our obligations under the
Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union preclude any kind of
support of a third power in the event that the Soviet Union should
become the object of military action on the part of this power. If
we should now make a declaration such as desired with respect to
Sweden it would amount to a stiffening of Finnish and Swedish
resistance against the Soviet Union, which would disturb German-
Soviet relations.
"W EJIZSACKER
1 Pol. VI 2322: 8485/596831.
'Documents Nos. 226, 227, 228, and 2&0.
260090 54 23
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 241
B18/B003097
Memorandum* ly an Official of the Foreign Minister^ Secretariat
, October 11, 1939.
The Foreign Minister has agreed to the evacuation of Reichsdeutche
and Volksdeutsche from Finland, in so far as they themselves wish it.
1
Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.
SCHMIDT
*A telephone message from the Legation in Finland at 4:30 p. m., Oct. 11,
summarized in a memorandum of that date by Hiigel of Political Division VI
(B18/B003092-93), stated that the situation in Finland had suddenly hecome
much more tense. Evacuation of Swedish nationals had begun ; the Finnish
Government intended to leave Helsinki ; and there was danger of attack upon
Oerman nationals by Finnish Communists. Bliicher therefore requested instructions
as to possible evacuation of Germans from Finland should this be necessary.
No. 242
463/225930-ai
Memorandum, of the Foreign Ministry'1
1. On October 3 the Spanish Ambassador expressed the willingness
of the Spanish Government to offer its good offices as mediator.2 The
Spanish Foreign Minister announced to our Ambassador on October 10
that the Spanish Government is completely and entirely at our disposal
in respect to the peace question.
3
2. The Italian Ambassador stated again on October 9 that Eome
would certainly be glad to act if we so desired.*
3. The Dutch Minister in Ankara told Herr von Papen as early as
October 1 that his Government was prepared to mediate in case an
official request to that effect was put forward. In that event the
Queen of the Netherlands would act jointly with the King of tha
Belgians.
5
1 At the top of this unsigned and undated document Siegfried added, in handwriting,
the title "Offers of mediation by neutrals, as of October 11, 1939." la
the margin WeizsUcker wrote "Attolico" opposite paragraph (2), "Zech" opposite
"our Minister" in (3), and "Andresen" opposite (4) .
* See document No. 186.
'Not printed (463/225919). 4 See document No. 222.
Papen telegraphed on Oct. 1 (463/22578T) that the Netherlands Minister, Dr.
Philips C. Visser, had asked him to inform Ribbentrop "that it was psychologically
of the greatest importance to make a peace offer through a third party,
but that the Führer ought to avoid for the time being a declaration, having
the character of finality, in the Reichsta*." Later on the same day Papen sent
another telegram (463/225788) saying that Visser had just visited him again to
announce that he had now received more detailed instructions: "His Govern
OCTOBER 1939 269
On October 7 the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested to our Minister
B that a skillful person be sent as mediator (preferably an Italian) ;
it is of decisive importance, he believes, that something in this direction
be done as quickly as possible. The Dutch Foreign Minister told
Professor Bruns at about the same time that the Netherlands Government
would at any time be glad to render services in initiation of
negotiations.
7
4. According to confidential information from Oslo on October 6
the King of Norway would be interested in having his good offices
employed as mediator.8
5. The former President of Finland, Svinhufvud, has told our
Minister in Helsinki that he is working for a peace appeal by the
Northern states, and that he believes the King of Sweden would be
most suited to head such an effort.9 According to the report from
Oslo referred to under [paragraph] 4, such a disposition to act as
mediator apparently exists in Sweden, too.
6. It appears that still more feelers are being put out by way of
Sweden, the details of which are not known to the Foreign Ministry.
ment was willing to mediate in case an official wish was expressed. In this
circumstance the Queen would act in conjunction with the King: of the Belgians.
The Minister added that he would certainly not have received this instruction
if his Government had not first made soundings to see if England were
prepared to negotiate/' In a telegram of Oct. 3 (463/225827), Papen reported
another conversation with Visser on the same subject. Visser said he had had
comprehensive talks with the British Ambassador concerning the Dutch peace
demarche. Knatchbull-Hugessen had told him "that, since British public opinion
would regard any peace offers publicly proposed by us [the Germans] as a capitulation
and would reject them, only a confidential diplomatic demarche by way
of a third power could lead to success. For tactical reasons the first offer should
be put in general terms without details, so that concessions which Germany
was. prepared to make could be used psychologically for the influencing of public
opinion." The British Ambassador said that he was in touch with London on
these questions.
e Document No. 210.
T Viktor Bruns, director of the Institute of Public Law of Foreign Countries
and International Law in the University of Berlin. No report of this conversation
has been found.
8 In a letter of Oct. 6 to Weizsacker, Joh. H. Andresen, former leader of
the Conservative party in Norway, asked whether Germany would be interested
in a peace effort by Norway and Sweden, either from "the highest quarters" or
more privately (2165/470553-55). Weizsacker replied on Oct. 12 that the possibility
of making use of the good offices of third parties was being given "due
consideration" by Berlin (2165/470556-57).
Further details concerning efforts by Andresen and other influential Norwegians
to make an effective peace move at this time are given in reports which
Ulrich Noack, a German historian attached to the Legation in Oslo, sent to the
Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry (2973/579502-05, 579508-11).
Noack has published extracts from these reports and other material as well in
his book, Nonoeffen gwtechen Friedensvermittlung und Fremdhvrr&ehaft (Krefeld,
1952).
1 * No report on this conversation has been found.
270
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
7. It is said that the TJ. S. citizen, Davis, in connection with the
Four Year Plan, is striving for the United States to act as mediator.10
10 William Rhodes Davis, a businessman with long experience of dealing with
German government agencies regarding the sale of Mexican oil, had a meeting
with President Roosevelt on Sept. 15. He informed the President that he had received
word from an associate with access to Goring that the latter heped Roosevelt
would use his influence to see if a mediated peace might be achieved.
Davis had been asked to come to Rome for talks with high German officials
and he proposed to- do so. Roosevelt replied that he would be interested to hear
what information Davis might bring back, but that he could take no position
unless a proposal for mediation came through official channels.
According to Davis's own account, he saw Goring in Germany on Oct. 1, 2,
and 3. He then returned to the United States and wrote two lengthy reports,
dated Oct. 11 and 12, to President Roosevelt. His request to be received at the
White House was denied but he was received on Oct. 12 by Assistant Secretary
of State A. A. Berle, and Pierrepont MofEat, a high official of the Department
of State. In his report to the President, Davis said he had been informed that
his talks with GSring would be kept secret from the Foreign Ministry, but that
Hitler and Rosenberg knew of them (Department of State, File No. 800.20211
Davis, William Rhodes). No records of the GSring-Davis conversations have
been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry.
No. 243
3S2/202T88-91
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Mvrdstry
A 1420 BRUSSELS, October 11, 1939.
Pol. II 4039.
Subject : The political situation and mood in Belgium.
With, reference to our telegrams Nos. 253 of October 5 and 270
of October 8.1
The shifting of the main weight of the Belgian home defense to the
northern and eastern frontiers of the country, on which a number of
reports have already been made, inevitably brings up the question
whether a change in the political attitude of the Belgian Government
has set in. After a careful examination of the situation, I believe
that I can without reservation answer this question in the negative.
From the current reports of the Embassy, it is well known that the
Belgian Government, from its own conviction of the necessity and
expediency of maintaining peace for the country and strengthened by
the wish of the King, has adhered to the straight line of the neutrality
policy since the outbreak of the war. Although from the German
point of view the attitude of public opinion and the sentiment of the
people have been quite unsatisfactory, and although there have occasionally
been deviations by individuals such as the telegram of
Max, the Mayor of Brussels, to the Mayor of Paris or the volunteering
of the 76-year-old Socialist Deputy, Hubin, for service in the French
Army there has never been any reason seriously to doubt the sLa-
1 Neither printed (141/127296 and 141/127300-O1).
OCTOBER 1939 271
cerity of the Government policy and the people's love of peace. Nor
has there so far been any change in this respect. The statement by
Pierlot 2 to the Belgian journalists, which I am enclosing herewith,
confirms this. Although the part that deals with foreign policy is
only a paraphrasing of well-known arguments, it is, as all previous
statements, completely directed toward the continuation of the neutrality
policy. All other official and semi-official statements are along
the same line. But all reports from other sources as well corroborate
the view that it is the desire of the Government to keep otit of the
conflict and maintain neutrality even in the face of great economic
sacrifices.
The shifting of the Belgian troops cannot, therefore, be regarded as
an indication of a change in the political attitude of Belgium. It
does, of course, signify a change in the appraisal of the general political
situation by the Belgian Government. In the opinion of Government
circles here the conclusion of the Polish campaign represents a
break in the course of the war that is important also for the attitude
of the belligerents toward the neutral region of the Low Countries.
At the outbreak of the war it was thought here that the French and
British Armies might still march through Belgium and possibly Holland,
since France and England would have to try to bring effective
help to their Polish ally, and in order to do so would, in view of the
impregnability of the Siegfried position, have to consider the roundabout
way via Belgium and Holland. This danger was, however,
never taken very seriously here, since it did not seem credible that
France, in view of her moral standing and political wisdom, would
break her solemn promise. Since Poland has been defeated and there
is no longer any Polish Army, it is believed that also France and
England no longer have any reason for an offensive operation, especially
since they believe they can win the war with the blockade. On
the other hand, however, Germany's interest in the possession of
Belgium and Holland is said to have increased enormously, since such
possession would furnish a base for fighting England and make it
possible to outflank the Maginot Line. This view is also reinforced
by the conviction, spread in Belgium under the influence of British
propaganda, that Germany will not be able to withstand the blockade
very long and will have to try to break it by a powerful offensive
tlirust against the Western Powers. Finally, the prevalent distrust
of Germany in Belgian public opinion is also an important factor.
The memories of the last war have not yet been forgotten here. Tinder
the influence of all these factors the view has developed here during
1 Hubert Pierlot, Premier of Belgium.
In Pierlot's statement to the press on Oct. 7, he expressed the belief that
Belgium could remain neutral, but was taking every precaution by foreseeing
the worst. See the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1939, p. 38.
272
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the last fortnight that Belgium is much more seriously threatened
on the north and east than on the south.
In the public opinion of the country this changed appraisal of the
situation has so far found only a weak and infrequent expression. All
official statements, too, scrupulously avoid showing any partiality or
even expressing the idea that a threat to Belgium is seen as coming
only from the German side. Actually, the fear of Germany is very
widespread, however, and extensive circles believe that the events of
1914 might be repeated.
The two ways in which Belgian neutrality might be violated by
England and France or by Germany would find the Belgian people
in very different moods and states of psychological preparedness for
war. An attack by the Anglo-French side, which no one here expects
any more, would be regarded by the people as a very deplorable and
tragic event. An attempt would probably be made to resist such
an incursion with military force, but presumably it would be very
feeble and inadequate, while an invasion by Germany would encounter
the highest degree of psychological preparedness for defense on the
part of the whole Belgian people both Walloons and Flemings. The
few friends whom we have here in this country, especially among the
Flemish nationalists, would in such a case break with us in indignant
disillusionment and join ranks with all the others. Hence, as uncertain
and hesitant as a Belgian military front against France and
England would be with respect to sentiment and morale, so united
would it be vis-k-vis Germany. The violation of a most solemn assurance
given at the beginning of the war that the neutrality of Belgium
would be respected would cause a passionate hatred to break out
and make the entire nation march unitedly against the old enemy of
the .World War.
VOX Bt7lX3W-SCHWrANTB
No. 244
58&/24222,7}-29
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BOMB, October 12, 1939 12 : 50 a. m.
TOP SECRET Received October 12 10 : 50 a. m.
No. 675 of October 11
Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform
me by instruction of the Duce, as he repeatedly emphasized of an
incident which, though not the only one of its kind, was the worst,
and was characterized as such by the Duce when he saw the police
report submitted to him; it cast a glaring light on the overheated
OCTOBER 1939 273
atmosphere in the Alto Adige. According to this report unknown
Germans, who had escaped in the darkness, attacked two unarmed
Italian soldiers yesterday evening and beat one of them half to death,
while the second, less seriously wounded, had been able to get away.
If one also considered the many cases in which volksdeutsch soldiers
on active service had secretly left their troop units an offense punishable
by death in the present state of mobilization, but which the Government
had been very lenient about the whole picture of the situation
appeared so threatening that the Duce was requesting the Führer
to give orders as quickly as possible that all of the controversial questions
be swept aside and the negotiations here on the emigration be
brought to a close, in order to end a state of affairs in which the
Volksdeutsche considered themselves as no longer subject to the Italian
laws and not yet under those of Germany, and thus committed excesses
which became more dangerous by the day especially since the rumor
was being spread among the population that the political situation
might change any day to such an extent that the whole repatriation
action would be nullified. To my objection that quite to the contrary
we had xip to now observed a really exemplary discipline among the
Volksdeutsche,1 Count Ciano replied by referring to the reports to the
contrary lying before him. One only had to imagine what the effect
would be abroad, and also on the mood in Italy, if it should even come
to an open shooting fray some day. Furthermore, the removal of
100,000 Volksdeutsche from Latvia, which had been accomplished
within a few days, had proved, after all, how quickly such a movement
could be carried through. Count Ciano did not reply to my very
pointed reference to the fact that he could hardly consider the two
actions parallel; he even reverted to this argument toward the end
of the conversation. Surely, he said, we would not push into the foreground
questions of the transfer rate, regarding which an agreement
had already been reached for the first billion, or the carrying away
of household effects "down to the doorknobs," thereby making an
agreement impossible. It was also impossible to postpone the date of
registration beyond June 1940 2 without delaying implementation ad
infinitum. He therefore wished to request most urgently that the
German Foreign Minister, acting out of political considerations, issue
the necessary instructions for a quick settlement of the question, which
*In a telegram of Oct. 6 to the Landesgruppenleiter in Italy (119/119183),
State Secretary Bohle, Head of the Auslandsorganisation, had ordered a ban on
all public activities of Party groups and German nationals in South Tirol.
Ortsgruppen were to limit themselves to business meetings without speeches.
a In telegram No. 652 of Oct. 8 (591/244759-60) -Clodius had referred to June
30, 1940, as a suitable date for the completion of registration. The Foreign
Ministry reply, telegram No. 721 of Oct. 9 (591/24476a) stated that, in its view,
registration could not be completed before Dec. 31, 1940.
274
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
was in the mutual interest a request which the Duce was also directing
to the Führer. Ciano indicated that he would also instruct
Bocchini 8 to use his influence in the same sense vis-it-vis the EeichsFührer-
SS, who is staying with him as his guest.
4
In agreement with Clodius I am of the opinion that, quite apart from
our own interest in quickly winding up the negotiations, we should
point out to the Italians in answering the Duce's request that in carrying
through this action, which involves very great sacrifices on our
part, we believe we can expect from them very generous treatment of
the separate questions.
MACKEN'SEN
Arturo Bocchini was chief of the Italian police. Following complaints by
Bocchini to Himmler that German authorities were obstructing the removal
of the German minority from the South Tirol, the two met at Tremezzo on
Lake Oomo, Oct. 11-13, 1989, to review the basic agreement of June 23, 1939.
It was agreed a) that the purpose of the original agreement had been "a lasting
and fundamental ethnic solution," 6 ) that under simplified procedures the closing
date for opting would be Dec. 31, 1939, c) that the Italians would desist from
political arrests in the area, d) that no propaganda for or against resettlement
was to be allowed, and e) that both sides would in future "really cooperate in
a cordial, open, and comradely manner." This summary is based on a long
memorandum of Dec. 12, 1939, by Bene, German Consul General at Milan; not
printed (F7/0507-0481 ; Fl/0247-0254). 4 On Oct. 11, the Italian Embassy in Berlin presented a note to the Poreign
Ministry on the same subject (4537/B144318). It stated in part: "Minister
Clodius is making difficulties in Home which are greatly delaying execution of
the agreement, while it is absolutely necessary to hasten a decision. A very
serious psychological condition has developed in the Alto Adige: the Tirol
Germans believe that they are beyond the reach of Italian sovereignty ; naturally
this cannot be tolerated. . . . The friendly attention of the German Government
is therefore drawn to a situation in the Alto Adige which will admit of no
further delays, and which can give rise to serious incidents."
No. 245
8333/E5I8&83&-40
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign, Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT EOME, October 12, 1939 12 : 05 p. m.
TOP SECRET Received October 12 1 : 50 p. m.
No. 677 of October 12 Pol. 2244 g.
In yesterday's conversation Count Ciano voiced his opinion on the
general situation to the effect that he scarcely believed in a peaceful
solution any more, while the Duce still believed in certain possibilities,
without, to be sure, having any basis for this other than his own
feeling.
Ciano had carried away from Berlin the strongest possible impression
as the result of the assurance and strong determination with which
the Führer had spoken to him about the course of events. Circles
here had already been very deeply impressed in this respect at Salz
OCTOBEB 1939 275
burg.
1 The impressions of those days, however, had been considerably
surpassed. As I knew, he was of a rather critical nature, but he could
not rid himself of this impression and emphasized it in all his conversations,
even with the French and British Ambassadors, both of whom,
by the way, held very moderate views. He had also spoken to them
emphatically of the military strength of the Reich as the Führer had
described it to him at length and in detail in the course of the conversation.
He could not remember ever having heard so clear and precise
an exposition during the many years in which he had listened to
situation reports by high military persons. On the basis of this he
had told the Ambassadors that the Führer, in his opinion, by no means
rejected a peaceful settlement; if this could not be achieved, however,
he would strike with tremendous violence, and it appeared rather
doubtful to Ciano whether any opponent would be able to cope with it.
He had also told the Ambassadors that he believed that the Fuhrer's
Reichstag speech was actually his last word. If this word failed to
evoke sufficient response, for which the Führer would wait for a limited
period of time, he would seek a solution by other means ; and he would
find it with the same certainty with which he had found it in the
Polish question, in which his predictions had been borne out accurately
and almost to the day.
Ciano told me in addition that he assumed there would be another
conference before the final decision, perhaps patterned after the last
Berlin meeting or perhaps in the form of a meeting between the Führer
and the Duce.
He did not expect Daladier's speech of the day before yesterday z to
have any influence on the development of the situation.
MACKENSEN
1 This is a reference to Ciano's talks with Hitler on Aug. 12-13, 1939, See
vol. vn, documents Nos. 43 and 47.
* The text of Daladier's broadcast to the nation on Oct. 10 in reply to Hitler's
speech of Oct. 6 is given in International Conciliation, No. 354 (New York, November
1939), pp. 525-528.
No. 246
4.631/225953-54
Circular of the Acting Director of the Press Department
Telegram en clair
BERLIN, October 12, 1939.
e. o. P. 13526.
Chamberlain's speech 1 is an outrageous affront to Germany. With
incredibly scurrilous insults to the German Reich and its policy,
a On Oct. 12, Prime Minister Chamberlain replied in the House of Commons
to the German proposals contained in Hitler's speech of Oct. 6 (see Editors' Note,
p. 227). For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see Par. Deb., 5th ser. H of C, vol.
352, 563-568.
276
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Chamberlain rejected in his speech the hand of peace held out to him
by the Führer. It is obvious that Chamberlain did not wish to understand
the Führer's generous action and the proposals inspired by his
sense of responsibility. Whereas Germany desires peace and the
Führer makes constructive proposals for the establishment of a peaceful
and secure Europe, Chamberlain and his clique have chosen war.
In his speech he did not plead the case of the people but that of a small
clique which makes war its business. This afternoon Chamberlain
thrust aside the hand of peace offered by Germany, not only before
the House of Commons but before the entire world, and thus gave his
reply to the appeal which the Führer directed to all nations in his
speech of October 6 when he said: "May those peoples and their
leaders who are of the same mind make now their reply, and let those
who consider war to be the best solution reject my outstretched hand."
Chamberlain and his henchmen have made their choice in favor of the
latter. After this speech by the English Prime Minister the German
people can no longer entertain any doubt that no matter what we do,
no matter what we say, and no matter what offer we make, Chamberlain
and Britain's warmongers, under the cloak of hypocritical
phrases, are bent on exterminating the German nation.
Chamberlain's speech reveals the true meaning of the English war
aim, and it is : war to annihilation against the German people and
the German Reich. The English Prime Minister's speech is founded
on lies and culminates in the lie. And while he accuses German
policy of breaking its word he forgets that the world knows that
England's world empire is built on nothing but force and the broken
word.2 England wanted the war. The English Prime Minister even
asserts that Germany has rejected all attempts at restoring peace in
the recent past. He asserts for instance, contrary to his better knowledge,
that Germany declined Mussolini's mediation proposal; but it
is an established fact that Mussolini's generous mediation effort was
wrecked by England after it had already been accepted by France,
and that as a result the French people were driven into the most senseless
war of all time. After Chamberlain's speech the German people
know what their enemies are after. The experience of Versailles has
taught the German people what England's will to annihilate can bring
to pass, and they therefore know the road they must take in. order
to frustrate this determination of their enemies.
DR. SCHMIDT
The German text originally read "Luytf' but was changed to "Wortbruch."
OCTOBER 1939 277
No. 247
495/223342
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, October 12, 1939.
St.S. No. 800
The Bulgarian Minister, supplementing his recent conversation with
the Foreign Minister, informed me today of the following:
The suggestions recently made by Molotov to the Bulgarian Government
concerning a Eusso-Bulgarian agreement were not clear at first.
Later it became evident that Molotov was thinking of a Eusso-Bulgarian
mutual assistance pact in the event of an attack by a third power.
This suggestion was rejected in Sofia.
To my question why Bulgaria had not accepted it, Draganov offered
as his own conjecture the following : Up to now Bulgaria had never
concluded any treaty of alliance of this kind, not even with Germany,
with which she had close ties of long standing. Probably his Government
did not, for this reason, wish to depart from this principle,
nor, above all, conclude a mutual assistance pact with Kussia first.
Draganov then went on to say that the Bulgarian Government had
made the following counterproposal : Bulgaria was ready to conclude
a treaty of nonaggression or friendship with Kussia if Moscow would
present concrete proposals of this kind. A reply to this has not as
yet reached Sofia.
I thanked the Minister for his information and promised to transmit
it to the Foreign Minister.
WEIZSAOKER
No. 248
F2/0848-45
The Commander in Chief of the Na/&y to the Foreign Minister
TOP SECRET MIUTARY BBRUtf, October 12, 1939.
B. No. 1 Ski. I c 86 g.Kdos EM 48 g Es.
Mr DEAR MINISTER : With reference to my recent oral statements, I
am presenting in the following the wishes of the naval warfare people
regarding Eussian assistance. I shall proceed at this time on the assumption
that the Eussian neutrality though interpreted generously
in our favor will remain in force in relation to the Western Powers.
278
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
If in this connection new developments favorable to us should occur,
it would then become necessary to frame new plans for cooperation.
The naval warfare people seek the following objectives:
I. Improving the conditions for naval warfare ~by submarines and surface
forces in foreign waters.
It would greatly facilitate operations by surface forces and sabmarines
in foreign waters if Russia were to place at our disposal
suitable ports, such as Murmansk and Vladivostok, as supply and repair
bases.
The use of these ports is desired for the following purposes :
1. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuels, provisions)
for cruisers and submarines with a view to extending their endurance
at sea. The supplying of German naval units could be effected
in the following manner:
a} Russian naval escort for the supply ships to areas where
cruisers or submarines would receive them, (More strain on
Russian neutrality.)
"b ) Sailing of unescorted supply ships under prearranged orders
in such way that they would Be nominally seized by cruisers or
submarines and subsequently released after delivery of fuel and
provisions. (Less strain on Russian neutrality.)
c) Meeting at prearranged locations of German tenders for replenishing
their supplies.
2. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with fuels
and provisions in ports directly. Ammunition and other supplies
would be shipped from Germany. This would relieve the German
naval units of the necessity of breaking through the mined and
guarded zone at the outlets from home waters each time in and out.
3. Reconditioning of the machinery of cruisers and submarines in
ports in northern Russia and the Far East, using Russian shipyards.
For periods of several weeks. Transfer of additional specialists
from Germany would be arranged.
4. Refitting of German steamships as auxiliary cruisers and their
outfitting for commerce raiding.
5. Protection of the outlying sea areas of the ports in question
against the activity of enemy naval forces and submarines.
6. Continous transmission of information from the Russian intelligence
organizations on the naval forces and merchant traffic of the
enemy.
II. Other possibilities for facilitating the conduct of German, naval
operations:
1. The provision of an escort service for German supply transports
along the Norwegian coast, which in certain cases might have
to fly the Russian flag, could eventually contribute greatly toward
easing the tasks of German naval warfare.
2. Cessation of all direct and indirect Russian deliveries to the
enemy countries.
OCTOBER 1939 279
I regard it as very important to secure the maximum cooperation
of the Russian Government so as to improve the Navy's opportunities
for sea warfare most effectively. I request that clarification in
principle of the points mentioned be secured through diplomatic channels
as soon as possible. Particularly urgent, to my mind, is clarification
of points I (2) and (3) (Outfitting and reconditioning of naval
units in Russian ports) . Once an agreement in principle has been
reached, the technical details could be agreed upon by the two Navies
through attache channels.
Heil Hitler I
RAEDER
Grand Admiral
[EDITORS' NOTE. State Secretary von Weizsacker at his trial at
Nuremberg stated that on October 12, 1939, he submitted to the Foreign
Minister a memorandum entitled "Military-Political Action after
the Failure of the Present Peace Action." This memorandum advised
against intensification of the war in the West and particularly against
an offensive through Belgium. Weizsacker submitted in evidence at
Nuremberg a typewritten draft of the memorandum which he had
kept and this appears in translation in Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
Nuernberg, October 191$-April 1949, volume XII, pages 1203-1205, as
Weizsacker Document 370, Weizsacker Defense Exhibit 122. The document
has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Weizsacker
stated that Ribbentrop summarily rejected his suggestions on
this occasion.]
No. 249
58a/242236
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, October 13, 1939 12 : 00 noon.
TOP SECRET Received October 13 1 : 40 p. m.
No. 681 of October 13
With reference to last night's telephone instructions to me from the
Foreign Minister,1
As instructed, I informed Count Ciano this morning, emphasizing
that the Foreign Minister was particularly anxious to have the Italians,
also clearly and unequivocally brand as an untruth the lie repeated in
*No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
280
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Chamberlain's speech to the effect that the Führer had rejected Mussolini's
offer of mediation.2 Count Ciano showed full
understanding
for my statements and promised me that he would immediately contact
the Duce and Alfieri to convey our wishes. I told him that at
the same moment Press Counselor Mollier was at the Ministry of
Culture discussing details of the treatment of Chamberlain's speech
in the press, in response to a suggestion made by Alfieri yesterday.
Ciano remarked with regard to the general situation that developmentshad
proved his predictions to be correct. From what the Führer
and the Foreign Minister had told him in Berlin, he was expecting
massive attacks by air and sea to be unleashed against England and
France in the immediate future, including unrestricted submarine
warfare.
MACKENSEN
* See document No. 246.
No. 250
861/2044012
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the
Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 545 of October 12 BERLIN, October 13, 19396 : 15 p. m.
Received October 13 11 : 40 p. m.
The Embassy in Ankara has telegraphed
1 that the conclusion of a
Turkish-Russian assistance pact defining joint interests in the Black
Sea, in the Balkans, and in the Straits may be anticipated any day now.
The Dardanelles would be closed to foreign warships and the Turkish
pact with the Western Powers probably would include the reservation
that Turkey would remain neutral in the event of a conflict between
the Western Powers and the Soviet Union unless she were attacked
herself by a third power.
2
WOERMANN
1 Ankara telegram No. 378 of Oct. 11 (96/108054^55) .
In telegram No. 534 of Oct. 14, Schulenburg reported :
"Molotov told me today that he knew nothing of the details about the Turkish-
Russian negotiations communicated in your telegram. No. 545 (Pol. II 4016) of
October 12. The negotiations were still in the same phase. The Soviet Government
had made it unequivocally plain to Saracoglu that Germany's interests
absolutely had to be safeguarded, and that the well-known clause in favor of
Germany would have to be inserted in any assistance pact that might toe concluded.
Turkey did not seem to like the idea, but had not yet made a decision,"
OCTOBER 1939 281
No. 251
Ul/1273071
The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BRUSSELS, October 13, 1939 8 : 00 p. m.
No. 282 of October 13 Received October 14r 12 : 30 a. m.
For the Air Ministry, Attach^ Group.
From today's conversation * with the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff the following is worthy of note :
On his own initiative the Chief of the General Staff turned the
conversation to the implementation of Belgian neutrality.
I pointed out that in Holland rumors about the shifting of Belgian
troops from the French to the Dutch and German borders were causing
uneasiness. The Chief of the General Staff replied that this was
actually not altogether true, since it was only a question of an exchange
of troops in the course of a slow mobilization process.
He expressly emphasized that Belgium was firmly resolved to maintain
neutrality and would not only fire on any intruder, no matter
from where he came, but would fight him energetically and regard him
as an enemy.
He took the opportunity, for his part, to express his concern over reports
he had received about the concentration of German armored
troops and motorized forces in the region of Cologne, which he called
the Eeichenau Army. The concentration of a normal number of
troops for the defense of the West Wall had been regarded by Belgium
as an obvious defense measure. Armored and motorized troops were,
however, evidently intended for a war of movement.
I pointed out that being a member of the Luftwaffe I knew nothing
about these occurrences, but would, if he so desired, forward the report.
He requested me to do so and in conclusion emphasized once more that
Belgium would not give up her determination to remain neutral.
The Military Attache here will be informed upon his return.
WENNINGER
BTJLOW
1 Between Lt. Gen. Wenninger, the German Air Attach^ in Belgium, accredited
also to the Netherlands, and the Belgian Lt. Gen. EL M. van den Bergen.
282 DOCUMENTS ON GBEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 252
116/66658-60
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
SECBET BERLIN, October 13,
IMMEDIATE ZU Kult B Sp6Z. 68-01 11.10.39.
No. 554
With reference to your telegram No. 510.1
Please make the following reply to M. Molotov and M. Potemkin:
1. The assertion that the emigration of the Germans from the Baltic
.countries initiated by us seriously compromises the action of the Soviet
Government is incomprehensible to us. Such a connection between
the two actions is asserted only by English propaganda, which is of
course interested in disturbing the relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union and for this purpose constantly treats events in the Baltic
countries in a most tendentious manner.
2. There cannot be the slightest question of any panicky emigration
or flight. On the contrary, the resettlement is being carried out by us
in a perfectly calm and orderly manner and will presumably extend
over a period of months. We are carrying on negotiations in the matter
with the Latvian and Estonian Governments and are regulating
by agreement questions of citizenship and property esr
these matters are being dealt with in a generous, rat
manner.2
3. We are carrying out the action in accordance with the agreements
made in Moscow, it does not grow out of the fear that the Germans
might in any way be endangered by the Soviets ; rather, it is a necessity
for us to populate with Germans the many deserted farms, stores, and
workshops in the occupied area. In the interest of an early restoration
of economic life there we are anxious to have at least a part of the
Germans emigrate from the Baltic countries even this winter.
4. To the Baltic Governments we described the evacuation as being
a result of the program developed by the Fuhrer in his last speech in
the Reichstag and expressly emphasized that it has no connection with
the new agreements between these Governments and the Soviet Government.
* Document No. 239.
* On Oct. 16, a German-Estonian Protocol on evacuation of the German element
was signed (400/214522), but on Oct. 26, Frohwein wired that a biU had been
introduced in the Estonian Parliament restricting the removal of economic assets
from the country (406/214525r-26). This action brought considerable argument
regarding application of the Protocol. On Dec. 30, 1939, the Estonian Government
agreed to extend for 3 months (i. e., until Mar. lt 1940) the period for
evacuation by approximately 1,000 Germans who had volunteered for resettlement
(Frohwein telegram No. 389, dispatched Dec. 31: 406/214568-69). The
evacuation was not completed within the stipulated time limit, and in telegram No.
242 of July 13, 1940, Frohwein reported that his Legation still had 400 requests
for transfer (406/214647) .
x3 treaty Providing for the resettlement of Latvians claiming German nationality
was signed by Germany and Latvia on Oct. 30, 1939 (1272/342047-69). Art
rv of this treaty provided that the evacuation be completed by Dec. 15, 1939.
in tele ram No. 416 of Dec. 16 that this had been accomplished
OCTOBER 1939 283
Thereupon appropriate semi-official explanations of the true meaning
of the resettlement were also published in the press by the Latvian
and Estonian Governments on October 8 and 9.
5. Moreover, the Soviet Government should really welcome the entire"
action from its point of view as well. We are thereby removing
an element which might possibly in the future have disturbed our
relations with the Baltic countries and consequently also with the
Soviet Union. It is a well-known fact that the attitude of the Latvian
and Estonian population is in some instances quite hostile toward the
Germans living there. This could have led to all sorts of difficulties
in the future. The evacuation is thus a clear indication that we are
taking seriously Germany's political disinterestedness in the Baltic
countries as agreed upon in Moscow.3
I further request you to point out to M. Molotov on this occasion
that we expect the Soviet Government to agree to a similar resettlement
of the Germans from the former Polish areas in the Soviet
sphere of interest. The following principles should therefore be followed
in the matter :
1. The question of membership in the German Volksgruppe should
be given a broad interpretation.
2. The action should be carried out at an early date in the interest
of resettling the deserted farms in our sphere of interest.
3. Formalities should be confined to an absolute minimum.
4% Livestock, agricultural effects, and personal belongings should
be taken along at once.
5. A reichsdeutsch concern should be set up to act as custodian for
all assets not taken along ; the concern would assume all the indebtedness
of departing individuals to public and private parties, and would
settle their obligations.
VON RlBBENTROP
*In a telegram of Oct. 14 (406/214514), reporting on the execution of this instruction,
Schulenburg stated that Molotov showed himself "somewhat relieved."
Molotov declared that the Soviet Government had that day published a Tass dispatch
to prevent false interpretation of the German measures, and emphasized
that his Government saw no need for hasty resettlement.
No. 253
73/52087
The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary
Telegram
No. 424 BEBMK, October 13, 1939.
With reference to your telegram No. 421.1
1. You are requested to observe extreme reserve there on the subject
of Hungarian-Russian relations and possible military measures
on the part of Hungary against Russia and to make no statements in
the matter whatsoever.
1 Document No. 238.
284 DOCUMEISTTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. In the question of German arms deliveries to Hungary all necessary
steps have already been taken. You will receive a separate communication
regarding the details.2
3. You will also receive separate instructions concerning the handling
of the Polish refugees.
3
WEIZSAOKER
a Telegram No. 423 of Oct. 13 informed the Legation that Ribbentrop had approved
the resumption to a limited extent of arms deliveries to Hungary1
(5571/E399614).
*Not printed (73/52088 and 52092).
No. 254
321/133ia9'-71
TTie Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT KAUNAS, October 14, 1939 9 : 08 p. m.
No. 185 of October 14 Received October 15 2:45 a.m.
Foreign Minister Urbsys, on whom I called today following his return
from Moscow, gave me rather detailed information of a strictly
confidential nature on his Moscow negotiations.
First he emphasized that the rumors circulating abroad to the effect
that Lithuania intended to request Memel and the Suwalki corner from
Germany were entirely false. Lithuania had no such thought; on the
contrary, she was very much interested in continuing to foster, insofar
as the changed circumstances permitted, friendly relations with Germany
in general, but especially in the economic and the cultural field.
To be sure, he could only tell me this confidentially and asked that
I transmit it to Berlin in the same manner, since he had noted in
Moscow a certain distrust with reference to alleged German intentions
in Lithuania. Especially in all Lithuanian objections against Russian
wishes for garrisons, the Russians suspected that it was a case of German
prompting. I thereupon told him I was convinced that it was
also the desire of the Reich Government to continue to foster relations
with Lithuania, but it was, of course, out of the question that Germany
should in any way oppose or interfere with Soviet Russia's political
interests. Concerning the Moscow negotiations, Urbsys said that in
general they took place in an amicable atmosphere. He had been able
to defend the Lithuanian viewpoint without restriction and to present
all arguments. Only toward the end had the Russians become impatient.
Stalin and Molotov had also repeatedly remarked on German-
Russian relations and had described them as being very good and
friendly. They had also paid high tribute to the Reich Foreign Minister
himself. Specifically Urbsys stated the following :
1. Stalin and Molotov had repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union
did not wish any sovietization of Lithuania. He had been especially
OCTOBER 1939 285
pleased that Stalin had repeated this at the farewell banquet in the
presence of many members of the Soviet Government. Urbsys had
interpreted this as a directive to the various People's Commissariats.
2. In the Vilna question the Soviet Government had drawn the
frontier "with a firm hand," as Urbsys expressed it. No extensive
changes had been possible, and objections had been dismissed with
the statement that the Soviet Union did not need to give lithuania
any part of the Vilma area. The Lithuanian center Jwiciany remained
on the Soviet side for strategic reasons, Urbsys thought, since
the Soviet Union had evidently been interested in fixing the frontier
as close to the Vilna-Daugavpils a railway line as possible. The
Soviet Government had especially urged that the territory to be ceded
be taken over quickly. Lithuanian troops will march in on October
16.
8. By far the most difficult question had concerned the Russian
requests for garrisons. The Soviet troops had been fixed at 20,000
men. Vilna would have a Russian garrison until it had really become
the Lithuanian capital. Then the city would be evacuated by the
Soviet troops. With this exception, Soviet troops are not to be stationed
in the larger cities and industrial centers. The Lithuanian
delegation had attempted to have further details regarding the garrisons
settled at once in Moscow, because the Estonian experience had
shown that it was more difficult to negotiate with the military commission.
This had, however, been rejected for technical reasons. The
Soviet Union had reserved the right to designate an unlimited number
of strategic points for Russian garrisons. The details of the billeting
were Lithuania's concern. Geographically these points have not yet
been fixed ; in the course of the negotiations, however, reference had
been made to the area between Palanga and Kretinga and the road
between Tilsit and Riga.
4. As long as he was in Moscow, no negotiations had been carried on
concerning the economic question, but Norkaitis 2 had remained in
Moscow for this purpose. In a conversation with Molotov, Urbsys
had stressed that Lithuania was especially interested in continuing
her full volume of trade with Germany because of the free-port zone
in Memel, the settlement resulting from the evacuation of the Memel
area, and the good prices paid by Germany. He had further pointed
out that Lithuania had so far received the worst prices for her products
in the Soviet Union; Molotov had promised to look into this
matter. Details on the economic negotiations will not be known until
Norkaitis returns from Moscow.
In connection with the foregoing Urbsys did not hide his concern
about future developments but he also emphasized that Lithuania
would still work in the future to the utmost for her independence;
and in conclusion he requested once more that all this information be
kept strictly confidential.
ZECHDIN
* The German reads "Dtinaburg" ; the town is also taown as "Dvinsk."
*
J. Norfcaitis, a senior official of the ^Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.
286
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 255
463/225978
The Charge
OCTOBER 1939 287
suit in making additional enemies for us, without our as yet possessing
the submarines necessary to defeat England. On the other hand, the
Navy has very persuasive reasons for its stand in urging the opening
of unrestricted submarine warfare.
It therefore appears necessary to me that the OKW be asked for
certain specialized information before a decision is made. In my
opinion the following should be asked.
a. When does the Navy wish to open unrestricted submarine warfare?
5. What declared areas does it propose? (Notification of neutrals
is necessary.)
c. What are the present monthly figures on sinkings and those to
be expected in the future?
d. >oes the Navy intend to make exceptions with reference to sinking
as regards passenger vessels and certain neutrals (e. g., Russian
trade to England, Danish food ships, etc.) ; and what steps will the
Navy take to ensure that such ships will be spared ?
I request that I be authorized to direct an inquiry to this effect to
the OKW at once.2
WEIZSACKER
3 See document No. 270.
No. 257
F2/0347 ;
P2/0346 ;
F2/0840
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
TOP SECRET BERUJST, October 14? 1939.
No. 568 [Sent October 1512 : 15 a. m.] .*
For the Ambassador personally.
On the occasion of the conversations in Moscow the Soviet Government,
as the Embassy knows, showed itself well disposed toward our
wish for a certain measure of assistance to our Navy by the Soviet
Union for the duration of the war.2 This idea will soon have its first
1 From the copy in the Moscow Embassy (4191/E072496-97).
*No documents have been found on naval discussions during Ribbentrop's
visit to Moscow Sept. 27-29, 1939, but "Ftthrer Conferences on Naval Affairs,
1939-1945," JBrassey's Naval Annual, 1948, p. 43, includes the following from a
Hitler-Raeder conference of Sept. 23: "7. The Chief, Naval State, raises the
question of Russian and Italian cooperation on the following points: (a) cession
of submarines to the German Navy, (&) equipment of auxiliary cruisers
(Murmansk), (c) permission for German warships to use Russian ports.
"The Ftthrer will ask the Foreign Minister to clarify these questions on his
next visit to Moscow. The Italians will certainly be very cautious. Japan
will presumably keep her promises regarding permission to use Japanese ports
and equipment of German ships."
288
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
practical application in one aspect as a result of the discussions there
regarding the refitting of Iller as an auxiliary cruiser in a Russian
port.
8 These discussions, according to the Naval High Command,
have also already dealt informally with further wishes, such as the
reconditioning of German vessels in Soviet ports.
The Naval High Command sets great value upon a far-reaching
cooperation of the Soviet Government in this question, with a view
to effectively improving the Navy's opportunities for sea warfare.
The points primarily concerned are the following :
1. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with
fuel and provisions in Russian ports, with the ammunition and other
supplies being shipped from Germany.
2. Reconditioning of cruisers and submarines, especially their
machinery, using Russian shipyards.
3. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuel, provisions)
for cruisers and submarines, so as to extend their endurance
at sea.
Please discuss this matter with Molotov immediately. In doing
so, the conversation should be framed in such a way that you are not
bringing up anything new or unexpected ; instead, you should refer
to the Foreign Minister's conversations in Moscow and the negotiations
about the conversion of Iller into an auxiliary cruiser as well as
the wishes set forth on that occasion, which are not known here in full
detail.
In discussing the question of which ports are concerned, please mention
Murmansk and some Far Eastern port to be agreed upon later.
It is important that such ports are selected as afford adequate railroad
connections for the shipping of ammunition, supplies, and repair
material.
As regards point (2) it is also necessary that the ports have shipyard
facilities and, if possible, docks.
Please make a telegraphic report on your conversation. It would
then be left to decide with Molotov which details will subsequently be
handled by yourself, and which by the Naval Attach^.4
WBIZSACKBR
* In telegram No. 431 of Sept. 23, Schulenburg reported as follows : "Molotov
informed me today that the Soviet Government agrees to our proposal to convert
motor ship Iller into an auxiliary cruiser and will assist us in this matter"
(4191/E072502). The conversion was presumably carried out at Murmansk.
Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Oct. 17 as follows : "Before starting to
carry out this instruction I think I must wait for the return of Naval Attach^
von Baumbach, who is now in Berlin to discuss these questions. I suggest that
you get in touch with Baumbach, who wishes to leave on Wednesday [Oct. 18],
at the Eden Hotel" (51/33910). Meanwhile, Raeder had reported to Hitler on
Oct. 16 ''that the Bussians have placed at our disposal a well-situated base west
of Murmansk. A repair ship is to be stationed there." ("FUhrer Conferences
on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, p. 52). No immediate
sequel to Schulenburg's telegram has been found.
OCTOBER 1939 289
No. 258
J2T/60.6.79
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 572 of October 15 BERUX, October 15, 1939 11 : 20 p. m.
Received October 16 4 : 20 a. m.
For the Ambassador personally.
We should welcome it if the exchange of the instruments of ratification
of the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty could
take place in the near future. A separate communication will be sent
to you regarding the technical details still to be arranged in this connection.
As originally agreed upon in Moscow, we expect M. Molotov
to visit Berlin for the ratification. Therefore, please repeat to M.
Molotov now my earlier oral invitation. As the time for the visit I
should suggest the end of October, approximately between October 25
and 31. Public announcement of the date of the visit would still have
to be agreed upon. Up to that time we expect strict secrecy.
RIBBENTROP
No. 259
B18/BOO&116
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
[No. 346 of October 15]
x BEBLIN, October 15, 1939.
[Pol. II 4064 Ang. I].
With reference to your telegram No. 298.2
Please tell the Finnish Foreign Minister in reply to his question that
Chamberlain rejected the Fuhrer's magnanimous peace offer in the
most insolent manner and that this closes the subject for us. You will
please mate no further explanations about the matter.8
RIBBENTROP
*The information in brackets comes from another copy of this telegram
(463/226003).
'Not printed (463/225976-77). The Finnish Foreign Minister had asked the
German Minister in Helsinki to let him know, before his departure for Stockholm
to attend the meeting of the Northern Heads of State, whether Germany
could still propose any possible solutions that might lead to a termination of the
war.
3 The text of this telegram was transmitted on Oct. 18 to the Missions in all
the leading- neutral states of Europe and to the Embassy in the United States
with the instruction : "In case a similar question is raised there, please let this
be your guide in conversation" (463/226004).
290
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 260
1571/380194H9&
The ^Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT HOME, October 16, 1939 1 : 10 a. m.
SECRET Received October 16 6 : 05 a. m,
No. 692 of October 15
With reference to our telegrams Nos. 663 * and 676.2
I. Another thorough discussion with Minister of Commerce
Quarneri on the question of obtaining raw materials via Italy revealed
that Italy is insisting unconditionally that with the British
control growing constantly more strict the security of Italy's own
vital supplies of raw materials must not be jeopardized by an attempt
to route shipments of raw materials to Germany via Italy. Another
member of the Government, too, who at first had a very affirmative
attitude and had promised me to discuss the matter with the Duce,
has now said that it is not possible to support Germany at the moment
because of the danger to Italy's own supplies.
II. I thereupon told Ambassador Giannini that I would now have
to give my Government a final report to the effect that the certain
expectation of the German Government that Italy's nonparticipation
in the war would facilitate the supplying of raw materials to Germany
was incorrect, and in any case Italy was not willing at the present time
to aid Germany in this particularly important field. Considering the
serious impression which this report would make on the leading political
and military authorities, I desired before sending my report that
the Italian Foreign Minister once more expressly confirm the fact that
the Italian stand was final. In reply Ciano sent word to me that although
he would like to continue the conversation with me regarding
the Italian attitude toward the British blockade, he had to state in
advance that the negative Italian stand in the question of raw-material
supplies could not be changed, at least for the moment.
III. The authoritative Italian offices are aware of the significance
for us of their refusal ; in particular, Guarneri and Giannini urgently
requested understanding for the Italian attitude, which was dictated
by the direst necessity. It was the unavoidable duty of the Italian
* Document No. 231.
*Not printed (588/242230-31). Clodius reported in this telegram of Oct. 11
that Ambassador Giannini, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Foreign
Ministry, had told him that Italy would not be able to transship to Germany
the previously agreed quantities of raw materials from overseas sources. The
reason given was the intensified British blockade, which now required a declaration
on imports of oil, rubber, and nonferrous metals that these would not be
transshipped to Germany.
OCTOBER 1939 291
Government not to endanger Italy's supply of the most important
raw materials, and this was also in the German interest ; as soon as
the present emergency was overcome, the Italian Government would do
everything to aid us.
IV. With the strong concentration of Italian imports of raw materials
in relatively few firms and the dependence of these firms on
the Government, the delegation sees no prospect in these circumstances
of obtaining any significant quantities of raw materials through Italy
covertly. In particular, the possibility of supplies from Spain is
thereby also made impracticable. Attempts to conclude at least individual
small transactions will be continued.
I shall also continue to urge that the Italians at least refuse, as even
the Oslo States have done, to give British authorities pledges against
re-exporting goods.8
QLODITJS
MAOKBNSBK
*In a memorandum of Oct. 13 (1848/421080-82) recounting the difficulties
which Clodius was having in Rome, Wiehl recommended that influence he brought
to bear through Ambassador Attolico to get the Italians to put up more resistance
to British blockade measures. WeizsScker saw the Italian Ambassador on Oct.
17 and recorded in a memorandum of the conversation (463/225995) that he
told him : ". . . at present Italy seemed to me not to be marching at the head
of the resistance by the neutral countries against -such [British] pressure, but
rather to be bringing up the rear."
No. 261
84/28465
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTKGENT Moscow, October 16, 1939 2 : 56 p. m.
No. 547 of October 16 Received October 16 3 : 35 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 572 of October 15.1
Ambassador Shkvartsev, who is returning to Berlin tomorrow, informed
me today on instructions from Molotov that the Soviet Government
desired early ratification of the Boundary and Friendship
Treaty. It proposed that it be ratified simultaneously on both sides
on October 19, and be published on October 20,2 Please inform me
1 Document No. 258.
* The Treaty was ratified by the Führer and the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet on Oct. 19. On Dec. 30 the following announcement by Weizsacker appeared
in the Reichsgesetssblatt : "The German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship
Treaty signed on September 28. 1939, and the Additional Protocol signed on
October 4, 1939, with the attached maps, have been ratified. The exchange of
ratifications took place in Berlin on December 15, 1939. The Treaty entered
into force as provided in its Article v on September 28, 1939, the Additional
Protocol as provided in its section in on October 4, 1939."
292 DOCTTMEiNTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
as soon as possible by telephone whether you agree to the Soviet
proposal.
I informed Shkvartsev of the contents of telegraphic instruction
No. 572, stressing expressly the need for secrecy, and asked him to
inform Molotov so that he might at once give me the reply on my
forthcoming visit,
No. 262
141/127308-09
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgiwm
Telegram
No. 374 BERLIN, October 16, 1939,
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 282.1
I request that you bring up the following with the Belgian Foreign
Minister,
2 not as a special demarche, but on the occasion of your next
call, which you should make as soon as possible :
1. In his conversation with Air Attach^ "Wenninger, the Chief of
the Belgian General Staff referred to reports he had received to the
effect that German armored troops and motorized units, which he
called the Reichenau Army, were concentrated in the region of
Cologne. He asked the Air Attach^ to forward this information to
Berlin. With reference hereto you have been instructed to state that
actually there has been no concentration of German armored troops
and motorized units in the region of Cologne, and that, consequently,
the reports which the Chief of the Belgian General Staff has received
are completely false.
2. On the other hand, we have definite and reliable reports that
France, for her part, has concentrated motorized units on the Franco-
Belgian border.
3. In view of this situation it has naturally surprised us that Belgium
has proceeded to transfer Belgian troops from the Belgian-
French to the Belgian-German border. That there has actually been
such a transfer is attested by all the reports we have received ; nor
was it denied, after all, by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff in
his conversation with the 'German Air Attach^, when he merely called
the Air Attaches reference to these transfers "not altogether true."
4. On this occasion you should also call attention to the fact that
during the last few weeks the Belgian press, in contrast to the press
of the other neutral countries, has shown a pronounced anti-German
tone and vied with the inflammatory attitude of the British and the
French press.
1 Document No. 251.
a Paul Henri Spaak.
OCTOBER 1939 293
I request that you make the foregoing statements to the Belgian
Foreign Minister in carefully formulated words but at the same time
speak in a decidedly friendly manner and avoid giving your step the
character of a formal action.8
REBBBNTROF
On Oct. 20, Billow telegraphed that lie had that day made a demarche according
to these instructions (141/127314).
No. 263
F3/0011-0001
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Personal Staff
[BEKLTKT, October 16? 1939],
VISIT OF THE SWEDISH EXPLORER, SVEN HEDIJST, TO THE FTJHRER, ox
OCTOBER 16, 1939, FROM 12 O'CLOCK NOON TO 1 : 15 p. M.1
Sven Hedin had stated in advance that although he had spoken
with the King of Sweden he was coming not on an official mission,
but rather as an old acquaintance.
The conversation began by Sven Hedin's remarking to the Führer
on the tremendous burden the Führer was carrying. The Führer
replied that he was happy to be allowed to carry it. He was a man
who loved responsibility and who was glad that the solution of this
great problem had been allotted to him.
Sven Hedin said that he was afraid for Sweden. He thought that
Sweden would soon have to help Finland, and he feared that Sweden
would thereby place herself in opposition to Germany. The Führer
did not think that Finland would become involved in a war with
Eussia; the Russian demands would not go very far. If it should
come to a conflict nevertheless, he did not believe that Sweden could
help Finland. At Sven Hedin's question as to whether the Führer
could not help Sweden, he said he would not attack her from the rear.
The Führer added some comments here on his relationship to the
Scandinavian countries, observing that in the long years of Germany's
struggle for equality, he had not received the slightest help from the
Scandinavian countries. The Baltic States had been created by the
sacrifice of German lives, and Finland also had been rescued from
bolshevism by von der Goltz. Nine hundred thousand Germans had
fallen on the Eastern Front and their blood had helped to bring these
countries into being. To be sure, he had not expected these countries
1 Hedin's version of this conversation, together with his account of a controversy
growing out of his subsequent press interview with a British reporter in
Stockholm, is given in Sven- Hedin's German Diary, 19S5-19J$ (Dublin, 1951),
pp. 40-66.
294
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to fight for Germany now, but they could at least have taken a stand
in the League of Nations in favor of Germany, for this would never
have hurt them. But they had always fundamentally opposed Germany.
The press in these countries had in the most shameless manner
published distorted, mendacious, and inflammatory versions of conditions
in Germany, so that one day he had made up his mind to revise
the principles of Germany's foreign policy.
The Führer went on to say that he was through with getting politically
involved in matters that were no concern of Germany's. He
no longer claimed any interests in the Mediterranean, and in Albania
and Greece he had registered no interest. He had effected a delimitation
of spheres of interest. In the German sphere of interest he would
certainly fight and defend himself to the last. Where an aircraft
carrier had been established against Germany i. e., Czechoslovakia,
Poland he had destroyed it. He had written off the West ; there was
no problem there. Any advance there would only impair the nationality
balance in Germany. He had written off the South and likewise
the North, where he had experienced only ingratitude and antipathy,
although he had never done them any harm. He could say that these
countries had acted abominably [niedertrachtiff~\ in public statements
and in their press. And to the Danes he had ceded the previously
hard-won territories. Friendship was worth more to him than a few
square kilometers. In the East, too, there was now a clear-cut division
of interests.
He had freed Germany from bolshevism, and Germany was
now invulnerable against bolshevism. The countries that, ... the
whole ....
[one page missing from the German text]
had already lost the World War.
Hedin said he thought the British Empire was finished. He described
the situation in Asia where the proud British Empire was in
retreat before the Japanese. He mentioned British capital there
amounting to 300 million pounds, and referred to Hong Kong and
England's inability to send her Home Fleet there.
The Führer said that England was ruled by lunatics who thought
that England was an island, which she no longer was. England was
in for some big surprises, Hedin asked : "What are you going to do ?"
The Führer said that anyone considering the situation had to say
that this was the most preposterous affair in world history. He had
repeatedly offered peace and friendship to that nation and received
only slaps in return. The preservation of the British Empire was
also to Germany's advantage; for, if England lost India, we had
OCTOBER 1939 295
nothing to gain by it. Now he was convinced, however, that this war
had to be fought to a finish. He could describe Chamberlain as
nothing else than mad.
Naturally, he would restore the Polish state, for he did not want
that riff-raff \G-escKmeis8\ the Poles within his own borders, but
never again would Poland become a threat to Germany. He had no
demands to make of the West aside from the colonies which were of
no value to England herself.
He now compared at some length the relative strength of Germany
and England, and concluded that Germany had enormous superiority.
And in such circumstances England believed that Germany should
beg for forgiveness ! !
Hedin wondered what the French really were fighting for. They
were England's slaves and faced ruin. The Fuhrer: "France will
sacrifice her national strength." There were many Frenchmen who
thought the same but they were not allowed to speak out. Hedin : If
he succeeded in preventing the war, future generations would venerate
[
296
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
eastern Europe were at our disposal. Thanks to the abundant harvests
of recent years, Germany had a 2 years' supply of grain on hand.
Hedin said that it was senseless to blockade Germany, The Fuhrer
agreed. The others were much more vulnerable than we.
He was glad to take on this fight and he grew envious at the thought
that this fight otherwise would have to be carried on by someone else
after him.
Hedin inquired whether there was really no possibility of peace
now. The Fuhrer replied : "So far as it is up to us, at any moment,
but England does not want it. England must learn that she has to
keep out of the German spheres of interest. She wasn't even decent
enough to help the Poles." Indeed, England had made long-distance
flights through France for propaganda reasons, but the planes had
carried gasoline instead of bombs. Our planes, however, were flying
all the way to the Shetland Islands with heavy bomb loads and even
then would engage in combat for hours.
Hedin asked whether everything would be over quickly. The FuKrer
replied that he did not know. His first war plan was for 5 years,
but he could go on fighting even 8 and 10 years. In a final showdown,
we would triumph and England would be a field of ruins. The British
were stupid enough to believe that they were safe from the German
submarines, but they were thinking of submarines used in the World
War, which had long since been improved upon. There were no
weapons against our present submarines. If England wanted peace,
she could have it. She was playing a role in Europe that no longer
convinced anyone. In the Far East, the British were whining already.
He could not say this publicly, but the only man in England
that he would care to call a genius was Lloyd George. Eden was a
foppish nonentity [pomadisierte NuLT\ and Churchill an incompetent
\wnfahig]. Of all the British to whom he had spoken to date, Lloyd
George had made the greatest impression upon him.
The Fuhrer then gave a detailed account of the capture of Warsaw.
Hedin asked whether he could not give him a message to the King
of Sweden. The Fuhrer asked Hedin to thank the King for his good
intentions, adding that it was not really up to him, France and England
did not want peace. In the North we had no other desire than
to live in friendship with the countries there. England was to blame
for everything that was happening there today. There was only one
chance for England, and that was to recognize Germany's interests.
These were very limited. In the East was powerful Bussia ; an advance
to the Urals was ruled out. Collaboration between Germany
and England would be a tremendous factor in behalf of the peace
OCTOBER 1939 297
and would constitute the most potent element in the world. England
was the greatest sea power, Germany the greatest land power. But
England did not realize that Germany was the greatest land power.
Perhaps she thought that France was. Poland's collapse had not
come as a gift from Heaven. It had been accomplished by inspired
generalship in the Prussian military tradition, equipment engineered
superbly to the last technical detail, and painstaking, unremitting
training. Germany was the soundest power in the world, and no hothouse
plant. Our military preparations had been cautious and
pedantic,
if anything, and the training of the soldier, thorough and
careful. A battle might be won once in a while by accident, but a
triumphal march, such as that of the Polish campaign, was no accident,
but the fruit of enormously painstaking preparations.
Sven Hedin said he had always, even in 1919, believed in a new
dawn for Germany but the Führer's accomplishments were phenomenal
indeed. And yet he was sometimes afraid of the peril that
might threaten Germany from the United States or if Russia should
betray Germany. The Führer said that he had pondered all possibilities.
If the war had to come some time, it was best that it should
have come now. Our lead in armaments was enormous, and we were
far out in front in the field of inventions as well. He spoke of the
rebirth of the German Army out of the 100,000-man army. Hedin
ought to take a look at the new aircraft factories. Against them those
in England were a joke. He described the amateurish \diletantisohen\
measures of the British, such as the evacuation of the children, etc. ;
he compared the air forces and pointed out that the German antiaircraft
defenses were the best in the whole world.
On taking leave, Hedin asked once more what Germany had to say
to Sweden if she should get into difficulties over Finland: "Will
Germany give Sweden her blessing in that fight?" The Führer replied:
"We shall not attack Sweden from the rear." Hedin asked
what could be done for the cause of peace, and the Führer replied
that that was not up to us. Germany had not declared war !
If the British changed he had no objection, but he had to insist
on one condition : Czechoslovakia was not to be discussed. The settlement
of Poland had to be left to him, but he was prepared to
negotiate all other problems.
The conversation was very cordial and amicable throughout.
HEWEI*
298
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 264
100/65700-07
TTie Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
SECRET TOKYO, October 16, 19S9.
Pol. 719 Received November 2.
Pol. Vni 1725.
POUCTICAI, REPORT
Subject : Japan's attitude toward the European war.
In its memorandum of September 5, 1939, tlie Japanese Government
communicated to the belligerent powers its intention not to
become involved in the European war.1
In the following report, the antecedents of this memorandum,
Japan's policy since the beginning of the war, and future prospects
are examined.
I. Antecedents
The most important forces motivating Japan's policy today became
clearly apparent as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression
Pact. For Japan the Pact came at a time of very great tension
between the two leading political camps, the opponents and supporters
of a pro-British line. Their old antagonism had in the course of this
year become increasingly bitter, influenced alike by the conflict in
China, which made deep inroads into the sphere of British power,
and by the Anti-Comintern Pact, the development of which into an
instrument of alliance against England was the subject of violent
discussion in Japanese circles.
Thus, in the middle of August, the Army, the motive force of the
anti-British group, had just caused the breakdown of the Tientsin
negotiations'
2 and started the final struggle for the strengthening
of the Anti-Comintern Pact when the news of the impending German-
Russian KTon-Aggression Pact arrived. The first shock was natural
and severe; it struck at the genuine feeling of friendship in the general
masses which had been the Army's principal support. The Japanese
press did its part to intensify this reaction, encouraged by the pro-
British group in Court circles as well as in business to avoid all objective
discussion of the possible advantage in the Pact to Japan, and to
reject the offer of help made by the German Foreign Minister in the
presence of the Moscow press as interference in the sovereign policy
of Japan.
1 See document No. 61.
* See vol. vi, document No. 526 ; and vol. vn, document No. 868.
OCTOBER 1939 299
The general attack of the British group failed because of the strong
resistance offered by the Army and activist circles friendly to us.
"With an objectivity and loyalty that deserves the highest recognition
they allowed themselves to become convinced of the necessity for
Germany's action and its advantage against the common foe, England,
and for their part attacked the indecisiveness of Japan. To be sure
the Hiranuma Cabinet fell, undermined by 70 fruitless conferences on
the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but its successor did
not represent the pro-British group. In a bitter struggle with Court
circles, the Army achieved a middle-of-the-road Cabinet, whose leader,
General Abe who at the same time took over the post of Foreign
Minister was understood to be amenable to the influence of the Army.
On September 5 this neutral Abe Cabinet presented the memorandum
with regard to Japan's nonintervention [in the war].
II. Policy Since Begirwiing of tTie War
In view of the attitude Japan had declared toward Europe it was
clear from the start that she could not announce any ostrich policy
for the Far East, for she is in the position of being compelled to confront
the Great Powers in the China conflict*
Every Japanese Government describes it as the main task of its
foreign policy to end the China conflict as soon as possible. This
compels it to proceed against the Marshal's last sources of strength,
his support by England and Russia, and obliges it further to assure
the Wang Ching-wei Government of early recognition by the Great
Powers in order to make it viable. Moreover, the injury done to
trade by the war will force Japan to abandon her reserve. It suffices
to call attention in this connection to the shortage of freight space,
tlxe interference by British naval warfare, and America's threatening
attitude in the question of the expiring commercial treaty.
By its first acts, the Abe Cabinet showed its disposition to profit
actively by the European conflict. The memorandum mentioned
above gives the belligerent Powers the advice to withdraw their forces
from the parts of China occupied by Japan* Japan has therefore
started to exert pressure on the British and French, the only ones
involved, in order to weaken their position in China.
In the truce of Nomonhan,3 Japan declared her intention to restore
to normal her relations with Russia, and the Army pursued this further
in a publication emphasizing the friendly atmosphere between
the Japanese and Russian officers conducting negotiations.
Both measures were promising indications that the "nonintervention"
of the Abe Cabinet would in practice be directed at a settlement
8 See document No. 77, footnote 2.
260090 54 25-
300
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
with Russia, and pressure against England and France in China. Apparently
the influence which the Army has secured upon the Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister was at work; a last manifestation of
the old striking power of the Army it has since then not again succeeded
in influencing the policy of the Cabinet further in our direction.
From two sides the pro-British camp (whose driving power, it
now clearly emerges, is from the persons closest to the throne), and
the Government of the United States of America opposition arose
which was directed primarily against a settlement with Russia. The
pro-British camp recognized the dangers of the truce of Nomonhan
when the Army and large groups of the population welcomed it most
joyfully. It might again bring Japan closer to Germany, and the
zealous effort at outlawing the latter would collapse if Japan followed
the German example toward Russia. In this way, moreover, Japan
would by necessity be driven gradually into the anti-British front
Court circles proceeded to take carefully calculated countermeasures,
first by having the press minimize the truce and deny any
friendly influence on the part of Germany and, shortly after, getting
the Minister of the Interior to issue a secret decree forbidding further
press reports regarding negotiations with Soviet Russia. After the
Soviet Army had moved into action against Poland the day after the
truce and displayed an increasing activity in Europe, a general agitation
began in the principal newspapers of Japan, aimed at instilling
fear of Soviet Russia, which, with her growth in power and her
"notorious untrustworthiness" would increasingly become a communistic
and military threat to the Far East. This agitation also overshadowed
appreciation of the incomparable triumph of the German
Wehrmacht in Poland, which naturally also made a deep impression
in Japan.
The Government of the United States had perhaps not entirely
by chance acted in harmony with the pro-British camp in Japan.
In a demarche about which we have learned nothing, it must have
expressed its displeasure at the Japanese rapprochement with Soviet
Russia. In any case, the Japanese press hastily published a statement
by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, minimizing the
truce of Nomonhan and denying German influence in it. By strengthening
the fleet and air force in Hawaii the Government of the United
States gave to its attitude un emphatic note of warning and seems also
to have answered with a sharp protest the Japanese memorandum
relative to withdrawal of the belligerent forces from China, which
OCTOBER 1939 301
was communicated to it by way of information.4 If one sums up these
individual measures, one is forced to the conclusion that the Government
of the United States has undertaken the task of relieving the
Western Powers in the Far East and vigorously espousing their interests.
In this connection, the imminent expiration of the commercial
treaty is especially disquieting to the Japanese.
America's attitude provided Court circles with the opportunity of
carrying out a number of far-reaching changes in personnel, with the
purposes of removing the Cabinet from the influence of the Army, of
purging the Army of politics through the compliant Minister of War
by radical changes in all key positions, and of removing the supporters
of anti-Comintern policy from the service of the Foreign Ministry.
Included in this category is, first of all, the appointment of a Foreign
Minister, which was forced upon the Minister President and for which
Admiral Nomura was selected because of good personal relations with
America, allegedly after the Army had opposed the appointment of
Ambassador Shigemitsu from London. The new Foreign Minister
was hailed by the principal newspapers as one who would lead the way
to general settlement with America, and thus Japanese policy was
given a second main task besides that of ending the Chinese conflict.
It remains to be seen whether an attempt is thus to be made to bring
Japan closer to the Western Powers by way of America.
No direct rapprochement with England is thus far discernible
even if indications are increasing that England is revising her attitude
in China. Today's special report
5 on the organization of the
Wang Ching-wei Government discusses in detail events in China and
the necessary German countermeasures.
III. Outlook for the Future
If one reviews the Japanese attitude since the beginning of the war,
there appears a brief attempt to widen the policy of friendship with
Germany into an adjustment with Russia and to draw closer to the
anti-British front. In a large-scale counterattack, Court circles,
armed with increased power, brought this movement to a halt and put
settlement with America first. A thorough purge carried out in the
Cabinet, the Army, and the Foreign Ministry, especially of the supporters
of the German alliance policy, is supposed to guarantee this
new orientation for a long period.
4
Secretary of State HnU discussed the Japanese memorandum with Ambassador
Hprinouchi on Sept. 7 and again on Sept. 15. See his memoranda of conversations
in Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n,
pp. 12-14, 15-19.
5 Not printed (8137/E582155-62) .
302 DOCUMENTS ON GETRMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
What are the prospects of success for this policy? To answer the
most critical question at once, I consider the danger very slight that
Japan will he brought into the war on the side of England by way of
America. There are no German possessions in the Pacific that represent
worth-while military objectives and that could be offered to Japan
such as Tsingtao and the South Sea territories in 1914. War aimed
at Eussian possessions, such as Vladivostok, would be predicated on
the entry of Russia on the German side, but this would surely deter
Japan from entering the war, for the experience of Nomonhan has,
according to reliable reports, demonstrated a formidable superiority
of Russian arms and military technique. Japan will not regard as
adequate British compensation in China or Hong Kong, for these may
fall to her in the course of the war anyway. Also military or economic
pressure applied jointly by America and England can hardly be made
so effective as to constrain Japan, which is always intent upon exploiting
the war situation in order to invade the sphere of her Pacific
neighbors. A psychological deterrent is the fact that hostility
toward England is so intense in the Army and in activist circles of
the population that for the foreseeable future acts of terrorism might
be expected against any collaboration with England.
The question remains whether settlement with America can be
effected and whether it will prevent a settlement with Russia. An
agreement with America, on trade is, as I have repeatedly reported,
a vital question for Japan. The policy of Court circles, therefore,
means to large groups in industry and in the Navy a prospect of
realizing an old dream. Extremely embittered popular feeling in
America, however, and the 600 American demands arising out of the
China conflict stand in the way of its realization. These culminate ill
the preservation of the Nine Power Pact, which would mean practically
the abandonment of Japan's China policy, and thus put the
greatest difficulties in the way of Japan's most urgent aim, the speedy
and successful termination of the China war. The attempt at a
settlement has therefore been rendered extremely difficult by circumstances
and is very much impeded by the clique policy of Court
circles, which have always been especially hated in the radical groups
of the population and have this time exposed themselves to an extraordinary
degree. It should be recalled that the bloody events of
February 1936 6 were directed against these same Court circles.
In this situation, continued efforts toward a settlement with Russia
simultaneously or in lieu of a settlement with America will by
On Feb. 26, 1936, within a few days of an election victory by the moderate
Okada Cabinet, a group of young officer extremists led a regiment of troops in
-an uprising against the Cabinet. The mutineers held control of central Tokyo
for 3 days and assassinated several members of the government.
OCTOBER 1939 303
no means be hopeless as soon as the efforts with America lead to the
first reverses.7 The Japanese protagonists of such a settlement will
again be provided by the Japanese Army, which, from the experience
of the last few years, defies all attempts at purging it of politics and,
after a certain lapse from power, which during a war in Europe will
probably be very short, again forces the new nonpolitical leaders under
the active influence of the middle ranks in the officer corps. The first
signs of this are already apparent in cautious contacting of the German
Embassy. The like-minded younger element in Japanese official
circles will probably gradually crystallize around Ambassadors
Shiratori and Oshima. Ambassador Shiratori's very emphatic statement
in favor of the old alliance policy upon his arrival in Japan is a
step in this direction. In important business circles also, leaders have
emerged and made contact with us, who reject a pact with America
and England and aspire to a settlement with Russia in order finally
to drive the Anglo-Saxon powers out of the western Pacific. It will
be the task of the immediate future to bring together these various
forces in the Army, in official life, business circles, and pro-German
popular groups, to strengthen them in their attitude, and to exploit
every setback in the attempted settlement with America in order to
consolidate them against England's position in the Far East.
The common anxiety weighing upon all these circles concerns
Eussia's growth in power and doubts of her trustworthiness. With
reference to their many demands for convincing proof of Russia's good
will, I must call attention to my repeated telegraphic proposals that
a long-term cession of the Russian oil wells in Sakhalin and a public
abandonment of support for Chiang Kai-shek might advance considerably
the cause of Russia and Germany here. Any encroachment by
Kussia on the British Empire's sphere of interest would surely have
the same effect.
The greatest influence will, however, proceed from our actual successes
in the war. Every British warship sunk will score a gain here
for the German cause, and if German or Russian submarines were,
under the eyes of the Japanese Navy, to proceed against the British
fleet, whose control of the seas arouses a feeling of impotent rage, the
sentiment of even the most reluctant group in Japan, the Japanese
Navy, would surely be very strongly influenced.
OTT
T In a report of Nov. 9 (157/181092-95), Ott recalled this prediction and
stated there were already signs of its fulfillment. In a speech by Ambassador
Grew in Tokyo, the United States had given sharp expression to its opposition
to Japan's new order in Asia, and American senators were demanding an embargo
on war materials. At the same time Russian overtures for economic negotiations,
especially in a speech by Molotov on Nov. 1, were receiving an increasingly
friendly reception in Japan.
304
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 265
4218/E07392&
TTie Director of tTie Political Department to the Embassy in Spam
Telegram
No. 256 of October 16 BERLIN, October 17, 193912: 05 a. m.
Received October 17 1 : 00 a. m.
[PoLIXSia?].1
[I.] Diplomatic Missions in America have received th.e following
instructions:
"The resolutions of the Panama Conference 2 are appraised here as
follows :
1. Roosevelt's influence on the Ibero-American republics has
been further strengthened by the outcome of the Conference.
Affirmation of the will to neutrality and of American solidarity,
however, will compel Roosevelt to move cautiously as regards his
well-known international position. The transfer of the Economic
Committee to the Washington atmosphere affords him great opportunities
for exerting influence.
2. A statement as to our position on the question of the closed
zone will follow.3
3. We consider as favorable to us the agreement on bona fide
changes of registry and the noninclusion of foodstuffs and raw
materials for the civilian population in contraband lists.
4. Until further instructions, please exercise reserve in evaluating
the political and legal effects of the conference."
II. Please thank the Government there on a suitable occasion for its
efforts in behalf of the maintenance of the neutrality by the Ibero-
American states. You may stress in that connection that this step will
surely serve to enhance the prestige of the new Spain in Latin America.
In view of the expected strong countermeasures on the part of the
North American Government, it is desirable that the joint efforts, in
which Italy is also participating, should be continued on a larger scale.
Spain unquestionably will have some interests of her own in this because
any extension of North American influence will be primarily
at her expense.*
a The file numbers are taken from Stohrer's reply (see footnote 4) .
a The Final Act of the Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
American Kepublics is published in Department of State, Bulletin, 1939, vol. I,
pp. 321-337.
8 See document No. 306.
* In a telegram of Oct. 19, Stohrer replied that he had spoken, as instructed, with
the Spanish Foreign Minister and State Secretary. They showed "great understanding
of our community of interests in this area," and the Foreign Minister
said that since his Government regarded Argentina as the decisive factor in the
neutrality and general position of South America, it was directing its main propaganda
effort to Argentina. He would be pleased if Germany would do the same
(136/7B925).
OCTOBER 1939 305
No. 266
The Ambassador m Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET ROME, October 17, 1939 7 : 45 p. m.
URGENT
No. 698 of October 17
Ciano informed me today of a telegram from Attolico, quoting an
unpublished DNB report of a United Press dispatch from London,
to the effect that Italy would assume leadership of a neutral bloc and
veer away from the Axis* Although he had already authorized
Attolico to make a similar statement, he also wanted to ask me to
advise Berlin that these rumors were false. The idea of a bloc of
Balkan states under Italian leadership had been aired already at the
Berlin conversations,
1 and the Duce had pondered it long and in detail
but then had definitely decided against it, although the Balkan capitals
had clearly shown sympathy for such a project. In no circumstances
did the Duce want to be made the spokesman of the neutrals. He
simply detested that word because Italy belonged neither to the belligerents
nor to the neutrals; her status, as before, remained that of
maximum preparedness, for which the Duce was working by every
means in order to be ready at the given moment. I know from the
Duce himself how heavily he is weighed down by the fact that, owing
to the gaps in preparedness, he must for the time being remain in the
background. Impatiently he is subordinating everything to his efforts
to fill the serious gaps. Leadership of a bloc of neutral Balkan
states would only mean a tie for him that might prove embarrassing
some day.
Ciano also added that all rumors about special instructions for
Bastianini were pure inventions. Italy's new Ambassador to London
received no special instructions but, on the contrary, was enjoined
to confine himself to the role of a reserved observer.
1 On Oct. 1 ; see document No. 176.
306
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 267
3TS/0468
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT Moscow, October 17, 1939 9 : 57 p. m.
No. 554 of October 17 Keceived October 18 3 : 00 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 572 of October 15 * and to my
telegram No. 547 of October 16.2
Molotor, to whom I personally handed at 5 : 30 p. m. today the invitation
of the Foreign Minister, stated that he was fully aware of
his obligation to make a return visit, but in view of the pressure upon
him of political business of the greatest importance, he most sincerely
regretted not being able at this time to undertake the journey to
Berlin. To my objection that a round-trip flight to Berlin could be
made in 3 to 4 days, Molotov replied that he had never yet flown in
his life, that he was a poor sailor, and therefore shrank from travel
by air. Molotov asked that his apologies be presented to the Foreign
Minister and he reiterated that he would surely make the required
visit, as soon as time and circumstances permitted.
ScBTCTLENBtJRG
1 Document No. 258.
3 Document No. 261.
No. 268
10a/111726
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TraoEJSTT Moscow, October 17, 1939 9 : 57 p. m,
No. 555 of October 17 Received October 18 3 : 00 a. m.
Saracoglu is leaving Moscow this evening. Molotov told me, in
this connection, that the conversations with Saracoglu had come to
no result. Nothing had been agreed or signed. To my question as
to how things now stood with respect to Turkish neutrality, closure
of the Dardanelles, and peace in the Balkans, Molotov replied that
everything remained uncertain since the position of Saracoglu was
not clear. Obviously the Turkish Government would have to give
thorough consideration now to all these questions.
1
*A detailed account of Saracoglu's negotiations in Moscow was sent by
Woermann on Nov. 2 to the Embassies in Moscow, Ankara, and Rome, and to
the principal Missions in Southeast Europe. The account came from a secret
source of evidently high credibility (2131/466289-97).
OCTOBER 1939 307
No. 269
103/111724
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No 591 EERIEST, October 17, 1939 [10 : 02 p. m.]
zu PoL VII 1865 1 Ang. I.
Drafting officer : Dr. Schlobies.
For the Ambassador.
Keferring to your conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister
in Moscow regarding the possible use of Russian influence, please
use a suitable opening in an informal conversation with Molotov to
inquire what Russia's intentions are regarding Afghanistan and Iran.
In this connection, please find out from the Russian authorities what
they think about Amanullah and Afghan internal affairs.
Report by telegraph.
2
WEIZSACKER 3
1 Pol. VII 1865 : This is evidently Rome telegram No. 657 of Oct. 7 ; not printed
(617/249875).
3 Marginal note on the Moscow Btaabassy copy of this document (352/202843) :
"Taken care of in a telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister himself.
v[on] T[ippelskirch] Nov. 13." See also documents Nos. 353 and 369.
Unsigned minute: "An Afghan source (Ghulam Siddiq) has called our attention
to the urgency of the matter, considering that the advancing season would
soon make any operation in the Hindu Kush impossible for this year." This
minute was not part of the telegram sent to Moscow. For Ghulam Siddiq (Gulam
Sittig) see documents Nos. 449 and 470.
No. 270
54/36438-40
Memorandiwi T>y the State Secretary
SECRET BERUN, October 17, 1939.
StS.No.822
The High Command of the Wehrmacht (General Jodl) today gave
me the following information concerning the Führer's orders and the
Navy's intentions with reference to merchant warfare against
England :
1
At present our naval vessels have instructions to sink without warning
merchant ships positively identified as of enemy origin. The only
exceptions are enemy passenger ships not proceeding in an enemy
convoy. Furthermore, it is permissible to sink without warning
1 These orders of the Fuhrer were recorded by Raede-r in a memorandum dated
Oct. 16. The German text is published in Trial of the Major War Criminals,
vol. xxxiv, document No. 157-O, Exhibit GB-224, pp. 608-609, and an English
translation appears in "Ftthrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1989-1945," published
in Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, pp. 51-52.
308 DOCTJME3STTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
neutrals whose conduct arouses suspicion (blackouts, changes of
course, etc.). Spanish, Russian, Japanese, and Italian merchant vessels
will at present be left alone.2
The memorandum3 handed the Fuhrer by Grand Admiral Raeder
yesterday on the continuation of merchant warfare against England
begins at the above-mentioned standpoint and then discusses a scale
of further intensifying measures. The ordering of these measures
is to depend, however, on a consultation between the High Command
of the Wehrmacht, the Foreign Ministry, and the offices concerned with
economic warfare. Theinvitations to such discussions will be extended
shortly.
Apparently these decisions are not very urgent.
The memorandum enumerates the following points :
Enemy merchant vessels should be sunk without warning regardless
of locality (this probably means also in the Western Atlantic, etc.).
The neutrals should be requested not to make use of enemy merchant
vessels any longer.
The neutrals should be requested to treat armed enemy merchant
ships the same as naval vessels.
The existing order to leave alone Spanish, Russian, Japanese, and
Italian merchant vessels should be rescinded.
The Air Force should operate against the principal British import
harbors (Air Force operations against enemy merchant vessels are
not yet permitted) .
Prohibition of "continued voyages".
Political and economic pressure should be brought to bear on the
Northern countries to stop delivering contraband to England.
The result of the above-mentioned measures should then be awaited;
if the result should be insufficient, the following measures shoxdd be
considered :
A blockade of all of England (in this the Navy seems to admit that
such a blockade would not be recognized by the neutrals, since it could
not be effective anyhow) . A "siege" of England. The Navy believes that such a siege would
have to be connected with the declaration of a sea area in which action
will be taken without warning and without exception (the Navy itself
is of the opinion that such intensified action cannot be considered as
long as the position of the neutrals has not been clarified) .
The promised invitation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht
to joint discussions is now to be awaited.4
WEIZSACKBR
*Itaeder's memorandum of Oct. 16 stated that it was decided to request the
Italian, Soviet, Spanish, and Japanese Governments to declare that their vessels
carried no contraband ; otherwise they would be treated as other neutrals.
* The German text of this "Memorandum on intensified naval warfare against
England," dated Oct. 15, 1939, together with four annexes, is printed in Trial
of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxiv, document No. 157-C, Exhibit GB-224,
pp. 6091-641.
4 No record of the meeting anticipated here has been found!
OCTOBER 1939 309
No. 271
127/69672-7
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram.
No. 594 of October 17 BXSRIJCT, October 18, 1939 12 : 40 a. m.
deceived Moscow, October 18 10 : 05 a. m.
For the Ambassador personally.
At an occasion soon to arise, I intend to speak in public about the
foreign political situation and shall then, with reference to Chamberlain's
latest speech,
1 deal with the future aims of England and the
English propaganda of lies. In this connection I would also like
to refute a lie recently circulated in quite specific form by the enemy
press, alleging that during my stay in Moscow I had asked the Soviet
Union for military assistance, but had met with an outright refusal.
I propose to say on this subject approximately the following :
"In its grave disappointment at the recent development in the international
situation, which has been strongly influenced by the establishment
of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet
Union, English propaganda has left nothing untried to discredit and
disturb this development and German-Russian relations. In its wellknown
manner, it stopped at nothing and has made use of the grossest
and most absurd lies. Thus, for instance, it has circulated the statement
that in the Moscow negotiations I had asked M. Stalin for military
assistance against Poland, France, and England. To this, M.
Stalin, however, is said to have given only the tart reply :
6RTot a single
soldier.' But what in reality was the course of these Moscow negotiations
? Let me reveal it to you :
"I came to Moscow on August 23 for the purpose of negotiating and
concluding, in the name of the Führer, a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union. I commenced the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov
with the statement that I had not come to Moscow, as the British and
French delegates had come in their time, to ask the Soviet Union for
armed assistance in case a war should be forced upon the German
Government by England. The German Government was not in need
of assistance for this contingency, but would, in this event, have sufficient
military strength to take up the struggle alone against Poland
and the Western foes and to carry it to a victorious conclusion. To
this Stalin, with his characteristic clarity and precision, replied spontaneously:
'Germany is taking a proud attitude by rejecting at the
outset any armed assistance from the Soviets. The Soviet Uniont
however, is interested in having a strong Germany as a neighbor and in
the case of an armed showdown between Germany and the Western
democracies the interests of the Soviet Union and of Germany would
certainly run parallel to each other, The Soviet Union would never
stand for Germany's getting into a difficult position.' I thereupon
thanked Stalin for his clear and precise statement and told him that
I would report to the Führer on this generous [gross&ugigen\ attitude
1 See document No. 246, footnote 1.
310
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the Soviet Government. Thus the German-Russian negotiations
were opened and this exchange of views created from the outset a generous
and friendly climate, in which within 24 hours the Non-Aggression
Pact and, in the course of further developments, at the end of
September, the Boundary and Friendship Treaty were concluded.
Upon the same political foundation it was likewise decided immediately
to inaugurate a comprehensive economic program, the implementation
of which is now being discussed at Moscow. Germany has need
of the raw materials of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union has need
of manufactured articles. There is no reason why the flourishing trade
of the past between the two nations should not soon revive* On the
contrary, I am firmly convinced that the former traditional friendship
between Germany and Russia has now been restored, and that it will
grow stronger and stronger and that the exchange of goods, wMcli is
complementary by nature, will result in an undreamed-of prosperity
for both nations in the future. Upon the same political foundation,
the German-Soviet declaration of September 28, 1939,
2 has also been
agreed upon, to the effect that both Governments would work toward
the restoration of peace upon conclusion of the Polish campaign. In
case these efforts should fail as they have both Governments would
recognize the responsibility of England and France for the continuation
of the war and at the same time provision would be made for
a consultation between the Government of the Reich and the Soviet
Government on the necessary measures to be taken. These consultations
are now under way and are proceeding in the same friendly spirit
as the Moscow negotiations, and on the firm basis of kindred interests.
In this connection, we expect an early visit of M. Molotov to Berlin.
I believe that this brief account is sufficient to sink once and for all the
whole raft of lies of the British Ministry of Lies and the other
blundering propaganda centers of our enemies, about the present German-
Russian negotiations and the future pattern of relations between
the two greatest countries of Europe."
Please inform M. Stalin as promptly as possible of the account of
the Moscow negotiations as given above and wire me his approval.
3
RIBBENTROP
* Document No. 161.
* See document No. 280.
No. 272
103/1117131-84
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 559 of October 18 Moscow, October 18, 1939 9 : 38 p. m.
Received October 195 : 00 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 509 of October II.1
I. The negotiations are not proceeding as methodically as we are
accustomed to in this kind of negotiations and as we envisaged here,
a Document No. 237.
OCTOBER 1939 311
too. The other side always takes a stand on only some of the specific
points in our list of requests, depending on the degree to which their
own day by day deliberations lead to internal clarification and decisions.
The progress of the other side in their own deliberations,
which was at first somewhat slow, was expedited in the past few days
as a result of the Ambassador's intervention with. Molotov.2
II. The following is the present status of the negotiations in the
individual fields :
First : In the case of grains, a million tons have been promised us,
with delivery in one to two months ; this probably includes nine hundred
thousand tons of barley. We thereupon authorized Herr Dassler
and Herr Donner of the Reich Grain Office, who had meanwhile
arrived, to negotiate immediately on the business details.
Second : As far as petroleum is concerned, the following was promised
: One hundred thousand tons of aviation gasoline, two hundred
thousand tons of motor gasoline, three hundred thousand tons of
diesel oil, two hundred thousand tons of fuel oil, one hundred thousand
tons of lubricating oil ; total, nine hundred thousand tons.
Instructions for the immediate commencement of the business negotiations
have been given by Mikoyan. Special quantities from Borysiaw
and Drohobycz are included in the total of nine hundred thousand
tons. It is not yet clear how we shall handle these special quantities.
It would probably be better in order to bring the contracts for the
entire amount of nine hundred thousand tons to a speedy close if these
special quantities did not receive strictly separate handling, since
the crude oil production and the amount of the crude oil from Boryslaw
and Drohobycz refined into various products can only be determined
on the spot and this will probably take a considerable length
of time. Before these things are determined, contracts for purchase
of these special quantities also cannot be concluded. On the other
hand, however, it is necessary in the future correspondence between
Ribbentrop and Molotov to insist on the special character of and
special promises for these special quantities. We shall report via the
best channels, as the occasion demands.
Third: Cotton, one hundred thousand tons. Please send experts
as soon as possible to attend to the closing of the contracts.
Fourth : On lumber no figures could yet be given us. It has been
generally stated for the present, however, that what will be promised
will come rather close to our request for lumber worth one hundred
and twenty million RM.
Fifth : In the case of ores, it was stated that we could have any
amount of manganese ore we wanted, but that export possibilities
*No record of this intervention has been found.
312 DOCXJMEiNTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
were very slight in the case of iron ore and chromium ore, since the
Soviet requirements have increased considerably.
III. Eegarding payment for raw materials from third countries,
after consulting Molotov Mikoyan made the proposal that the Soviet
Government pay 30 percent in foreign currency, and that for the remaining
70 percent Germany find the means of payment. We have
not yet declared ourselves in the matter. A special telegram on the
subject will follow.8
IV. With regard to German deliveries to the Soviet Union, a contract
for some special ships worth approximately 10 million RM has
been concluded ; also one for thirty thousand tons of tubes worth some
3 to 3^ million RM. Negotiations for the delivery of other special
ships are in progress. The other side also shows interest in hydrogenation
plants and a Fischer-Tropsch plant. Conversations of an
informational nature regarding the delivery of armaments material
have been held with Eltze,
4 who is returning to Berlin to obtain further
clarification.
On Thursday evening, Mikoyan will declare himself on many of
the items in our list of offers. We expect at this time also to receive
further statements on specific portions of our claims of last February 5
which have not yet been clarified.
V. The general impression thus far is not unfavorable, even though
the method of negotiation of the other side is rather tiresome. The
above-mentioned figures do not seem to us unsatisfactory in the specific
portions of the German list of requests thus far clarified. In view of
the aforementioned working method of the other side, who carefully
study among themselves section after section and then negotiate with
us point for point, it does not seem to us advisable to overemphasize
at this stage the question of total deliveries and force the other side
to make final statements on a definite total figure. By acceding to
the other side's working method of building the contractual structure
piece by piece from the bottom up, we shall achieve speedier and
better results than by the reverse method of working from the top
down.
VI. I shall make the length of my stay here dependent on the
result of the next meeting with Mikoyan Thursday evening. No
agreement on the substance of the negotiations as a whole is to be
expected from this conversation, to be sure, but a preliminary opinion
"Telegram No. 560 of Oct. 18 (2093/452715). The German delegation con*
sidered it improbable that a more favorable Soviet proposal could at present
be obtained and requested instructions from Berlin.
* Generaldirektor Eltze of Ausfuhrgemeinschaft fur Kriegsgerat of the Helens*
gruppe Industrie, a member of the German delegation (1369/357054). * On the negotiations for a 1939 German-Soviet Trade Agreement, see vol. iv,
ch. vi.
OCTOBER 1939 313
then presumably be possible. If I receive no instructions to the
contrary, I therefore intend to return at the end of this week.6
VII. Before returning I shall discuss with Mikoyan the question of
a possible press communique in which certain of the figures, such as
those on grain, petroleum, cotton, which will make effective publicity
are especially mentioned as an example of agreements already reached
within the framework of the economic program. If there are any
objections, please wire instructions.
HITTER
'Hitter returned to Berlin on Oct. 22, leading Schnurre in charge of the negotiations
in Moscow.
No. 273
10&/111728
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in
the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 600 BERLIN, October 18, 1939. W 2215 g, II.
With reference to our telegram No. 578 of October 16.1
For Kitter.
1) For your information. On the assumption that British tin and
rubber are to be forwarded to us, the Fxihrer has ordered that Russian
merchant ships carrying corresponding deliveries of lumber to England
shall, as in the past, remain unmolested.
The question of Anglo-Russian economic relations continues to
occupy the keen interest of the British public. In reply to a question
in the House of Commons, the President of the Board of Trade yesterday
agreed that the Government must take precautions so that the
tin and rubber should not be re-exported to Germany. With, reference
to the new conversations of the day before yesterday between the
Eussian Ambassador in London and Halifax, the press reports that
the British Government is considering sending a special envoy, perhaps
a Cabinet Minister, to Moscow for economic discussions.
'Not printed (2093/452702-03). An instruction by Weizsacker to Ritter to
enter into friendly discussions with the Soviet Government regarding Soviet shipment
of mining timbers to Britain and also, if necessary, regarding Soviet deliveries
in general to Germany's enemies, as the German Government could not
continue its policy of leaving Soviet ships unmolested if they actually carried
contraband to enemy countries. Weizsacker also stated, for Bitter's information
only, that confidential reports told of a large quantity of lumber being
assembled at Murmansk and Archangel for shipment to Britain.
314
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2) Please report by telegraph as to whether the discussions have as
yet brought out details of the Anglo-Russian barter agreement and
give any clues as to Russian intentions respecting the trade with
England.
2
WEEHL
* In telegram No. 557 dispatched at 5 : 09 p. m., Oct. 18, Bitter reported that
he had discussed the question of British-Soviet economic relations with
Mikoyan in a "thorough and friendly" way. Mikoyan described the agreement
for exchange of lumber for rubber, tin, copper, and other raw materials as
advantageous to the Soviet Union (and indirectly to Germany) and denied any
intention of aiding England economically. The amount of lumber involved
was relatively small and the entire risk was borne by Britain. Bitter recommended
that the matter be allowed to run its course unless new complications
arose (2093/452716-17) . Hitter's telegram presumably crossed Wiehl's telegram
printed here.
No. 274
2862/563120
Memorandum ~by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, October 18, 1939.
THE SHIPMENT OF TIN FROM THE NETHERLANDS INDIES VIA
THE SIBERIAN RAILWAT
During the conversations with Dr. Hirschfeld the latter told Herr
Walter and me that the Netherlands Government was also interested
in having Germany continue her imports from the Netherlands Indies
on as large as possible a scale. In view of the difficulties to which
shipments by the normal route would be exposed as a result of
British economic warfare, the Netherlands Government was prepared
to encourage shipment via the Siberian Railway and within the limits
of quotas to be agreed upon, to place foreign exchange at our disposal.
Geheimrat Kreuter 1 called on me today with reference to this matter.
He stated that the firm of Arnold Otto Meyer (Hamburg) was
very much interested in such shipments. Because of its widespread
connections of long standing in the Far East, it was particularly
adapted to arrange the necessary camouflage, and it had a trusted
agent immediately available who was eminently qualified to initiate
the transaction. Senator Witthofft, of the above-mentioned firm, was
prepared to come here with the agent to discuss the details with the
appropriate authorities.
1 Manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit See also document No. 535.
OCTOBER 1939 315
After consultation with the Economics Ministry (Herr Schlotterer) ?
I informed Herr Kreuter that we would first ascertain the view of
our delegation in Moscow as to whether and on what scale shipments
would be possible via Russia.2 I would revert to the matter as soon
as a reply had been received.
'Copies of this document were sent on the same day by courier to Schnurre
and Bitter in Moscow. See document No. 237.
In telegram No. 14 of Jan. 23, 1940, the German Consulate in Batavia was informed
that difficulties in the way of transit traffic in raw materials via Japan
and the Soviet Union had been removed and that Soviet consular authorities in
japan and Manchuria would issue necessary papers for such shipments (83T4/-
B590708).
No. 275
83/2422i38
Memorandum "by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 827 BERLIN, October 18, 1939.
The Italian Ambassador told me today that a new stalemate had
occurred in the negotiations on the repatriation of the South Tirolese,
and it was owing to a trifle in comparison with the whole problem.1
Clodius evidently had orders to be intransigent with regard to the
transport of the possessions of the emigrants, and to demand payment
for the transport as well as the insurance and packing material. Now
he, Attolico, suggested that Italy should take over the transport of the
goods and persons on the Italian railroad, whereas the remainder
would be paid either by the emigrants or by the Reich Government.
After all, it should be possible to reach an agreement on this basis in
order finally to settle the matter at this time. Of course Attolico
Jpointed again to the parallel with the Baltic countries, where we allegedly
acted so much more generously.
I absolutely denied that we had given Clodius instructions to be
intransigent, and said that I was unable to make a statement before
investigating the matter.
1 Only 5 days earlier, on Oct. 13, Mackensen had reported Ciano's satisfaction
that agreement had been reached between Himmler and Bocchini (1982/440236).
Himmler would instruct Clodius in Rome to conclude on the agreed terms. See
document No. 244, footnote 3. The agreement was signed on Oct. 21 (119/119188-
226), and was accompanied by a secret exchange of notes (5831/E425174-79).
260090 54
DOCUMENTS ON GEKMA2ST FOREIGN POLICY
No. 276
86WB602581-83
Fuhrer*s Directive
CHEFSACHE BERLIN, October 18,
TOP SECRET MUJCTART
The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA No. 181/3& GkChefs. L I
By officer only
DUCECTIVE No. 7 TOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
Until the planned attack against the western enemy is begun, the
previous directives for warfare in the West are supplemented herewith,
1. Permission is granted effective immediately as follows :
The Army may cross the French border with patrols but only as far
as this is necessary for reconnaissance and for keeping in touch with.
an enemy avoiding contact.
The Luftwaffe may send fighter escorts into French territory as far
as this is necessary for protecting our reconnaissance ; may raid British
naval forcesmnowcd harbors (oral advance notification) .
The Navy may attack enemy passenger ships which are in a convoy
or are sailing without lights.
The Führer will decide on all other measures suggested for the purpose
of intensifying the war against British shipping, as soon, as these
measures have been checked by the OKW as to their political and economic
effect.
The attacks against British naval vessels at sea and in naval harbors
are to be continued at every favorable opportunity, the Navy and the
Luftwaffe cooperating closely.
2. In case a Franco-British invasion into Belgium must "be repulsed
(Directive No. 6,
1 paragraph 6), the Army will be permitted to enter
Luxembourg territory.
If that occurs, the Luftwaffe will support the Army directly and will
protect it from raids by British and French air forces. Our Luftwaffe
will also interfere with the approach and transport of enemy forces.
A further objective is to prevent British troop landings in Belgium
and Holland and to prevent British and French air forces from gaining
a foothold there. For this purpose flights will be allowed over the
entire western frontier of Germany. Raids on industrial targets and
such raids as might endanger the civilian population to a high degree
are not permitted in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
1 Document No. 224.
OCTOBER 1939 317
For the Navy, the principles stated in Directive No. 6, paragraph 5,
apply in this case? a^so*
3, Besides the measures taken by the commanders of the individual
branches of the Wehrmacht, the offices directly subordinate to the
OKW (particularly the Inspector of the Wehrmacht Signal Communications
and the Intelligence and Propaganda Division) should
work together to conceal our preparations for an attack.
Pertinent suggestions and requests are to be submitted as soon as
possible to the OKW, Operations Planning.
By order:
JxEITEL
Countersigned: WAHUMONT
Colonel, Greneral Staff
No. 277
1571/380196-99
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreiffn Ministry
Telegram
URGENT SOME, October 19, 1939 12 : 25 a. m.
TOP SEOKET Received October 19 5 : 00 a. m.
No. 702 of October 18
With reference to our telegram No. 692.1
In spite of the negative attitude of the Italian Government, which
I reported, I have continued to work on the question of the transit
through Italy of raw materials for Germany, with the following
results :
1. The Duce informed me today through a member of the Government
who discussed the question once more with him at my urging
that he would see that deliveries of all Italian raw materials to
Germany would be facilitated in every way. Italy was also willing to
help with all possible means in the organization of German exports
via Italy. This necessarily involved the elastic application of Italian
regulations. Italy was also willing to assist to the limit and wherever
technically possible in the import of foreign raw materials to Germany
via Italy. However, this help must not lead to armed conflict with
England and France. Italy could enter the war only for the sake of
great objectives when the time was ripe both politically and militarily,
and could not be drawn into the war by such questions at a possibly
undesirable moment.
1 Document No. 260.
318
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The informant adds confidentially that on this occasion the Duce
again stated his conviction that Italy would participate in the wary
with the remark that "he could not and would not formulate Italy's
policy as if she were Switzerland."
2. In a further conversation today Ciano told me in the same sense
that the Italian Government knew how important raw material
supplies were for Germany, and was aware of its obvious duty to help
us in every way. Therefore, by order of the Duce he had instructed
all offices concerned to exhaust every single economic or technical
possibility, also with regard to the particularly difficult question of
transit imports to Germany via Italy. However, naturally only such
deliveries could be considered as could be camouflaged and passed
through the British control. In particular, it would be necessary to
keep at least approximately within the limits of the past import
statistics. Count Ciano telephoned the agencies involved in my
presence and instructed them to promote the transit to Germany asmuch
as was humanly possible.
3. Then Count Ciano asked me to inform the Foreign Minister that
in the meantime he had discussed in detail with the Duce the question
of more vigorous political activity by Italy against England in the
fight against the blockade, for instance at the head of a bloc of the
states of Southeastern Europe. The Duce had instructed him to tell
the Foreign Minister that although the first suggestion came from the
Italian Ambassador in Berlin he considered it inadvisable at the
present moment to initiate any sort of action at the head of the
neutrals. He disliked being placed on the same level with the neutral
powers, even if only outwardly ; this was in contradiction to Italy's
attitude. I stressed once more that in this connection we had naturally
never thought of underlining Italy's position as a neutral power;
on the contrary the aim was actually supposed to be intensification of
the anti-British attitude. Count Ciano replied that nevertheless the
Duce felt that at the present time any sort of joint protest action
through diplomatic channels, which could be interpreted as being
done in the name of neutral powers, was inadvisable. Count Ciano
added that one must not forget that the Duce had begun his political
career as an interventionist and that even now it went against his
grain to be stamped as neutral, even outwardly.
4. Since the Italian Government has changed its former stand and
has secretly assented also to the import of raw materials via Italy,
I shall now continue trying to organize the execution of such transactions
in so far as possible. However, there will still be a considerable
number of technical difficulties with subordinate offices even now.
CLODIUS
MACKENSEN
OCTOBER 1939 319
No. 278
1793/40'8574
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT HELSINKI, October 19, 1939 8 : 22 p. m.
No. 313 of October 19 Received October 19 9 : 25 p. m.
Pol. VI 2405.
The Finnish. Government continues to maintain the strictest secrecy
regarding Russian demands. The Finnish people are calm but are
firmly determined to defend the independence and integrity of the
Finnish mainland, by force of arms, if necessary. The stubborn
attitude of the people will limit the freedom of the Finnish plenipotentiary
to negotiate.
The mobilization has been concluded and the troop concentration
completed.
The Scandinavian and United States demarches 1 in Moscow and
Finland and the friendly press comments from these countries as well
as from England, France, and South America are raising the morale
here and create the impression that iri the impending conflict the whole
world, with the exception of Germany, is supporting Finland, at least
morally.
Pro-German circles are at the moment completely disconcerted; in
many, a total change of sentiment is taking place. Government representatives
maintain a correct attitude, but the previous close political
collaboration is a thing of the past.
Please inform OKH. BLTJCHER
1 The Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Governments presented identical notes
to the Soviet Government on Oct. 12. The text of President Roosevelt's message
to President Kalinin, dated Oct. 11 and delivered Oct. 12, is printed in
Department of State, Bulletin, 1939, vol. I, p. 95, along with Kalinin's reply.
No. 279
82O/E5-88S69~7O
Circular of the State Secretary 1
Telegram en clair
BERLIN-, October 19, 1939.
zu B 25440 Angabe I.2
With reference to telegraphic instruction of September 29.s
The British Government claims that to proceed under British naval
escort affords neutral merchant vessels greater protection and does not
a Hewel had informed Weizs&cker the day before of Hitler's wish that a new
warning along these lines be issued to the neutrals (51/33915). The telegram
was sent to all the principal Missions.
*R 25440: 8280/E588267. 8 Not printed fS28O/E58826O-66^ SAP documpnt No. 144. footnote 3.
320 DOCTJMESTTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
signify a breach of neutrality. You are requested to notify the Government
there at once as follows with reference to this matter :
German forces will combat British and French convoys by force of
arms. German action will be directed not only against the naval
escorts but also against all convoyed ships without exception. This is
in accordance with generally recognized rules of naval warfare. At
the same time it should again be pointed out that all neutral merchant
vessels, including passenger steamers, which proceed at night without
lights expose themselves to be mistaken for enemy naval vessels or
auxiliary naval vessels, and consequently to the danger of being
annihilated.4
Please send a telegraphic report upon execution of this instruction.
WEIZSACKER
4 A supplementary circular of Oct. 22 directed that neutral governments should
be informed that they ought to warn their nationals against traveling on British
and French ships (8280/E588277-83).
No. 280
1-271/696610
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
tniGBNT Moscow, October 19, 1939.
No. 568 of October 19
With reference to your telegram No. 594 of October 17.1
Molotov today informed me that Stalin approved the account of
the negotiations in Moscow that the Reich Foreign Minister contemplates
making in his forthcoming speech. He only asked that instead
of the sentences quoted as the statement of Stalin : "Germany
was taking a proud attitude . . ." up to ". . . getting into a difficult
position," the following version be adopted : "The attitude of Germany
in declining military aid commands respect. However, a strong Germany
is the absolute prerequisite for peace in Europe, whence it
follows that the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong
Germany. Therefore the Soviet Union cannot give its approval to
the Western Powers' creating conditions which would weaken Germany
and place her in a difficult position. Therein lies the community
of interests between Germany and the Soviet Union." 2
SCHTJLENBTJKG
1 Document No. 271.
*The sentences discussed were apparently intended for Bibbentrop's speech
given at Danzig on Oct. 24, but according to the text of that speech as printed
they were not used. Cf. Dokumente der Deutschen PoUtilc, vol. vn, pt i, PP-
362-381.
OCTOBER 1939 321
No. 281
an Official of the Foreign Ministers Personal Staff
BERUN, October 19, 1939.
Colot, the Secretary of the Belgian Embassy, returned this noon
from a short visit to Brussels. He confirmed the fact to members of
his Embassy that the Government circles in Brussels still see a chance
for peace. Reports received there from London and Paris indicate
that, in spite of the negative reaction of the German press to Chamberlain's
speech in the House of Commons, England and France are
still counting on the possibility that the Führer will not at this moment
make his final military decisions, which would be irrevocable. London
and Paris, too, are waiting for some diplomatic initiative by the
neutrals. The talk recurs repeatedly to Roosevelt, who is now regarded
as the only person who comes into consideration for any serious
peace move. One can assume that the representatives of many European
countries in Washington have tried these last days to encourage
the American President to accept the role of mediator. The Belgian
diplomat, who was totally pessimistic when he left for Brussels, states
that there was as yet no sign of 100 percent pessimism in Belgian
Government circles, which are very well informed. The Belgian
Government itself still clings to the hope that it will be possible to
avert the unloosing of a frightful war in Western Europe at the last
minute, as it were.
The Belgian diplomat claims that Brussels is convinced that the
Führer, too, does not regard the present situation as final. It is asserted
that the Reich Government is also delaying its final decisions
because supposedly it is not yet convinced that the final word for war
has been given.
The Belgian Embassy itself is not as optimistic as its informant
from Brussels. But even there the impression still persists that
fundamentally Germany, too, would prefer a peaceful solution to a
spreading of the war.1
L[IKTJS]
1
Marginal note: "Ffiilirer] : They do not believe that we are in earnest.
R[ibbentrop]"
322 DOCUMENTS OIST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 282
322/193531
Memorandum T>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department
, October 19, 193&.
The organization of the trade relations with Spain tinder wartime
conditions presents special difficulties because the flow of trade can
be maintained only as camouflaged transit through Italy as long as the
sea routes are subject to interference by the enemy powers. It is in our
interest to get the maximum quantity of Spanish raw materials
through this channel and to keep the Spanish from resuming exports
of raw materials to the enemy powers. The Spanish Government lias
on several occasions assured our Ambassador of its great desire, despite
the war, to carry into effect as much as it is possible the economic
collaboration envisaged prior to the outbreak of the war. It has
repeatedly requested the opening of negotiations, which has thus far
not been possible, because the Italian Government's position on facilitating
the transit traffic was not clear.
Now that this issue has been clarified, these negotiations ought to
be started at the earliest opportunity. Even though the economic
results of these negotiations would of necessity be slight compared to
former plans, it would nonetheless be desirable to indicate to the
Spaniards, also by the selection of the chief negotiator, that we, too,
on our part, are anxious despite the war to carry out the original
plans as far as possible.
I should like to propose the appointment of Herr Staatsrat Wohlthat
as the chief negotiator; he conducted the earlier discussions with the
Spaniards and is therefore the person most suitable for continuing
them and adjusting them to present conditions. Herr Wohlthat
would have to go to Borne as promptly as possible for briefing by
Minister Clodius as to the facilities for transit, and then take a
plane to Madrid. The estimated duration of the negotiations would
be about 2 weeks.
When I asked him, Herr Wohlthat said that he was personally
prepared to undertake the trip but was not quite sure whether the
Field Marshal might not want to have him available here for some
other tasks in the near future.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary with the request for authorization to ask the Field Marshal
for his consent to Herr Wohlthat's trip to Spain.
1
WIEHL
*G8ring raised objections to the sending of Wohlthat to Madrid (38S2/-
E047508), but tie was finally delegated to go, arriving on Oct. 31 (3868/E045875).
OCTOBER 1939 323
No. 283
276/178649-50 ;
276X178^52
Chief of Protocol Dorriberg to Ambassador ScTuulenburgr
BEBUST, October 19, 1989.
Keceived October 22.
DEAR COUNT ScHULEKTBtiRG : The Foreign Minister has asked me to
inform you as follows :
On the occasion of his second visit to Moscow he was particularly
anxious that in the demarcation of the definitive boundary the district
of Suwalki should be given to Germany or included in the German
sphere of influence* The Foreign Minister was interested in the fact
that the very valuable forests of Augustow, in which royal red deer
are supposedly found, are situated in the Suwalki region. So far as
I can recall from a conversation with the Minister, M. Stalin granted
his wish, saying that the region should be awarded to Germany for
her Foreign Minister because of its fine stags.
The Foreign Minister recently sent me to Poland to arrange for the
protection of our hunting interests. While so doing, I found that
in. the whole of the Suwalki region and in the forests of August6w
there are no royal stags or stags of any sort.
Bed deer are said to appear only when migrating. The Minister
was naturally very disappointed at learning this. I then tried to
find something suitable in the rest of Poland. In Warsaw I spoke
with competent Polish forestry and hunting people, and from this
it was quite plain that the really good hunting grounds, and particularly
the hunting grounds for red deer, have fallen almost exclusively
to Russia.
The most famous hunt in Poland, was, as we know, at Bialowieza.
The hunting grounds there, however, are known more for the presence
of lynx, wolf, elk, and bison, than for royal red deer. The large deer
are still in the Carpathian hunting grounds, and there, too, unfortunately,
in the part east of the San that was ceded to Russia. According
to the statements of a Carpathian huntsman, with whom. I am
personally well acquainted, there are two wonderful hunting grounds
in this part of the Carpathians south of Boryslaw. One is called
Skole,
1 and is on the Opor River* This district is said to have been
kept in excellent condition, with shooting boxes, hunting paths, and
game-keepers almost exclusively of German origin. The second famous
Carpathian hunting ground belonged to the Metropolite of
Lwow; it was called Zolotvina-Mizunska, near Stryj.
The Foreign Minister now requests you to tell either M. Molotov or
M. Stalin himself that there are no stags at August6w, and to suggest
1
Marginal note in SchuLenbTirg's handwriting: "Belonged to Baron GrSdel."
324 DOCTJMENTS OX GBBMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
that he be leased one of the two hunting grounds in the Carpathians.
The Minister also sees certain political advantages in this proposal
since through his hunting visits to Russia he could come in closer
contact with personages in Russia. The Minister is himself in doubt
as to whether the Russians will accede to such a proposal, but he would
like to have the attempt made, in any case, and he leaves it to you to
make his wish known in whatever form seems appropriate.8
Next I should like to refer to my letter of October 7,
3 in which. I
asked for another delivery of caviar. The Minister asked me for it
because he would like to have the caviar given to the badly wounded
who can take no other nourishment. Perhaps the next courier could
bring the shipment along with him. It would be much appreciated
here if the amount could be increased by another one kilogram can.
1 should also like to state in conclusion that Count Lrudwig Christian
zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, whom I commended to you in my letter of
September 24,* has meanwhile turned up in a hospital as a German
prisoner of war. I wish to thank you sincerely for your efforts in this
matter.
My wife asks me to give you her kindest regards, and I myself remain,
as ever3
Hen Hitler I
Yours, etc., AUBXANDDBK DORKBERG
2 Marginal note : "Berlin, November 3, 1989. The Foreign Minister and Dornberg
have been informed that Molotov 'will find a way* to comply with the wish
of the Foreign Minister. Sehu[lenburg]."
On Nov. 1 Schulenburg had handed Molotov a note in Russian (276/178651)
asking on what conditions (temporary use, lease, etc.) Ribbentrop might hunt
in the Carpathians, particularly in the two regions suggested, and had received
the answer noted here. DSrnberg wrote again on Dec. 5 about this matter
(276/178583-84), and Schulenburg replied on Dec. 12 that when he had raised
the question about 2 weeks previously and again on Dec. 10, Molotov each tune
promised a prompt answer. Schulenburg suggested that the matter might proceed
faster if DSrnberg came to Moscow (276/178585-80). * Not found.
4 Not found.
No. 284
49&/234192
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Cipher letter
No. 1038 g MADRID, October 19, 1939.
1. As lias been indicated in my reports, the Foreign Minister 1 and
the Under State Secretary 2 provide me regularly with information
found in the telegraphic and written reports from the Spanish diplomatic
Missions abroad.
1 Col. Juan Beigbeder Atienza.
* J. Peche y Cabeza de Vaca.
OCTOBER 1939 325
It might be possible to make even better use of this cooperation if I
were kept informed of any specific questions on which we want to get
information, in so far as they concern matters which presumably
would come to the attention of the Spanish diplomatic representatives
abroad and particularly in the enemy countries.
2. To strengthen security, I shall henceforth refer to information
supplied to me by the Minister or the Under State Secretary, by:
"Wilhelm reports" or "August reports."
Please acknowledge receipt of this message by telegraph.
STOBCKER
No. 285
46a/226013
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTRGESTT Moscow, October 20, 1939 4 : 22 a. m.
TOP SECRET Received October 20 11 : 45 a. m.
No. 567 of October 19
Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Ambassador in London
had recently had a number of talks with Halifax, Churchill, Eden, and
Butler. The most interesting was his talk yesterday with Butler.
Butler stated that the British Government would be ready to make
peace even tomorrow if it -received assurance that the understanding
reached would ensure peace for 20 or 25 years. The British Government
would regard as such assurance a guarantee pronounced by all
major -powers, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union.
In such an event the British Government would be prepared, in the
interest of a lasting peace, to make important concessions to Germany
even in respect to colonies. In as much as such a peace could not be
expected at this time, England would continue the war. Butler
pointed out that Germany's latest peace offensive had been a fiasco ; he
is inclined to believe, however, that new peace efforts later on in the
war might have better prospects of success. Molotov believes Maisky's
telegram conveys the impression that a Soviet mediation would not be
unwelcome to the British Government. I asked Molotov to confirm
whether Maisky had interpreted Butler's words the same as he had.
Molotov promised to let me know as soon as possible.
1
1
Schulenburg reported in a telegram of Nov. 13 (352/202726) that lie had
spoken that day with Molotov, who told him that Maisky had added nothing
substantial to his previous report, and that "Maisky did not have the impression
that Butler had Soviet mediation in mind."
326
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 286
F3/0019-0012
Memorandum 'by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
BERLIN-, October 21, 198*9.
Eeception of Slovak Minister Cernak by the Fuhrer on October 21
from 12 : 00 to 12 : 45 p. m. State Minister Meissner and Senior
Counselor Hewel were also present.
Cernak expressed thanks for his reception and conveyed the congratulations
of the Slovak Government on the victorious conclusion
of the Polish campaign. He continued as follows :
He had wished to present a request which in the meantime, however,
had probably become unnecessary, since he had been told just an hour
ago that the areas lost to Poland would now definitely be reunited
with Slovakia.1 This had been the greatest desire of the Slovaks, for.
they had every right to these areas, on historical grounds as well as
on ethnological, military, moral, and linguistic grounds. The only
thing he could do now was to thank the Fuhrer that his request had
already been fulfilled. He asked that the German Reich confirm this
reincorporation in writing, as had been done between Germany and
Russia and Russia and Lithuania. The Führer promised that this
would be done and added that Slovakia had behaved very decently
in this dispute, in contrast to another country. "Your conduct has
definitely established the Slovak state/'
From now on Germany would no longer permit anyone to infringe
upon the rights of Slovakia.
Cern&k mentioned that Slovakia was very small compared to other
countries. She pursued a policy based on a community of interests
with Germany. Germany had helped Slovakia become a state; as a
state she was practically an infant. In the past five or six months
she had been forced to work extremely hard to consolidate the state,
and a few mistakes had been made. But the Slovaks had not done
a great deal of talking, like other countries, and had not wished and
asked for much; they had acted and taken risks. The word gratitude
was unknown in the field of politics, but Slovakia would be happy
to reintroduce it there.
1 The Protectorate Government, in a similar manner, had taken the opportunity
of the Polish defeat to ask that the Teschen area be returned to the Protectorate.
Neurath endorsed this request and transmitted it to Lammers on Oct. 3
(1764/405559-62). Woermann recorded on Oct. 12 that the Political and the
Economic Policy Departments of the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Voltsdeutsche
Mittelstelle, had opposed this transfer, and that in any event, Hitler
had already decided that Teschen should not go to the Protectorate (1T64/
405571).
OCTOBER 1939 327
The Führer described the development of Slovakia as he saw it.
He said that he had originally seen Slovakia only through Hungarian
spectacles. He had always believed that Slovakia wished to return
to the "thousand-year Hungarian realm." But when on one occasion
he had discussed with the Hungarians the possibilities of a plebiscite
and the Hungarians had said that the Slovaks were not entirely reliable,
after all, he had gone into the question thoroughly and had
only then become aware of Slovakia's aspirations toward independence.
The Poles, too, had told him that Slovak was really only a
Polish dialect and Slovakia really belonged under Polish influence.
Finally he had become convinced, however, that Slovakia did not
want either.
Cemak said that Germany had had the power to act quite differently
with reference to Slovakia, but the Führer assured him that
Germany had absolutely no territorial interest there. The Carpathians
were the borderline of Germany's interests. Germany had to
have a barrier against the great power groups to the southeast, whose
development was unpredictable. He had had confidence in Slovakia.
Germany's relation to these countries was really a question of confidence.
If Germany had been able to trust Czechia, she would still
be in existence today, just as after the separation of the Sudeten
German areas. With Poland it was different. He often considered
Poland's fate really tragic, although some incredibly base acts were
committed during the fighting. But the West was entirely responsible
for this. Just as in the past, England was still searching the
entire world for countries to do the fighting for her. By looking
at the map one could see the absurdity of the [British] Empire; this
ridiculous little country wanted to control the world. It could do so
only because there always existed foreign peoples and countries which
shed their blood for England. This did not suit us Germans, for
we considered it a matter of honor for a nation to defend its own
interests. Thus, for example, we were not permitting any Czech
troops to fight for us.
If Germany assumed a guarantee for Slovakia, she would of course
hava to have certain military facilities there ; this could not be avoided.
A certain bond of sympathy had always existed between the Poles
and the Hungarians, resulting from the rule of the magnates in both
countries. These magnates, who exploited their poor fellow countrymen
in the most ruthless manner and did not have the slightest understanding
of social obligations, had connections beyond the frontiers
of the country, and one could never know whether these connections
might not result in some sort of political agreement. Therefore one
had to be careful.
328 DOCUMENTS OJST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Oernak said that Germany's confidence in Slovakia was surely
greater now than six months ago. But he had still another question
which concerned statements by the Führer, some of them from his
speech pertaining to the resettlement of ethnic groups.2 About 40 percent
of the Slovak people were living outside the borders of the Slovak
state. The Führer replied that his statements had referred primarily
to the Baltic countries. The situation was very simple there. He
had always had full understanding for Russia's desire for ice-free
ports. Germany had many of them, and Russia's efforts to obtain
such ports would always have been a threat to peace in the future too.
Germany did not want to oppose natural political developments, however.
Thus she had come to an agreement with Russia concerning
their respective spheres of interest, since he (the Führer) did not
want to have "stupid wars" develop at some later time after his death.
Cernak then spoke of about six hundred thousand Slovaks who had
been, living in Hungary in compact ethnic groups since the Vienna
Award. The Führer said that the separation of these areas had
partly resulted from the hesitant uttitude of Slovakia in those decisive
days. At that time the Slovak Government had caused a great
deal of difficulty at the idea of admitting German troops, so that at
the decisive moment he had been convinced that he should stay out
of these matters entirely and not burden himself with them. He asked
M. Cern&k whether the figures he had just mentioned were really
reliable. Oern&k confirmed this and said that Hungarian statistics
were to a large degree fraudulent. These figures, however, were
taken from reliable census data of the year 1910. He spoke subsequently
of the oppression by the Magyars of the Slovaks living in
Hungary. The Führer agreed and further commented upon the
peculiar Hungarian attitude. The Hungarians did not want to learn
anything from us in certain fields: They even . . . Germany on account
of her social . . .
3 He draws a parallel between . . . and the
great land owners in Hungary ... he had eliminated any basis
for . . .
When Cern&k asked whether there was a possibility for Slovakia
to discuss the population question at some later date, the Führer
answered that he would contact the Slovak Government as soon as
this problem was ready for discussion. Understandable as these efforts
were here in Germany, he realized nevertheless that it would
take decades to carry them out. We had noticed that already in the
case of Italy and Poland. But he wanted to draw definitive boundaries,
because he believed that this would lead to peace in the political
sphere also.
a See Editors' Note, p. 227.
* These passages are only partly legible.
OCTOBER 1939 329
Cernak asked whether he could officially inform his Government
of the reincorporation of the territories, the Führer said he
could do so, and he would confirm this later in a state treaty. Cernfik
said that an announcement in the press was the best argument to be
used against Benes and the other agitators. He also said that the
fact should become known that if a nation was not taking a hostile
attitude toward Germany's vital interests it could expect the greatest
loyalty on the part of Germany, as the Slovaks had experienced it.
The Führer answered that he would perhaps make use of this argument
at some opportune moment.
The Führer closed the conversation by speaking at some length
about England, which had actually been entirely indifferent to the
Czechs and Poles. Henderson himself had told him that the Poles
were "lousy dogs". He made a few more statements about Germany's
strength.
After a remark regarding a press communique to be drawn up the
Slovak Minister took his leave. The conversation went off in a very
cordial manner.
No. 287
Memorandum by the State SeGret&ry
St.S. No. 836 BERLIN-, October 21, 1939.
I discussed the Turkish-British-French treaty 1 with the Italian
Ambassador today. In doing so I made it clear to Attolico how the
Keich Foreign Minister had done his part in Moscow to prevent the
Turks from concluding with England and France a treaty with an
orientation offensive to Italy.
In the discussion of the details of the treaty I asked Attolico to let
me know some time whether and in what cases, in the opinion of the
Italians, British naval forces might still be expected to penetrate
into the Black Sea. It seemed to me that the text of the treaty left
certain doubts in this respect.
I especially asked Attolico, however, to inform me as soon as possible
whether the Italian Government would undertake a demarche
in Ankara because of the conclusion of this treaty, and, if so, what its
substance would be. I wished to ask this question since the treaty,
concluded now during a time of war, was in its general tendency of
*This treaty was signed at Ankara on Oct. 19, 1939. The text In English and
French Is published in the League of Nations Treaty Series, voL cc, pp. 167-175.
330 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
course directed against us, but viewed in its practical significance
naturally aimed primarily at Italy.
2
WEIZSAGKER
1 On Oct. 26 Attolico replied that Italy's attitude was that of waiting and
reserve (96/108085).
No. 288
2185/47-2247
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 837 BERLIN-, October 21, 1939.
Personal ! To the State Secretaries and Directors of the Departments
:
The Foreign Minister has just told me the following :
Until further notice he is forbidding members of the Ministry to
receive Ambassador von Papen, who is at present in Berlin, or to enter
into official conversations with him, especially concerning political
matters. This order is to be transmitted to the directors of departments
at once.
In so far as I shall not personally be in a position to inform orally
the heads of departments of this today, I hereby request that you
take cognizance of the above. Please also give the necessary instructions
immediately to the senior officials concerned who are under
you.
Herr von Papen, for his part, is also to be informed by me at the
Foreign Minister's instruction.1
WEIZSAOKER
1 Of. Franz von Papen, Memoirs (London, 1952) , p. 457. This order represented
Ribbentrop's reaction to the news that Papen had disobeyed the Foreign Minister's
order not to discuss with Hitler recent conversations with Visserr
the Netherlands Minister in Ankara, concerning possible peace moves. On the
Papen-Visser conversations see document No. 242 and footnote 5.
No. 289
2422/511820-2,2
Charge d''Affaires Thomsen to Voider State Secretary Woermann
WASHINGTON, October 21, 1939.
zu Pol. IX 2353.1
DEAR WOEKMANN* : Owing to the outbreak of the war I have been
unable, for obvious reasons, to answer your letter of August 10 2 con-
* Pol. IX 2353 : The basic file number was assigned to the telegraphic reply to
this letter referred to in footnote 5.
'Not printed (2422/511823-24).
OCTOBER 1939 331
cerning the possibility of resuming social relations between the Foreign
Ministry and the American Embassy in Berlin on the one hand,
and the German Embassy in Washington and the State Department
on the other. Now that the courier route is available again to a
certain extent, I should like to say the following regarding the problem:
We broke off social intercourse with the State Department here at
the time, including the men handling German affairs, and have rigorously
maintained that condition since.3 The State Department is
naturally fully aware of the reasons, the more so as it has probably
been informed by Mr. Kirk that he, as he put it on some occasion, "is
being treated like an outcast." 4
The same paradoxical situations have resulted here in Washington
as in Berlin. The armed forces attaches carry on regular social intercourse
with all branches of the American armed services and in that
way are frequently in social contact with members of the State
Department.
In the interest of official business I would therefore consider it
desirable at any rate to relax the social ban sufficiently to make it
possible for normal social relations to be resumed at least between
the members of the Embassy staff and the men in the State Department
concerned with German affairs. I know that the State Department
would not be averse to such a resumption of social relations. Since
we were the ones who started the boycott, it is also up to us to take
the first step in lifting it, a step which, for the reasons cited, I con*
sider politically and objectively sound.5
Quite apart from the normalization of our social relations with
members of the State Department, I should like to add parenthetically
that since the outbreak of the war we have been completely boycotted
by so-called good society here and the greater part of the
Diplomatic Corps that is neutral. It is the same phenomenon as in
1914 and something that can be borne with equanimity.
With cordial regards and Heil Hitler !
Tours, etc., THOMSEK
* This step was taken by order of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on Jan. 4, 1939.
See vol. iv, document No. 520.
4 The quoted passage is in English in the original.
8 Woermann replied on Nov. 20 by telegram (2422/511819) stating that normal
social relations with the American Embassy in Berlin had been resumed at the
beginning of September, and that Thomsen was authorized to proceed similarly
in Washington.
332
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 290
23O/15208O
The Minister in Yugoslavia, to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 426 of October 22 BELGRADE, October 22, 1939 5 : 50 p. m.
Received October 22 9 : 15 p. m,
The possibility that the principles concerning repatriation of German
splinter groups, expressed in the Fuhrer's speech,
1 might be applied
to the volksdeutsch groups in Yugoslavia is beginning to arouse
serious concern and unrest among Volksdeutsche and Yugoslavs here.
I therefore request authorization to state in reply to inquiries and
for publication in the volksdeutsch press that the problem of repatriation
of German groups in Yugoslavia is by no means acute at the present
time and even later on would demand solution only in so far as this
might appear necessary in order to eliminate a serious cause of friction
between the countries. Naturally, the full accord of both Governments
and of aJl those affected by the action would always be a prerequisite
for any action of this kind.
1 See Editors' Note, p, 227.
No. 291
B21/B005148
The Charge dt'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 551 of October 22 WASHINGTON, October 22, 19396 : 01 p. m.
Received October 233 : 00 a- m.
For the State Secretary.
1. I have learned from a reliable source that after a talk with
Churchill, in which the latter expressed his expectation of America's
early entry into the war, Kennedy urgently warned the American
Government of the possible consequences of a repeal of the arms embargo,
stressing that Churchill's statement did not represent the views
of Chamberlain and the majority of the British Cabinet. The Cabinet,
rather, would prefer to avoid any intensification of warfare
which might be announced or initiated by a repeal of the American
arms embargo.
2. According to the same source, Beaverbrook at a club in New York
described France's domestic situation as serious and far from favorable
for the prosecution of the war.
THOMSBN
OCTOBER 1939 333
No. 292
F3/0020-0025
Memorandum "by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
FAREWELL VISIT OP THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL
OSHIMA, WITH TUB FTJHKER, OK OCTOBER 24, 1939, FROM 4 : 30 TO 5 : 10
KM 52
The Japanese Ambassador first delivered to the Führer some presents
from the Japanese industrialist, Fujiwara. After examining
these presents they sat down and tea was served.
General Oshima thanked the Führer for the reception and, at the instruction
of his Government, read a short statement which he had been
directed to communicate to the Führer personally. "By order of my
Government I have the following statement to make to you, Mr. Chancellor:
The Japanese Government and the Japanese people always
recall with sincere gratitude Germany's attitude toward Japan in the
Chinese conflict. The Japanese Government cherishes the hope that
the cordial relations existing between Germany and Japan will undergo
no change as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe, but, on the
contrary, will be maintained on the same friendly basis as ever."
The Führer replied that it was also our genuine desire more and more
to strengthen the friendship between Germany and Japan. Whatever
happened, one thing was certain : German and Japanese interests
would never in the least conflict. Where our German interests might
one day lie, there would definitely be no Japanese interests ; and where
Japanese interests lay, there were definitely no German interests.
Only nations whose interests did not conflict could get along together
permanently, and conflicts of interests were mainly the result of territorial
claims. German colonial demands in Africa were of no consequence
at all to Japan. It had always been the endeavor of the
Fuhrer to make clear-cut divisions between spheres of interest, as he
had indeed often demonstrated, and in this he had finally gone so far
as, for instance, the resettlement of the South Tirolese. From the
purely climatic standpoint alone, the Japanese spheres of interest were
unhealthful for Germans and not worth striving for. On the other
hand, there were naturally certain regions where Germany would
under no circumstances tolerate any interference. This, too, he had
demonstrated. When the British had asserted that their frontier lay
on the Rhine, even this had been sheer stupidity. But when they asserted
that their interests lay on the Vistula, this was actually idiotic
a.nd he had given them the right answer. Finally, notwithstanding
their grandiose contentions, they had even ignominiously abandoned
their Vistula frontier.
334
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
General Oshima then spoke enthusiastically of his trip to the West
Wall, of his inspection of the bunkers, and a long conversation followed
regarding the fortifications and their impregnability. The
military aspect of the Polish operation and the capture of Warsaw
were also spoken of* The Führer concluded this conversation -with a
reference to his confidence in victory, even if war now broke out in
earnest in the West. The war against England and France had not
yet begun. He was a man who always liked to be sure of himself and
therefore made his preparations very exactly and reliably. But in
the West, too, the superiority of the German Army would be
demonstrated.
Every enemy of Germany would also some time, in some way, become
the enemy of Japan. If somebody should assert that Germany
was all alone, he would say in reply that he did not want military help
of any kind. The 82 million Germans could deal alone with the military
problems that confronted them. Nor, frankly, would he care
to share the victory with anyone. He had also made this clear to
Mussolini and had told him, moreover, that he did not need Italy's
military assistance. We Germans did not understand the methods of
the British, who went about in the world begging in order to find
nations that were willing to shed their blood for them and their aims.
We Germans would make our own sacrifices of blood in shaping our
destiny, and this would also be the sounder way and would have its
effect in the development of a nation. It was the same with the
Japanese. He hardly thought that the Japanese desired military assistance
of any kind in China. One could do nothing more than
triumph and if one was confident of victory, one preferred to triumph
alone. What we needed from other nations was assistance in the form
of trade, and of this we had already assured ourselves. Naturally it
was of advantage to us if England met with opposition in all parts of
the world.
The Führer concluded the reception with words of great cordiality,
stating that he was sorry to see General Oshima go. General Oshima
replied that he would not [illegible words] to continue working for
German-Japanese friendship in Japan. Upon taking leave, the
Führer wished him good luck and a successful conclusion of the Japanese
conflict in China.
When the reception was concluded, the following press communique
was issued, for which I obtained the approval of the Führer.
"Berlin, October 24, 1939.
"Today in the new Keich Chancellery, the Führer received for his
farewell visit the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima,
who has been recalled from his Berlin post. By direction of his
Government, the Ambassador expressed the firm conviction that German-
Japanese friendship would continue unchanged."
OCTOBER 1939 335
No. 293
174/136181-82
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
HOST URGENT TOKYO, October 24, 1939 10 : 15 p. m.
No. 618 of October 24 Received October 24 7 : 45 p. m.
With, reference to my report of October 1.
In our first detailed discussion Ambassador Shiratori offered close
cooperation in promoting a nonaggression pact between Japan and
Russia, with the ultimate aim of active cooperation between Germany,
Japan, Kussia, and Italy.
His impressions from his first conversation with Minister President
J^be, Prince Konoye, and leading men from the armed forces and
industry confirm my interpretation of the situation which is en route
by courier.1 Shiratori observed a great increase in the power of the
pro-British Court circles and industry and indications of weakness
within the Army, in particular because of the JsTomonhan military
defeat with its heavy casualties. The principal foreign policy aims
at the present time are to put a quick end to the conflict in China and
to come to an agreement with America before the threatened termination
of the commercial treaty. In order to attain these goals, Court
circles have instituted, together with British propaganda, wide-spread
agitation against the Russian danger. The weak Abe Cabinet, maintained
in power with difficulty by the Court circles, is in a most
precarious position between America's demands for far-reaching
abandonment of the Japanese objectives in China and the radical
opposition of the anti-British group which is threatening terrorist
action. Shiratori is counting on the fall of the Cabinet soon and the
impossibility of reaching an agreement with England and America ;
he envisages the possibility then of a gradual rapprochement with
Eussia until a nonaggression pact is concluded, and he has begun to
work on individual leading officials and political groups parallel with
my continuing efforts to exert influence.
The chief obstacle in the way of our policy is the widespread doubt
of Russia's good will. The most effective refutation would be Russian
renunciation of Chiang Kai-shek, by which Japan's policy in
China could be so assisted that a nonaggression pact would be feasible.
Shiratori suggested that the Reich Foreign Minister be induced to give
him a statement to the effect that Germany was prepared and in a
position to exert such influence on Russia. He expected that this
would cause a strong reaction against Court circles and greatly ia-
1 See document No. 264.
336
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
fluence the Emperor, to whom he is to report on November 6. I agree
with Shiratori's opinion and repeat my proposal that Russia publicly
abandon her support of Chiang Kai-shek, and in addition unequivocally
deny the imperialistic aspirations in Chinese territory which have
recently been imputed to her by British propaganda. I request consideration
for Shiratori's suggestion of a confidential declaration by
the Foreign Minister of his readiness to act in this matter. I call
attention to another promising possibility which would be for the
Russian standpoint to be announced for the first time through the
new Russian Ambassador, who has just left Moscow.2
OTT
a The new Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Oonstantin Smetanin, arrived
at Ms post early in November. Ott noted in a report of Nov. 9 (157/131092-95)
that Smetanin gave several interviews en route, repeatedly stressing the
friendly nature of his mission and Russia's readiness for an understanding.
No. 294
8126./B58200-7
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States
Telegram
No. 480 BERLIN, October 24, 1939 10 : 30 p. m.
e. o. R 26170
For the Charge d3Affaires personally, confidentially.
For the purpose of examining the question whether and in what way
we are to take a position on the enactment of the Pittman Bill,
1
please
wire us now the argument which could be effectively put forward from
precisely the American standpoint if the occasion arises. As soon as
the final formulation of the law is fixed, please send us a further telegraphic
report.
"WEIZSACKER
1 In an earlier draft of the telegram, altered in handwriting on this copy, this
opening clause had read : "As soon as the Pittman Bill becomes law we intend in
a detailed note to lodge a protest with the American Government on grounds of
discrimination against Germany and violation of neutrality."
The Pittman Bill, introduced in the United States Senate on Oct. 2 by Senator
Key Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, provided for repeal
of those provisions of American neutrality legislation banning shipment of arms
to belligerents.
No. 295
51/aS921-22
Memorandum, ~by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 843 BKRT.TTST, October 24, 1939.
For the Foreign Minister.
War against merchant shipping requires a daily exchange of ideas
between the Foreign Ministrv anrl t"h wv>T*arVif TVi
OCTOBER 1939 337
sible benefit could be achieved by our Navy against enemy and neutral
shipping for the purpose of combating England if the Navy would
sweep clean the seas around England by utilizing all available means
and methods of warfare. The Wehrmacht fully realizes, however,
that it must consider certain economic and political factors, depending
on the situation, which will restrict the methods of warfare.
Finding the proper limits in this respect is the purpose of the daily
exchange of ideas between the Foreign Ministry and the Wehrmacht.
So far the conferences between these two offices have taken place
informally at the Foreign Ministry or the Wehrmacht as convenient.
Just yesterday, however, I indicated that as a rule I would prefer
these discussions to be held daily in our building, especially since three
departments of the Foreign Ministry are regularly involved (Political,
Economic Policy, Legal) . The question of who should preside at the
conferences has so far not played any role and I have also requested
that it not be made a question of competence or prestige. Actually
in these matters, the Wehrmacht cannot act without the Foreign Ministry,
nor the Foreign Ministry without the Wehrmacht. So far we
have been on excellent terms. As a rule orders to the naval forces
are shown to us in advance, just as we in turn show the Navy our
instructions and notes in advance.
I believe that it would therefore be best to retain this procedure and
to take into account the importance of the Ministry and the very heavy
work load of the directors, etc., by generally holding the conferences
at the Foreign Ministry.
As a rule it is superfluous to invite economic representatives to these
conferences, which are essentially concerned with the legal aspects of
naval warfare.
The cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Foreign Ministry,
herein described which moreover existed all during the war of 1914 -
1918 relates to the Commission for the Economic [Requirements of the
War, which was appointed by Field Marshal Goring, only in exceptional
cases.
WEIZSACKER
No. 296
1625/8-8924&-4T
Memorandum ~by the Director of the Political Department x
, October 24, 1939.
Pol. II 4236.
I told the Rumanian Minister, who paid me a visit today, that we
were greatly displeased by the inclusion of Rumania in the Turkish-
* On Oct, 26 this document was sent as a circular to the Missions in Europe
338
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
English-French pact.
2 I reminded M. Crutzescu that on his return
from Ankara in June M. Gafencu had, vis-k-vis our Minister, claimed
it as his personal success that Turkey had promised complete elimination
of any reference to the Balkans in the treaty that was to be
signed.
3 To this the Minister replied that he could give us these
formal and solemn assurances : Turkey's commitment to assist Eng.
land and France in case the Anglo-French guarantee to Rumania became
operative had been inserted in the pact without any knowledge
whatever on the part of the Rumanian Government and Rumania was
in no way affected by this commitment. I answered that in July, following
the above-mentioned declaration made to our Minister in June,
M. Gafencu appeared to have been aware of the fact that England had
requested effective assistance from Turkey in case circumstances calling
for implementation of the guarantee to Rumania should develop.
4
In consequence we seriously doubted the theory that Rumania had been
entirely ignorant of this. The Minister was very emphatic in reiterating
his statement. At the same time, he personally deplored that the
inclusion of Rumania in the Anglo-French front was bound to make an
unfavorable impression on us. He then called attention to various
Rumanian press statements concerning Rumania's neutrality. M.
Crutzescu then expressed the opinion that Turkey had now placed herself
outside the framework of a projected Balkan neutrality bloc. I
answered the Minister that it was not quite clear to me what new neutrality
bloc was meant and asked him whether negotiations to form
such a bloc were actually in progress. To this M. Crutzescu gave an
altogether vague reply, expressing the opinion that at any rate the attempts
promoted by England to form a bloc directed against the North
had to be regarded as having failed.
The Minister had the same report as we had, that conversations between
Turkey and the Soviet Union were to be resumed in Ankara.
* See document No. 338.
* See vol. vi, documents Nos. 561 and 567.
4 See vol. vr, document No. 627.
No. 297
Gl/33926-27
Memorandum "by an Official of the Legal Department
BERIXKT, October 24,
B 26427.
A conference was held today by Under State Secretary Woermann
on the question of whether Germany should officially inform Sweden
OCTOBER 1939 339
that we do not recognize the 4-mile zone insisted on by Sweden. Those
present at the conference were :
Ministerialdirektor Wiehl
Minister Prince Bismarck
Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht
Senior Counselor von Grundherr
Counselor von der Heyden-Bynsch
Counselor Lohmann
The Economic Policy Department emphasized that such a step
would necessarily have a serious disturbing effect on the forthcoming
very difficult negotiations with Sweden about the continuance of ore
deliveries. The Economic Policy Department would therefore like
to have the step postponed until the negotiations are concluded, which
can be expected by the middle or the end of November.
The Political Department does not consider the disturbance to our
relations with Sweden very consequential, but it, too, would rather
have us refrain from such a step at the present time.
The Legal Department pointed out that Germany had always in the
past recognized the 3-mile zone, but no more. There were doubts as
to whether the extension of the mine barrage planned by the Navy
would actually give us greater control over the traffic through the
Sound.
The result of the conference was that the head of B. S.1 was instructed
to talk with the Naval Operations Staff in order to ascertain
whether a short postponement of the notification could be justified.
It was to be made clear at the same time that the Foreign Ministry was
prepared to assist the OKM as much as possible in this matter. The
OKM also was to be advised that Germany had made no reservation
with respect to the footnote in the Swedish neutrality law.
Since, according to the Political Department, several formal protests
of the Swedes regarding alleged violations of Swedish territory, relating
to the strip between the third and fourth sea mile, are still
pending, the plan has been adopted to notify the Swedes, in reply to
these protests, that we can recognize only a 3-mile zone as sovereign
territory. It might be possible in this way to avoid advertising the
differences of opinion between Germany and Sweden to the entire
world.
1 R. S., designation of a new division in the Legal Department charged with
coordinating the conduct of German naval warfare involving merchant shipping.
Johann Georg Lohmann headed this division ; his memorandum of the ensuing
conversation with the Naval Staff is printed as document No. 298,
3,40
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 298
B1/3S&24-2G
Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department
, October 24, 1939.
E 26428.
This afternoon I called upon Lieutenant Commander Neubauer
and Ministerialrat Dr. Eckhardt of the Naval Staff of the High Command
of the Navy in order to inform them, as instructed, of the result
of the conference held this morning at the office of Under State Secretary
Dr. Woermann on the question of the Swedish territorial waters.1
Captain Fricke had requested Lieutenant Commander Neubauer to
receive me in his stead, I stated that the question raised by the High
Command of the Navy and the High Command of the Wehrmacht had
been given thorough consideration at the Foreign Ministry and that
serious objections had come up, primarily of an economic nature. It
had not been possible at the conference held today at the office of the
Under State Secretary to overcome these objections. The Chief
of the Economic Policy Department, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl,
had referred to the imminent, very difficult, economic negotiations
with Sweden, at which we would have to secure the importation
of Swedish ore in the amount of some 120 million KM for the year
1940, while, for our part, we could promise payment for only about
half of this amount and that, moreover, in commodity exports. We
were therefore largely dependent on the goodwill of the Swedes, who
would have to give us credit for the remainder. The Economic Policy
Department was therefore seeking to avoid everything that might at
this very time create a bad impression or annoy the Swedes. The
Navy's wish to deprive the Swedes now officially of the fourth mile
of their territorial waters is for that reason very awkward for us. We
would be very glad to help in every respect, but we thought we had to
register our objections. Postponement of the notification until after
the conclusion of the economic negotiations appeared advisable to us.
Lieutenant Commander Neubauer, who first complained again that
the Naval Staff had heretofore received no statement of the Foreign
Ministry as to its wishes, was impressed by the objections advanced
by me, and promised that he would report them to Captain Fricke.
He said it was possible in view of these objections that the Naval Staff
might withdraw its wish, but if it should insist, the matter would
necessarily have to be brought before the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. A final decision would have to be made there.
x See document No. 297.
OCTOBER 1939 341
Lieutenant Commander Neubauer told me, in answer to my question,,
that a large part of the merchant vessels carrying goods from the
Baltic to the North Sea and beyond actually went through the gap in
our mine barrage and through the 3-mile zone. This was done by a
large number of ships every day. The Naval Staff was convinced
that they were mostly ships which were afraid of control by German
naval vessels.
Lieutenant Commander Neubauer will telephone me the result of his
report to Captain Fricke.
No. 299
B21/B0.05151CM57
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 564 of October 25 WASHINGTON, October 25, 1939 10 : 25 p. m.
Eeceived October 26 9 : 55 a. m.
For the State Secretary.
With reference to your telegram No. 480 of October 24.1
1. The Pittman Bill cannot enter into force until it has been debated
and passed by the House of Representatives. No estimate can
be made at this time as to the duration of the debate and the date
of passage. After passage by the Senate, the Pittman Bill will
probably be sent to the House as an amendment to the bill now before
it. After that there will probably be a so-called "conference" between
the two Houses to reconcile the two bills ; this will be followed by
a debate at which, in contrast to the Senate, speaking time will be
limited in order to hasten a vote.
2. It is still probable that the House, too, will repeal the arms embargo,
although a marked shift in favor of retention has become
apparent there in the recent days under the pressure of a large section
of the electorate, to which the Representatives are more responsive
than the Senators. Consequently, Senate isolationists are now placing
some hope of success on the vote of the House.
3. I believe it indispensable that we should issue a critical statement
on the repeal of the arms embargo at the proper moment, that is,
after its promulgation by the President; this must be done not just
because our criticism is already anticipated here or because silence
could be interpreted as concurrence, but because America is putting
herself into a preposterous position from the standpoint of international
law : on the one hand she participates in the war against us
1 Document No. 294.
342 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by most actively supporting our enemies with war material; on the
other hand she demands that we respect ull rights to which neutrals
are entitled. Senator Vandenberg strikingly characterized the situation
when he said : "If we make ourselves the arsenal for one side,
we must not be astonished if we become the target of the other."
4. Beyond that, it will be a matter for decision there as to whether
the Reich Government should, following elimination of the arms embargo,
lodge an official protest analogous to the protest of April 4,
1915, on account of unneutral attitude. To be sure, we would have
to expect rejection of the protest, but before the whole world we would
have maneuvered the United States of America into a legally vulnerable
position, because the American Government would today have to
defend its position with arguments diametrically opposed to those
which it marshaled on the same subject in the Bryan note to Bernstorff
of April 10, 1915.2 The justification given at that time for
rejecting our protest about arms exports was that America was not
in a position after the outbreak of war to change her traditional
position about the permissibility of arms exports to belligerents.
Today, however, the situation is exactly reversed. America decided
by the Act of 1935 not to export arms to belligerents. The principle
was adhered to in the cases of Ethiopia, Bolivia, and Spain. Uepeal
of the arms embargo after outbreak of the war would on that account
indubitably constitute an unneutral act against Germany, which is
alone and one-sidedly affected by it.
5. As for arguments we could use which proceed from the American
standpoint I should like to refer, apart from the above remarks, to
may telegraphic reports No. 416 of September 24 3 and No. 481 \J$f\ of
October 9 ;
4 1 also leave open the possibility of further reports on this
matter.
THOMSEX
'Actually Apr. 21, 1915. Citations for the published texts of this document
and of the German note of Apr. 4, 1915, are given in footnotes 1 and 2 of document
No. 220.
Document No. 129.
4 Document No. 220.
No. 300
51/83923
Memorandum 1>y\ am Official of Political Division I M
EERIEST, October 25, 1939.
The High Command of the Navy telephoned that the Navy has decided
to extend operations against merchant shipping in the Baltic
Sea farther north, i. e., up to the Aland Sea. This measure was
prompted by the fact that the ships of the eastern Baltic States bound
OCTOBER 1939 343
for England have made this area their habitual route for entering
Swedish territorial waters.
These operations would for the most part be carried out by naval
auxiliary vessels.
It is intended to inform the Russians of this decision by communication
from Naval Attache to Naval Attache.
Pointing out the possible political consequences, I asked that this
communication not be made for the present, in order that I might first
report the matter to the Foreign Ministry. I was asked to give an
answer in the course of this forenoon.
My question as to whether the matter had been discussed in the conference
between Ambassador Hitter and Admiral Schniewind was
answered in the negative, with the explanation that the decision was
not reached until later.
v. D.
No. 301
2993/586622
The Charge d?Affaires in tJie United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 566 of October 26 WASHINGTON, October 26, 1939 3 : 10 a.m.
Received October 27 4 : 00 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 555 of October 24.1
The American Government is trying to build up the seizure of the
American ship City of Flint as an unfriendly act on the part of Germany
in order to push the repeal of the arms embargo in Congress.
2
We should therefore avoid anything with respect to the treatment of
the ship and the American crew that the American Government could
exploit to that end.
If war material, including airplane parts, should be found in the
cargo, it would constitute a flagrant violation of the Neutrality Act.
Reliable reports indicate very brisk arms smuggling operations from
New York.
THOMSEN
1 Not printed (2422/511810). 3 The American cargo vessel was intercepted, by the German warship Deutschland
on Oct. 9 on the charge of carrying contraband and a German prize crew was
placed aboard. The Germans took the vessel into the port of Murmansk on
Oct. 23, but were permitted by the Soviet authorities, despite representations of
the American Government, to sail again 5 days later. (See Foreign Relations of
the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 984 ff.) When the ship subsequently
put in at the Norwegian port of Haugesund on Nov. 3, the Norwegian
Government acted on the rules of international law applying to prizes by interning
the German prize crew and restoring the vessel to American control.
344
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 302
The Ambassador m Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 300 of October 26 BRUSSELS, October 26, 193910 : 50 p. m.
Received October 27 i a* m.
The Foreign Policy Committee of the Belgian Senate met this morning
for a secret session at which Foreign Minister Spaak spoke at
length about the international situation. A member of the Senate who
took part in the session gave the following account of what took plam
His general impression of the session had been very favorable since
even behind closed doors, where one speaks more freely than in public,
the Committee had expressed a uniformly positive view on the neutrality
policy. M. Spaak had again made a brilliant speech in behalf
of his policy and, as the informant maintained, had also convinced
the few somewhat uncertain and critically disposed Senators of the
correctness of the neutrality policy. M. Spaak had been very categorical
and had again stated emphatically that he could no longer
tolerate the one-sided attitude of the press. The Belgian Government
wished to follow the neutrality policy as completely and loyally as was
in any way possible. It was intolerable that obstacles should be
placed in its path by the press.
In the course of the Committee's deliberations one of the Senators
stated that he had reports that Germany was concentrating armored
divisions on the Dutch and Belgian borders. M. Spaak declared that
these reports were false. The question was also discussed whether
Belgium would not have to make military agreements with Holland,
so as to be prepared for collaboration in the event of a German invasion.
M. Spaak rejected this idea, pointing out that the Dutch did not
desire any collaboration whatever and that, furthermore, General
Staff conferences with Holland would amount to violations of neutrality
in exactly the same way as would such conferences with England
or France. In conclusion, M, Spaak was asked what the Belgian
Government would do if Germany should invade Holland. The Foreign
Minister replied that he could not take a stand on a contingency
which in his opinion was not likely to arise, and merely stated that the
Belgian Government could come to a decision only if such events
should take place.
OCTOBER 1939 345
The informant who reported the foregoing has been known for years
to be trustworthy and reliable.
BtJLOW
No. 303
136&/S57018-19
Ambassador Hitter to Minister Schnwrre \m Moscow]
Via today's courier BERLIN, October 26, 1939.
DEAR SOHNURRE : I have just heard that there is a courier today and
would just like to dictate a few words to you in all haste.
I have thus far spoken with Ministers von Ribbentrop and Funk,
and also with Major General Thomas, Colonel Becker, and Under
State Secretaries von Hanneken and von Jagwitz. I shall also see
Minister Darre this evening, and, I assume, Field Marshal Goring
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
I have found among the men with whom I have spoken up to now
(1) great satisfaction with what we have so far been able to obtain
in the way of promises from the Soviet Government, and (2) complete
understanding for the fact that we must now make a great effort with
regard to the German deliveries. Minister Funk in particular promised
me his full support in the matter, I have heard from General
Thomas and Colonel Becker, after they had spoken with those responsible
for the different categories of arms, that from the military
standpoint the deliveries of arms would probably not encounter any
difficulties. Minister Funk promised me that he would use all his
influence to have the necessary iron made available to take care of all
the Russian demands. The final decision will probably be made
by the Führer, but not until the list promised by the Russians has been
received here and been given final study. I have made all preparations
for this final check to be made within a day after the list arrives
here.1
Probably things will depend on whether in your final bout at Moscow
you are indeed able to obtain from them the promise of substantial
deliveries of iron ore and chromium ore.
*0n Oct. 22, Mikoyan gave [Hitter?] an oral account (1369/35702^26) of the
deliveries which the Soviet Union desired from Germany, and promised to present
a written list within 2 or 3 days. Mikoyan further stated that in a few
days a Soviet delegation would come to Berlin for 2 or 3 weeks to conduct
preliminary negotiations on this list.
346 DOCUMENTS 03ST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
This in all haste. This evening the Russian delegation is coming,
the size of which alarmed us a little at first.2
Everything will be done
here, however, to give them a good reception.
With best regards,
Heil Hitler !
Yours, RIOTER
fl ln a telegram of Oct. 24 (1369/357021), Sclmurre reported that the Soviet
economic delegation of 45 persons, including People's Commissar for [Naval]
Shipbuilding, Ivan T. Tevossyan, and General of Artillery, G. K. Savchenko
would arrive in Berlin on Oct. 26. About 16 more persons led by the acting
People's Commissar for the Iron and Steel Industry, P. I. Korobov, would follow
soon afterward. Then in a telegram dated Oct. 26 and dispatched the
following morning (1369/356998), Schnurre said Mikoyan had told him that the
Soviet delegation was taking with it to Berlin the list referred to in the document
-printed here. Schnurre also reported that despite Mikoyan*s previous statements
the delegation would not have authority actually to make commitments, so that
the main negotiations at Moscow would presumably be delayed. Schmirre
therefore asked whether it might not be advisable to suggest moving them to
Berlin.
No. 304
51/33928
Memorandum by an Official of the Legal Department
BERLIBT, October 26, 1939.
B, 26588.
lieutenant Commander Neubauer of the Naval Staff of the High
Command of the Navy telephoned in the evening of October 26 to
inform us that the question of the Swedish territorial waters had
been taken up with the Commander in Chief, Grand Admiral Raeder.
Due consideration was given to the objections raised by the Foreign
Ministry against the Navy's taking the desired step at this time.1
Admiral Kaeder decided nonetheless that the Foreign Ministry should
be requested to approach the Swedish Government immediately with
a view to securing a free hand for the measures which the German
Naval Forces would have to take outside the 3-mile zone.
Herr Neubauer added that the High Command of the Navy would
also communicate this decision to the Foreign Ministry in writing.
He requested, however, that the necessary steps be taken at once in
order to avoid any further delay.
2
I replied that I would report on the matter.
1 See document No. 298.
a On Oct. 27, Woermann noted (51/33929) that Admiral Sehniewind telephoned
him the same day that Raeder had decided to respect only the 3-mile zone and
desired to learn the final position of the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible.
On Oct. 30, Weizsacker, after consulting OKM and OKW, sent to the Legation in
Sweden a telegram (205/141909-10) containing the text of a note to be handed
to the Swedish Government without delay. The note referred to Swedish protests
ahout German naval and air action in the disputed fourth mile of Swedish territorial
waters, stated that Germany would continue to recognize only the
standard 3-mile limit, and expressed willingness to discuss the exact course of
the line to be used. Wied reported on Oct. 31 that he presented the note that
evening (205/141911).
OCTOBER 1939 347
No. 305
34/23482
The Ambassador in the Soviet 'Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
3OST URGENT Moscow, October 27, 1939 3 : 22 a. m.
No. 611 of October 26 Received October 27 5 : 45 a. m.
Molotov asked me to come to see him this evening and, referring to
a report he had received from the Soviet Naval Attache in Berlin, declared
that the German intention to send the dispatch boat Grille and
some auxiliary cruisers to the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic coast
to carry out control measures had caused astonishment and gravest
concern to the Soviet Government. The appearance of German warships
in areas where there were important Soviet strategic interests
was particularly awkward for the Soviet Government at the present
moment, since negotiations with Finland were not yet concluded and
the German operation could easily be construed as a demonstration in
Finland's favor, as a result of which Finland's position would be
strengthened vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government
therefore urgently requested that the intended measures, which might
be construed as an unfriendly act, be canceled.
When I pointed out that Germany's purpose did not in the least
affect the Soviet Union, since it aimed solely at suppressing Finland's
exports of lumber to England via the Baltic Sea, Molotov replied that
the Soviet Government did not (group garbled) the justice of this
German aim, but asked that Germany confine any activities of this
nature to the Swedish side of the Baltic ; this would dissipate Soviet
misgivings. Please wire instructions.1
1 See document No. 309*
No. 306
2290/483355
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 811 of October 26 BERLIN, October 27, 1939 dL : 00 a.m.
Received October 27 6 : 20 a. m.
(1) Replying to notification of the resolution of the American Governments
at the Panama Conference establishing a closed zone to keep
warlike activities away from the Americas, the Fuhrer informed the
260090 54 2 8
348
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
President of Panama that he had entrusted study of the matter to the
German officials concerned.1
(2) The English and French Heads of State have replied in similar
vein.
(3) According to press accounts the English Government has officially
announced its unwillingness to recognize the closed zone.
English naval opinion is especially critical of the fact that it would
cut off England from her American colonies. Please ascertain the
views of the Government there [in Italy] on the fundamental question
of a closed zone.
(4) For information only:
Creation of a closed zone is unfavorable to us on technical naval
grounds, but we do not wish to draw upon ourselves the odium of
lifting
2
it. It is rather in our interest to let England and France take
the lead. Identical text to Madrid and Tokyo.
8
*In a telegram of Oct. 4 (8517/E597418-22), the President of Panama had
communicated to the Reich Chancellor the provisions of this resolution, the full
text of which is published in Department of State, Bulletin, 1939, vol. i, pp. 331-
333. Hitler acknowledged receipt of this notification in a telegram of Oct. 23
(not found), as stated in the document printed here. Then on Feb. 12, 1940,
Weizs'dcker cabled (143/128962-65) to the Legation in Panama the text of a
note to be handed the Foreign Minister in reply to the telegram of Oct. 4 and
one of Dec. 24, 1939 (90/100031-35). The latter contained a protest on behalf
of the 21 American Republics by the Acting President of Panama to the Reich
Chancellor regarding the Graf Spee incident (see documents Nos. 460, 461, et
&eq.). The text of the statement transmitted to the Governments of France and
Great Britain as well as to Germany is printed in Bulletin, 1939, vol. I, p, 723,
and the replies of the three belligerent Governments are printed in BwWeftt*,
1940, vol. II, pp. 199-205.
3 In German: Aufhelmg. Presumably a coding error for Ablehnung, rejecting.
* In a memorandum of Nov. 11, "The American Closed Zone," Freytag noted
that the German officials who studied the matter regarded the zone as disadvantageous
to Germany, but preferred to let the odium of rejecting it fall upon
Great Britain and France. Until Germany recognized the zone it would in any
event not be applicable to her. The Spanish and Italian Governments "showed
little interest and replied evasively" to the German inquiries, and no reply had
as yet been received from Tokyo. Freytag charged that the United States was
seeking to monopolize inter-American shipping, particularly at Germany's expense.
(He recommended "dilatory treatment" of the question of a closed zone,
even though this policy might expose Germany to hostile propaganda (240V
500485-89).
OCTOBKR 1939 349
No, 307
F10/106
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Ja/pim
Telegram
TOP SECRET BERLIN, October 26 [07],
1 1939.
No. 501 Pol. VIII 1645 g. Ks.
For the Ambassador personally.
The Reich Foreign Minister requests that Ambassador Oshima,
who will continue to work for German-Japanese friendship after his
return, be supported in every possible way. He requests that telegrams
which Oshima submits there be encoded without change and
transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister personally, and that provision
be made for safe and rapid transmittal of letters intended for
the Reich Foreign Minister; if they are sealed they should be left
unopened.
*A handwritten correction on another copy (174/136187) indicates that the
telegram was dispatched on Oct. 27 rather than on Oct. 26, the date appearing
on the copy from the Foreign Minister's file used here.
No. 308
362/202749-50
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
A 5018 THE HAGUE, October 27, 1939.
Pol. II 4307.
Subject: Holland's fear of violation of her neutrality; measures to
be taken in that event.
There can be no doubt that the emphasis of the Netherlands defense
measures, which were directed largely against England during the
first weeks of the war, has recently been shifted more toward the
German border. The reason for this is not so much that there is now
more fear of an attack by Germany, but that there is less fear of a
British attack. During the Polish campaign an Anglo-French relief
offensive was expected in the West and the possibility was taken into
consideration that Dutch and Belgian neutrality might be violated in
the course of this offensive. But with France and England having
abandoned their Polish ally without lifting a finger, it is no longer
believed here that our enemies could have any interest whatsoever in
undertaking anything against the Netherlands. In order to conduct
350
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the war, England and France need the support of the United States
which they would lose if they failed to respect the neutrality of
Belgium or Holland.
In spite of the large troop concentrations near the Netherlands
boundary, the Government fears no attack on Holland by Germany
since after all, the Führer quite spontaneously had the Queen of the
Netherlands informed that he would always respect Netherlands
territory so long as its neutrality was not violated by a third party.*
But quite apart from this, it is argued here, it would be the most
stupid thing Germany could do to violate Dutch and Belgian neutrality.
The symptoms of demoralization within France, due in particular
to the activity of the outlawed Communist Party, were indeed of
considerable importance and constantly increasing in intensity. But
all this would immediately change if Germany invaded France, perhaps
by way of the neutral countries. Against this, not only the
entire Belgian but also the whole French people would rise as one
man and, putting aside all differences, make every sacrifice to drive
the invader out of the country again. Moreover, the violation of
Dutch neutrality would bring into the field America and in particular
Roosevelt, who had a great fondness for Holland as the land of Ms
ancestors. Whether America would in that event lend active assistance
to the Allies by sending an expeditionary force remains an open
question. In any event, however, the entire industrial organization
of the United States would be mobilized to supply our enemies with
the necessary war materials. In addition, America would exert very
strong pressure on the rest of the world to induce it to turn against
us. The German Government realized this just as well as it was realized
here, and for this reason alone Germany would be very careful
not to undertake anything against the Netherlands. There is some
anxiety, however, that Germany might perhaps allow herself to be
provoked into action against Belgium and the Netherlands by some
false maneuvers on the part of England and France, and this fear is
fed by Belgium where, from everything I hear, a German attack is
feared more than it is here.
Certain preparations are nevertheless being made against all
eventualities, in particular by private individuals. An Amsterdam
banker told me yesterday that not only did the Bank of the Netherlands
have almost all its gold reserve in America now, but, as had
been the case through the whole summer, a great many private bank
customers were still sending their foreign securities, including those
of Dutch colonial companies, to America although the insurance
today amounted to about 5 percent.
ZEOH
1 See vol. vn, documents Nos. 272 and 313.
OCTOBER 1939 351
No. 309
103/111752
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
MOST URGENT BERLIN, October 28, 1939.
No. 659 zu Pol. I M 7313 g.
Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freiherr v. d, Heyden-Rynsch.
With, reference to your telegram 611.1
Having consulted the High Command of the Navy, I request that
M. Molotov be told the following : "In order to avoid all misinterpretations
of its intentions, the German Naval Staff will defer to the
wishes of the Russian Government in its present measures relating to
warfare against merchant shipping. It has given its naval forces
the necessary orders for this purpose."
Please at the same time stress the fact that in view of our friendly
relations with the Soviet Government we have in this case complied
with their request. You can mention casually that in further conduct
of warfare against merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea we intend
to inform the Soviet Government of our measures in so far as we
assume that Russian interests would be affected by them.
The Naval Attache will receive instructions only in accordance
with paragraph 1.
WEIZSACKER
1 Document No. 305.
No. 310
4497222.667
The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece
Telegram
tiRGENT BEBLIN, October 28, 1939.
No. 341 zu W XII 3384 Ang. I.1
With reference to your telegram No. 227.1
You are requested to call on Metaxas immediately in any case and
inform him with reference to this instruction that we would be constrained
to regard as a serious departure from Greece's neutrality
policy the possible conclusion of the planned agreement concerning
1W XII 3384 Is telegram No. 227, not printed (449/222666) , It reported negotiations
between the British Board of Trade and Greek ship owners concerning
the possible chartering of about 50 percent of all Greek merchant ships by the
British.
352
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the chartering of a considerable portion of the Greek merchant fleet
to England.
Should Metaxas plead that domestic economic difficulties compel
Greece to utilize her merchant fleet in that manner, please reply as
your personal view that the advantage presumably gained from that
transaction might very well become illusory through the loss of the
present principal customer for Greek exports.
For your information : the Italian Government is being informed
at the same time, with the suggestion that a similar step be undertaken.
2
Report by telegraph.
WEIZSACKER
* According to a Borne telegram of Nov. 24 (449/222680), Mackensen brought
this matter up with Ciano, after having repeatedly been unable to get an official
statement by the Italian Foreign Ministry on the subject. Ciano said that Italy
was not in a legal position to make representations in Athens as the Germans had
suggested, adding that it might be possible to discuss this matter with the
Greeks in a friendly and casual manner.
No. 311
230/15(20,81
The State Secretary to tTie Legation in Yugoslavia
Telegram
No. 474 BERLIN, October 28, 1939.
zu Kult B spez 68-01,
With, reference to your telegram No. 426 of October 22.1
The question of repatriating the German communities in Yugoslavia
is by no means acute at the present time. We are therefore
interested in limiting discussion of this problem in the Southeast as
much as possible at present. Any discussions in the press are therefore
undesirable and to the extent that we can influence it, should be
prevented as much as possible.
For guidance in your conversations : The idea underlying the repatriation
is an additional important contribution by Germany to the
pacification of Europe by eliminating causes of serious friction
between the countries. If at the proper time a resettlement of the
Germans in the Southeast, too, should appear desirable, such an action
would naturally be undertaken only with the agreement of the Government
and German community, for we want only voluntary repatriates
in Germany.
WEIZSACKER
1 Document No. 290.
OCTOBER 1939 353
No. 312
Memorandwn J>y (in Official of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, October 28, 1939.
1. Iraman political observations on the question of transit via Russia.
During my economic negotiations in Tehran in September of this
year
* I gained the impression that the present dependence of trade between
Iran and Germany on transit through Russia is causing great
concern to several members of the Iranian Cabinet. To be sure, my
actual partner in the negotiations. Finance Minister Bader, received
the report of the basic settlement of the transit question in the Moscow
Agreement of September 28 2 of this year with great joy and termed
it an essential contribution to the continuation of German-Iranian economic
relations despite the war conditions. Vassighi, the Deputy
Minister of Trade, and Foreign Minister Aalam, on the other hand,
felt grave doubts as to the dependability of the Soviet assurances regarding
transit. To be sure, the two Ministers just mentioned expressed
these doubts to me personally only in so far as to state that in
the light of the experience which Iran had had in recent years with
Russian assurances it was necessary for Russia to give a written assurance
(a) to grant transit to and from Germany through Russia to
all goods without exception, i. e., especially war material ; (&) to carry
out this transit in the course of normal freight movements by rail ; and
() to guarantee fixed transit rates. Without such definite commitments,
a Russian promise on transit would not offer sufficient security
for Iran to adjust herself completely to this route.
Through a reliable informant from the Court Ministry I learned,
moreover, of a discussion of the transit question in the Iranian Cabinet,
which took place at the beginning of October of this year with the Shah
presiding. At this session Trade Minister Vassighi presented his
opinion on the changes effected by the war in Iran's trade situation and
the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. He came to the conclusion that
the Iranian Government could no longer justify allowing the Iranian
economy to continue to gravitate toward Germany by preference to the
extent provided by the Iranian-German economic agreements concluded
the previous year. He expressed doubt whether it would really
be possible in the future to route almost exclusively via Russia the
greater portion of the normal deliveries which Iran had sent to Gerx
See document No. 14.
* See document No. 163.
354 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
many last year by water. He said that it was necessary for Iran even
now to look about for other possible markets and sources of supply and
in this connection to establish contact above all with Japan and Italy.
Italy had expressed general willingness to take over important German
contracts on deliveries and imports, especially the compensation agreement
for delivery of cotton goods in return for Iranian raw cotton. A
similar but much more concrete proposal had been received from
Japan. Japan was willing to take over at once, and with all of the
German stipulations, the agreement of July 11, 1939, between the
Christian Dierig A. OK, Langenbielau, and the Iranian Cotton Goods
Company ; this contract provides for German imports of 10,000 tons
of cotton in return for German cotton goods in an amount equal to the
value of the raw cotton.
Foreign Minister Aalam supported the basic statements of the Trade
Minister and voiced misgivings especially in connection with Russian
activity in the Balkan countries and the Russian invitation to Finland
to come to Moscow for conversations similar to those held with the
three countries mentioned above [sic] as to whether Soviet Russia
might not have aggressive intentions also with reference to Iran and
Afghanistan.
Minister President Djam, too, expressed the opinion although in a
very cautious manner that it would be advisable to consider all eventualities
arising from the war situation.
In contrast to these misgivings about the effectiveness of the transit
rights promised Germany by the Russians and the advisability of maintaining
and expanding the scope of the present economic relations with
Germany, Finance Minister Bader 3 stated that such doubts as had
been mentioned were in his opinion unjustified. He warned against
measures which Germany would doubtless have to consider at once as a
departure from the present course of sincere and honest cooperation
and would have to answer accordingly.
Until it was proved that transit via Russia would not work and
that Germany would not be in a position to supply Iran with the
goods promised her and urgently needed for the expansion of her
economy, Bader believed that it was absolutely necessary to adhere
to the present policy. He referred in this connection to assurances
which he, as the head of the Iranian economic delegation, had given
me. He had, as instructed, expressed the firm determination of the
Iranian Government to maintain normal trade with Germany in
spite of the war and if possible even to expand the mutual trade.
After these statements by his Ministers the Shah according to the
minutes of the Cabinet meeting agreed with M. Bader's opinion
and decided that the political and economic policies with reference
'Marginal note In Wiehl's handwriting: "Has resigned in the meantime."
OCTOBER 1939 355
to Germany should be maintained as heretofore, unless and until it
should be proved that this would be to Iran's disadvantage.
2. Iranian fears of Russia.
Aside from the positive decision of the Shah on the economic
policy to be continued by Iran, it appears to be a very important
point that doubts concerning Soviet Russia's attitude are entertained
in the Iranian Cabinet and by important members of this Cabinet.
In view of these doubts it appears to me to be urgently necessary for
Germany to obtain information in Moscow about the intentions of
the Soviet Government toward Iran. Any possible aggressive action
by Russia against Iran will doubtless strengthen England's position
in Iran and might possibly even drive Iran into the arms of our
enemies, the Allies. Considering Turkey's strong ties with England
and France it appears politically especially important at this particular
moment to continue to strengthen Iran in her absolute neutrality
for the time being.
Should the Soviets pursue aims with reference to Iran bound to
affect Iranian neutrality, it would be advisable for Germany to make
representations in Moscow that these be abandoned.
If Iran should turn toward the British and French side this would
mean in Iran, as in Turkey, the destruction of Germany's economic
position, which has been built up so laboriously. In the event of
such a turn we could, moreover, no longer count on Iran to continue
delivering to us the quotas agreed upon in the secret protocol of
October 8 4 of this year. Thereby we would lose annually 22,500 tons
of cotton, approximately 6,000 tons of wool, 20,000 tons of wheat,
10,000 tons of barley, 20,000 tons of rice, 3,000 tons of hair, 3 million
reichsmarks worth of leather, 1 million reichmarks worth of hides
and 25 million reichsmarks worth of dried fruits.
3. Iranian efforts toward the conclusion of a new economic agreement
with Soviet Russia.
Concerning Russian intentions toward Iran I was not able to learn
anything more definite during my stay in Moscow by talking either
with our Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, or with the German
delegation (Ambassador Ritter and Minister Schnurre). However,
the Ambassador and the delegation had gained the impression
in the conversations on the transit question that the Russians were
very little interested in yielding to the Iranian campaign for bringing
about a new economic agreement. It is possible to understand
Russia's negative attitude if one considers the unilateral manner in
which the Iranian Government insisted vis-a-vis Soviet Russia on
4 Not printed (8529/E597530-67).
356
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Iranian interpretation of the economic treaty of 1935.5
Since
Russia did not wish to give in to the Iranian request, the Iranian
Government informed the Soviet Government in June 1938 that because
of the Russian attitude it no longer considered the agreement to
be in effect. Iranian efforts which were made in Moscow at the end
of 1938 to reach a new trade agreement with Soviet Russia
more in conformity with Iranian wishes than the treaty of 1935, were
unsuccessful. At the beginning of this year the relations between
Iran and the Soviet Union deteriorated even further as the
result of the collapse of the Moscow economic negotiations. The
outbreak of the war then made it appear advisable to the Iranian
Cabinet to make another attempt at achieving an economic understanding
with Russia. Proposals on this score, made through the
Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, have only had negative results. The
Russians have rejected the Iranian proposal that the treaty of 1985
be put into effect again until the basis for a new agreement has been
created. Moreover, they have rejected Iran's demand that the principle
of complete compensation should be made the basis of trade between
Iran and the Soviet Union and stated that they would have to
reserve complete freedom with reference to their exports to and their
imports from Iran. After these Soviet statements it appears out of
the question for the time being that the two partners will reach an
agreement very soon.6
During the discussions of the delegations in Tehran on the transportation
problem occasioned by the war, the Iranian delegation had
suggested that Germany and Iran reach an agreement on joint action
in Moscow concerning settlement of the question of transit through
Russia. The surprisingly quick basic solution of this question in the
German-Russian agreement of September 28 of this year has made
such joint action meaningless. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister
later returned to this request and when I took leave of him he
asked me to bring influence to bear as much as possible on the Russians
during my sojourn in Moscow, and if necessary later from Berlin,
so that they would arrive at an economic understanding with Iran.
I discussed this request of the Iranian Government with Ambassador
Count von der Schulenburg in Moscow, and, barring a different decision
by the Foreign Ministry, reached an agreement that Count
von der Schulenburg would at the request of the Iranian Ambassador
to Moscow declare himself willing to maintain further contact with
the latter and to advise him concerning the proposals to be made to
the Russians by Iran. Such cooperation would naturally stop wherever
support of the Iranians would affect adversely German-Russian
Agreement of Aug. 27, 1935. * A Soviet-Iranian economic agreement was eventually signed on Mar. 25, 1940.
OCTOBER 1939 357
relations. Economic cooperation between Soviet Russia and Iran on
a new treaty basis, which, should have been brought about long ago
owing to the common frontiers of the two countries and the naturally
favorable economic conditions, is not only in the interest of both
parties themselves but also of German-Iranian economic plans. The
less friction there is in Soviet-Iranian relations in the near future, the
smoother can be the course of German-Iranian trade. The Iranian
effort to normalize relations with Russia therefore deserves the most
active German support, in my opinion. It need hardly be feared
that Soviet-Iranian understanding might work to the detriment of the
German position in Iran.
4. Transport of German goods to Iran in neutral ships.
When I called on Finance Minister Bader to take leave of him he
raised the question of transporting German goods to Iran in neutral
ships from neutral harbors. He said that the British Minister in
Tehran had assured the Iranian Government, upon inquiry, that the
British naval forces would not stop and confiscate German goods,
even war material, being transported to Iran aboard neutral ships, if
they had already become the property of the Iranian Government.
M. Bader expressed doubt in this connection as to the absolute reliability
of the British Minister's statement. He asked that I find out
in Berlin after my return whether the German Government had heard
of instances of German goods transported on neutral ships reaching
the country of their destination unimpeded by British naval vessels.
In that case his Government, too, would decide to make the attempt at
transporting German goods on neutral ships.
KIPKEN T
7 Marginal note : "Herewith submitted to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl for Ms
information; also, a decision is requested as to an inquiry in Moscow about
the Soviet Government's intentions toward Iran. R[ipken] Nov. 11."
No. 313
103/111758
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT Moscow, October 29, 1939 2 : 15 a. m.
No. 628 of October 28 Beceived October 29 5 : 40 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 611 of October 26.1
Molotov asked me to come to see him today and said that the contents
of the communication from Commander Neubauer to the Soviet Naval
3 Document No. 305.
358
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Attache were not satisfactory to the Soviet Government.2 The Soviet
Government, to be sure, had no objections to German warfare against
merchant shipping it was even in favor of intensifying it in every
possible way but it took the position that cruising by German warships
in the Soviet Union's sphere of interest was contrary to the spirit
of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. It therefore asked that
the activities of German warfare against merchant shipping be
shifted to the area west of the twentieth degree of longitude, since the
twenty-first degree, proposed by the Germans, ran too close to the
Baltic coast and, among other things, went directly through Libau
[Liepaja].
3
*No record of the communication made by Commander Neubaner has been
found.
* See document No. 341.
No. 314
1369/35698$
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TTKGENT Moscow, October 29, 1939 3 : 48 a. m.
No. 627 of October 28 Received October 29 1 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 613 of October 20 [W IV
3940] .
l
A few days ago I spoke to Mikoyan about the transit shipments of
foreign raw materials through the Black Sea ports. Mikoyan today
informed me that the Soviet Government was agreeable to it, but
at the same time stressed the need for camouflage. The discussion
brought out the readiness on the part of the Soviet Government to
let its own organizations effect the purchases of raw materials for
us and ship them to Odessa in neutral bottoms ; if purchases are made
by us in our own name or through neutral agents, the Soviet Government
agrees to having the goods consigned to the Soviets, via Odessa.
Lead, for instance, could be consigned to Importorganisation, industrial
raw materials, to Promsyrjo-Import, Moscow. Vessels carrying
such cargoes will even now be accepted in Odessa ; this readiness
to accept delivery also applies to goods already en route.
Mikoyan added that one means of camouflaging would be to mix
the contraband goods destined for Germany with other cargoes which
would first be unloaded at Bulgarian or Rumanian ports.
1 Not found.
OCTOBEE 1939 359
The appropriate confidential agent for any detailed discussion with
the Soviet authorities also regarding camouflage methods would be
Director Hecking in his capacity as the Embassy's shipping expert.
SCHNTJRKE
No. 315
B21/B005164-65
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 585 of October 30 WASHINGTON, October 30, 19393 : 28 p. m.
Received October 31 2 : 00 a. m.
The course of the war thus far has caused many a reversal of political
opinion in the United States. Having been mistaken in its expectations
that total war would be waged, public opinion, instead of
flaring up, has had opportunity to reflect soberly on the European
war and its effects on America. Two views of approximately equal
strength still counterbalance each other : a) the war is the result of a
conflict of ideological or moral and political differences and must
end with the crushing of "Hitlerism" (not, however, "Stalinism"
also) ; &) the outcome of the battle for the European balance of power
does not concern America. An antipathy to National Socialism and
totalitarian forms of government and a determination in no circumstances
to employ American troops except for national defense
is common to both schools of thought. The last speeches of Roosevelt
and Woodring have shown that the Administration is prepared to
respond to public opinion in this respect. It can do this the more
since the course of the war has shown that an American expeditionary
corps in Europe is not indicated in the foreseeable future, and because
after the lifting of the arms embargo the delivery to the Allies of at
least gradually increasing supplies of all war material (particularly
planes) is assured, without the necessity of now drawing the consequences
of an active participation in the war. British policy is not
always unreservedly approved ; the abandonment of Poland, the lack
of rational war aims, and the equivocal nature of British policy toward
Russia are criticized. Clear-sighted economic leaders warn against a
repetition of the sham prosperity of the World War through unbridled
increase of production for wartime requirements, and are beginning
to study the problem of gold hoarding in America with anxiety ; on
the other hand, they fear the development of strong competition in
360 DOCTJMEOTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Canada, which, under certain circumstances, can become the new
center of the British Empire. The activity of Russia in Europe and
Asia is anxiously observed. The bitterness against Russia in the
"Flint incident" is considerably stronger than against Germany,
Opinions on the power balance between Germany and Russia difier
even though the predominant assumption is that Russia has won the
political game at the expense of Germany. The first enthusiasm
over the success of the Turkish pact vanished after the importance
of the supplementary protocol was realized.1 The view that Germany
is not equal to the blockade and the economic war is widely disseminated
under a scientific guise, but the hope of an early peace at
present outweighs the wish to see Germany conquered after a long
and bloody war* The indecisive conduct of the war by the Allies
supports the hope of peace. The importance of a strong German
Government as the handyman of the Western Powers against Eussia
is often emphasized.
The great majority of Americans have by the course of the war to
date been strengthened in their belief that America can help the
Allies to victory without herself having to experience the injurious
effects of the European war on American economy and policy. As
opposed to this, the fatalistic view that America will under any circumstances
be drawn into the war has markedly receded into the
background. Nevertheless, despite the counterefforts of sensible
people, the belief that a defeat of the Allies is tantamount to a threat
to America by Germany, remains unshakable. Any threat to the
Western Hemisphere would be interpreted by the people and Government
as a cause of war.
Despite the apparent calm and the aloofness of public opinion
which the course of the war has induced, the tinder remains the same.
The aftereffect of the experiences of the World War is so strong
that America today voluntarily waives rights that she resolutely defended
against belligerents in 1914. The danger that such incidents
may occur in German-American relations as would, in view of the
partisan attitude of public opinion, quickly lead to another flare-up,
is thereby considerably lessened.
THOMSEK
1 The reference is to Turkey's treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain
and France signed on Oct. 19, 1939 (see document No. 287, footnote 1) . The supplementary
protocol stated that Turkey assumed no obligation "to take action
having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with
the USSR."
OCTOBER 1939 361
No. 316
Ambassador Sitter to the Embassy in the /Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 672 BERUCN, October 30, 1939.
e. o. W IV 4148.
For Schnurre.
1. For your information : My conversations within the Government
here, while not yet entirely concluded, are proceeding favorably, so
that I hope that the Eussian wishes can largely be met as far as the
supplying of iron is concerned, Perhaps, however, later on in the final
round in Moscow we shall have to insist that the Russians be very
accommodating with respect to iron ore and scrap.
2. I am not so satisfied with the length of time my talks with
Tevossyan and Savchenko are taking. Tevossyan has not submitted
written lists here, but has only read aloud the various categories from
extensive lists.
1 Despite my repeated and very urgent requests that
the lists be delivered to us at once in the interests of speed3 he did not
allow himself to be persuaded. He said that the lists could not be
delivered until the Russian desires as to deliveries could be precisely
defined after conclusion of the visits of inspection.
Certain of the Russian experts, as, for example, those concerned
with the production of gasoline and the refining of petroleum, have
worked out an inspection program that will take 24 days. We are
willing on the one hand to show the Russians everything, but on the
other hand we cannot postpone the conclusion of the agreement in
Moscow until these inspection trips are over. I have therefore insisted
that these tours of inspection be greatly expedited. I have also
proposed that Tevossyan inform us of the Soviet desires in advance,
by categories and in round figures. For this purpose it has first been
agreed that the various groups of experts, or at least those of them
who have been touring Germany since Sunday, October 29, return to
Berlin on Friday, November 3, in order, after reporting privately
to Tevossyan on Saturday and Sunday, November 4 and 5, to participate
in conversations here with the German side regarding those
of the Russian wishes which have been decided upon by that time.
*
Hitter's file contains a list based on Tevossyan's statements of Oct. 27. It
includes numerous categories of military, naval, and air weapons and materiel,
as well as technical and industrial equipment, but gives little indication of the
Quantities expected (1369/356885-89).
362 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
The various groups of experts can then resume their tours of inspection
in order to conclude them at the end of the week beginning
November 53 so that the definitive talks may take place in Berlin
at the end of that week. Tevossyan agreed to this work program
with some hesitation. I do not have the impression, however, that
this program will be adhered to. Apparently Tevossyan cannot
resist the general desire of his assistants to travel around in Germany
for a considerable length of time. General Savchenko repeatedly
stated today, in response to my urging, that he first had to see everything
before he could give figures pertaining to orders in his field.
Please take up this question again with Mikoyan before your departure
and, referring to our understanding in Moscow, ask him to instruct
the Soviet delegation to decide in the first place on round figures
for the various categories in the delivery program. The German Government
would thereupon call these round figures satisfactory, as is
expected by Tevossyan. These round figures could later, of course,
be revised upward or downward, if when all the tours of inspection are
over or the contracts are closed the precise figures are available. Please
state explicitly that we are willing that such later revisions or breakdowns
be made.2
HITTER
* In telegram No. 642 of Oct. 31, Schnurre reported that lie liad that day had a
final talk with Mikoyan in which they had reached "full agreement on this procedure**
(1369/356976-77). Schnurre was returning to Berlin to take part in
the negotiations with the Russian delegation in Germany for industrial deliveries.
No. 317
463/226112
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 862 BERLIN, October 81, 1939.
This morning a conference concerning the sanctioning of air attacks
on enemy convoys took place in the office of Field Marshal Goring with
Grand Admiral B-aeder, Colonel General Milch, and General Jeschonnek
participating. It was agreed that there were no legal objections
to launching immediately attacks on all ships proceeding under enemy
convoy, i. e., also neutral ships. It was further agreed that the neutrals
have been warned sufficiently through diplomatic channels about
accepting enemy convoy. In these circumstances Field Marshal Goring
wants to propose to the Führer that air attacks on enemy convoys
now be sanctioned.
I for my part requested with regard to the intended attacks that
they be carried out with sufficient effect to discourage the neutrals
OCTOBER 1939 363
once and for all from proceeding under enemy convoy in the sea area
involved.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
WEIZSACKER
[EDITORS' NOTE. On October 81, Molotov discussed before the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR various major international problems as
well as Soviet proposals to Finland regarding exchange of territory
and the establishment of a Soviet naval base at the northern entrance
to the Gulf of Finland, i. e.5 in Finnish territory. A translation of the
speech is printed in V. Molotov, Soviet Peace Policy (London, 1941),
pages 27-46, and various passages, translated somewhat differently,
were included in two telegrams of November 1 to Washington from
United States Ambassador Steinhardt ; these are published in Foreign
Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939>, pages
785-790. The section of the speech dealing with Finland also appears,
in still another translation, in The Finnish Blue Book: The Development
of Finnish-Soviet Relations During the Autumn of 1939 Including
the Official Documents and the Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940^
published for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Philadelphia,
1940) , pages 56-60. Paasikivi and Tanner, who had already left
Helsinki, held talks with Molotov in Moscow, but these were broken
off on November 13. On November 28 the Soviet Government officially
denounced the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932, and on the
following day Molotov announced the rupture of diplomatic relations
between the two countries. Fighting broke out on November 30.]
No. 318
7433/B539989-94
Unsigned Note
[undated],
TALK WITH B[ABOK] D[B] K[OPP] l
B. d. K. stated that our first talk has been a complete success. As a
result of his subsequent efforts, the English circles which want an
early peace because of their concern for the Empire have brought it
about that henceforth no official organ will proclaim the overthrow
of the German regime as a war aim. He repeatedly stressed that the
implications of that success were utterly incalculable.
1 See docximent No. 235.
26009054 29
364
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The tiling now was to proceed to the second stage. These circles
have to be mindful of the sentiments of the English people and therefore
must in one way or another save appearances for England's commitment
to the Poles. Some formulation would still have to be found
for that. The Poles as such were of no further interest to them. It
would therefore be necessary now to strengthen further these circles
to be referred to hereafter, for short, as the "English party" which
had meanwhile increased in power. For this reason it was especially
important to meet for talks at regular intervals, so as to be able to
advance step by step. His journey to Berlin ought to come when he
had reason to believe that the "English party" had grown powerful
enough to gain the upper hand over the warmongers. He still believed
that heavy armed clashes would unfortunately be necessary
before this could come about. The British as a whole were still too
sure of victory over Germany.
To my question as to the source of his statements, that is, whether
they might come from the Air Ministry (Fred), B. d. R. replied that
the City, too, which, as is well known, is very powerful, had now to be
counted among the "English party." I had the impression that he is
currently in touch in particular with Sir Ralph Glynn, an exponent
of the City who, he asserts, has very close personal connections with
Chamberlain. The City is motivated by anxiety about the value of
British currency, which typifies the power of the British Empire. As
an additional success of the "English party" he cites the fact that
differences have already arisen in the inner circle of the present Government,
between Churchill-Eden on the one side, and Halifax, not
to speak of Chamberlain, on the other.
When he believes that the time has arrived for coming to Berlin,
he wants to go first from Switzerland to London. This could now be
done in two days. He wants to be absolutely certain that the statements
which he might make in Berlin actually reflect the views of the
leading figures of the "English party." He thinks it woul$ then be
wise to go from England to Germany officially, via Holland, lest the
opposing forces (the Foreign Office) get wind of the matter too soon
and take counter steps. He would therefore propose that as a former
Bait he might be invited, perhaps by Christian or some official government
agency, to pay a visit to inspect Red Cross installations or
the provisions made for the housing of the Baltic Germans, being a
former Bait himself. Such a letter would have to be so framed that
it could be submitted to the British authorities.
I told him that I had received no communications to convey to him.
He wanted to have replies to the following questions, whi^h are
moving the minds of all Englishmen at the present time :
They had serious concern, in the interest of the Empire, because
Bolshevist Russia was pressing continuously westward, and because of
OCTOBEK 1939 365
the possibility
that Germany, too, might in the end become bolshevized.
That would also mean the end of England. Russia's advance in the
Baltic States as also in Finland has caused the profoundest consternation.
It is also feared that with National-Socialism and Bolshevism
so closely akin, it would be sufficient for the one to move but
slightly to the left, and the other slightly to the right, for the two to
merge in one another. The withdrawal of the Baltic Germans as the
outpost of the Aryan race was also viewed as extremely disturbing. I
replied that I could not submit this question to my superiors. The
question was exclusively the concern of Germany. We did not share
this anxiety in any way. But one could call it almost comical that,
after Germany had vainly tried for years to remind England of the
common tasks of the Aryan race, it now was none other than England
who worried that we were forgetting them. He knew only too well
that it was positively absurd to see any relation whatever between
National-Socialism and Bolshevism.
The second question for the British today was what would become
of Poland. I told him that the Führer had already stated officially
that this question would be settled exclusively by Germany and
Soviet Russia alone. The British would have to learn that this was
absolutely none of their business. If such questions were to be discussed
at all, it could be done only with the idea of putting arguments
into the hands of the "English party." I told him that I knew nothing
of Germany's intentions. I only knew that it was the talk among
the German population that a certain portion of Poland would come
to Greater Germany, in which only Germans would live ; that another
part would be Congress-Poland, for the Polish population; and it
was hoped that one part would be reserved only for Jews. The
question of the form in which such a Congress-Poland would be
constituted was not even discussed among serious-minded Germans,
because this was entirely a "beer-table" issue. At the proper time
the Führer would surely let the German people know what he had
decided. It was certain that the territories on which an understanding
had been reached with Soviet Russia would remain Germany's
sphere of interest, in which the British would have, politically, nothing
further to do. B. d. R. replied to this that in the interest of
saving face before the people, knowledge of the bare fact, for instance,
that such a Congress-Poland was being contemplated in one
form or another would already be of great value to the "English
party."
As a private individual I also explained to him the reasons why
the Baltic Germans are being withdrawn. These measures were no
retreat of the Aryan race, but on the contrary signified a strengthening
against the East through abandoning the lost posts and eliminat
366
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ing all points of friction. He ought not to forget that a substantial
Polish population element existed within Germany proper at her
eastern border in 1914. If an extensive shift of population were
to be effected now through a transfer, it would mean an advance,
and not a retreat, for the German people and, hence, the Aryan race.
B. d. R. thought that such measures were extraordinarily generous
and farsighted. Unfortunately these ideas were known neither to
England nor to him. I told him quite frankly that I could not understand
that, because these were commonplaces that were printed in
every German newspaper. He plainly gave the impression that he
considered such information very valuable in strengthening the
"English party," which could only be in accord 'with such purposes.
It is perhaps interesting to mention an illustration of how things
which are taken for granted by any German are regarded by him
as extremely important and news for England. During the conversation
I mentioned that if it was England's war aim to break tip
Greater Germany into her components again, she had achieved the
exact opposite in starting the war through Poland. Here for the
first time all the branches of the German people united in Greater
Germany fought and shed their blood under the swastika flag. I
reminded him of the blood that the Germanic tribes had shed together
in 1870-71, which had the effect that despite the pre-war
divergencies between Prussia and Bavaria, Bismarck-Germany did
not fall apart in 1918. He also was aware of how many circles in
Germany had kept their allegiance to the black, white, and red flag.
It was, however, entirely overlooked that Germany fought under
the flag only during the World War of 1914-18. I reminded him
especially of the dead of the Movement of November 9. It was therefor
the mystique of blood which one had to see actually at work,
whether an Englishman was capable of grasping it or not. By
means of this war in Pola.nd England had already brought it about
that, through the mystique of blood, the Great* German Reich was
now irrevocably and forever welded together under the, swastika*,
flag. B. d. !R. said that this kind of information was extremely important.
It was a weighty argument against the warmongers.
An understanding was reached on the following points :
1. I am to convey to Christian that B. d. H. requests him to be
patient and therefore proposes that the mutual contacts be continued.
If Christian concurs, it is agreed that I am to write that the excursions
have given me much pleasure. B. d. R. assured me that the communications
received from us would be conveyed to the important circles,
especially the Air Ministry and the City, and that, in particular, he
now had a direct connection with England without using the mails.
2. He will make inquiries among "his friends in London whether
they would in principle be agreeable to his accepting an invitation, if
forthcoming, to pay an official visit to Germany in order to inspect
OCTOBER 1939 367
Red Cross installations or as he would prefer look at the housing
facilities for Baltic Germans. Should his friends be in agreement
with the principle of it while holding as was to be expected that the
time was not ripe for it as yet, _
he would write:
368
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 319
449/2226701
The Minister in Ghreece to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 24:7 of November 1 ATHENS, November 15 1989 $ :45 p. m.
Received November 2 % :15 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 229 a of October 30.
During today's conversation regarding the chartering of Greek
merchant vessels by England, the Minister President 2 took the same
stand as the State Secretary.
The Minister President emphasized repeatedly that in view of its
attitude of neutrality the Greek Government desired to stay clear of
the matter.
When asked to what extent the individual ship owners would be
allowed to retain their freedom of action, the Minister President
answered, as the State Secretary had done, that if individual contracts
nevertheless should be concluded, the Greek Government had no legal
means of preventing it. Moreover, only a small number of ships were
involved, belonging to ship owners whose offices were in London and
who operated their ships exclusively in the Atlantic.
Upon my strong representations that we took a serious view of the
matter, the Minister President assured me that the Greek Government,
too, had the greatest interest in preserving the national wealth, which
was to a large extent invested in ships.
ERBACH
1 Apparently this should read "No. 239"; this telegram which is not printed
(449/222668) was the reply to telegram No. 341 from Berlin of Oct. 23 (document
No. 310) . It was Erbach's report that a demarche had been made with the
State Secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry.
* Jon Metaxas.
No. 320
1369/356973-74
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 645 of November 1 Moscow, November 1, 1939 9 : 55 p. m.
Received November 2 2 : 15 a. m.
With, reference to our telegram No. 627 of October 28.1
Director Fuchs of the Metallgesellschaft, Frankfurt, today had his
first conference with the Soviet authorities regarding, among other
things, the transit shipments of raw materials through the Union
1 Document No. 314.
NOVEMBER 1939 369
of Soviet Socialist Republics. The conference brought out the
readiness of the Soviet authorities, in conformity with the agreements
between our Governments, to import raw materials purchased
by us and now stored abroad under camouflage. The Soviet representative
asked Director Fuchs for a list of the specific categories
that might come under consideration for this procedure. Director
Fuchs was unable to comply with this request because he lacked the
necessary data. Please check and inform us without delay on what
raw materials purchased by or belonging to German firms we should
negotiate with the Soviet authorities, stating accurately the type of
commodity, its location, tonnage, and the kind of packing. The next
negotiations being set for November 4, Fuchs requests that at least
partial data be telegraphed to him by that time.
The Soviets attach decisive importance to strictest secrecy. Mikoyan
terms the procedure a German-Soviet conspiracy \Konspiration\^
knowledge of which would have to be confined to a few persons.
2
SCHULENBURQ
2 Marginal note :
"Ambassador Bitter : The Ministry of Economics (HerrBethke) will tomorrow
morning check the relevant data, which can be sent to Moscow tomorrow.
M[ackeben] November 2."
There is very extensive documentation on this subject in the files, but the
particular instructions asked for here have not been found. Cf. especially
3782/E041708-11, 103/111967, and 111995-96; and 2093/452835.
No. 321
103/111764
Memorandiwn, ~by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 864 BERLIN, November 1, 1939.
Field Marshal Goring, Grand Admiral Raeder, and Colonel General
Keitel, independently of each other, have told me that the Russian
delegation in Berlin expected too much in the way of inspection and
procurement of German materials of war* General Keitel told me
it was the Führer's opinion that materials regularly issued to troops
could be shown to the Russians; what might be sold, we had to decide
ourselves. Things in the testing stage or otherwise secret should not
be shown to the Russians.
WEIZSACKER
370
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 322
173/83997-98
TTie Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 427 of November 2 THE HAGTJE, November 2, 1939 2 : 34 p. m.
Received November 2 5 : 10 p, m.
Rumors from French and British sources to the effect that we intend
to invade Holland soon have lately again been very intensively
disseminated here and have caused great uneasiness. The Spanish
Minister told me yesterday that several diplomats here had already
taken some fairly far-reaching precautions. The American Minister
has made inquiries with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry
about the rumors, hinting that in the event of a German invasion
the United States would doubtless come to the aid of Holland with
all the resources at its command. The Secretary General of the
Foreign Ministry informed the inquiring diplomats that he considered
the rumors of a German invasion utter fabrications, and in
corroboration of his view cited the Führer's solemn declaration to
the Queen on August 26.1 To me the Secretary General has stated
that in his opinion such rumors were circulated by France for the
purpose of prompting us to embark on the invasion, which would
only be in the interest of France because it would produce the longedfor
war sentiment in France and make American aid a certainty.
The declaration of a state of emergency has nothing to do with the
above-mentioned rumors. Rather, it had been planned a long time
ago and has now been put into effect in order to put some curbs on
espionage activities based on Holland which had lately become quite
intensive. A state of emergency had been declared here during the
World War, too.
ZECH
1 See vol. vii, documents Nos. 272 and 313.
No. 323
8129/E582Q33
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 608 of November 2 WASHINGTON, November 3, 1939 12 : 50 a. m*
Eeceived November 3 9 : 45 a. m.
Pol. IX 2238.
The House of Representatives, which only a few months ago resolved
to maintain the arms embargo, voted today by an unexpected
NOVEMBER 1939 371
majority of 61 to raise it.x This change of sentiment is due both to
the strong pressure brought to bear by the Administration on Representatives
subject to party discipline and to events abroad in recent
days. Despite organized resistance by considerable numbers of voters
against raising the embargo, many Representatives were probably
led to revise their earlier views in the wake of the impressions left
by the City of Flint case,
2 the Molotov speech and the threat to
Finland.3
THOMSEBT
*Tlie House vote completed legislative action on the measure, the Senate
having approved it on Oct. 27 by a vote of 63 to 30. By proclamation of Nov. 4
the President revoked the existing ban on shipments of arms to belligerents*
The text of the proclamation is published in Department of State, Bulletin, 1939,
vol. i, pp. 453-^54.
The Foreign Ministry telegraphed the Embassy in Washington on Nov. 8
(2993/586627) : "We do not intend to make any official representations to the
American Government against the lifting of the arms embargo. Our negative
attitude is sufficiently evident from the Diplomatische IZorrespondenz of Nov. 5
and the German press."
* See document No. 301, footnote 2.
See Editors' Note, p. 363.
No. 324
8483/13596864-65
TTie Foreign Minister to tTie Ambassador in Turkey
BEIOLIN, November 3, 1939.
e. o. Pol. II 4228.
After your return please call on the Turkish. Foreign Minister at
once and inform him of the following by direction of the Reich
Government :
1. The Turkish Government is aware of the fact that even the joint
declaration of May 12, 1939, by Turkey and England 1 caused the
greatest astonishment on the part of the German Government. In
his conversation of June 8, 1939, with Ambassador Hamdi Arpag, the
Reich Foreign Minister expressed this astonishment unequivocally.*
2. Despite this warning, however, Turkey has now taken the step
of concluding a treaty with England and France, the separate articles
of which clearly show that it is no less than a far-reaching identification
of Turkey with the system of promises of assistance and guarantees
which the British Government, in league with France, brought
into existence for the purpose of establishing an encirclement front
against Germany,
3. If even before the outbreak of the present war Turkey's commitment
to this Anglo-French line caused our greatest astonishment,
the treaty now concluded has a far more serious significance precisely
because of the state of war between Germany, England, and France
which has come about in the meantime. There is a considerable dif-
1 See document No. 69, footnote 1.
a See vol. vi, document No. 496.
372
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ference between a power such as Turkey binding herself in time of
peace as regards certain hypothetical eventualities and the same power
entering into extremely far-reaching treaty obligations with one of
the two oelligerent parties in time of war.
4. The fact that in spite of this situation Turkey has now concluded
this treaty and put it into force at once impels the German
Government to observe that it must consider this conduct a grave
violation of the duties of a power not participating in the present war
and an intentional affront to Germany.
5. The German Government must reserve the right to take the measures
it sees fit should the treaty just concluded lead to practical consequences
against Germany.
Please report by wire on how your demarche was received.3
RlBBENTROP
3 Marginal notes :
"The enclosed finished copy, signed by the Foreign Minister is to be handed to
Herr v. Papen immediately. Gaus, November 2."
"Has been arranged. November 3, 5 : 30 p. in." [The initial has not been
identified.]
No. 325
111/116242
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
MOST URGENT BERLIN, November 3, 1939.
No. 519 RAM 554
With reference to your telegraphic report No. 618 of October 24.1
I authorize you to declare on my behalf to Shiratori, for his
confidential use in suitable quarters, that the Government of the Reich
has always exerted its influence on Kussia in the direction of complete
neutrality in the China conflict, and will continue to do so in the future.
BIBBENTROP
1 iDocument No. 293.
No. 326
3O27/59529-32
Circular of the Foreign Ministry *
BERLIN, November 3, 1939,
Pol. II 4394.
Enclosed I am sending for your confidential information an excerpt
from a letter of October 23 by the German Minister at The Hague,
which briefly analyzes sentiment in England.
By order:
V,
1 Circulated to German Missions in Europe, the Embassy in Turkey, and the
Consulate General in Geneva. The text used is that of the copy sent to the
Madrid Embassy. The original letter from Minister Zech has not been found.
NOVEMBER 1939 373
[Enclosure]
Pol. II 4:394.
If sentiment in England is reduced to a common denominator, it
appears approximately as follows :
On the whole England would prefer to make peace rather than have
war. Peace as envisaged by the British, however, looks different from
a German peace. A peace acceptable to England means the reestablishment
of an independent or practically independent Poland, not to
the extent of Versailles, but nevertheless approximately within ethnographic
boundaries, and greater independence for the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, both brought about with British participation.
Moreover, it means general European disarmament to the extent that
in the future changes in the map of Europe, even in Eastern or Southeastern
Europe, or basic changes in the economic spheres of influence,
can be made only by way of negotiations. Finally, although still
somewhat hazy in its details, it would mean the certainty that German
aggressions are definitely at an end. The British believe that they will
be able to achieve these objectives in a war. If they can obtain them
without war, they much prefer it that way. However, at the present
moment they prefer a war to a peace that does not approximate the
one outlined above, a peace, in particular, that does not give England a
guarantee that another war will not break out within a few months or
years.
The reasons for this attitude are as follows: Aside from the fact
that they believe their honor is at stake, the British have the feeling
that their prestige has suffered a great setback and that this prestige,
which they consider indispensable for their control of the Empire, can
be reestablished only by a peace now or later that would fulfill England's
demands. They are convinced that they will win the war in a
military sense and consider Russia a strong factor in their favor.
They feel that Russia concluded the treaty with Germany in order
to cause a European war to break out in which, of all countries, only
Russia has an interest and from which Russia alone can achieve any
real gain. Stalin will support Germany at first but later abandon
her, since a German victory and therewith a strengthening of Germany
is not in Russia's interest. Russia is on the verge of pocketing whatever
she can obtain through a war with German help, beginning with
Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. Once she is satisfied she will
withdraw her support from us. At any rate, it is certain even today
that Russia, thanks to her newly gained position of predominance
at the Baltic Sea, will in the future constitute a permanent threat to
Germany,
The British are experiencing considerable concern at the thought
that the war and the subsequent unavoidable weakening not only of
374
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the belligerents but also of the neutrals will result in a spread of the
influence of Bolshevism or Russian imperialism, or whatever one may
wish to call it not to England herself, to be sure, which is considered
immune to the Bolshevik germ, but certainly to Germany and possibly
even further west. This as well as the fear of the great sacrifices
which a war would involve for England herself explains the desire to
wind up the war in so far as this is possible without losing face. In
certain circles such as at Court, around Lloyd George and his followers,
etc., the opposition to a war is even greater than elsewhere in England.
An informed person who recently spoke with an acquaintance of Lloyd
George told me yesterday, however, that it would be a mistake to
believe that in spite of all his talk Lloyd George would support a
peace that would leave the solution of the questions in the East and
Southeast to Russia and us alone. In his opinion the key to Lloyd
George's attitude is that in view of the Last Judgment, the latter
wishes to make use of the short time left to him on earth by doing a
good deed.
As I heard yesterday, too, but only from City circles, no military
offensive seems to be planned. This is also indicated by Hore-
Belisha's speech.
2 It is believed that England and France can endure
a long waiting period better than Germany, whose Government has
supposedly accustomed the people to having something happening
all the time. Moreover, they think it will take some time for the
Russian factor to take effect against Germany. The past setbacks on
land in Poland, on the sea, and in the air, are felt to be a painful experience.
In consolation they tell themselves, however, that it was the
same way in the beginning in the World War ; that in those days the
effective countermeasures grew out of the losses, and that in the end
England was victorious after all.
*On Oct. 11 Leslie Hore-Belisha, British Secretary of State for War, had
given in the House of Commons details of the movement of the British Expeditionary
Force to France and other military dispositions.
No. 327
2181/496299-301
Circular of the State Secretary l
BEKUN, November 3, 1939.
Kult A 1691 g.
In spite of the fact that the foreign press was promptly informed,
the Führer's statement concerning a new ordering of the ethnograpli-
1 This instruction was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions in Europe, including
Turkey, and to the Embassies in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile.
NOVEMBER 1939 375
ical situation through resettlement of the nationalities in foreign
countries has in many cases been interpreted falsely or even maliciously.
I therefore make the following statement for your guidance.
Behind the resettlement action there is the idea that Germany wishes
to make another far-reaching contribution to the pacification of Europe
by offering to aid in establishing better lines of separation and
thereby eliminating grave areas of friction between states.
In his speech in the Reichstag on October 6, 1939, the Fuhrer
formulated these thoughts in the following words :
"All Eastern and Southeastern Europe is partly filled with untenable
German splinter groups. There exists in these groups a prime
reason for and source of continued disturbances between states. In
the age of the nationality principle and the racial idea it is Utopian
to believe that these members of a first-class nation can be simply
assimilated. Thus it is one of the tasks of a far-sighted regulation of
European life to undertake resettlements here in order in this way to
eliminate at least some of the causes of conflict in Europe."
In the further course of the speech the Fuhrer again outlined the
problem of establishing better lines of separation as follows :
"The disposition of the entire living-space according to the various
nationalities ; that is to say, a solution of the problems affecting minorities
which concern not only this area but nearly all the States in the
south and southeast of Europe."
In his speech in Danzig on October 24, 1939,
2 the Reich Foreign
Minister then underlined the idea of eliminating areas of friction in
the following words :
"At the moment Germany is trying to unite within this area all
of the German splinter groups in Europe which can be resettled. In
so doing she is creating definitive, clear national relationships and
borderlines, and by means of these large-scale resettlement projects
is eliminating the.possibility of future conflicts."
The textof the Fuhrer's statement to the Reichstag- indicates that his
offer is dependent on certain prerequisites. It refers to untenable
national splinter groups which as a result of attempts at assimilation
and other oppressive measures on the part of the host country or
for other special reasons are a source of disturbances between states.
It goes without saying, and also follows from the character of the
action as a contribution to peace, that resettlements will be undertaken
only if the German Government considers them necessary and
is able to reach an agreement in the matter with the government concerned.
Another condition, of course, is that the German group itself
a Printed in Dokumente der Deutsohen Politik, vol. vii, pt. i, pp, S62-381.
376
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
is in accord with the resettlement, for we wish to receive only voluntary
repatriates.
So far we are carrying on resettlement discussions only with Italy,
Russia, Estonia, and Latvia.3 Other resettlements are not urgent and
are not being discussed. The German splinter groups at our northern
and western borders are of no interest whatsoever in this connection.
Please use the above ideas in conversations as occasion requires. We
are interested, however, in restricting the discussion of this problem
as much as possible. As far as our influence can be brought to bear,
discussions in the press should therefore be avoided as much as
possible.
WEIZSACKER
3 See documents Nos, 199, 207, 239, 252.
No. 328
F5/0261-5T
The Regent of Hungary to the Fuhrer and dianoeUoT
BUDAPEST, November 3, 1939.
EXCELLENCY : When one knows a friend to be heavily burdened with
responsibility, facing great decisions and laden with care, one feels
the urge to visit him in one's thoughts, to clear up any possible misunderstandings,
and to warn him of dangers of which, one is aware.
So please do not consider my gift of fruit in these grave and dark days
as naivete.
No honest person of sound political judgment could fail to realize
that unless the flagrant injustices of the Paris peace dictates were
eradicated in time they would be wiped out by force of arms. A bad
peace can only bring forth new wars. We Hungarians are the best
witnesses to the fact that the statesmen of the Western Powers did
not recognize this or, if they did, did not have the will or the power
to avert the disaster, for at a time when there was nothing for us to
do but try to improve our impossible situation through the League
of Nations, our grievances were always ignored. The famous article
19 was never applied, though we were the ones who suffered more
than any others after the World War.
Although we look up in admiration to the German Army and
to German might, we face the coming events with concern, for war
today is a war without romance, without swords, and causes much
suffering, deprivation, and sorrow.
We were loyal comrades-in-arms and, when the entire world turned
against Germany after the collapse, her only true friends. Yet
NOVEMBER 1939 377
while our feeling toward Germany never changed, we had the impression
that Germany's attitude toward us underwent a change. The
only way we could explain this to ourselves (by "we" I mean public
opinion, the Government, and myself) was that falsely colored
situation reports and mendacious accounts were circulated to
present our Government in a false light. In recent years a political
party has been formed here, known as the Arrow Cross
[Pfeilkreuzler\i which is under the leadership of contemptible individuals
and operates with anonymous leaflets. They spread false
situation reports and slander our best public figures. Besides, those
who are seeking to stir up the Hungarian citizens of German stock
are engaged in similar activities. Both movements are working for
money.
That the Hungarians oppressed the nationalities living here is a
lie which was invented in Paris when the peace dictates were contrived.
For centuries the German communities have spoken German,
and they have not been discriminated against in their pursuits. The
name of our best Minister of War was Wilhelm Roder, the present
Chief of the General Staff is Heinrich Werth, the Minister for
Education and Worship is Homan, the Minister of Finance is Schneller,
etc. Moreover, the highest position in the country was held
by Prince Primate Cardinal Czernoch, the son of a poor Slovak peasant,
and is now held by Prince Primate Cardinal Seredi, the son of
a Slovak roofer by the name of Zapucek.
The plan of repatriating the German minorities to their original
homeland settles a multitude of questions and prevents friction; it
is an excellent idea that should be applied to all minorities. The
Turks and Greeks to my knowledge did exchange 1% million people.
If this plan is ever realized, the efforts of those who want to use
the minority question to drive a wedge between us and the German
Reich will come to naught. Our good Swabians, by the way, of
whom we have always been very fond, are certainly the best farmers
and farm workers among all those who can be repatriated. The Volga
Germans, I hear, have become out-and-out Communists.
I have reliable information, by the way, that Russia will deliver
nothing if Germany should get into difficulties, for she is afraid of
Germany alone ; if Germany is weakened the road is open for .world
revolution.
Lenin wrote the following: "It is a fundamental principle that
in case of war the revolutionary classes must desire the defeat .of
their own government." And Stalin said on the occasion of the tenth
anniversary of the Red Army : "Precisely because our army is being
educated in the spirit of internationalism it is the army of world
378 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN POHBIGN POLICY
revolution. The essence of official Soviet diplomacy is to keep the
Soviet State out of a world war, but at the same time to hasten the
outbreak of a world war, for it expects from it the final victory of
world revolution."
After November 11, 1918, Marshal Foch made the official proposal
that France, England, Italy, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, should
all immediately march against Moscow, establish order there, break
up into its component parts that gigantic empire composed of 118
nationalities which was a threat to all ; then they were to return, sit
down at the green table, and as comrades-in-arms conclude an eternal
peace. This proposal was killed by Clemenceau, and yet this would
have been the only practical way to save Europe.
I should also like to express my sincere and heartfelt thanks for
the friendly words with which Your Excellency remembered Hungary
on the historic occasion of your latest very forceful speech.1
We are a grateful and absolutely reliable people, and we realize
what we owe to you and the German nation. We want the German
people to feel that even though it wishes to fight its great battle alone,
it need not face its cares alone. Whatever we can spare is at your
disposal.
. If you should, perhaps, some day wish to make use of my services
in some other way, in absolute secrecy, for very confidential negotiations,
I shall always be available except for the East.
Your Excellency's devoted friend,
HORTHY
P. S. I sent the names of the five varieties of apples with them.
The grapes should be hung in a well-aired room and should be
washed before eating, as they have been sprayed.
* On Oct. 6. See Editors' Note, p. 227.
No. 329
TTie Minister in Rwmowiia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
ORGENTT BUCHAREST, November 6, 1939 8 : 50 p. m.
No. 834 of November 6 Received November 7 5 : 25 p. m.
I spoke today to Gafencu concerning today's teletype message from
Borne, according to which the Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara was
NOVEMBER 1939 379
negotiating about Article 3 of the Turkish pact.
1 Gafencu termed
the report false; it came tinder the category of canards like the one
about the flight of the Polish President to Brussels and similar ones
that were calculated to cast doubt on Kumania's good faith.
Ambassador Stoica was negotiating about the neutrality bloc and
nothing else. He showed me 1) his instruction to Stoica; 2) the
latter's reply; 3) instructions to Athens and Belgrade.
Re 1) The Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara is instructed to ask
the Turkish Government whether it would approve neutrality of the
Balkans in a form still to be determined in detail.
Rumania has in mind :
a)
absolute neutrality in the present European 'conflict;
o) binding pledges of nonaggression among the Balkan states;
c) in the event of an attack on a Balkan state by a third state no
attack must be made on the attacked state by other Balkan States (i. e.
protection against Bulgaria and Hungary) ;
d) withdrawal of troops from common borders in the Balkans, with
demobilization as its aim (similar to the agreement with Hungary) ;
e) close economic cooperation to eliminate economic difficulties
during the present conflict;
/) ]oint consultation for the defense of the economic interests of
the neutrals.
It is stressed that the accession of Hungary and Bulgaria is necessary,
and that that of Italy, which at present is still aloof, will be
sought.
Re 2) Secretary General Numan welcomes the proposal and will
submit it to the Turkish Minister President. He promises a reply on
or before November 14.
Re 3) Belgrade and Athens will be informed of the reply.
Gafencu considers his step a contribution to the neutrality of the
Balkans, and feels certain of our approval. Having already replied to
his inquiry in conformity with paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 707
of October 31,
2 I refrained today from further remarks.
FABRICIUS
1 See document No. 338, footnote 2.
2 Not printed (583/242247. In paragraph 2 of this telegram, Woermann
instructed Fabricius to tell Gafencu that "we believe the question of establishing
a political bloc of all the Balkan States tinder Italian leadership does not arise
at all, since to our knowledge Rome is not seeking anything of this kind. Thus
in these circumstances there is no need for us to take a position either of approval
or disapproval." See also documents Nos. 266, 296, 354, 358, 359, and 372.
260090 64 30
380 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
No. 330
8342/E5O01S9-43
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
No. 416 BERLIN, November 7, 1939.
Received November 7 7 : 00 p. m.
You are requested in accordance with the conversations with the
Ambassador here to continue the economic negotiations 1 on the
following basis :
(1) If the Turks persist in refusing to restore the Clearing Agreement,
we propose a comprehensive compensation arrangement with,
bilateral general settlement. The arrangement could take in about
one-third or one-half of the former volume of goods on the basis of
the foreign trade during the last treaty year, exclusive of Avar material. We prefer comprehensive to item-by-item compensation because the
latter is inadequate as the sole basis of an exchange of goods. It is
necessary, however, to keep open the possibility of individual compensation
transactions besides the comprehensive compensation arrangement.
The limitation on the comprehensive compensation
arrangement is unavoidable on account of transportation difficulties,
(2) Acceptance of proposal (1) by the Turks would also automatically
ensure delivery of part of the imports of chromium ore. For
the rest of the chromium ore imports [we could offer] specific compensations.
The total imports during the year, counting from October
1st, must if possible [reach] last year's imports of 80,000 tons; the
indispensable minimum is 60,000 tons. Failure of the Turks to agree
to the inclusion of a portion of the chromium ore in the comprehensive
compensation arrangement, would make it necessary to propose a
special compensation arrangement for the total quantity. Conversations
with Ochel and Palucca's 2 statements, with which you are familiar,
offer the first starting points in that direction. Apart from this,
Habib Edih, the Turkish merchant here acting supposedly as the
agent of the Turkish War Ministry, has proposed a special compensation
of 50,000 tons of chromium ore, 8,000 tons of cotton, and 2,000
tons of mohair, valued at 12 million K.M, against Mauser rifles, 20-mm
antiaircraft guns, 37-mm antitank guns and medical instruments and
medicaments. We have given an evasive answer because we would
prefer if possible to barter chromium ore for manufactures important
to Turkey, e. g., railway material and only, as a last resort, for arms
and, if so, then possibly only for arms on the basis of old orders.
(3) With regard to military equipment, we propose the following
general settlement :
a) Large arms (heavy guns from 150 mm to 240 mm, submarines
and related equipment) will not be supplied, as before;
1 On July 31, 1939, tlie existing German-Turkish Agreements on Trade and
Payments had terminated. Discussions concerning the resumption of trade, with
or without a comprehensive agreement, had been going on since the spring of
1939. For a summary of these discussions, see document No. 391.
1 Owner of a chromium ore mine near the Sea of Marmora.
NOVEMBER 1039 381
since the outbreak of the war it would be equally indefensible on
military grounds to deliver 60 Messerschmitt 109's and 8 Heinkel
Ill's as well as 16 75-mm antiaircraft guns. As regards the
second order for 40 antiaircraft guns of the same type, which are
not to be delivered until 1942, there is hardly any need to discuss
it now. Finally, there is doubt as to the advisability of delivering
in full the 4,000 light machine guns on order with Skoda,
because they represent the equipment of 13 divisions. Of this,
however, a portion, scaled down to a minimum could be delivered.
For the information of the Embassy : 500 are ready for shipment
at this time.
&) Other deliveries of military equipment can in the main be
carried out provided a satisfactory general settlement is obtained.
In the case of the delivery of the 278 37-mm antitank guns, which
would be inconvenient at this time, it would be desirable at least
to extend the delivery dates.
o) The prerequisite for deliveries under (b) is that in the event
of nondelivery of orders under (a) the Turks will in all instances
recognize the intervention of force majeure and waive fines for
breach of contract and judicial procedure against the firms concerned.
Advance payments would be returned with interest.
Transferring back to German firms through the clearing of advance
payments made by the same method will offer no difficulties
since funds are available from a mounting balance. Negotiations
will be necessary to settle the manner of refunding to firms in the
Protectorate their advance payments in English pounds. Since
it is obvious that we cannot make refunds in English pounds at
this time, an attempt must first be made to arrange repayment
through the clearing. If this is not agreeable, reimbursement
could perhaps be made in the form of goods of particular interest
to the Turks.
d) An additional condition for further deliveries under (b)
is that deliveries of chromium ore discussed in Section. 2 must be
guaranteed. It is then immaterial whether they are linked
directly to the former or are compensated for in some other way.
e) If guarantees for the delivery of the chromium ore cannot be
obtained in this way, the last resort, in view of the imperative
need for chromium ore, would be a new arms transaction ; arms of
the type designated under (a) would however be ruled out. From
the Turkish standpoint also new contracts are probably feasible
only if the fate of the old contracts is clarified. If the new contracts
are for arms similar to those discussed under (b), the
substitutions of new contracts for the old might perhaps have
the advantage for us that this would convert credit transactions
into cash transactions on the basis of chrome ore.
4) If a general settlement is effected, the balance, in so far as it
is not used for repayments, must in accordance with Article 12
of the Clearing Agreement be used for imports of articles of pur
choice, which would exclude chromium ore if chromium ore is subject
to a special arrangement.
5 ) We cannot deliver a i \y goods and the Clearing Office in Germany
can make no more advances until a general settlement is agreed upon.
382
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Nor are we in a position any longer to deliver bills of lading that are
not already in Turkish hands. Please advise the banks there to get
in touch with their customers in regard to this matter.
You must make it plain that this is not a matter of chicanery or
reprisal, but simply economic necessity because we cannot allow
our balance to continue to mount unless we know what use we shall
be able to make of it.
6) We are aware that negotiations are difficult on this tasis.
Turkey, just as any other country, must appreciate, however, that as
things stand it is indeed a great technical and organizational achievement
if Germany, in spite of the war, is willing to maintain German,
exports on the scale proposed. This is especially true with respect
to war material. In international practice contracts for military
equipment are signed with the express or tacit reservation that
involvement of the supplier country in a war will at least suspend
their performance. The proof of this is that in ordering military
equipment in the last year before the outbreak of the war, buyers
often expressly insisted on a clause that delivery must be performed
in spite of a possible outbreak of war. The fact that notwithstanding
these circumstances we are willing to carry out deliveries on a large
scale is a very special concession, particularly with respect to Turkey,
considering her political attitude in the past half year.
7) As soon as we can perceive a basis for agreement we would make
a junior official of the Ministry of Economics temporarily available to
the Embassy for the purpose of technical consultations and preparation
of the text of the agreement since the sending of Clodius is now
impracticable for political reasons.
Please report by telegraph.
Worn
No. 331
141/127838
Memorandum by the State Secretary
StS. No. 873 BERLIN, November 7, 1939.
The Belgian Ambassador, who 'called, on me today because of
several instances of alleged German violations of Belgian air sovereignty,
made several attempts to turn the conversation to the subject
of a German offensive and rumors of an intended violation of
Belgian territory. I did not follow these hints and referred Count
Davignon to the Foreign Minister's address at Danzig for the general
political situation.1 Davignon intends to go to Brussels about the
1 The Foreign Minister's address at Danzig was made on Oct. 24. For text,
see Dokutnente der Deutschen Politik, vol. vn, pt. I, pp* 362-381.
NOVEMBBB 1939 383
end of this week in order to contact his Government directly again
and visit his family.
The Ambassador described the trip of the King of the Belgians to
Holland, which became known today, as an outcome of the last meeting
of the Scandinavian monarchs.2 He added that the Bang had great
respect for the Queen of the Netherlands. Belgium could also learn a
great deal from the wide experience of Holland in the field of neutrality
during wartime.
Addendum : At a reception this afternoon the Belgian Ambassador
approached me in a state of alarm, alleging that the entire German
afternoon press was using the occasion of the visit of the King of
the Belgians to The Hague for attacking Belgium and Holland in such
a manner that it seemed as if Germany were trying to start a quarrel
with these countries.
I immediately rejected this impression and said that as yet I was
not familiar with these articles.
Davignon asked, since he was extremely upset, that I tell him a
little more sometime during the afternoon about the meaning of these
press articles, unless it should be possible for him to ask the Foreign
Minister himself concerning them.
* See document No. 255, footnote 1.
No. 332
173/84010-11
Memorandum, by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat
SECRET BERJXN", November 7, 1939.
StS. No. 874
Minister Count Zech telephoned from The Hague at 7 : 05 p. m. and
dictated the telegram annexed hereto. He added that the text of the
telegram had been handed to him at the Netherlands Foreign Ministry
about an hour and a half ago (it had taken that long to get a
connection with Berlin). Immediately after him the French and
British Ambassadors were received and handed a telegraphic communication
of the same text, addressed to the President of the French
Republic and the King of England.
The telegram will not be published in the Dutch press until tomorrow
morning.
SIEGFEIED
384
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure]
Telegram of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands
to the German Chancellor.
THE HAGUE, November 7, 1939.
In an hour which is of ominous import for the entire world, before
the war in Western Europe begins in full violence, it is our conviction
that it is our duty once more to raise our voices.1
Some time ago, the belligerent parties declared that they were not
averse to examining honest and secure bases for a just peace. It is
our impression that they find it difficult in the present circumstances
to establish contact for a more complete exposition and coordination
of their positions.
As the Sovereigns of two neutral states which have good relations
with all their neighbors, we are prepared to offer them our good
offices. If agreeable to them, we are willing to place ourselves at
their disposal as they may see fit and, with all resources at our command
and in the spirit of friendly sympathy, facilitate the transmission
of proposals for the attainment of an understanding.
This is in our judgment the mission which we have to carry out for
the sake of the well-being of our nations and in the interest of the
entire world. We hope that our offer will be accepted and that with it
the first step will be taken toward the restoration of a lasting peace/
WlLHELMINA
LEOPOLD
'In testimony given June 23, 1948, before Tribunal IV, rase 11, "The Ministries
Case" (Nuremberg Military Tribunals, mimeographed transcript, English
edition, pp. 9807-9811), Biilow-Schwante stated tliat at the end of October
1939 the former Oberbiirgermeister of Leipzig, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, brought
to him in Brussels a message from Weizsiicker which could not be sent through
regular channels. Weizsiicker urged Btilow-Schwante to act promptly on his
own initiative, even if this ran counter to the official Reich policy, to Impress
on the Belgians the extreme gravity of the situation. Accordingly, Biilow-
Schwante testified, he arranged for a private audience with King Leopold, and
shortly afterwards he read that the King had gone to The Hague to consult with
Queen Wilhelnaina.
a On Nov. 11 the heads of the Missions in Belgium and the Netherlands were
given telegraphic instructions by Ribbentrop to call immediately upon the
respective Foreign Ministers and to say : "The Führer has received the telegram
sent to him by Queen Wilhelmina and King Leopold jointly. The contents of
the telegram will be carefully studied" (476/229466). For subsequent German
reaction see document No. 356.
NOVEMBER 1939 385
No. 333
4531/144260-61
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Turkey
Telegram
XJRGBNT BERLIN, November 8, 1939 [12 : 59 a. m.]
Ho. [420]
* zu WIII c 30 Ang. 3.
With reference to our telegram No. [416] of November 7,
WHIc3(X2
There are numerous reports here that in her attempt to shift her
industrial orders from Germany to England Turkey is confronted
with great difficulties and that in most cases delivery is being refused.
The situation seems to be especially critical with regard to spare parts,
which can be obtained only from Germany. In case these reports are
correct, please take account of this situation in carrying out the instruction
cited above. If the Embassy is of the opinion that the
difficulties of the Turkish economy will shortly increase to such an
extent that the Turks will have to approach us with a request for
certain deliveries, with the result that we would be in a more favorable
position, we would even agree to delay carrying out the
instruction for the time being. If the pressure on the Turkish economy
caused by the lack of German deliveries is really sufficiently
serious, there is a better prospect for making a changeover to cash
payment the condition for completion of the credit transactions
already concluded both with respect to war material under section
3 b) of the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction as well as with
respect to other deliveries. If in view of the situation the Embassy
should consider such dilatory treatment proper, the attempt should
merely be made at this time to bring about single compensation transactions
on chromium ore in the sense of the previous instruction.
Report by wire.
WIEHL
Information in brackets is from the Ankara copy of the document
(8493/E596917-18).
3 Document No. 330.
386
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 334
141/127646
The Ambassador in Belgiwm, to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 327 of November 8 BRUSSELS, November 8, 1939 2: 56 p. m.
Received November 8 6 :15 p, m.
Have just heard from a reliable Dutch source that the journey to
The Hague has been undertaken by the Belgian King owing to threatening
news received concerning German preparations for attack near
the Belgian and Dutch border. The King is said to have stated in
The Hague that he is in possession of exact information concerning
the formation of the German units, which according to military
opinion show indications of intention to attack. Hitherto it was only
a matter of billeting of large troop formations which had been released
in the East. In the last few days, however, regrouping is
said to have taken place which represented a strategic concentration
for attack.
According to the King's information this concentration would be
completed in about 2 to 3 days so that from then onwards the attack
could ensue at any moment. From the foregoing description of the
Dutch confidential agent, it is seen that the Belgian-Dutch offer of
mediation 1 represents a move which derives from the initiative of
the King of the Belgians and the fear of being precipitated into a war.
Bifecnr
* See document No. 332.
No. 335
1369/356966-6T
Memorandum T>y an Official of Political Division V
November 8, 1939.
On November 7, the anniversary of the October [Revolution, a
reception was held by the newly-appointed Ambassador, Alexander
(Alekseyevich) Shkvartsev, at the Berlin Embassy of the USSR.
Field Marshal Goring was among the guests; after the welcoming
address by the Ambassador, he expressed to the latter his satisfaction
about the fact that the relations between the German Reich and the
USSR were constantly growing more friendly. The Field Marshal
then inquired of the Ambassador as to the progress of the economic
negotiations and asked whether the Soviet delegation in Berlin found
everything as they desired, whereupon the Ambassador replied that
NOVEMBER 1939 387
the negotiations were proceeding very favorably, so that it could be
expected that the agreement would be signed in the very near future.
The Ambassador thereupon introduced the head of the Soviet
negotiating delegation, People's Commissar Tevossyan, to the Field
Marshal. Tevossyan, an Armenian who speaks some German, stated
that the Soviet delegation was not entirely satisfied with the attitude
of reserve that the Germans were showing on the arms question. The
Germans had promised that the Soviet delegation would be shown the
most recent achievements of arms technology, for instance in field
artillery, airplanes, aiming mechanisms, and communications, but the
very latest improvements were nevertheless being kept secret. Field
Marshal Goring declared that the Germans will adhere with painful
exactitude [peinlich genau\ to their promise. He had given strict
instructions to that effect and he was ready to do away with existing
difficulties. With regard to field artillery there could be no talk of secrecy
; after all, that was already proven. Then it was the foot artillery
[Fussartillerie], said Tevossyan. In aviation, too, much was being
kept secret. Field Marshal Goring thereupon explained that much experimental
work was being done in aviation and that only thoroughlytested
innovations could be considered. He would not like to assume
the responsibility of delivering to the Soviet Government a plane
that had not yet been finally tested. The many numbers of a single
airplane type are explained by the fact that the figures indicate re*
peated series in each case. Tevossyan thereupon said he would then
like to have the planes with the latest numbers shown. Field Marshal
Goring replied to the People's Commissar that the German-Soviet
relationship was based on mutual confidence and, as we trusted the
Soviet Government, we should also like to ask that we not be approached
in a spirit of mistrust. If we showed something as the most
recent innovation, it was the most recent innovation. Field Marshal
Goring promised again to issue instructions to this effect and asked
that cases of doubt be referred to his staff whom he would instruct
accordingly.
Respectfully submitted to Minister Freiherr von Dornberg.
No. 336
173/84014
Memorandum T>y the &ta>te Secretary
St.S. No. 875 BERLUST, November 8, 1939,
The Italian Ambassador today spontaneously mentioned to me the
fact that the two Sovereigns of Belgium and the Netherlands offered
388
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
their good offices in the question of peace. I told Attolico that it was
obviously the wish of the British Government to obscure and kill in
advance any mediation effort through Lord Halifax's speech last
night.
1 As to the German reaction to the action of the two Sovereigns
I pointed out to Attolico that the Führer was not in Berlin at the
moment.
In the subsequent course of the conversation I told the Italian that
Belgium was making remonstrances with us at present about repeated
flights over Belgian territory; of all these complaints one at most
appeared to me to have any foundation. Conversely, however I
continued as instructed we had reason to complain about the recurrent
violations of Belgian territory by the Allied air forces. Belgium
and Holland must be careful to maintain their neutrality no?merely
in words but also in deeds and to offer energetic resistance to British
pressures unless the two countries wished to acquire with us the reputation
of showing definite favoritism to our enemies.
WEIZSACKER
1 The text of this speech is published in Speeches on Foreign Policy "by Viscount
Halifax, edited by H. H. E. Craster (London, 1940) , pp. 33O-335.
No. 337
476/2&9491
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
STOCKHOLM, November 9, 1939 7 : 00 p. m.
No. 357 of November 9 Received November 9.
Civil Engineer Dahlerus requests that the following message be
conveyed to Field Marshal Goring :
With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday I recommend
that no definite stand be taken for several days on the appeal of
the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians. I shall
in the meantime seek to ascertain from England whether the British
are interested at all and, if so, what their conditions are. It is regrettable
that such a proposal was made without better preparation while
the British still have under consideration the communications referred
to in my letter of November 7.1 End of message.
1 Not found.
NOVEMBER 1939 389
No. 338
1625/3*3265-66
The Ambassador m Turkey to the Foreign Mitdstry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ANKARA, November 9, 1939 7 : 55 p. m.
No. 464 of November 9 [Received November 10 4 : 00 a. m.
PoL II 4507.
1. A demarche has just been made in accordance with the Foreign
Minister's instruction Pol. II 4228 of November 3.1 My statements,
made with great seriousness and supplemented in accordance with the
oral instructions, were received by M. Saracoglu in silence. He repealed
the old, well-known excuses that the treaty was not directed
against Germany and was exclusively an instrument for defending
Turkey against attacks. Italy, against which the treaty was mainly
directed, had not lodged any formal protest whatever in view of this
situation. In reply to my question about the meaning of articles 4
and 5, Saracoglu made evasive and empty statements. Criticizing the
Turkish attitude most severely, I emphasized the value of our friendship
with Russia for all future developments. The Minister admitted
that he had wished to limit article 3 to consultation, but that the
Western Powers had refused to give up the version previously agreed
upon.
2 Saracoglu's speech yesterday in the Assembly, with its arrogant
praise of the new partners, can be explained only by the existence
of strong opposition and uneasiness in leading Turkish circles in the
face of the deterioration of Turkish-Russian relations.
2. From the discussion of the meaning of article 5 of the Tripartite
Pact I received the impression that (group garbled) a violation of the
1 Document No. 324.
3 The text of the articles referred to here is as follows :
Article 3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom
to Greece and Koumania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939,
remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the "United
Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of
France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either
of the said guarantees.
Article 4. In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in
hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by
that Power against either of those States without the provisions of articles 2
or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult
together.
It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at
least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.
Article 5. Without prejudice to the provisions of article 3 above, in the event
of either :
(1) Aggression by a European Power against another European State which
the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of
that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality
against such, aggression, or
(2) Aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another
European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the
High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security, the High Contracting
Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as
might be considered effective.
390
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
neutrality of such countries as are of vital interest to England, detailed
discussions have already been held in view of the situation on the
Dutch-Belgian border, which is much 'discussed here and is considered
very serious. It must be expected that in such an event Turkey \vill
yield to British pressure and break off diplomatic relations with us,
3. An exhaustiv&conversation with the Russian Ambassador, whom I
told of the reports available here on the [French] Army of the Orient,
showed agreement on the necessity of preventing in all circumstances
the use of this army for an attack through (group garbled) against
the southern German flank. The maintenance of peace in the Balkans
was equally important for the two powers. Russia had already taken
precautionary military measures against Turkish troop concentrations
in the Caucasus and would continue such measures until spring. Discussing
the possibility of a forced entry by the British fleet into the
Bosporus the Ambassador said that he had left no doubt here that this
would have the most serious consequences. He mentioned to me the
possibility of a Russian air attack on the Straits being launched in
that event. Present Turkish-Russian relations do not permit any
continuation of the negotiations broken off in Moscow.
4. General estimate of the situation found here : In order to gain
time for the operations jointly agreed upon, about which I have not
spoken to Terentiev but which were suggested by him as quite possible,
and in order not to be forced to give up the German foothold here
prematurely, I would again recommend joint, large-scale operations
against England for the spring. In any case an attempt should be
made to extract a Russian declaration .that any Allied attack on the
Balkans would lead to a Straits conflict with Russia in the sense of
Protocol 2.
No. 339
2121/462425
TTie Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT ANKARA, November 9, 1939 11 : 12 p. m.
No. 465 of November 9 Received November 10 5 :00 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 416 of November 7.1
On the occasion of today's political discussion with the Foreign
Minister I pointed out to him that the only possibility of an improvement
in political relations was a new economic agreement. I found
that the Minister was in general agreement, and referred him to the
guiding principle of the above instruction as a basis.
* Document No, 330.
NOVEMBER 1939 391
In view of the general war situation I consider it urgent to arrive
at this agreement as soon as possible ; for that reason I have not made
any use of the suggestion given in instruction 420.2 It developed that
the chromium for which the Allies are so ardently contending is obtainable
only against compensation in the form of war material in
accordance with Subsection 3 b. The Minister also seemed willing
to conclude agreement on this basis in accordance with Subsection 3 c
(recognition of force majeure). With reference to chromium, England
and France were demanding extensive deliveries, and America
similarly, 50,000 tons. Turkey was trying to determine whether an
increase in output would be possible. I replied that this was of no
interest to us and that an agreement with Germany was possible only
if the required minimum was -delivered.
The Foreign Minister promised that he would give me a binding
answer on Monday. I propose that the motors for the submarine here
be included in Subsection 3 b, since I have ascertained that they are
in Spanish harbors and therefore are useless to Germany. Such a
delivery would give me an exceptional possibility of concluding a
favorable treaty. Please send telegraphic instructions on this point.
PAPBN
3 Document No. 333.
No. 340
2914/566588-91
Tlie Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in* Sweden
Telegram
BERLIN, November 9, 1939.
With reference to your telegram No. 340.1
1) Although the conduct- o naval operations is outside the function
of the governmeaataJLdelegation, we agree that you should enter
*Not printed (2914/566572-74). In this telegram dispatched Nov. 3, Mtnisterialdirektor
Walter of the Ministry of Food, chairman of the delegation to
negotiate a German-Swedish clearing agreement, reported on views expressed
to him privately but on behalf of the Swedish Government by Richert, the
Swedish Minister to Germany. Richert said his Government was astonished
at the presentation of the German note of Oct. 31 on the 4-mile limit (see document
No, 304, footnote 2) just as economic conversations were being undertaken,
and regarded this act as evidencing an "unfriendly attitude." Sweden had
claimed the 4-mile limit of territorial waters for many decades and was not
disposed to yield it; she was, however, willing to discuss the matter through
usual diplomatic channels. Richert then presented Swedish views on maintaining
normal trade with belligerents. Walter replied that the economic delegation
was not authorized to negotiate on problems of sea warfare. Richert
thereupon requested that the German delegation ask for an extension of ltd
powers because Sweden was not prepared to conclude a treaty unless the repercussions
of German sea warfare on Swedish foreign trade were taken into
account.
392
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
into conversations about it because we believe that this will improve
your position in the negotiations.
2) Please take the following standpoint :
a) In accordance with the declaration made by Hassell,
2
it is not
our intention to interfere with Sweden's trade with the enemy countries
through applying economic pressure, provided that such trade
is kept within normal bounds and on a pre-war scale ; this means, for
instance, we shall not because of such trade relations apply reprisals,
such as refusing to buy Swedish products or to deliver German products
essential to Sweden. We also consent to the maintenance of trade
with neutral countries, but shall agree to any increase above normal
trade and the pre-war volume only if it is not at the expense of exports
to Germany. If so, we would construe it as a serious violation of
Swedish neutrality.
&) Our commercial policy does not affect the conduct of naval
operations. Since England has adopted the ruthless suppression of
all trade between neutrals and Germany, where she has the power to
do so, and since she has moreover subjected the trade between the
neutral countries to rigid control, often rendering trade practically
impossible, on the pretext of preventing goods going to Germany by
way of the neutral countries, we have to claim the same right. We
shall accordingly cut off Swedish exports to England with all the
means of naval warfare, and also stop shipments of goods destined for
neutral countries, if we have reason to suspect that they are ultimately
intended for the enemy. Please emphasize that this is merely Germany's
reply to England's way of handling the control of the seas.
The argument that the suppression of the direct and indirect Swedish
exports to enemy countries would so weaken the Swedish economy
that a reduction in Swedish exports to Germany would necessarily
follow is not true. Sweden would, despite this, be in a position not
only to keep up exports to Germany, but even to increase them. If the
point is raised that the maintenance of normal trade with one belligerent
is predicated upon the maintenance of trade with other belligerents,
please reply that to our knowledge not a single country whose trade
with Germany has been cut off by British measures has decided to
break off trade with England, or even restrict it, on that account.
c) The 3-mile zone is internationally recognized. We are not in a
position to make an exception and grant Sweden a 4-mile zone. It is
desirable, however, to continue to handle the discussion of this question,
on which negotiations between the Legation there and the Swedish
Government are now in progress (see telegraphic report No. 849),
8
in the same manner as heretofore.
2 See document No. 165.
'Not printed (205/141918-20). This telegram, dispatched Nov. 5, quoted the
text of the Swedish reply of Nov. 4 to the German note of Get, 31. The Swedish
Government repeated its claim to a 4-mile limit and expressed its strong hope
that the German Government, regardless of its objections on principle, would on
reconsideration find it possible to respect the Swedish view.
NOVEMBER 1939 393
3) For your information: Should Sweden insist on bracketing the
two questions, we have no objection, if you deem proper, to breaking
off the negotiations for the present.
Reply by telegram.
4
* Not found.
No. 341
103/111773-74
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
Uo. 740 BERUCN, November 9, 1939.
With reference to your No. 628.2
Telegraphic instruction No. 659 3 and telegraphic report No. 628
apparently crossed en route. As already explained therein the Naval
Staff, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, has ordered German
naval forces to comply with the wishes of the Russians, particularly
in view of the pending negotiations with Finland.
You are authorized to reassure the Eussians regarding this, and to
add that in the present situation we understood the Eussian attitude
also in regard to the longitude degree
4 and were now taking it into
account. Please also say that this accommodation on our part does
not, of course, mean a renunciation in principle of an extension of our
xiaval warfare to all parts of the high seas. If, as in the present case,
there were particular interests to be taken into consideration, we were
prepared to engage in a friendly discussion of such proposals in the
future, too.
For your information :
The Eussian authorities appear to have misunderstood Commander
Neubauer's statements. In the conversation with the Naval Attache
it was merely a question of technical information expressly designated
as such, delivered in a personal way, to which no fundamental importance
whatsoever could be attached.
WEIZSACKER
1 Pol. I M 7540 g : Not found.
2 Document No. 313.
* Document No. 309.
4 See document No. 313.
394 DOCUMENTS CIST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 342
1S69/35696O
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT Moscow, November 10, 1939 6 : 09 a. m.
No. 687 of November 9 Received November 10 8 : 45 a. in. W IV 4360.
For Hitter and Schnurre :
1) Molotov informed me this evening that if Germany were to
meet the wishes of the Soviet economic delegation and an agreement
were reached on Soviet wishes respecting deliveries, the Soviet Government
would be prepared to agree to payment for the transit freight
through clearing, that is, in reichsmarks. This would apply to all
German transit shipments via the Soviet Union in the trade with
Iran, Afghanistan, the Far East, and Rumania. With respect to the
transit traffic from Rumania to Germany via former Polish territory,
the Soviet Government agreed to the application of the provisions of
the relevant German treaty with Rumania.
2) Molotov further stated that the Soviet Government had decided
to ship to Germany "several" million tons of iron ore with a 35- to
40-percent iron content, on condition that its wishes with respect to
deliveries were met. In reply to the question as to what quantity
we could infer this to mean, Molotov replied that the exact quantities
had not yet been settled upon, but that the Soviet Government was
disposed to take account of our requirements within the limits of
the possible. The relatively low iron content of the ore would be no
obstacle owing to the high level of the German concentration methods.
3) The Soviet Government was prepared to start exporting grain
and petroleum products to Germany at once in order to show its good
will and on the assumption that our deliveries in return would not be
long in coming..
SCBLTJLBXBTJRG
No. 343
84S7/E59685i6~57
The State Secretary to the Legation in Switzerland
Telegram
No. 396 BERLIN, November 10, 19S9.
zuPol. IVbd.412.1
With reference to your reports No. A 751, of September 2,
2 and No.
2893, of September 13.8
1 Not printed (8487/E596852-54). * Not printed (6331/E472466-71).
Not printed ( 8486/E596839-48 ) .
NOVEMBER 1939 395
According to reports received the Acting President of the Assembly
of the League of Nations and the Secretary-General have proposed to
call a meeting of the Assembly for December 4.
In spite of the ostensible intention to consider only administrative
matters, we must fear that a war-time session will lead to political
demonstrations directed against Germany, such as, for example, the
possible appearance of a Czech or a Polish delegation. England and
France moreover will surely seize the opportunity to make open or
covert propaganda against Germany.
I therefore request that you forcefully impress upon the Swiss Government
with reference to its repeated declarations of neutrality that
we are obliged to inform it of our views regarding the possible deleterious
effect on German-Swiss relations which might result from the
session at Geneva.
We expect the Swiss Government to take every precaution against
any impairment of its neutrality.
Ploaee b4d fekafe fehe eveaafe fekafe e*a* ieaps regarding fee League ei
Nationo Aooombly e? Council should be realized, we would havo fce
roooTTo fee- ouraolvoo &*e right to rcoonoidor eta? poaition.*
WEIZSACKER
* This sentence was scored through by Hibbentrop and deleted before the telegram
was sent. The document bears the initial B.[ibbentrop],
No. 344
173/84022-23
Memorandum 'by the Deputy Director of the Political Department
BERLIN, November 10, 1939.
The Netherlands Minister called on me at 7 : 45 this evening and
handed me the annexed note verbale.
M. de With stated the case as follows :
Yesterday afternoon a Dutch automobile with two Englishmen,
who supposedly were to conduct peace negotiations with Germans at
the Dutch-German border, accompanied by a Dutch officer in civilian
clothes, who had been assigned to them, had come to the border near
Venlo, halting at a cafe there about 40 meters from the border line.
As soon as the car had stopped, the occupants were fired upon from
ambush ; the Dutch officer was seriously, probably fatally, wounded,
and one of the Englishmen also was hit. Immediately after the shooting,
an automobile crossed the border from Germany and towed the
Dutch car with the two wounded men, the second Englishman, and
the driver of the car across the German border.
260090 54 31
396
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
M. de With declared repeatedly that in these troubled times he did
not wish in any way to exaggerate the incident. Since the Netherlands
Government supported every peace movement, it had given its authorization
to that trip. To the extent that the incident concerned the two
Englishmen, it was no concern of the Netherlands Government. It
did request, however, that the wounded or dead Dutch officer and the
Dutch chauffeur be returned to Holland. An investigation of the
matter was deemed urgent by him because, as he had heard, the incident
had already been announced over the Dutch and the foreign radio.
I stated that I knew nothing of the whole matter.
[Enclosure]
Note Verbale From the Netherlands Legation
No. 6719/75M BEKLIST, November 10, 1939.
The Koyal Netherlands Legation has the honor to inform the Foreign
Ministry of the following :
At 4: : 30 p. m. on November 9 of this year, a Dutch automobile containing
four passengers halted at a distance of 40 meters from the
border at Venlo; two of them alighted, whereupon two persons
emerged from a cafe at that place and took off their hats. Apparently
this was a signal, for immediately six persons dressed in civilian
clothes rushed up and opened fire. The two persons who had alighted
from the car fell to the ground. Then an automobile approached
from Germany and pulled the Dutch car with its remaining occupants
and the two persons who had been shot over to the German side.
Whether the persons who had remained in the car were also hit is not
known.
Pursuant to instructions the Legation wishes to request the Foreign
Ministry to institute an investigation of this matter and to inform it
of the results.1
1 On nine occasions, at frequent intervals, the Netherlands legation requested
a reply to its note of Nov. 10, 1939. On Jan. 25, 1940, a new Netherlands note
(173/84170-72) was presented suggesting that the matter be referred to the
German-Netherlands Conciliation Commission or to an international court To
this and several subsequent inquiries no reply was made prior to the German
attack on the Netherlands in May 1940.
Additional information and documentation on the Venlo incident were brought
out in the course of the so-called "Ministries Case" at Nuremberg. Some of this
material was published in the Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-
April 194$, vol. xn, pp. 117S-80, 1206-10, 1214, 1232-42, and 1248-49.
NOVEMBER 1939 397
No. 345
An Official of the Embassy in China to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
November 11, 1939 1 : 00 p. m.
No. 17 of November 11 Received November 11 4 : 30 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 10 of November 9 (W 2500g) .
2
Prime Minister Kung, who has personal control of the state monopoly
production of tungsten, etc., most of which is pledged to England
and the Soviet Union and for repayment of the American loan,.
told me yesterday afternoon that he was in principle prepared to
make deliveries, but he asked that before concrete details were discussed
Germany make a statement with regard to the single Chinese
condition that payment be made by means of German deliveries of
arms and munitions (rifles, light and heavy machine guns, ammunition
for light artillery and field guns) . He had already refused offers
of cash payment from other powers.
In case of German consent, he would be willing "to guarantee deliveries
to Germany for the next 50 years," and hinted that he would
even make use of ores pledged to England and other countries in order
to supply Germany.
Ores could be made available for German acceptance and further
shipment only in the vicinity of the production areas, tin in Yunnan,
antimony and tungsten in the southern part of Kiangsi Province.
Moreover, he would consent only to overland transportation, in view
of the need for absohite secrecy toward England.
BIDDER
1 Following tlie occupation of North China by the Japanese and the removal of
the Chinese Government to Chungking, the German Embassy in China was located
at Shanghai. Subordinate offices \_Zweig8tellen\ of the Mission maintained
diplomatic representation in both Chungking and Peking.
Not found.
No. 346
476/299402
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Telegram
No. 493 BERUOST, November 11, 1939.
BM see.
With reference to your telegram No. 357 of November 9.1
Civil Engineer Dahlerus has already received word from the Field
Marshal by telephone that the German Government is no longer in-
1 Document No. 337.
398
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
terested in his sounding out England, because the official attitude of
the British Government has already indicated unequivocal rejection
of the German position. If Dahlerus should inquire, you are requested
to inform him in this sense.
No. 347
Memorandum J>y the Foreign Minister
KM 53 BERLIN, November 11, 1939.
Pol. II 4610.
The Turkish Ambassador Gerede called on me at 6 : 00 p. m. today
in order to communicate the following :
He had been instructed to express the congratulations of the President
of the Turkish Republic on the Führer's escape and at the same
time his sympathy for the victims of the assassination attempt. Ambassador
Gerede read to me the instruction to this effect. I thanked
the Turkish Ambassador and told him that I would forward the communication
of the President of the Turkish Republic to the Führer.
I then told the the Turkish Ambassador that the eventuality wMcli
we had discussed in our last conversation,1 namely, Turkey's conclusion
of mutual-assistance pacts with England and France, had in the
meantime become a fact after all. Turkey had thereby joined the
anti-German front.
The Turkish Ambassador denied this and declared that the treaty
was in no wise directed against Germany.
I replied that it was difficult for me to follow his reasoning. On
the contrary, I had the impression that Turkey's policy was chiefly
directed against Germany. As proof of this I cited the fact that
according to definite reports
2 Foreign Minister Saracoglu had offered
a mutual-assistance pact in Moscow, but with the provision that
Turkish assistance was not to be granted in the event the Soviet Union
became involved in a conflict with England and France. The Soviet
Union had then proposed a similar provision in the event of a conflict
between Turkey and Germany, since the Soviet Union naturally did
not wish to fight Germany. If the reports I had received were correct,
Turkey had rejected the Russian reservation with respect to
Germany and had insisted that she would conclude a mutual-assistance
pact with the Soviet Union only if it was also directed against
Germany. In addition, I received reports almost every day to the
1 See document No. 202.
a See document No. 268, footnote 1.
NOVEMBER 1939 399
effect that Turkish policy had taken a predominantly anti-German
line and seemed moreover to be very active. It might almost be said
that Turkish policy considered itself as an extension of the Foreign
Office; indeed, it seemed at times even more British than Downing
Street policy. For the rest. Ambassador von Papen had conveyed
to the Turkish Foreign Minister our view on the conclusion of the
treaty.
3 Germany, which had always striven for nothing but friendly
relations with Turkey in particular, was unable to understand the
development of Turkish policy.
The Turkish Ambassador had little to say in reply. He merely
stated that he could not believe my information about Turkish policy
was correct.
Passing on to the attempted assassination in Munich, I called
England its spiritual instigator and left it an open question whether
the investigation would not also reveal England as the perpetrator.
At the conclusion of the conversation I told the Ambassador that I
knew he had come here with the best of intentions to improve German-
Turkish relations; unfortunately, however, he had entered upon his
office at a very unfavorable time.
* See documents Nos. 324 and 838.
No. 348
479/229499-001
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
St.S, No. 888 BERLIN, November 11, 1939.
Attolico has prepared an excerpt from a report by Bastianini, the
Italian Ambassador in London, which he gave me in written form.
Attolico requested particularly that the fact that he had informed us,
of which Rome was ignorant, should not by any chance be in turn
relayed to our Embassy in Rome. Attolico considered its contents
interesting enough, however, to pass it on to us for our use. Of particular
significance to him was England's anxiety about Russia as
well as in general a certain disposition for conciliation.
"WEIZSACILER
[Enclosure Translation]
Cadogan met with me for the first time and discussed the situation
in great detail. Since he is known as one of the most reserved men in
the Foreign Office, the least inclined to let himself go, it may perhaps
be regarded as symptomatic that he told me that two things were
indispensable: a) the restoration of a Polish state, and &) a positive
400
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
collective guarantee that Germany would not resume tomorrow what
she was unable to accomplish today. I noted that he was not free
from misgivings about the easy conquests by Bolshevist Russia and
the gains which the latter could derive from a prolongation of the war
or a postwar period that would find Europe exhausted.
I found that Lord Halifax and Vansittart shared these doubts. In
the case of the former they are a factor which possibly might exert
some positive influence, and in the case of the latter, they are the only
if weak, indication that he is being shaken in his firm conviction that
it is necessary once and for all to reduce Germany to a position where
she could not dictate war or peace to the world at will.
Cadogan was rather explicit also about another matter, telling me
that in his latest statement Chamberlain had of course not closed the
door to the Germans, but that he was very well aware that Hitler did
not feel he was in a position to open it himself. Continually using the
word "guarantee", he defined his point of view more closely and
stressed that these (guarantees) obviously could not be supplied by
someone who offered a German peace and at the same time threatened
a war of annihilation. Sir Ronald Graham talked to me in a similar
vein.1
Halifax as well as Cadogan and Vansittart expressed their keenest
appreciation of the efforts made by the Duce and Your Excellency to
avert the conflict, while Cadogan added that an understanding could
have been achieved if Poland had not been invaded. But once the
German troops began to march, England had had no other choice.
1 Sir Ronald Graham bad been British Ambassador in Italy, 1921-33.
No. 349
141/127357M58
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
BRUSSELS, November 11 [JftB],
1 1939 1 : 10 a. m.
No. 337 of November 11 Received November 12 5 : 30 a. m.
Foreign Minister Spaak sent for me today in order to discuss the
political situation with me. He gave the impression of being very
much depressed and at the very beginning of the conversation asked
me why we were concentrating troops against Belgium. After all,
it could certainly not be asserted that Belgium had not scrupulously
observed neutrality. We would not be able to charge any incorrectness
to the Belgian Government. As regards the press, which had
perhaps been unsatisfactory, much was, after all, now being done, as
the restrictions of the last few days showed. I would have to admit
NOVEMBER 1939 401
that the tone of the press had for several days been moderate and
discreet. He could not possibly be blamed because Belgium had not
reacted more sharply against the British blockade measures. What,
after all, was he to do except negotiate and protest? He had no
means of exerting force against England. He asked me to tell him
once and for all what we really demanded of Belgium and why we
took this threatening attitude.
I replied that we were in no wise threatening Belgium. Troop
movements, which he described as a concentration against Belgium,
were caused by French action which constituted a threat to us on
the southern border of Belgium, where a considerable number of
motorized units had been concentrated. The Foreign Minister replied
that he did not understand how I could give him such an explanation.
He assumed that I knew as well as he himself did that
the French had absolutely no idea of invading Belgium.
In reply to my doubting remark as to whether Belgian-French discussions
might not actually be taking place again of which, incidentally,
I do not have any indications the Foreign Minister told me
very definitely that he could assure me this was not the case.
Although the press is calm and is not publishing any alarmist reports,
very grave concern about a German attack is becoming more
and more widespread among the people. Informed circles seem to
be convinced of a threatening counteragitation and fear an invasion
in the very near future. Military defense preparations are being
continued with feverish haste.
1 The information in brackets Is from the copy in the file of the Brussels Embassy
(8346/E590233-34).
No. 350
5556/E39544S-49
Memoranch/an l>y the Deputy Director of tTie Economic Policy
Department
SECRET BERLIN-, November 12, 1939.
As early as my return from Italy, in late October, I was told by the
Defense Economy Staff [Wehrwirtschaftsstab] that the Army had
laid such big claims to the Polish booty that probably next to nothing
or only very little would be left for Rumania. In the very exhaustive
discussions following this statement I declared very emphatically
that the Foreign Minister would absolutely have to insist that we live
up to the agreement of September 29, 1939,
1 about the sale to Rumania
1 See document No. 166.
402
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of a large part of the Polish booty, concluded with the consent of the
highest authorities of the Reich and upon express instruction from
the Foreign Minister. After Major General Thomas had thereupon
promised to give me for my trip to Bucharest at least the prospect of
delivery of part of the captured materiel, yesterday, immediately before
my departure, he had one of his assistants deliver the enclosed
letter,
2
according to which practically nothing at all is available for
Rumania at present. The promise that later on perhaps deliveries
could be made on a very small scale is so vaguely worded that, to
judge by the prevailing attitude in this matter on the part of the
Defense Economy Staff and the High Command of the Army, one
must reckon with possibility that nothing will be left.
Aside from the fact that we have here a promise made by the Eeich
Government only a few weeks ago, it would be utterly unjustifiable
in the interest of Germany's supply of petroleum, and especially of
aviation gasoline, to go back now on our agreement of September 29,
1939, with Rumania. As early as last September the Rumanian Government
made available 40 million RM for petroleum purchases as an
advance payment on the 100 million RM stipulated as the minimum
purchase price for the war material. About 600,000 tons, i. e., nearly
one-third of the total amount imported annually by Germany, could
be purchased for that sum.
It is impossible for me to bring the forthcoming difficult negotiations
in Bucharest to a successful conclusion if I have to start out by
telling the Rumanian Government that we do not intend to keep the
agreement of September 29, 1939, which is of equal importance to
Rumania both militarily and politically. I shall therefore try in
Bucharest to treat the matter in a dilatory fashion at first, which in
itself will render the negotiations considerably more difficult.
In my opinion it is absolutely necessary, however, that Colonel
General Keitel be told even now by someone of the highest possible
authority in the Foreign Ministry that we must insist on the implementation
of the agreement and that we could not otherwise assume
the responsibility for ensuring the import of petroleum to Germany.8
Herewith submitted through the Director [of the Economic Policy
Department] to the State Secretary.
CLODIUS
'Not printed (5556/E395450-52).
Marginal note: "I emphasized this today to Colonel General Keitel. K i
going to talk to Thomas this afternoon. To the Director of the Economic Policy
Department. W[eizsacker] [Nov.] 25."
NOVEMBER 1939 403
No. 351
453S/E144275
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in
Turkey
Telegram
[No. 424 of November 12 1
] BBBLIN, November 11, 1939.
[Sent November 13 1 : 40 a. m*]
zu WHI c 76
With reference to your telegram No. 465.2
The delivery of submarine motors is at least for the present not
possible.
It is altogether out of the question to ask a new Führer
decision unless it is the only way to obtain advantages of decisive
importance for the war economy. First, however, we wish at any rate
to await the further progress of the negotiations and, above aU, the
promised Turkish reply.
WIEHI,
1 The information in brackets is from the Ankara copy (8493/E596912).
1 Document No. 339.
No. 352
51/33074
Memorandum* ty an Official of the Foreiffn Minister's Personal Staff
SECRET BERUN, November 13, 1939*
During the military conference with the Führer this morning I was
told that it is intended to intensify submarine warfare in the foreseeable
future in the following manner:
1. By sinking a greater number of merchant vessels without warning
in the danger zone declared by America to the west of England
and France.1
2. By declaring armed merchant vessels to be naval vessels and
treating them as such.
HEWEL
*By a Presidential proclamation of Nov. 4, issued under authority of the
new American neutrality legislation, American shipping was barred from certain
areas around the British Isles and "Western European ports which were
defined as combat -zones. The text is published in Department of State, Bulletin,
1939, vol. i, pp. 454-455.
404
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 353
476/229505
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJRGEN-T Moscow, November 14, 1939 12 : 11 a. m.
SECRET Received November 14 5 : 30 a. m.
No. 714 of November 13
For the Foreign Minister personally.
I had a detailed discussion with Molotov today, as instructed, about
the concentration of French troops in Syria, of British troops in
Egypt, etc., as well as about Turkish troops on the Caucasus front,
the entire complex of questions relating to Soviet countermeasures
(concentration of troops in the Trans-Caucasus region and in Central
Asia), the sending of Amanullah 1 to Afghanistan, and of Schafer to
Tibet*
Molotov said that he would inform his Government and let me know
its views.
SCHUUENBTJBG
1 See document No. 269.
* Ernst Sch&fer had taken part in several scientific expeditions to Tibet and
had charge of an SB-expedition to Tibet in 1938-39.
No, 354
2131/466340
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Itc&y
Telegram
TTRGENT BERLIN, November 14, 1939 12 : 28 a. m.
No. 884 of November 13 Received November 14 2 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 698.1
Reports received here 2 indicate that the Rumanian Government has
initiated negotiations with Ankara about the formation of a neutral
bloc of the Balkan countries and to that end has also contacted other
states of the Balkan Entente. As we have learned from a secret
source,
3 it is envisaged in this connection not only to invite Bulgaria
and Hungary to join, but also to approach Italy. The bloc members
are to bind themselves to mutual nonaggression. But evidently it is
also planned to develop the bloc into a defensive entente with the
general staffs entering into mutual consultation to that end.
To what extent contact has already been established with Italy rela-
1 Document No. 266.
* See documents Nos. 296 and 329. * One sucn report had been sent by Papen on Nov. 8 (169/82896).
NOVEMBER 1939 405
tive to these projects we do not know. But, in view of these recurring:
reports concerning such plans for a Balkan bloc, it is of importance to
us to know whether the Duce's stand, as stated in your telegram K"o^
698, has changed somewhat in the meantime, and what stand the
Italian Government is taking on these conversations today. Please discuss
this question with Ciano at the first opportunity.
RlBBEKTTROJ?
No. 355
U/100108-O6
The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECRET DUBLIN, November 14, 1939.
STo, 129 of November 13 Received November 14 2 : 20 p. m.
For the Tinder State Secretary.
With reference to my telegram No. 123 of November 8.1
I. Rumors which have increased again of late concerning alleged
German support of the Irish Republican Army lead me to point
out that in my opinion complete restraint continues to be advisable
for us. According to my observation the Government is in control
of the situation so far, in spite of the increased danger of unrest of
late because of the refusal to release the political prisoners engaged in
a hunger strike. The IRA is hardly strong enough for action with
promise of success or involving appreciable damage to England and
is probably also lacking in a leader of any stature. I refer to the
lessons drawn from the Casement case.2 Sensible adherents of the
radical nationalist movement, correctly sizing up the situation and
the danger, are opposed to coming out into the open at the present
time; they also recognize, in agreement with the overwhelming majority
of the population, the determination to maintain neutrality
which the Government has shown so far in spite of difficult circumstances.
Interference on our part would, even in their opinion, prematurely
endanger the whole nationalist movement including groups
which are not radical because the latter would accuse the IRA of making
national interests dependent on Germany; in view of the widespread
aversion to present-day Germany, especially for religious reasons,
this could rob the IRA of all chances of future success. England
would be given a pretext for intervening which she would probably
z Not printed (91/100097). This telegram reported rumors of undercover connections
between German intelligence agencies and the IRA.
Sir Roger Casement, Irish nationalist and former member of the British
consular service, had attempted to enlist Irish prisoners of war in the German
service in 1914^-16. He was landed in Ireland from a German submarine at the
time of the Easter Rebellion in 1916, but was captured and executed.
406
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
welcome and Irish neutrality as well as the possibility of a future
utilization of the Irish cause for our interests would be prematurely
destroyed.
As it is, moreover, the ERA seems to be getting sufficient support
from the radical Irish groups in the USA, and it is asserted that this
support, too, is of German origin. The situation would presumably
change if Irish neutrality were definitely violated, perhaps also if
a considerable weakening of England were to make the prospects of
regaining Northern Ireland appear more favorable. Then we might
expect the rise of an active nationalist movement on a broad basis,
perhaps inclusive of the Government and supported by the Irish in
the USA and the Dominions, which might force us to make decisions.
For the time being the IRA provides favorable backing for the Government
and the Army. I wish to state that I have occasionally heard
the hope expressed which is probably entertained also in some Government
circles, although hardly by De Valera so far that in case
of a suitable development of the situation we would at the proper
time promise Ireland our support for the return of Northern Ireland,
to be made good at the conclusion of peace, and thereby assure ourselves
the friendship of all Irishmen. Even for this, in my opinion
at any rate, the proper moment has not yet arrived.
II. So far, I have no confirmation of reports received concerning
British demands for Irish harbors. But the Government recently
appears to be more concerned, especially if the war should
spread to Holland and Belgium.
III. I have reliable information that the continued existence of
the German Legation here is worrying London. Great care is therefore
indispensable, also in view of intensive activity of informers.
For this reason also I would strictly advise against sending propaganda
material (cf. my telegram No. 117 \_187]
3 of November 11)
which would, moreover, interfere with my measures against British
propaganda which are becoming increasingly successful. The German
broadcasts in English, which are heard everywhere, are the best
of propaganda. However, I hear time and again that sharp attacks
on Churchill which extend even to his most intimate personal affairs
achieve the opposite of the intended effect, especially in England.
HEMPEL
'Not printed (91/100102) ; dealt with postal communication between Germany
and the Legation in Dublin and advised, against sending certain types of material
by post to tne Legation.
NOVEMBER 1939 407
No. 356
F3/0039-0035
Memorandum, 'by the Foreign Minister
EM 56 BERUUST, November 14, 1939.
Today at 11 : 45 I received the Belgian Ambassador, who had previously
announced his visit.
The Belgian Ambassador at once handed me the brief note annexed
hereto, stressing that his action today had nothing to do with the last
Dutch-Belgian attempt at mediation.1 Belgium merely wished to say
that she was prepared to mediate at any time, if an opportunity arose
in the future course of the war. The Belgian King attached importance
to making this known to us.
I took notice of the statements made by the Belgian Ambassador
and declared that the last Dutch-Belgian attempt at mediation had
certainly had the catastrophic result that I had all along expected.
The replies of the British and French Governments, which had been
made known through the press,
2 must be regarded as an insolence of
which the German Government would take no notice. I then asked
the Belgian Ambassador why the Belgian Government permitted
England to treat her as she pleased. The Downs were crowded with
Belgian ships which had been held up unlawfully. The British
Government was ordering Belgium around as if she were just another
part of England. I was informed that England had recently sent
Belgium a note which was almost insulting in tone and content and
such as one would think appropriate only for a vassal state.
The Belgian Ambassador interjected here that Belgium had sent
a sharp reply to this note and that she did not put up with everything.
I replied to him that the actual situation seemed to me to show the
opposite. Moreover, in reading the Belgian press one had the impression
of reading French newspapers. Already during the Polish
campaign, the attitude of a part of the Belgian press had been worse
than that of the British and the French press.
The Belgian Ambassador replied that this applied only to a few
newspapers and that the Flemish press especially was mtich better.
I then pointed out that the Flemish press was hardly read internationally.
On the other hand, the countries of the enemy coalition
.were constantly quoting the Brussels newspapers, which distinguished
themselves by the violence of their anti-German articles and their
lying reports about Germany. The Belgian press, to my mind, would
be well advised to practice more self-restraint. In addition, it had
*See document No. 332. 3 The British and French replies had been published on Nov. 12.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
been noted that British planes were constantly flying over Belgian
territory at night. Whenever an occasional German plane flew over
Belgian territory by mistake, a great outcry always went up, but the
continuous neutrality violations by the British received no mention
at all.
The Belgian Ambassador replied that Belgium had shot down
several English and French planes and interned their crews. .He
then declared that Belgium had faith in the repeated assurances by
Germany and the other powers that they would respect Belgium's
neutrality. I should tell him frankly whether I viewed the present
situation as serious.
I replied that England could have had peace early in October after
the Führer's speech. We now knew, however, that England had
prepared the war long in advance; the evidence discovered in Poland
and Czechia gave an absolutely clear and incontrovertible picture
which confirmed this. Mr. Chamberlain's desire for war was demonstrated
by his reply to the Führer's peace speech,3 to which he had
ingeniously referred in his reply to the peace move of the Belgian.
King, and now there could be only a war of annihilation between
England and us. I then went into the background of this war, with
particular reference to England's policy.
The Belgian Ambassador received my criticism of British policy
witlx the remark that he, too, thought this policy insane and stupid.
In conclusion I told the Belgian Ambassador that Belgium would
do well to maintain strict neutrality. It would at present seem, however,
that Belgium's sympathies were entirely on England's side. I
tad been told that 95 percent of the Belgian people were pro-English
and pro-French. If large-scale fighting were to start perhaps next
year, for instance, it would be good for a country like Belgium to
observe complete neutrality in all directions.
Thereupon the Belgian Ambassador told me in leaving that the
Belgian King was firmly resolved to maintain neutrality in all circumstances
and toward all sides.*
[Enclosure]
We continue to believe that the offer of our good offices has not lost
its purpose. For that reason we wish to continue to avail ourselves
of the opportunities that may arise.
' See Editors' Note, p. 227 and document No. 246.
In another memorandum of Nov. 14 (2177/471618), Kibbentrop recorded that
shortly after the conversation with Davignon described above, he received the
Dutch Minister who likewise presented the communication from the two
Sovereigns.
NOVEMBER 1939 409
We hope that we shall be able to continue our efforts, if necessary
confidentially.
5
WTT/FTBVT ..TMTryr A
LEOPOLD
*A draft reply to the Belgian and Butch telegram of Nov. 7 was prepared in
the Foreign Ministry for Hitler's signature (476/229467-70) , but it was not sent.
Instead, on Nov. 15, Ribbentrop saw Davignon and van Haersma de With, the
Dutch Minister, and informed them of a statement to be issued by DNB the next
day (141/127381-82). The statement was as follows: "Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop informed the Belgian and Dutch Representatives, in the name of the
Führer, that after the brusque refusal of the peace move of the King of the
Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands by the British and French Governments,
the German Government too must consider the matter closed." No memorandum
on these conversations of Nov. 15 has been found in the files of the Foreign
Ministry. Of. Davignon's Berlin, J.9S6-J.940: souvenirs d'une mission (Paris and
Brussels, 1951), pp. 158-159.
No. 357
1085/317314-15
Memorandiwn by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BEBI/IN, November 14, 1939.
Economic policy discussions with Belgium opened here on Saturday,
November 11, between Ambassador Hitter and myself on one side and
Ministerial Director Suetens of the Belgian Foreign Ministry on the
other.1 We had indirectly suggested to M. Suetens that, as the
Netherlands Government had done,2 he acquaint us with the Belgian
negotiations with England and France which have been going on for
a number of weeks.
M. Suetens postponed a response to this suggestion until the conclusion
of these negotiations with England and France. He stated that
the Belgian Government had not undertaken any economic policy
commitments toward England and France that were inconsistent with
its neutrality obligations. On the contrary, for the duration of the
war it intended to conduct its economic policy autonomously. This
autonomous regulation would consist of a number of export embargoes
and restrictions which, while they would be formally applied to all
belligerents alike, would in practice have the effect of cutting off or
restricting to a greater or less extent our present imports of raw
materials from Belgium.
Ambassador Hitter replied to M. Suetens that we could by no means
accept such an arrangement which, even if it was autonomous, never-
1 M. Suetens was Director General for Foreign Commerce in the Belgian Ministry
of Foreign AfEairs.
a ln a memorandum of Oct. 12 (4041/E063878-&4), Wiehl noted that Hirsehfeld,
Netherlands representative in economic negotiations with Germany,
had said that he had been expressly enjoined by Ms Government to discuss with
the Germans the progress of Dutch-British economic negotiations.
410
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
theless *was obviously tailored to British wishes and would be at our
expense, and that on the contrary we would be compelled to react
accordingly on the economic-policy and perhaps also the political
level.
M. Suetens denied that the contemplated Belgian economic policy
would have the far-reaching consequences which we feared. The negotiations
on the practical implementation of the exchange of goods,
due to start now, would demonstrate that Belgium was willing and in
a position to meet a large proportion of our wishes in the future, too.
The practical negotiations between the two government committees
will begin here tomorrow, for which M. Gerard, the chief Belgian
negotiator, will arrive here today with a small delegation. It is not
impossible that these negotiations will be productive of satisfactory
results for us, but, with a view to these continued negotiations, it was
important in the preliminary talks with M. Suetens to put the Belgians
under pressure.
Submitted herewith through Ambassador Hitter and the State Secretary
to the Foreign Minister,
W[IEHL]
No. 358
2131/4&6366~68>
TTie Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Tgb. No. A/3472 Ang. I Moscow, November 14, 1939.
CONFIDENTIAL Received November 16.
Pol. II 4637.
Subject : Balkan neutrality bloc.
With reference to my telegram No. 711 of November 13, 1939.1
Enclosed I am sending a copy of the memorandum referred to in
the telegram cited above which the Turkish Ambassador had handed
to Molotov and which was given to me by the latter with the request
that I find out the position of the German Government.
[Enclosure]
The Rumanian Government, having considered the formation of a
bloc of states in Southeastern Europe, has put before the Government
a Not printed (103/111778) : In this telegram Schulenburg reported that Molotov,
upon handing him the memorandum had explained "that the Soviet Government
had reached no decision as yet and asked that it be informed of the
German Government's view in this matter as soon as possible. Molotov had
gained the impression from the conversation with the Turkish Ambassador that
the Turkish Government was favorably disposed toward this plan."
NOVBMBEB 1939 411
of the Turkish Republic the following proposals as a basis for such
a formation.
a) Absolute neutrality within the present scope of the war.
b) A nonaggression treaty between the governments which participate
in the bloc.
c) In the event that a member state of the bloc should become
the object (victim) of aggression9 to observe at least a benevolent
neutrality with regard to that state.
d) The member states of the bloc to reduce to a normal level the
military measures taken along their common borders.
e) Direct contact between the Foreign Ministries of the bloc and
exchange of political and economic information.
/) Economic measures on the basis of membership in the bloc.
An explanatory note sent by the Rumanian Government remarks
that adhesion to the bloc in no way affects present commitments of
the participants in the bloc and that, besides, members of the Balkan
Entente, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy will also be able to join ; and
the neutrality which will be proclaimed in that event shall have reference
to the war within its present limits.
In case such an understanding between the members of the Balkan
Entente is reached, it would be possible, in the opinion of the Rumanian
Government, to have the Yugoslav Government invite the Hungarian
and the Bulgarian Governments to join the bloc and then tohave
the Italian Government invited by all the members.
From statements made to our Ambassador in Bucharest by the Rumanian
Foreign Minister it can be inferred that formation of such a
bloc would be welcomed by the British, French, Italian, and German
Governments. I am notifying Your Excellency of this Rumanian proposal
in conformity with Article 2 of the Protocol signed on November
17, 1929,
2 concerning extension of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality
of 1925 s and request an expression of your views on that,
subject.
* League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLTTI, pp. 36O-362.
*., pp. 354r-357.
No. 359
1K71/S8021O
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
MOST -DKGENT BERLIN, November 15, 1939^
No. 895
Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor von Bintelen.
With reference to our telegram No. 884 of November 13.1
'Document No. 354.
^60090 54, 32
412
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Minister requests that instead of awaiting a convenient
-opportunity you obtain an interview with Ciano tomorrow, and ascertain
on that occasion Italy's reaction to the idea of a Balkan bloc,
whether Italy has already been approached on that account by any
third party, and what attitude Italy intends to take on this question.
Report by telegram.
No. 360
F19/046
Memorandum ly an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
KM 58 BERLIN, November 15, 1939.
Today at 1 : 30 p. m. the Foreign Minister received the Slovak Minister,
who had asked to see him.
The Slovak Minister first spoke to the Foreign Minister about a
treaty to be concluded between the German Eeich and the Slovak
Republic concerning the return of the territories which Poland robbed
from Czechoslovakia, and gave him the enclosed draft of such an
agreement.
1 The Foreign Minister promised the Slovak Minister
to consider the matter and give an early reply.
The Slovak Minister then said that the Slovak Government intended
to take a stand in a statement before the Parliament on November 21
against the efforts originating in France and England to reestablish
Czechoslovakia. The Slovak Government intended to state that the
Slovak people were entirely satisfied with their present independent
.existence and would never be willing to return to a Czechoslovak political
community.
At the request of the Foreign Minister the Slovak Minister promised
first to inform Berlin of the planned statement by the Slovak Government,
so that Germany could express an opinion on whether such an
announcement was opportune.
ERICH KORDT
"Not printed (F19/047-048). For the final text of this treaty see document
No. 381.
NOVEMBKR 1939 413
No. 361
81/38977
Merrwrandwm, l>y am. Official of Political Division 1
sr, November 15, 1939.
zu Pol. I M 8095 g.
1
Captain Fricke telephoned me today to elaborate his statements of
November 13 as follows :
The questions which I had put to him at the meeting at Ambassador
Bitter's had also been transmitted to the Navy by other offices (OKIW) ,
and he therefore wished to recount to me once more the course of
Grand Admiral Raeder's conference with the Führer.2 The statements
concerning the danger zone fixed by America had been purely
of a theoretical nature. Complying with the Navy's memorandum
concerning the intensification of naval warfare, which had also been
presented to the Foreign Ministry,3 it was not intended to declare
by some big proclamation a sort of siege of England and France, but
to bring about the isolation of England which we desired by means
of a gradual intensification on a military basis. In practice we could
then utilize the danger zone fixed by America, since we would then
be sure of not meeting American ships there.
Moreover, Captain Fricke stated explicitly that the order to take
steps against enemy passenger vessels that were armed had not yet
been issued but would be issued in a few days, when the propaganda
now being spread had taken effect.
Furthermore, Captain Fricke emphasized that the order to take
Action against all tankers, even those sailing under a neutral flag, had
not yet been given. He intended to prepare the draft of such an
order today, then to discuss it with the Foreign Ministry, and only
then to make the final decision on the basis of the outcome of this
consultation. The conference with the Führer had merely served to
obtain for the Navy the authorization to develop its measures in the
direction indicated.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary with reference to the
memorandum of November 13.
v. D.
1 Pol. I M 8095 g. is missing from the flies. According to tfce Pol. I M register
of the German Foreign Ministry, this document is a memorandum of Nov. 15 by
Heyden-Rynsch entitled : Memorandum of a report by Raeder to the Führer on
tlie intensification of submarine -warfare.
a A memorandum summarizing Raeder's conference of Nov. 10 with Hitler is
printed in "JPtihrer Conferences on Naval Affairs," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948,
pp. 55-57.
3 See document No. 270, footnote 3. The Navy's memorandum, though dated
Oct. 15 and presented to Hitler on Oct. 16, was sent to the Foreign Ministry
on Nov. 3 ; see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxjcjv, document No. 157-C,
Exhibit GB-224, p. 6O8. Whether WeizsScker had seen tne actual text of the
Navy's memorandum when he wrote his own No. 822 of Oct. 17 is not clear. No
414 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
No. 362
1671/880211
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJEGENT ROME, November 16, 1930 11 ; 15 p. n^
No. 800 of November 16 Received November 17 3 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegrams No. 884 of November 13 and 895
of November 15.1
I visited Ciano today as directed, and queried Mm as indicated
in the above-mentioned telegraphic instructions. He stated that he
had the same information that we had ; but the Governments in the
Balkan capitals had told his diplomatic representatives of the plans
of the neutral bloc only by way of information without trying in any
way to press Italy's participation. The Duce's attitude in this question
was unchanged and exactly the same as the one set forth to me
in the middle of October. Nothing ha
NOVEMBER 1039 415
outside the closed zone around England defined by the United States,
1
in order to avoid any loss of American lives. The Foreign Minister
concurred.
He gave me on this occasion the general directive that in so far as
possible we should not create any difficulties for the Navy with regard
to measures which it deems necessary.
IfclTTER
1 See document No, 352, footnote 1.
No. 365
TTie Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
BRUSSELS, November 17, 1939 12 : 40 a. m.
No. 352 of November 16 Received November 17 3 : 30 a. m.
Following the violent excitement and panicky unrest of the past
week, the situation in Belgium has begun to return to normal in the
past few days. Large sections of the population had been convinced
that a German invasion of Holland and Belgium was imminent and
that everything had to be done to stop it. Some rumors even specified
the day of the anticipated attack, some mentioning Armistice
Day, others November 15. The excitement abated only when a
Belga 1 communique was published about reassuring German statements
from the Military Attache.
The press, evidently under instruction, endeavored during the
critical days to mitigate the panicky mood and foster a more confident
view of the situation by observing moderation and giving prominence
to hopeful-sounding news items.
It appears that the Belgian Government fully shared the fear of a
German invasion but had not yet abandoned the hope of preserving
the country from war. Full-scale military preparations had been
made to check a German attack. According to the information
obtained by the Military Attache, almost the entire Belgian field army
was concentrated along the northern and eastern borders, so that no
forces of any consequence were left at the southern border. However,
the Belgian Government has (group garbled) correctness. The
events of the past few days were the subject of debate today in the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Belgian Chamber. According to
strictly confidential information which I have received, the Foreign
Minister made a detailed statement on the international situation
in a closed session, in which he specifically explained the military
measures at Belgium's eastern border on the grounds of the serious
fear of a German invasion, Spaak cited in particular the flights of
a Agence Belga (Agence tlgraphique Beige, S. A.), Belgian news agency.
416 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
German aircraft over Belgium, the German troop concentrations, and
the sharper tone toward Belgium in the German press. Contrary
to declarations made to Belgium, German aircraft had flown reconnaissance
missions over Belgium. The situation had calmed down,
to be sure, but only moderate optimism was in order with respect to
the future. An invasion of Holland by German troops would have
placed Belgium in a difficult situation from the (group garbled) and
moral viewpoint. The Foreign Minister again emphasized the need
for the strictest neutrality. The Government would henceforth be
even more rigorous in supervising the attitude of the press. He justified
the measures which the Government had taken against French
newspapers on several occasions. The statements made a deep -impression
on the Committee. The will to strictest neutrality received
the unqualified support of the great majority of the Committee.
Despite the calmer atmosphere observable as the result of the
foregoing, there are still strong suspicions with regard to Germany's
intentions.
BXJLOW
No. 366
06/108112-13
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
M-OST URGENT ANKARA, November 17, 1939 7 : 50 p, m.
K"o. 493 of November 17 ^Received November 18 5 : 30 a. m.
The Foreign Minister has just informed me that the Government
is prepared to agree on an over-all settlement of economic relations
on the basis of your instruction.1 The first conversation with the
Minister of Commerce will be held today to discuss individual problems.
A report will follow.2
The Foreign Minister then discussed the question of a possible improvement
in our political relations. He read a number of telegrams
from his Berlin Ambassador on the conversation with the Reich
Foreign Minister, from which he was pleased to be able to state, as
he believed, that the relations of M. Gerede had become a shade more
friendly. The President of the Republic would have liked to express
his congratulations in the form of a telegram on the occasion of the
attempt on the life of the Fuhrer and Chancellor; such a telegram
was not sent, on account of the fact that no German telegrams were
received on October 29.3 However, the congratulations expressed
1 See document No. 330.
Telegram No. 499 of Nov. 18 ; not printed (8489/E596890) . 'The anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey's
national holiday.
NOVEMBER 1939 417
through the Ambassador were none the less cordial and sincere, as-
Saracoglu wished to emphasize once more.
From the one-hour conversation I received the impression that our
serious protest has strengthened the desire of the Turkish Government
to improve political relations as far as possible. Taking up this
matter, I outlined the present situation for the Foreign Minister. The-
Führer's desire for peace had been destroyed by England through a
maneuver of unsurpassed hypocrisy and sabotage. Comparison with
the reply of the British Bang 4 and Churchill's speech 5 would reveal
before the eyes of the world where the warmongers were. Saracoglu
agreed entirely and acknowledged that Churchill's thesis, "The war
could end only with victors and vanquished," had destroyed all hope
of peace. All the more, I said, was it the duty of England's allies
openly to denoxince this attitude. Germany's determination to continue
the war with all the means at her disposal remained unshaken,
and Turkey would have to thank England for any consequences which
she too might have to suffer. Saracoglu replied that the President of
the Republic had told me as long ago as last May 6 that a strong
Germany was of vital interest to Turkey. Hence the Turkish Government
could never be in agreement with Churchill's war aims. Its
obligations toward the Western Powers did not extend one step beyond
the treaty provisions. They would become effective only in theevent
of a direct attack on Turkey.
I replied that if this was the situation, Turkey could now at least
demonstrate in the economic field to what extent she felt independent
of England.
In conclusion the Minister asked me to make sure that the approximately
700 Turkish students returning to Germany would be given,
all the facilities for study possible under wartime conditions.
4 See document No. 356.
"For Churchill's speech of Nov. 12, see The W-ar Speeches of the Rt. Hon.
Winston 8. Churchill, compiled by Charles Eade (Ixmdon, 1951), vol. i, pp.
119-123.
Actually, this conversation had taken place on June 7, 1939. See vol. vi,
document No. 489.
No. 367
51/33888
Memorandum, T>y Ambassador Ritter
IMMEDIATE BERLIN, November 17, 1939.
In carrying out the gradual intensification of submarine warfare
authorized by the Führer,
1 the Naval Staff intends to take the following
measures :
1 See document No. 352.
418
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1. To torpedo without warning wherever they appear all enemy
passenger vessels which are unmistakably found to be or known to be
armed ;
2. To torpedo without warning in the danger zone fixed by America
all tankers, even the neutral ones. Exceptions are the tankers of the
four friendly nations, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Japan, and of the
United States of America. In this the basic assumption is that pursuant
to the neutrality regulations the American tankers will not enter
the danger zone.
After lengthy discussion with the Navy, the participating departments
of the Foreign Ministry have come to the conclusion that the
Navy's intentions should be approved even though certain objections
might be raised for reasons of policy and international law.
The Navy is requesting an immediate decision since, according to
the information which it has received, it would otherwise have to miss
irretrievable opportunities.
Submitted through the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign Minister.
Rj.-JL-.UfiR
No. 368
1&L/13S603
Minute l>y Ambassador Bitter
BERUN, November 17, 1939.
zu W 2500 g.
1
The problem of "arms for China" in return for tin and other needed
raw materials was laid before the Foreign Minister today and discussed
with all the arguments pro and con.
The Foreign Minister refused completely any delivery of arms to
China. On the other hand, he would be in agreement if important
raw materials could be obtained from Chiang Kai-shek China in
exchange for other German products, pharmaceuticals, for example.
2
RnrER
1W2500g : Not found. This is the Foreign Ministry telegram No. 10 to Chungking
referred to in document No. 345.
a A marginal note to Senior Counselor Voss of the Economic Policy Department
instructed him to draft a reply in the sense of the above minute to the Chungking
telegram printed as document No. 345.
NOVEMBER 1939 419
No. 369
eiT/249880
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union t& tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT Moscow, November 185 1939 3 : 03 a. m.
SECRET Received November 18 8 : 30 a. m.
No. 743 of November 17
With reference to my telegram No. 714 of November 13*1
For the Foreign Minister personally.
Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Government itself had
had the intention of reinforcing its troops in Transcaucasia and Central
Asia and would carry out this measure in the near future. The
Soviet Government had no objection to our utilizing this fact for propaganda
purposes and would not deny our reports with reference to
this matter.
The Soviet Government had no basic objections to the intended
dispatching of Amanullah to Afghanistan and of Schafer to Tibet,
but its final decision depended on the actual manner in which the corresponding
measures were carried out. Molotov requested more detailed
information on this point.
SoJtLLIIJENBTTRG
1 Document No. 353.
No. 370
14iyi27386-88
Memorandum "by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*
BERLIN, November 18, 1939.
e.o. W II 6919.
GEBMAN-BIXGIAN NEGOTATHONS
Ministerialdirigent Ruelberg 2 received M. Gerard in my presence at
11 a. m. today and told him the following :
He had presented a report on the negotiations of the past few days
to higher authorities and had been instructed to inform M. Gerard
that the Belgian application of the neutrality policy in the economic
sphere would not be satisfactory to us. Through Ambassador Hitter's
special mission we had taken the initiative previously in clarifying
from the outset our viewpoint relative to the continuance of our
1 Counselor of Legation Karl von Campe had been assigned to the Embassy
at Brussels to deal with economic questions, but at this time bad returned to
Berlin in connection with the economic negotiations then in progress.
Ministerialdirigent Buelberg was a chief of section in the Ministry of
Economics.
420
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
economic relations with Belgium.8 Minister President Pierlot had in
principle concurred with the three main viewpoints advanced at that
time by Herr Ritter (which Herr Ruelberg proceeded to
recapitulate) .
Meanwhile a situation had developed which was no longer in accord
with these principles. We did not intend to inquire into who was to
blame for this. We were only considering the facts and had to note
the following :
1. Belgium, through her export embargoes, trade lists, and the
system of licenses, had reorganized her export trade in accordance
with new viewpoints, without any previous consultation with us. Even
today we had no clear picture of how the system of trade lists would
in practice affect our trade. The Reich Government deemed this
action a unilateral measure on the part of Belgium that was contrary
to the promise of the Belgian Minister President.
2. Belgium tolerated the complete shutting off of our imports from
the Congo and had done nothing to ensure their continuance.
3. The actual flow of goods had generally deteriorated. While our
exports to Belgium were being kept up to a high level, our imports
from Belgium had fallen off substantially. This trend had been aggravated
during October ; deliveries of many raw materials and semifinished
products had fallen far below the quotas specified and in
some instances were not made at all.
4. England's influence on the Belgian economy, our information
showed, was increasingly assuming proportions amounting to encroachment
upon Belgian neutrality. British agents were active
everywhere, making threats, trying to exercise control measures, etc.
He (Ruelberg) had been instructed to state that we could no longer
remain passive in the face of these British encroachments but had to
express our expectation that the Belgian Government would take
energetic steps against these British activities. In our opinion, the
Belgian Government ought to demand for itself the powers which
would enable it to expel these troublesome agents and buyers who
were undermining Belgium's neutrality.
In closing Herr Ruelberg stated that the Reich Government now
saw itself compelled in consequence of the above-mentioned circumstances
to curtail German exports to Belgium to the extent that our
purchases in Belgium had been cut oflf. This was not a threat or a
reprisal but merely the conclusion which had to be drawn from the
actual economic situation. The necessary instructions had already
been drafted to stop, first of all, the export of German coal to Belgium.
Under these circumstances there could naturally be no thought of
his going to Brussels with a German delegation for further negotiations
before the Belgian Government had taken the necessary steps
to alter the above-mentioned situation. We wanted to see action first,
and then we would be prepared to continue negotiations.
* See documents Nosk 17 and 18, ante, and vol, vii, document No. 573.
NOVEMBER 1939 421
M. Gerard, who took very detailed notes throughout the conversation,
made the following reply to the various points in Herr Kuelberg's
statements :
He considered it his mission to familiarize himself as fully as possible
with the German viewpoint in order to be able to present it with
all its arguments in Brussels and, if possible, gain recognition for it.
He himself had been under the impression all along that the negotiations
were proceeding quite satisfactorily and could be brought to a
positive conclusion. Herr Ruelberg's statements exceeded his area
of responsibility to some extent, however. He would therefore first
have to report them to Brussels. However, in the future, as in the
past, he would do everything in his power to further the German-
Belgian economic relations. The arguments which he himself had
to advance with respect to the separate German complaints were in
general sufficiently well known. He would therefore be able to confine
himself to a few brief remarks :
All he could say in reply to Germany's allegation that Belgium had
done nothing to ensure our imports from the Congo was that Belgium
had never carried our imports from the Congo to Germany. Germany
had always attended to this herself, because all her purchases
had been f. o. b. the Congo. Besides, Belgium did not even have ships
of her own. Furthermore, the production of the Congo did not suffice1
even to cover Belgium's own requirements; after all, one could not
sell what one needed oneself during the war. Germany was in the
best position to know that. Belgium, for her part, accordingly did
not ask Germany to sell her any vital commodities which Germany
needed herself. He had to employ the same argument, by the way,
in respect to Herr Ruelberg's statement about the inability to get the
full quotas. One could not sell what one did not have.
M. Gerard wound up by saying that the inability to make deliveries
up to the full specified quotas did not convey a correct picture of Belgium's
exports, because large quantities of raw materials had been
bought during the past months outside the framework of the trade
agreement. A complete survey of all Belgian exports (under the
trade agreement and otherwise) would give an entirely different
picture.
Herr Ruelberg closed the conversation, which had been in friendly
terms from beginning to end, by thanking M. Gerard for his work in
the past and his promise to make an earnest presentation of the German
viewpoint to his Government.
v. CAMPS
422
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 371
Ambassador Bitter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram a
November 18, 1939.
For the Ambassador.
1. Tevossyan and Savchenko are leaving by plane for Moscow early
Sunday to give their report. It has been agreed that they will return
within a very short time, about 1 or 2 days. According to agreement
the trip was not announced to the press.
2. During the last discussions Tevossyan, and in particular
Savchenko, did not seem to be quite satisfied with what has been shown
them in the various military branches. The dissatisfaction is caused
by the idea that we have many secret things which we do not wish
to reveal. This notion was often a great trial to the patience of the
German military authorities. On the other hand, the impressions of
the Eussian delegation in nonmilitary fields were altogether satisfactory.
If you have occasion to see Molotov, please call attention
to the following : the Russian commission has been met with the greatest
accommodation here on the part of all military authorities, to a
degree which has never before been shown to foreigners. Everything
in the way of arms equipment which is being used by the German
Wehrmacht was shown to the Eussian groups, and much more besides,
which is merely in the experimental stage and has not yet been introduced.
If in connection with the innumerable Eussian wishes
everything did not always proceed according to schedule, this was
often enough to be attributed to the fact that the Eussians continually
changed their program and confronted the German organization
with problems which were often insoluble. Please' stress that after
the return of Tevossyan and Savchenko we are counting on finishing
up the work here quickly, and that for political reasons decisive
importance must be attached to the rapid completion of the entire
negotiations in Moscow.
BITTER
*This document is from Bitter's own file and the telegram number and time
of dispatch are not indicated.
NOVEMBER 1939 423
No. 372
The Fdreign Minister to the Embassy in tTie Soviet Union
Telegram 4
jf _ BBKLXKT, November [18], 1939.
zu Pol. II 4686
Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor von Bintelen.
With, reference to your telegram No. 729 of November 16.2
You are requested t*> convey to Molotov our view on the Turkish
memorandum, a copy of which was handed to you by Molotov, and
on the proposal by the Rumanian Government described therein,
as follows:
1) Study of the Rumanian proposal reveals that the designation
as a neutral bloc of the grouping of states in Southeastern Europe
contemplated in it is misleading. Although observance of absolute
neutrality is listed as the first point, the additional clause "in the
present scope of the war" signifies a qualification which demonstrates
the meaninglessness of this point. In consequence of this qualification
the obligation of neutrality is immediately voided if any other state
becomes involved in the war.
2) Since the new pact would not create any significant additional
obligations between the states of the Balkan Entente of February 9,
1934:, the purpose of the proposal obviously is to impose restrictions
on the freedom of action of the states which are to be invited to join,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy. As Bulgaria has consistently declined
all the invitations repeatedly extended to her to join the Balkan
Entente, Bucharest wants to tie her hands by this new pact, while it
wants at the same time by the inclusion of Hungary to secure its western
boundary against any eventuality. It is unlikely that Bulgaria
and Hungary will lend themselves to that as long as the well-known
demands of these countries remain unsatisfied. For this reason alone
the Rumanian proposal, in our opinion, has no chance of success.
3) The Rumanian assertion which is repeated in the Turkish memorandum
that the English, French, Italian, and German Governments
would welcome the formation of the proposed bloc is wholly unfounded,
as far as the German Government is concerned. The German
Government is merely interested in having all of the states of
Southeastern Europe observe strict neutrality toward it in this war
and not play the game of England and France, as Turkey has done
through concluding the pact of October 19.3
Precisely with regard
1 The copy available is a final edited draft from which the telegram dispatch
number and date are absent. The date is given as Nov. 18 in the instruction
to Rome noted in footnote 4.
3 Not printed (103/111789-90). This telegram conveyed a summary of the
Turkish memorandum printed as document No. 358. Berlin had evidently
requested the telegraphic summary before receiving the text of the memorandum
which Schulenburg dispatched by courier.
See document No. 287, footnote 1, and document No. 338, footnote 2.
424
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to this point of preserving a neutral attitude, the proposed pact, with
the qualifying formulation of the neutrality obligation, would not improve,
but rather worsen the present situation.
4) As far as the Italian Government is concerned, we know that
Rome rejects such plans.
5) Of the four Great Powers whose assenting attitude is alleged
in the Turkish memorandum, only England and France remain.
This, however, is precisely what inspires in us the strongest suspicious
toward the plans pursued by this pact proposal, the more so since other
information also confirms that this project enjoys British and French
support. Actually such a pact could in the long run lead to the extension
of the preponderance, which England and France have already
been able to gain in Turkey, to all of Southeastern Europe.
6) Our view on the Rumanian proposal conveyed in the Turkish,
memorandum must therefore be summed up to the effect that its realization
would be undesirable to us. Even if, because of the aforementioned
reasons, we do not believe that the proposed pact will come
into existence, we would deem it desirable for the Soviet Government
which can have no more interest than we have in the consummation
of such a pact calculated to strengthen Anglo-French influence
in the Black Sea region likewise to take a negative attitude toward
this project.
4
RIBBENTROP
4 On Nov. 21 the text of this instruction was telegraphed to the Embassies in
Borne (2131/466346-49) and Ankara (103/111797-99-). The telegram to Home
also requested that Ciano- should be informed of the German attitude which the
instruction set forth and might be told also that these views had been conveyed
to the Soviet Government. Mackensen replied on Nov. 24 that he had spoken to
Ciano as instructed, and that the latter had stated that the Italian view remained
that they wished to have nothing to do with a Balkan bloc; moreover,
they had not been approached on the subject by any of the interested states (1571/
380224).
The telegram to Ankara contained the following addition : "You are requested
to make it clear in your conversations with the Turkish Government and representatives
of the countries involved that the reports stating that the German
Government welcomed the new Balkan bloc plans are false. For the rest, the
extent to which you can make use of the arguments outlined above will depend
upon who your conversational partner is. In any case, I request that the Moscow
discussions with Molotov not be mentioned. . . ."
No. 373
470/229S33/1-33/2
Circular of the Foreign Minister 1
Telegram
BEKUGKT, November 18, 1939.
Hiiro RAM 5T2.
It is possible that actions of one kind or another to bring about
peace may continue to come up for discussion in foreign countries.
On such occasions please orient your conversation with all firmness
along the following lines :
1 This instruction was sent to all German IMplomatic Missions and to the
Consulate General in Geneva.
NOVEMBER 1939 425
In his Reichstag speech on October 6 the Führer again made one
last generous peace offer to England and France. England had
given a purely negative reply in Chamberlain's speech on October 12,
and in a manner which could only be regarded as an insulting and
insolent challenge. Thus England had slammed the door on any attempt
whatsoever at peace mediation. The same attitude was shown
by the British and also the French reply to che Belgian-Dutch offer
of mediation.3 Germany had taken up the challenge flung at her
and would now carry on the fight to final victory.
Please take any detailed arguments that may be necessary from the
Führer's latest speech at Munich on November 8 3 and from my Danzig
speech of October 24.*
(Foreign Minister)
* See document No. 356.
Printed in Monatshefte fur Ausw&rtipe Politito, December 1939, pp. 1061-1072.
4 Printed in DoTcumente der Deutschen PolitiJc, vol. YEI, pt. i, pp. 362-381.
No. 374
2691/529200-04
Memorandum T>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department
SECRET BEKLTN-, November 18, 1939.
No. W. H. A. 7M
[Extract a
]
MEETING OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICT COMMITTEE ON
NOVEMBER 18, 1939 2
2. Sweden
Ministerialdireklor Walter 8 reported on the course of his negotiations
in Stockholm : The Swedes demand that the 4-mile zone be
recognized, wood and cellulose be removed from the list of unconditional
contraband, and halted Swedish ships be dealt with more expeditiously.
In return they indeed propose to keep up trade as such,
but for the time being want to except certain goods, especially copper
and ferrochrome steel, and for the remainder (especially ore) want to
concede only the average of the years 1932-38, whereas we demand
the volume of 1939.
In ores the average of 1932-r38 amounts to 7,000,000 tons, whereas
the total for 1939 is 10,400,000 tons. At the very end, the Swedes
* Other sections of the memorandum deal with negotiations with Denmark,
the danger of adverse balance in clearing transactions, and Germany's decision
not to check on ultimate destinations of merchant ships "for the time being."
In addition to Wiehl, officials representing- the Reichsbank, the Plenipotentiary
for the Economy, the Four Tear Plan, and the Ministries of Food, Finance, and
Economics were present.
See document No. 340, footnote 1.
426
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
offered the 1938 volume of ore (9,500,000 tons) ; Herr Walter will
not be satisfied with this, however, but will insist on maintaining the
amounts^exported in 1939 in all goods of interest to us.
The Commercial Policy Committee expressed agreement with this
line of procedure.
At the beginning of December, the negotiations are to be continued
here in Berlin. Our ore imports will continue undiminished
in the meantime.
On the question of delivering coal to Sweden, Ministerialdirigent
Bergemann 4 stressed that we cannot give preference to both Italy and
Sweden at the saiHe time ; this is impossible on account of the transportation
problems involved. An attempt is to be made to get the
Polish locomotives and freight cars from the Russians. Furthermore,
the Plenipotentiary for the Economy will push action on the problem
of coal transportation.
5
Ministerialdirektor Walter also pointed out that all of the railroad
stations in Denmark are full of German freight cars that cannot be
unloaded. This is generally the case at the present time in neutral
countries, owing to the fact that because of censorship the bills of
lading do not arrive until 8 to 10 days later. The Plenipotentiary for
the Economy will consult the responsible military authorities in order
to remedy the situation.
WEBHL
4 Ministry of Economics.
"In a memorandum of Dec. 7 (3072/612842-45), Wiehl recorded that the
Commercial Policy Committee had that day recommended (subject to Ritter'a
approval) an accommodating attitude toward Swedish exports to neutral countries
to the extent necessary for safeguarding German ore supplies. Since the
Swedes stood firm on their position regarding minerals, it was also decided that
the Ministry of Economics would find out how far the Swedish requests for
iron could be met and whether transportation was available, possibly via Hotterdam,
for the desired quantities of coal and coke.
No. 375
4761/229543-44
Memorandum, T>y the State Secretary
St.S. No. 916 BERLIN-, November 20, 1939.
The Italian Ambassador today handed me the enclosed memorandum
containing information from Bastianini, the Italian Ambassador
in London, to the Foreign Ministry in Borne'. When "I" is used in the
enclosure, Bastianini is therefore meant. Attolico added orally that
the conversation took place after Churchill's well-known latest
speech.1 Butler told Bastianini that Churchill's speech was in con-
1 On Nov. 12, 1939. See The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston 8.
ill, vol. i, pp. 119-123.
NOVEMBER 1939 427
flict with the Government's views not only in the present instance. As
a matter of fact, he always spoke only as Mr. Churchill.
[Enclosure]
Annex to St.S. No. 916
The British people entered the war in order to eliminate the system
of constantly recurring German aggressions ; peace can be concluded
only when there are concrete guarantees that such attacks cannot be
repeated in the future. Acting on this fundamental premise, the
British Government is even today prepared to examine and give the
most serious consideration to any German proposal that offers a real
possibility of achieving this goal.
I then asked Butler whether the rumor circulating in London was
true that evacuation of Poland by German troops was England's basic
condition for any kind of agreement. Butler denied in the most categorical
manner that this was the intention of his Government; the
absurdity of such a demand, which Germany or any other Great
Power could never accept, was obvious, he added.
Butler, who in his conversation with me again stressed the wellknown
war aims of Great Britain and the firm resolve of the Government
to achieve them at all costs, gave me to understand although
not concealing a certain skepticism about the practical feasibility of
a peaceful solution at the present time that neither the Foreign
Office nor the Prime Minister excluded such an eventuality a priori.
No* 376
472/228)768-72
Ambassador ScJiulenburg to State Secretary Wei&sdcker
Moscow, November 20, 1939.
DEAR HERH vox WEIZSACEIER : In the following I take the liberty of
making several remarks supplementing the reports on my latest discussions
with M. Molotov, which could not be taken up adequately in
the telegrams concerned.
M. Molotov was very angry at the Finns.1 He obviously takes the
view that the Soviet Union's effort to protect Leningrad and the Gulf
of Finland was altogether legitimate, and everyone ought to recognize
this. The demands of the Soviet Union were so modest that the stubbornness
of the Finns could only be explained by the fact that their
resistance was being bolstered by England. Molotov mentioned that
1
S'clralenbiirg had reported in a telegram dispatched Nov. 14 on a conversation
of the previous day with Molotov regarding Finland (108/111779).
260090
428
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Finns had been willing to move their boundary further back near
Leningrad. By doing this they had already abandoned their line of
fortifications. In view of that, he did not understand why the Finns
were unwilling to move the boundary far enough back to permit real
security to be obtained for Leningrad- He was all the more unable
to understand this since the Soviet Union had offered to assume all
expenses connected with any evacuation of population and any new
construction which might become necessary.
I enclose a cartoon 2 from the KomsomolsJcaya Pravda: "Minister
Beck says to General Sikorsky : We will wait for M. Erkko, for he
is following in our footsteps."
The sudden refusal of the Soviet Government to undertake any
changes whatsoever in the boundary established on September 28 *
is probably to be attributed to the fact that we gave "the interested
persons" time to raise a storm against the Soviet Union's proposals.
I imagine that these "interested persons" are people from Sieniawa and
Ostrol^ka who have declared themselves to be fervent Communists
and are now mortally afraid of becoming German or Polish- again.
Presumably Sieniawa's representative in the Moscow Supreme Council
was also not willing to lose his mandate. I shall try once more to
salvage the Ostrolka barracks, but I doubt that I shall have any
success.4
3 Not reprinted.
* See document No. 157.
4 In a telegram of Oct. 20, Weizsacker authorized Schulenburg to negotiate
directly with Molotov or Stalin on certain proposals of the German delegation
in the Boundary Commission (2426/512837). Annexed to file copies of this
telegram were papers and sketch maps supporting these proposals which called
lor changes in the agreed boundary near August6w, between Ostrolgka and Nur,
and between Sokal and Jaroslaw (2426/51281825), and also other papers relating
to Germany's desire for access to U2ok Pass. (2426/512826-35).
On Oct. 28, Molotov handed Schulenburg a memorandum agreeing to some of
the proposals and making various counterproposals. Hencke forwarded to Berlin
a translation of this memorandum (2426/512716-17), recommending in an accompanying
letter acceptance of the Soviet terms, even if they did not meet German
wishes in all respects (2426/512712-15). On Nov. 9, however, Schulenburg wired
as follows: "Molotov noted today that there had as yet been no German reply
to the last Soviet proposal about boundary rectification. The Soviet Government
therefore requests that we drop the idea of any such border rectification and
leave everything as it was before. In reply to my objections, Molotov declared
that the Soviet Government placed- great value on achieving its wish and that
it urged us to let the question rest, since a certain stability of relationships
had meanwhile been achieved and the proposed changes would occasion new
unrest, which the Soviet Government wished to avoid" (2427/512956). Weizsacker,
in a telegram of Nov. 11 which was also initialed by Ribbentrop, instructed
the Embassy to express "our real regret" at this withdrawal of the
Soviet proposal of Oct. 29 |>S] (2427/512960). To this instruction Schulenburg
replied in a telegram of Nov. 13 (dispatched Nov. 14) as follows : "In spite of
my most urgent representations Molotov persisted in his request that we cease
calling for any change in the boundary set on September 28. The Soviet Govern*
ment considered it most important that the impression not arise, after elections
had been held for the Supreme Soviet and things were somewhat stabilized, that
the boundary settlement was not final, since this might induce renewed disquiet
among the populace involved. All my efforts to dissuade Molotov from this view
NOVEMBER 1939 429
I questioned M. Molotov cautiously on what he thought of the support
of German peace efforts by the Soviet Union which he mentioned
in his speech.
5 He replied that the Soviet press had carried a considerable
number of newspaper articles along these lines ; his speech
ha,d served the same purpose, and at every opportunity that offered he
would again make the same support available.
M. Molotov mentioned that the agreement with Bulgaria regarding
a Burgas-Moscow air line would probably be signed. I cannot really
believe the somewhat fantastic reports of an air and naval base at
Burgas.
When, as instructed,6 1 informed M. Molotov that in our naval warfare
in the Baltic Sea we would take into account Soviet wishes (not
to approach the Baltic coast too closely) , but must in principle maintain
our right to carry on war everywhere on the high seas, M. Molotov
attempted to point out that after all we had agreed to a delimitation
of spheres of interest along the southern boundary of Lithuania. I
called M. Molotov's attention in a friendly but firm manner to the
fact that at that time it was a question of determining a land boundary
and that it was not permissible to extend this boundary out to sea.
Whereupon M. Molotov let the matter drop.
When we discussed our plains regarding MM. Amanullah and
Schafer,
7 M. Molotov said that both of them would surely travel
incognito through the Soviet Union. I am enclosing a newspaper
clipping pertaining to M. Amanullah..8
In case we actually want to exploit as propaganda the reinforcement
of Soviet troops in the Caucasus, I should like to recommend that
we have Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Guse of Neubabelsberg, Friedrich-
Karl-Strasse, write an article showing how easily the Armenian
plateau in Turkey (Erzurum and Ersignan [Er&incan$~\ ) can be
captured from Transcaucasia and how much more easily Mosul with
its oil fields can be taken from there.9 During the World War Herr
Guse was Chief of the General Staff of the Third Turkish Army in
were unsuccessful ; lie repeated over and over that it could not be too difficult to
build new roads or barracks. Both sides must accept small inconveniences for
the sake of weightier considerations. He certainly expected that the German
Government would show understanding for his argument and not insist further"
(34/23504) . On Nov. 19, Weizs&cker wired to Schulenburg that the OKW placed
great value on the barracks at Ostroleka and the road near Sieniawa [i. e., the
proposed change in the Sokal-Jaroslaw sector] , and asked him to try once more
to arrange with Molotov for at least the barracks at Ostroieka to remain in
German hands (2427/512999). Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Nov. 21
that the Soviet Government consented to the Ostroie.ka change, stipulating that
Germany should propose no further changes and that the new line would heconsidered
final and unalterable (2427/513030). * See Editors' Note, p. 363.
'See document No. 341.
See documents Nos. 60, 353, and 369.
Not reprinted. "
Marginal note : "Yes. R[ibbentrop] ."
430
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Erzurum. He is an authority on matters pertaining to this region.
Am article written by him in the above-mentioned sense would give
the Turks and the British a good deal of food for thought.10
With the very best wishes and Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc., F. H.
10 Marginal note: "Minister Schmidt: Submit to me again later. Articles and
news items of this sort should be launched in the neutral press and then picked
up by [our] press. Schmidt, please take care of this at once. R[ibbentrop] *
In a letter of Dec. 5 (2196/473656), Weizsacker informed Schulenburg that
the suggested article had been written by Guse at Ribbentrop's instance; it
appeared in that day's VolTcischer BeobacHter under the title "Troop reinforcements
on the Caucasus Front." Weizsacker sent Schulenburg a copy and retained
one for his own files (2196/473652-55) .
No. 377
8589/H602606-09
Fuhrer*8 Directive
, November 20, 1939.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L(I)
By officer only
DIRECTIVE No. 8 FOR THE CONDUCT or THE WAR
1. For the time being a state of readiness must be maintained in
order to be able to continue at any time the assembly of forces which
has already begun. Only in this way is it possible to take advantage
immediately of favorable weather conditions.
The branches of the Wehrmacht will make their preparations in such
a way that the attack can still be canceled, even if the order to that
effect arrives at the High Commands as late as 11 p* m. on A-l day.
At that time, at the latest, the High Commands will receive either the
code word "Ehine" (go through with the attack) or "Elbe" (withhold
the attack) ,
x
The Commanders in Chief, Army and Air, are requested to report
to OKW, Operations Planning, immediately after the day of attack
has been determined, the hour of attack agreed upon between them.
2. Contrary to the directive given previously all the proposed
measures against Holland may be taken without special orders when
the general attack begins.
The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be predicted.
Where no resistance is met, the invasion is to be given the character
of a peaceful occupation.
1 The words "Rhine?' and "Elbe1 ' were changed to "Danzig" and "Augsburg,"
with the foUowing marginal note : "Corrected per 1/Skl I Op 42/40 I a."
NOVEMBER 1939 431
3. Land operations are to be executed on the basis of the directive
of October 29 concerning assembly of forces.
That directive is supplemented as follows :
a. All preparations are to be made to facilitate a quick shift of the
focal point of the operation from Army Group B to Army Group A, in
case greater and quicker successes are scored there than at Army Group
B which seems likely with the present distribution of enemy forces.
'&. Holland, including the West Frisian islands off the coast (excluding
Texel for the present) , is first of all to be occupied up to the
Grebbe-Maas line.
4 The Navy^s submarines will be allowed to take blockading measures
against Belgian and, contrary to previous directives, also against
Dutch harbors and shipping lanes during the night before the attack;
its surface vessels and airplanes will be allowed to take such measures
after the time the Army's attack begins. Even where the submarines
are concerned, however, the space of time between the beginning of
blockading operations and the time of the land attack must be kept
as short as possible.
Operations against Dutch naval forces are permitted only if the
latter take a hostile attitude.
At the coastal areas to be occupied, the Navy will be in charge of
the coastal artillery defense against attacks from the sea. Preparations
are to be made for this.
5. The duties of the Luftwaffe remain unchanged. They have
been supplemented by the special verbal orders issued by the Fizhrer
concerning airborne landings and the support to be given to the Army
during the capture of the bridges west of Maastricht.
The 7th Airborne Division will be used for air landing operations
only after the bridges across the Albert Canal are in our hands. The
message to this effect is to be assured the quickest possible transmission
between OKH and OKL.
Population centers, especially large open cities, and industries are
not to be attacked either in the Dutch or in the Belgian-Luxembourg
area without compelling military reasons.
6. Closing the border:
a. Traffic and communications across the Dutch, Belgian, and
Luxembourg borders are to be maintained in the customary manner
until the beginning of the attack, in order to preserve the element of
surprise. Civil authorities are not to be involved in the preparations
for closing the border until that time.
&. When the attack begins the German border with Holland, Belgium,
and Luxembourg is to be closed to all nonmilitary traffic and
communications. Orders to that effect will be given by the Commander
in Chief, Army, to the military and civilian offices concerned.
432
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
At the beginning of the attack, the OKW will inform the hig
government authorities that measures to close the border are b,,
ordered directly by the Commander in Chief, Army, even at those
parts of the Dutch border which are outside of the area of operations.
c. At the other (neutral) borders of the Reich no restrictions will be
made for the time being concerning traffic and communications.
Further measures prepared with regard to tlie supervision of bordercrossing
by persons and communications will be put into effect if the
need arises.
By order:
A true copy : v. TROTHA
Captam
No, 378
B21/B005277t-70
The Charge cPAjfa&res in the United States to the Foreign Mimstry
Telegram
MOST raGENT WASHINGTON, November 21, 1939.
No. 684 of November 20 Received November 21 9 : 00 a. ro.
With reference to your telegram No. 562 of November 19 (Int
2882) ^
A stiffening of German-American relations, which was being exploited
by enemy propaganda, has made necessary since the beginning
of the year a more active German propaganda in the United States,
on which regular reports have been made. Consequently at the outbreak
of the war the following propaganda organs could be fully
employed :
1. The Trans-Ocean agency in New York sends to Latin America
news on the United States in line with our interests, for the purpose
of disturbing North American propaganda. Moreover, the publication
of Trans-Ocean reports in the press here is constantly being promoted,
so that German and bilingual newspapers are increasingly
printing them. For example, the leading New Yorker Sta&tszettflmg,
which for a time had to be banned in Reich territory, is using Trans-
Ocean material in order to present the German viewpoint in unobjectionable
form.
On account of their pro-Allied attitude and also for reasons of
competition American newspapers avoid regular printing of Trans-
Ocean material. On the other hand, it is a gain that they use it to
1 Not found. Similar replies from other Missions indicated that it was a
circular telegram requesting an accounting of propaganda activities being carried
on by Missions.
NOVEMBER 1939 433
check their own news service, which yesterday's Neu> York Times
openly admits. In this way the German viewpoint gains indirect
entry into the leading American newspapers.
2. In order to get over this boycott wall of the American press, the
weekly periodical Facts in Review was founded, which now regularly
reaches 20,000 especially interested persons ; all materials of the
Foreign Ministry, particularly political reports, are utilized for it.
The periodical is proving a success and is quoted and occasionally
attacked by the American press,
3. The German Information Library in New York was developed
into an institute of propaganda. It has sent through numerous special
editions of Foots in Review' speeches of the Führer, the White
Book, and addresses of the Reich Foreign Minister to hundreds of
thousands of especially (group garbled) personages. The Information
Library, in addition, provides numerous organizations, newspapers,
and individuals with information and propaganda material
on Germany.
4. Both through the Information Library and the office of the
German Railways in New York, which works with hundreds of travel
bureaus distributed over the whole continent, German films and propaganda
material are circulated. Since the outbreak of the war the
regular advertising matter of the German Railways office has been
given a decidedly political tinge.
5. Through the press office established since the outbreak of the war,
propaganda is centrally directed from the Embassy in closest collaboration
with German consular officials, which is especially important
in view of the size of the continent. The press office is in
regular daily commxinication with the press here, which, moreover,
is supplied from time to time by the Embassy with statements via
leading American news agencies.
6. All further propaganda possibilities are being carefully observed.
The requested buying up or purchase of newspapers, periodicals, or
the information service, which is very popular here, is constantly being
studied. The same applies by analogy to the American broadcasting
stations. Every valuable speaking opportunity is taken advantage
of by the undersigned (radio talks) or by members of the Embassy
or suitable agents.
7. The most effective tool of German propaganda in the United
States is, as heretofore, the American correspondents in Berlin, who,
as for example, the New York Tiaries correspondent Brooks Peters in
yesterday's Sunday edition, give detailed descriptions as to their
being carefully and courteously treated by German officials, and are
not being handicapped by pre-censorship as on the Allied side. The
Embassy is therefore endeavoring to induce suitable American jour
434
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
nalists to visit Germany. Accordingly, the distinguished feature
writer,K Stoddard, is at present reporting in Germany for the North
American Newspaper Alliance, which supplies a hundred influential
American, British, and Latin American papers.
8. An important supplement to and correction of reports by American
correspondents is the German short-wave transmitter, whose propaganda
effect is carefully observed here and for whose activities the
Embassy has sent detailed suggestions.
THOMSEH
No. 379
F10/045
Memorandum of the Foreign Minister
EM 59 BERLIN, November 21, 1939.
At 5 : 00 p. m. today I received Italian Ambassador Attolico who
had requested an interview.
Ambassador Attolico spoke to me about the statement I had made
some time ago to the effect that according to information received
in Berlin, the British Government had hastily signed the treaty of
alliance with Poland only after it was known that Italy would stand
aside from the present conflict.1 The hope that the Führer could
be deterred from taking action by these two items of intelligence had
motivated the British Government.
Ambassador Attolico tried to convince me that time and date calculations
made it impossible to maintain this thesis.2 He therefore
asked me to re-examine the data in my possession.
I promised Ambassador Attolico that I would be glad to undertake
such an examination when opportunity offered; however, the future
appeared to me to be more essential than the past. In my opinion
developments had actually taken a course which was in the interest
of both countries. Furthermore, it appeared to me certain that after
1 Hitler himself made this statement to Ciano in their Berlin conversation of
Oct. 1. See document No. 176.
* Attolico had seen Weizsacker on Nov. 11 with instructions from Ciano to
contest the above German thesis. Weizsacker noted: "Obviously Attolico intends
to base his argument on the assertion that Mussolini absolutely -wanted to
participate and was only forced to the contrary position at the last moment
because of the military-technical statistics. Allegedly the time relationship
clearly proves that the Italian decision on Aug. 25 came much too late to have
precipitated the signing of the Anglo-Polish treaty in London" (2131/466333).
(The Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance was signed in the afternoon
of Aug. 25.) A copy of the Weizsacker memorandum of this conversation was sent to the
Rome Embassy. Mackensen wrote on the margin of the passage quoted above:
"This assertion (except for the 'absolutely') is perhaps correct, but it has nothing
to do with the question whether Britain's entry into the war was connected with
Italian nonparticipation."
NOVEMBER 1939 435
the inevitable German victory not only could Germany's future be
guaranteed, but Italy's aspirations could also be satisfied. I assured
Ambassador Attolico that we fully understood the Duce's attitude
and had complete confidence in his policy.
No. 380
5556/E395457-5S
Memorandum ~by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, November 21, 1939.
Subject : Economic negotiations with Rumania.
Shortly before Minister Clodius' departure for Bucharest the military
authorities, contrary to their previous position, stated that we
could not, as promised in the agreement of September 29, 1939,1
deliver to the Rumanians over 100 million RM worth of war material,
but only some 10 million EM worth at most. Reason : much of the
captured war material was badly damaged. Usable stocks were needed
for equipping German units activated in the meantime upon higher
orders.
In response to remonstrances the OKW agreed that for a beginning
the Rumanians could be given binding promises of 500 guns and
14 French-made howitzers with ammunition. The pertinent telegraphic
instruction to Minister Clodius 2 crossed the latter's telegram
enclosed herewith.3 In the meantime he has already notified me by
telephone that a further telegraphic report 4 would be sent to the
effect that this concession was not yet sufficient to assure the compensatory
Rumanian deliveries, especially of oil, as fixed by contract.
It is expected that upon receipt of this further telegraphic report
the possibility of further concessions to the Rumanians will be explored
with other departments at home, the High Command of the
Wehrmacht in particular. The proposals for further concessions
thus agreed upon will then be submitted to the Foreign Minister.8
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary.
1 See documents Nos. Ill and 166.
'Not printed (2117/460899) : Telegram No, 783, sent to Bucharest on Nov. 18.
'Not printed (169/82908-09) : Telegram No. 877 sent on Nov. 18. Clodius reported
that the Rumanian Minister President strongly persisted in his request for
the Polish war material, even after having been informed of the poor quality
of the war material in question.
Probably telegram No. 886 of Nov. 21 ; not printed (169/82918-14) .
' A minute by Erich Kordt of Nov. 21 ( 5556/E395459) stated that the Foreign
Minister requested the speedy submission of new proposals. The agreement of
the military authorities to increased deliveries of artillery was noted in Wiehl's
answering minute of Nov. 24 (5556/E395460-61).
436
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 381
2871/563S8S-86
Treaty Signed at Berlin, November #7, 1939
PoL IV 2502 g.
The German Chancellor
and
the President of the Slovak Republic,
desirous of adjusting the northern frontier of the Slovak Republic
to ethnic requirements and of reuniting for this purpose with the
territory of the Slovak State the areas incorporated into the former
Polish state in 1920, 1924, and 1938,
have agreed to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed
the following as their plenipotentiaries, namely :
The German Chancellor:
Herr Joachim von Hibbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister;
The President of the Slovak Republic:
M. Matus Cernak, Minister at Berlin ;
who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found
to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows :
ARTICLE 1
The two High Contracting Parties are agreed that the areas situated
at the southern border of the former Polish state and indicated
on the annexed maps 1 shall become a part of the national territory
of the Slovak state and come under the sovereignty of the Slovak
Republic on the day this treaty becomes effective.
The frontier shall be drawn on the spot as soon as possible by a
German-Slovak commission.
ARITOLE 2
All questions arising as the result of reuniting the designated areas
with the territory of the Slovak state in pursuance of article 1 shall
be regulated by special agreements between the two High Contracting
Parties.
In particular the two High Contracting Parties shall reserve the
right to conclude special agreements if necessary, anent the rights
and interests of German nationals and Volksdeutsche in the areas
designated in article 1.
ARTICLE 3
This treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification exchanged
at Pressburg as soon as possible.
'Not printed (2871/56388^-916). Fifty-two Slovak localities were involved. (Gemeinden}
NOVEMBER 1939 437
The treaty shall become effective with the exchange of the instruments
of ratification.
Done at Berlin on November 21, 1939, in duplicate in the German
and Slovak languages.
V. RlBBEN'TROP
M. CERNAK
No. 382
5S2/2420I23-24
The Ambassador in Italy to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, November 22, 1939 9 : 35 p. m.
No. 825 of November 22 Received November 23 12 : 40 a. m.
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
Dollmann *
just called on me after a very serious conversation with
Buffarini 2 who considers that the development of the situation in
South Tirol has become very threatening in the days since his conversation
with Wolff ;
3 among other things he spoke of the necessity
of guaranteeing public order through a further reinforcement of the
Carabinieri and the military. Buffarini as well as Bocchini very
emphatically pointed out the urgent necessity of dispatching as
quickly as possible the special deputy promised by Wolff; together
with his counterpart sent by the Italians, this deputy is to settle all
differences arising, especially in police matters, but also in the general
implementation of the Tremezzo agreement,* so that Buffarini and
Dollmann will in the future be called upon only as authorities on a
higher level, that is, in cases in which the matter has definitely
reached a deadlock locally ; in short, Buffarini and Dollmann will not
be consulted in cases in which all possibilities have not been exhausted
on the lower level.
Buffarini further transmitted to Dollmann the Duce's urgent request
that the number of people actually emigrating daily be increased
above the minimum which Wolff had promised and which, in the
Duce's opinion, was not even being adhered to. In this connection the
Duce had called attention to the repatriation figures for Volksdeutsche
from the Baltic area, which had been published in the press (in my
opinion an irrelevant reference, since the conditions are completely
* Bugen Dollmann, at this date a Sturmbannftihrer in the SS, was Himmler's
personal representative in Rome for police matters.
*Guido Buffarini-Guidi, Deputy Minister of the Interior, 1933-43, under
Mussolini who himself retained the post of Minister. Buffarini was Minister
of the Interior in Mussolini's Italian Fascist Republic, 1944-45.
'Karl Wolff, at this date Gruppenftihrer and Chief of Personal Staff for
BeiehsFührer-SS Himmler. 4 See document No. 244.
438 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
different), and according to Buffarini's account had clearly indicated
that we were apparently interested only in a "plebiscite for show" in
South Tirol. Buffarini had remarked in this connection that the
situation would be considerably eased if we could bring ourselves
to agree to the departure of the impressive number of approximately
100 persons per day, which would have to begin at once, however.
Although I have no doubt whatever that the Italians are thereby
making a request which exceeds what was agreed upon, I would
nevertheless consider it desirable, in view of the unmistakable deterioration
in the situation in South Tirol, if the^ReichsFührer-SS would
investigate the practicability of such an action and if possible initiate
the appropriate measures. On the basis of Dollmann's account I have
the impression that in Buffarini's opinion the Duce would be considerably
reassured if for 2 to 3 weeks we would actually arrange for
the departure of approximately 100 persons daily ; later, if it caused
too many practical difficulties to maintain such a tempo, we could
go back to the number of persons who could be taken care of in a
normal and quiet manner.5
*A memorandum (100/65424-30) from the files of the Home Embassy, dated
at Bolzano Jan. 11, 1940, and presumably submitted by the Consulate General
at Milan, showed that up to that date 90.7 percent of the Volksdeutche in South
Urol had opted for Germany.
No. 383
476/22955-6
Memorandum 'by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
BERLIN, November 22, 1939.
For [Under] State Secretary Woermann.
The Minister yesterday discussed with the Führer the draft of the
reply to the Netherlands Government concerning the crossing of
Netherlands territory by German aircraft.1 The Führer then authorized
me to issue the following instructions :
1. In future, all flights by German aircraft over neutral territory
will be denied \_dbgeleugnet] , unless they can be absolutely proven,
for example, by crashing, or by parts of the aircraft which are found,
or something of the sort.
2. In case it can be proven absolutely that such flights have taken
place, a decision will have to be made in each individual case as to
what is to be done.
3. The Foreign Minister requests [Under] State Secretary Woermann
to submit to him as soon as possible an exact list of flights over
x Two notes (173/84050-51) protesting German flights over Netherlands territory
were presented by the Netherlands Charg6 d'Affaires on Nov. 20.
NOVEMBER 1939 439
Holland and Belgium by German aircraft and a list of flights over
those countries by enemy aircraft.2
* The list requested has not been found.
1 Unsigned marginal note : "Neither of the drafts is to l>e dispatched."
No. 384
Nuremberg document 789 PS
Exhibit USA-23
Memorandum of a Conference of the Fuhrer With the Principal
Military CommanderS, November 83, 1939*
November 23, 1939 1200 hours.
Conference with the ITiihrer, to which all principal military commanders
are ordered. The Fuhrer gives the following speech :
The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the thinking
which governs my view of impending events, and to tell you my decisions.
The building up of our armed forces was only possible in
connection with the ideological education of the German people by the
Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief
in the final success was based on a thorough observation of the events
of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore,
in the midst of the set-backs which were not spared me during
my period of struggle, I never lost my belief. Providence had the
last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear
recognition of the probable course of historical events and the firm
will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919, when
after long internal conflict I became a politician and took up the
struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions.
I had, moreover, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First
of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a
minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years
I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs*
When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle
lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I
had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people
and extending it to the armed forces. First internal reorganization,
abolition of the appearances of decay and of the defeatist spirit,
education to heroism. While still engaged in internal reorganization,
1 This report of Hitler's speech was found in OKW files captured at Flensherg.
Its authorship is unknown. Additional information about Hitler's statements
during this conference is contained in the testimony of General Haider in the
"High Command Case", Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunal* Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuemberff, October 1946-April
1949, vol. x, p. 867.
440 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POXiICY
I undertook the second task to release Germany from its international
bonds. Two particular landmarks are to be pointed out in
this connection secession from the League of Nations and denunciation
of the Disarmament Conference. It was a hard decision. The
number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation
of the Bhineland was large; the number of believers was very
small. I was supported by the nation which stood firmly behind
me when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament.
Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted
misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 came the introduction
of compulsory military service. After that, militarization of the
Bhineland, again a step believed to be impossible at that time. The
number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then the
beginning of the fortification of the whole country, especially in the
West.
One year later came Austria ; this step also was considered doubtful.
It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. The next
step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this step was not possible
to accomplish in one move. First of all, in the West the West
Wall had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one
effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be
satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial
solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made.. Then followed
the establishment of the Protectorate and with that the basis
for the conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not quite clear at that
time whether I should start first against the East and then against
the West or vice versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in
his time. By the pressure of events it came first to the fight against
Poland. It will be charged against me : Fight and fight again. In
fighting I see the fate of all creatures. Nobody can avoid fighting
if he does not want to go under. The increasing number of people
required a larger Liebensraum. My goal was to create a rational relation
between the number of people and the space for them to live in.
The fight must start here. No nation can evade the solution of this
problem. Otherwise, it must yield and gradually go down. That is
taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southeast, then
adaptation of the number of people to the smaller space by emigration.
In later years, adaptation of the number of people to insufficient space
by reducing the number of births. This would lead to death of the
nation, to bleeding to death. If a nation chooses that course all its
weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to force from the outside and
uses this force against oneself by the killing of the child. This means
the greatest cowardice, decimation of numbers, and degradation; I
decided on a different way adaptation of the living space to the
NOVEMBER 1939 441
number of people. It is important to recognize one thing. The state
has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its national
substance. In our case 82 million people are concerned. That means
the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this
responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the body of the people.
That gave me the strength to fight. It is an eternal problem to bring
the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space.
Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help
here, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the
strength to fight must withdraw. Struggles are different from those
of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial struggle. Today
we fight for oil fields, rubber, mineral wealth, etc. After the Peace
of Westphalia, Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of
the German Reich was determined by treaty. This German impotence
was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia
realized her task. Then the opposition to France and England began.
Since 1870, England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were
certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at
that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was, at times9 in favor of a
preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian
mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed.
Insufficient hardness of the leading personalities. The basic thought
of Moltke's plans was the offensive. He never thought of the defense.
Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution
was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political
and military leadership were to blame that the opportunities
were lost. The military leadership always declared that it was not
yet ready. In 1914, there came the war on several fronts. It did not
bring the solution of the problem. Today the second act of this
drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years, it must be
made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which
has been desired since 1870, and considered as impossible of achievement,
has come to pass. For the first time in history, we have to fight
on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can
know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike in the East and then in the West. Basically
I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The
decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve
the problem. Under the pressure of events, it was decided that the
East was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly,
it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious
event in our history. Unexpectedly small losses of men and material.
Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation
which we viewed previously as impossible of achievement. Now the
442
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
situation is as follows : The opponent in the West lies behind Ms fortifications.
There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The
decisive question is how long can we endure this situation? Russia
is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many internal conditions.
Moreover, we have the Treaty with Russia. Treaties, however,
are only kept as long as they serve a purpose. Russia will only
keep it as long as Russia herself considers it to be to her benefit. Bismarck
also thought so. One recalls the Reinsurance Treaty.2 Now
Russia still has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her
position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free
in the West. Further, Russia is seeking to increase her influence in
the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the
goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to
her benefit. At the present moment internationalism has retired to
the background. In case Russia renounces it, she will go over to Pan-
Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the
present time the Russian Army is of little worth. For the next 1 or 2
years, the present situation will remain.
Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death can
alter everything. Italy has great goals for the consolidation of her
empire. Fascism and the Duce personally are exclusively the proponents'
of this idea. The Court is opposed to it. As long as the
Duce lives, so long can it be calculated that Italy will seize every
opportunity to reach her imperialistic goals. However, it is too much
to ask of Italy that she should join in the battle before Germany has
seized the offensive in the West ; similarly Russia did not attack until
we had marched into Poland. Otherwise, Italy will think that
France concerns herself only with Italy since Germany is sitting
behind her West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has
taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the
death of the Duce can bring danger to us. How easily the death of
a statesman can come about I myself have experienced recently.
Time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself
faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this
position then no danger from Yugoslavia is to be feared. Similarly
the neutrality of Rumania is assured by the attitude of Russia.
Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxist influences, but is neutral
now. America is still not dangerous to us because of her
neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America is
still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is
not yet certain whether she will join against England.
Reinsurance Treaty was concluded by Bismarck with Russia June 18,
loot.
NOVEMBER 1939 443
Everything Is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable
now; in 6 months it might not be so any more.
As the last factor I must in all modesty describe my own person :
Irreplaceable, Neither a military man nor a civilian could replace
me. Attempts at assassination may be repeated. I am convinced of
my powers of intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only
by the annihilation of the opponent. Anyone who believes differently
is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversaries. Now there is
a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious for us,
but which can only deteriorate. The enemy will not make peace
when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromises.
Hardness toward ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate.
The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall act accordingly.
Today we still have a superiority such as we have never had before.
After 1914 [sic\ our opponents disarmed themselves of their own
accord. England neglected the expansion of her fleet. The fleet
is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only
two new modern ships Rodney and Nelson. New construction
activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class which were,
however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become
effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war, England did not
have enough forces to occupy Lake Tana. At Malta, Gibraltar, and
London, little antiaircraft protection. Since 1937, rearmament has
begun again. At present, however, only a small number of divisions,
which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the
Army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before
next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British Army
lias only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding.
The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Antiaircraft has only
guns from the last war. A German flyer at 6,000 meters altitude is
safe from English antiaircraft fire. The Navy will not be fully rearmed
for 1 to 2 years. I have the greatest experience in all rearmament
questions, and I know the difficulties which must be overcome
therein.
After 1914, France reduced the length of service. After 1914, decrease
of military might. Only in some artillery branches are we
inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after
the war the French Army deteriorated. There were no changes until
Germany rearmed and announced her demands.
In summary (1) The number of active units in Germany is at its
highest, (2) superiority of the Luftwaffe, (3) antiaircraft beyond all
competition, (4) the tank corps, (5) large number of antitank guns,
5 times as many machine guns as in 1914, (6) German artillery has
260090 54 34
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
great superiority because of the 10.5 guns, and (7) there is no French
superiority in howitzers and mortars.
Numerical superiority, but also the value of the troops is greater
than with the others. I was most deeply pained when I heard the
opinion that the German Army was not individually as capable as it
should have been. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what
one might have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that
troops must be judged on their relative value in comparison with the
opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. The
individual German infantryman is better than the French. No
hurrah-enthusiasm, but tough determination. I am told that the
troops will advance only if the officers lead the way. In 1914, that
was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In
reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the
war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is
better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming
Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.
Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what
importance is it if a few of them disappoint. Daring in the Army,
Navy, and Luftwaffe. I cannot bear to hear people say the Army is
not in good order. Everything lies in the hands of the military
leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led.
We have succeeded with our small Navy in clearing the North Sea
of the British. Recognition of the small Navy, especially the Commander
in Chief of the Navy.
We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire
German Lebensraum.
The land Army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in
the West it has not been shown that the German soldier is inferior to
the French.
Revolution from within is impossible. We are even superior to the
enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest
armament industry of the world.
I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the
British. The Englishman is a tough opponent. Above all on the
defense. There is no doubt that England will be represented in
France by large forces at the latest in 6 to 8 months.
We have an Achilles heel the Ruhr. The conduct of the war depends
on possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push
through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest
danger. That could lead to the paralyzing of the German power of
resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish. Victory or defeat !
The question is not the fate of a National Socialist Germany, but who
is to dominate Europe in the future. This question is worthy of the
NOVEMBER 1939 445
greatest
efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive
against Germany when they are fully armed. England and
France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request
English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies
are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at
Venlo :
8 The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch
general staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Netherlands
Government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up.
This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not
mention the incident any more. At a suitable time I shall exploit all
that and use it to motivate my action. If the French Army marches
into Belgium in order to attack us it will be too late for us. We must
anticipate them. One more thing. U-boats, mines, and Luftwaffe
(also for mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better
starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that
sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type
mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the
chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines
which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands
a different starting point. England cannot live without its
imports. We can feed ourselves. The continuous sowing of mines
on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However,
this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is
a difficult decision for me. No one has ever achieved what I have
achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the
German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now.
I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory
or annihilation. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first
Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even
there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything
depended on Frederick the Great. Also the decisions of Bismarck
in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and earliest moment. Breach of the neutrality
of Belgium and Holland is of no importance. No one will question
that when we have won. We shall not justify the breach of neutrality
as idiotically as in 1914. If we do not violate neutrality, then England
and France will. Without attack, the war can not be ended victoriously.
I consider it possible to end the war only by means of an
attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no
one can answer. Everything depends upon a kind Providence. The
military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite, however, is that
1 See document No. 344,
446
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the leadership must give from above an example of fanatical unity.
There would not be any failures if the leaders of the people always had
the courage a rifleman must have. If, as in 1914, the commanders
suffer a collapse of nerves, what should one demand of the simple
rifleman?
The only possible conclusion : The enemy must be beaten by attack
Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically,
we have more than 100 divisions. With respect to men^
reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. As for
the rest, what does not happen today must happen tomorrow. The
whole thing means the end of the World War, not just a single action.
It is a matter of not just a single question but of the existence or
nonexistence of the nation.
I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.
(1) The decision is irrevocable. (2) There is only prospect for success
if the whole Wehrmacht is determined.
The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate
does not demand from us any more than from the great men of German
Jiistory. As long as I live, I shall think only of the victory of my
people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall annihilate everyone
who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand
unashamed when I have to die.
I want to annihilate the enemy. Behind me stands the German
people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles
with destiny can have a kind Providence. Even in the present development
I see the work of Providence.
If we come through this struggle victoriously and we shall come
through it our time will go down in the history of our people. I
shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat
of my people. No capitulation to the outside, no revolution from
within.
No. 385
10a/111807
The Embassy in tTie Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 770 of November 23 Moscow, November 23, 19396 : 02 p. m.
Received November 234: 10 p. m. [m].
For the State Secretary.
For the High Command of the Army, Attache Section.
The Italian Military Attache called on me today to inform me confidentially
of an estimate current in attache circles: Approximately
28 divisions, plus cavalry and guard units, are believed to be assem
NOVEMBER 1939 447
bled on the Bessarabian front, with their main strength on the right
wing, in East Galicia. The French Military Attache estimates the
strength at this front as being not over 11 * divisions- The disposition
of the Soviet forces vis-Jt-vis Finland is unanimously estimated as
follows : A total of 18 divisions is assigned here, of which four are
spread out from Lake Ladoga to the Arctic Ocean, with the rest on
the Karelian Isthmus and south of Leningrad.
It is the general assumption, held especially by the British Military
Attache, that the Soviet Union will in no circumstances seek to enforce
its demands on Rumania and Finland by resort to armed intervention,
Time works for the Soviet Union, particularly in the case of Finland,
so that they can attain everything without the risk of a war. The
British Military Attache believes that the Soviet Union will do
nothing against Rumania before next spring. Other Military Attaches
think that Stalin would like to achieve his aims without bloodshed,
but with the greatest possible speed, so that in the event of an
early termination of the European war he would not afterwards
stand alone as the instigator of new trouble.
Kostring No. 141.
1 Marginal note by Decoding Officer : "Gerald also read 10."
No. 386
1869/356864
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Moscow, November 24, 1939 12:20 a. m.
No. 775 of November 23 Eeceived November 24 2 : 30 a. m.
With reference to our telegrams No. 754 of November 21 a and No.
773 of November 23.2
To the Reich Ministry of Transport.
The Embassy has entered a strong protest with all the Soviet offices
concerned against the change-over of gauge of the section of the rail-
1 Not printed (1369/356929), A telegram notifying Schnurre that Hilger
had made written and oral protest to Soviet authorities about the change in
railroad gauge (see document No. 237, footnote 4) and about the Rumanian
transit question. As to the latter, Schnell reported in telegram No. 760 of Nov. 21
(1369/356873) that the Soviet Government had made transit through Rumania
dependent upon German acceptance of a temporary agreement concerning railroad
arrangements along the entire new frontier through Poland.
'Not printed (1369/356865-66). In this telegram Schnell transmitted a summary
of the technical instructions issued by the Soviet Commissariat of Transport
to the LfWdw railroad district on technical cooperation with German officials.
Schnell recommended that corresponding instructions be issued to the Krak6w
district
448
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
road between Lw6w and Przemysl. The railroad delegation has also
protested repeatedly in the matter. In spite of this, the fact that conversion
has been started has been announced in the local railroad
newspaper. Potemkm, instead of giving a direct reply to the demarche
made day before yesterday, limited himself today to the statement
that people in Germany were apparently not very well informed about
the efficiency of the railroad section Sniatyn-Drohobycz-PrzemySL
Potemkin added in these words : "Our German friends will be satisfied."
In spite of constant urging no statement of its viewpoint could
be obtained from the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.
It is apparent from Ministerialrat Schnell's telegram to the Ministry
of Transport today that all preparations have been made for beginning
transit traffic with Rumania as of December 1. The representatives
of the Benzol Association who are negotiating here state
that the extensive Soviet petroleum deliveries to Germany which are
imminent will be greatly facilitated by the change-over of gauge on
the Lwow-Przemygl section, since in this way the installations for
refilling the petroleum into other tank cars will be located on German
soil.
SCHTELENBtnEUJ
No. 387
B21/B005283-84
The Charge
NOVEMBER 1939 449
and had chosen the alternative of an understanding, which Russia
also desired.
1
The fact that Russia is not included in the British navicert procedure
was attributed by Oumansky to British apprehensions of being
exposed to another sharp protest from Russia against the conduct of
the naval war.
THOHSBN
1 Oumansky refers to the Nomonhan Incident which involved large-scale fighting
between Japanese and Soviet troops in the summer of 1939. A settlement was
announced at Moscow on Sept. 16.
No. 388
2181/466370
Ambassador Bitter to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No, 958 of November 25 BERLIN, November 2S [1939] 10 : 20 p. m.
Received November 26 1 : 30 a. ECU
The Spanish Foreign Minister very sharply condemned vis-a-vis
the German Ambassador the procedure announced by the enemy
powers with reference to German exports
a and stated that in view of
the intended Spanish protest he had ordered all Spanish representatives
in neutral countries, especially in Home, to sound out the respective
Governments concerning their stand. Since he intends to let
Spanish ships proceed to neutral countries under convoy of Spanish
naval vessels, it is highly important for him to know what attitude
Italy will adopt toward such a procedure, since other neutrals, too,
will then certainly follow suit.
The Foreign Minister requested that the Italian stand also be ascertained
via Berlin.
Please mention the suggestion to the Government there and use
your influence to the effect that the Spanish suggestion meets with a
positive reply. A later telegraphic report is requested.
2
KlTTER
1 Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on Nor*
21 that, in retaliation for illegal German use of mines, blockade measures would
be extended to German exports, including those carried in neutral vessels.
*Mackensen replied on Nov. 26 (582/241933/2) that Ciano had said that he
had not yet been approached by the Spaniards, He had added, however, that he
did not see how the Spaniards proposed to undertake convoying with their war*
ships, which "were really nothing but scrap."
450
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 389
1571/5802^1-33
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
UBGBNT BOME, November 26, 1939 7: 45 p. m.
No. 864 of November 26 Received November 2610 : 30 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 842 of November 24.1
During my visit today Ciano himself brought up the step concerning
the intensified British blockade measures which he had undertaken
with the British Charg d'Affaires and the French Ambassador
the day before yesterday, and stated that he had refrained from carrying
out the intention mentioned to me day before yesterday of taking
up the matter by way of a note, since it had developed in the formulation
that it would not have been possible to avoid bringing in the
word neutrality in such a note. In his oral statements to the two
diplomats, however, it had been easy to get around this difficulty.
When I asked how the British and the French reacted to his communication,
Ciano replied that the British ChargS had taken cognizance
of it with the remark that he would inform his Government;
Franois-Poncet, however, had replied with a little smile that he was
taking cognizance of this protest against the "consequences" of the
measures and that he knew that just as Ciano had received the Englishman
15 minutes before him in order also to protest against the
"consequences", he would send for me 15 minutes later to protest
against the "causes". England and France had done no more than
give an answer to our "anarchist" mines, whereby we had placed ourselves
outside the laws of naval warfare, I had the impression that
Ciano did not permit himself to be drawn into any further discussion
of the subject.
When I asked whether he had given his remarks to the British and
the French the tone of a definite demand, he replied that he had expressed
himself somewhat to the effect that if England and France
persisted on the course they had taken, Italy would reserve to herself
the freedom of action necessary to guard her interests.
MACKBNSBN
1 Not printed (8331/E589811-12) ,
NOVEMBER 1939 451
No. 390
$6/108123-24
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 522 of November 27 ANKARA, November 27, 1939 8 : 15 p. m.
Received November 28 3 : 30 a. m.
1. The note verbale has been delivered in accordance with telegram
No. 454 of November 25.1
2. With reference to telegram No. 458 of November 27,2 I today
called the Foreign Minister's attention to the consequences of his
economic policy if it was to be conducted in accordance with the
interview.8
The Reich Government is always prepared to conclude a reasonable
trade agreement; it could not but [consider]
4 it a very unneutral
and therefore unfriendly act [if] Turkey should give in to British
pressure not to deliver any chromium to us. We could understand
that Turkey might want to exchange this valuable material for foreign
exchange, if possible. Therefore we were even prepared to deliver
war material in payment. I had to reject absolutely the Foreign
Minister's request that an agreement with the Minister of Commerce
be concluded first and chromium discussed later. In view of my
attitude and my reference to the increased political tension which
would doubtless set in between the two countries, as well as in response
to the desire of the President of the Republic that this tension
be eased through economic concessions, Saracoglu said that he did
not intend to cut us off from chromium supplies but was only awaiting
the result of an investigation of the extent to which the chromium
output could be increased in order to make me an offer. Finally
we agreed that the negotiations with the Minister of Commerce should
be immediately begun and quickly concluded. Before the final signing
he will then submit to me his proposals with regard to chromium.
The trade policy of the Turkish Government coincided with the
article in the TtirTcische Post of November 16, and he also wished to
arrive at a political detente in this manner.
3. For this purpose Saracoglu proposed to me that the feud be
called off on both sides. My representations with respect to Tan* and
1 Not printed (849O/E596894).
'Not printed (8493/E596956). 9 In an interview with Jules Sauerwein of Paris Soir, Saracoglu had indicated
frank dissatisfaction with the course of economic discussions with Germany
during 1939 and optimism about establishing closer economic relations with the
Western Powers. DNB report of Nov. 24 on the interview : 4531/E144257-58. 4 The words in brackets, garbled in transmission, are from the Ankara draft
452
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
an entirely impossible article by Hussein Yalcin had shown him. that
this could not go on. The Tan incident would be settled in accordance
with my proposal. Maranz s had been warned that he was an undesirable
alien. I promised that I would ask the Minister and the
Government to instruct the German press not to write anything in
the future that might offend Turkish national pride or the President
* Austrian-born correspondent of the London Daily Herald.
No. 391
2121/462413-15 ;
2121/4.62418-20
Unsigned Memorandum of the Economic Policy Department
[November 1939].
I
The German-Turkish agreements on the exchange of goods and
payments, of July 25, 1938,
1 were in force until July 31, 1939; the
agreements provided that the two Governments were to decide in
the course of the month of May 1939 whether or not the agreements
should be extended for another year.
Some time before that date an understanding had been reached
with the Turkish Government that negotiations were to take place
at Ankara early in June 1939 regarding the extension and modification
of the agreements (cf. also telegraphic instruction of March 22 a
of this year). The negotiations were subsequently canceled (telegraphic
instruction of May 27, 1939-W4240-) ,
3 This action of ours
was based, among other things, on the consideration that owing to
the seasonal character of the Turkish products the Turks would be
more eager to negotiate in the fall. The Turks were likewise left in
uncertainty about the entry into force of the credit agreement of January
16 * of this year, which was to have been effected by an exchange
of notes (cf. telegraphic instruction of May 11 of this year, No. 117).
5
The Führer ordered on May 14 6 through a directive issued by General
Keitel that no heavy guns were to be delivered to Turkey. For all
financial questions arising out of the contracts the German firms involved
were to be referred to the Ministry of Finance. Failure to
deliver was to be justified vis-k-vis Turkey on political grounds and
1 See vol. v, documents Nos. 545 and 549
'Not found.
Nat printed (8452/E595141). 4 See vol. v, document No. 557.
Not printed (8452/E595145). * Not found. See vol. vi, document No. 435.
NOVEMBER 1939 453
with the explanation that for the German firms it was a case of farce
The Turkish Embassy in Berlin appealed to the Foreign Ministry
in a note verbale of May 27 of this year (W III 4271) 7 about the holding
back of military equipment, and the Turkish Ambassador approached
Minister Clodius on several occasions about this matter and
also about the negotiations for the extension of the Trade Agreement
and the entry into force of the Credit Agreement (memorandum of
May 30, 1939).
8
In a conversation with our Ambassador on June 5,
9 the Turkish
Foreign Minister stated in connection with the holding back of the
torpedoes and the Skoda guns that if we did not perform delivery,
Turkey, on her part, would have to curtail her deliveries of raw
materials and stop payments. The Ambassador noted that the Turks
must have been referring to chromium ore.
When the Turkish Embassy made another urgent inquiry about
the starting of the German-Turkish economic negotiations contemplated
for May and the question of the delivery of military equipment,
an evasive answer was given on June 24 (W III 5025) ,
10
As of July 11, the following deliveries of war material to Turkey
were stopped :
1) 19 150-mm guns, ordered from Krupp, delivery of which was to
begin on July 8.
I) 12 210-mm guns, from Skoda.
3) 6 batteries of 240-mm howitzers, from Skoda, \alued at 935,000
English pounds (a down payment of 270,000 English pounds has
already been made on this order) .
4) 60 Messerschmitt planes.
The other deliveries of war material were continued.
In July we were considering starting negotiations in the middle of
August with a view to extending the arrangements for another year
and at the same time securing an agreement that the penalties for
nondelivery of war material would not be enforced (Wg. 1163 g) ;
1X
but on August 7 Papen told the Foreign Minister, who had invited
him for a discussion of the question of delivery, that he was awaiting
instructions and that any prior discussion would be pointless.
12
In accordance with the instruction of August 18,
13 our objective was
to obtain extension of the Trade and Payments Agreements on con-
T Not printed (7996/E575629-30). See vol. vi, document No. 454, footnote.
*
Vol. vi, document No. 454.
' Vol. vi, document No. 475.
10 VoL vi, document No. 565.
Not printed (8452/E595147). These ideas were also expressed in a memorandum
which Wiehl submitted to Bibbentrop on July 28, 1939 (96/107918-23).
"Telegram No. 225 of Aug. 8 (8452/B595148).
Vol. viit document No. 109.
454 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
dition that an understanding could be reached regarding our release
from the war material contracts (W 1361 g) ; in order to increase the
pressure, the issuance of import licenses for seasonal products was
stopped.
14
According to report No. 243 of August 24,
15 the Turkish Government
took note of the nondelivery of war material and was willing not
to bring up the question of indemnification guarantees provided
NOVEMBER 1939 455
industry through financial investments and by supplying technicians ;
a whole series of projects is under way. She has delivered to the
Turks a great number of industrial products for which parts can
now be had only from Germany. She has also bought large quantities
of agricultural products on the sal of which Turkey's rural
population depends. She has created a market in Germany for
Turkish agricultural products and through the good prices paid for
these products, which are mostly nonstandardized and therefore cannot
be sold on the world market, she has made it possible for Turkey
to expand her production. If Turkey believes that she can henceforth
supply her industrial needs from England and Franc and will
sell her agricultural products in these countries, that is her business.
We believe that her expectations will be disappointed. If England,
prompted by transparent political motives now appears as a buyer
on the Turkish market, that is a development that will not suffice to
meet Turkey's needs for markets even temporarily. In any case, England
must still in the long run give prime consideration to th interests
of her Dominions and overseas possessions, and will stop her purchases
in Turkey as soon as the war is ovr and the political reas'ons
prompting her present action disappear. When that time comes,
however, Turkey will turn to Germany in vain. It cost Germany a
great deal of effort and technical work to develop economic relations
to their present high, level. Existing ties can be broken easily. But
if Turkey should decide to sever her connections with Germany, the
Turkish producer, much to his sorrow, will also have to accept the
fact that the former customer for his agricultural products turns to
other markets.
Ill
1. At the present stage of th negotiations, th Turks are drawing a
clear distinction between
a)
J)
chromium or deliveries, and
other deliveries.
Chromium or is to be delivered in exchange for war material ; the
other deliveries are to be compensated against German counterdeliveries
and the open balance.
2. Previously we have taken the stand that we will not negotiate
without chromium ore. This attitude clearly indicates our interest in
chromium or to th Turks and, no doubt, also to the British, and so th
counteraction is all th mor intns.
3. Th Ministry of Economics believes that by holding back we
shall compel th Turks to yield. This to my view is erroneous because
industry is not of primary importance for Turkey, which is
456
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
basically an agrarian country. Experts who are familiar
NOVEMBER 1939 457
No. 392
The Minister in Rwnania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
BUCHAREST, November 28, 1939 2 : 45 a, m*
No. 916 of November 27 Received November 28 3 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 810 of November 25 (Pol. II
4758).
1
Foreign Minister Gafencu repeated to me that the neutrality pact
had been abandoned ; he would not even refer to it in his statement
to Parliament on Wednesday.
Gafencu claims, however, that England had at first been cold to the
idea and had only later agreed to it. He had believed that we would
give our consent because we. had at one time proposed Italy's leadership
in it. Nor had the Italian Minister been averse to it in the beginning.
Only later did he indicate reserve. Knowing now that
Germany and Italy did not welcome the neutral bloc, he was withdrawing
his proposal.
FABRICIUS
* Not printed (6520/E487376).
No. 393
g!2T/B582019
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States
Telegram
No. 593 BERLIN^ November 27, 1939.
Sent November 28 4 : 20 a. m. W VI 4046 II.
With reference to our telegram No. 589.1
I have instructed the German Missions in Rome, Moscow, Tokyo,
and also in other places to speak to the governments there about
England's renewed breach of international law and urge energetic
defense measures and joint action by neutral states.2 Even though
*Not printed (51/34049-50). The telegram snimmarlzed the reaction of neutral
states to new Anglo-French blockade measures against Germany tinder
which it had been announced that all German goods of German origin or German
ownership found on neutral ships would be seized in retaliation for illegal German
use of mines. The telegram stated that with the exception of the United
States almost all neutrals affected by the measures had protested and Germany
was urging them to take joint countermeasures.
'The instructions to Rome and Moscow are printed as documents Nos, 394
and 395; that to Tokyo is not printed (1703/398323-24).
458
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I do not expect very much from a similar step in Washington, it nevertheless
seems to me necessary and desirable also to inform the Government
of the United States of the developments that were reported
for information by telegraphic instruction No. 589. I leave it to
your judgment to decide how emphatically in your further oral
statement you should urge the government there to take a stand also
against this new breach of international law and to halt this interference
with the commerce of the United States. Report by
telegram.
RlBBENTROP
No. 394
8127/E5820ai>-2'2
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 968 BERLIN, November 27, 1939.
Sent November 28 5 ; 20 a. m.
zu W VI 4050 I.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 861 * and 864 of November 26*
Please point out to Ciano again and on my express instructions
the necessity of Italy's protecting herself against the new violation
of international law and the new attack by England on the rights
and economic interests of Italy and the other neutrals. In so doing
please inform him that Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
Japan, and Iran thus almost all countries actually affected, with the
exception of America have also lodged protests with England.
Furthermore, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry threatened
countermeasures in case the British action should damage important
Japanese interests. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has
stated that in all probability the Inter-American Neutrality Commission,
which is meeting shortly in Rio, will decide to protest against
the tightening of British blockade regulations.
Italy is all the more interested in an energetic defense of her position,
since she has suffered more harm than the other countries through
being cut off from deliveries of German coal by sea. Although, the
German Government will do everything it can to replace ship deliveries
which may become impossible with deliveries by rail, there should
be no delusions that this might succeed even partially, especially if
Italy does not provide more freight cars. In this connection, I request
in particular that you suggest the formation of convoys of coal freight-
*No. 861 Is the telegram referred to In document No. 388, footnote 2.
'Document No. 389.
NOVEMBER 1939 459
ers escorted by Italian naval forces. Say that I am convinced that
England would not dare molest such convoys.
I should be very pleased if you could find an opportunity soon to
speak to the Duce, too3 in this matter and to inform him of my
opinion.
Report by wire.3
HlBBENTROP
By Berlin's telegram No. 967 of Nov. 28 (582/241936), the Rome Embassy
was asked to refrain from executing this instruction until a further message was
received.
Hibbentrop's telegram No. 978 of Nov. 30 (582/241937) then ordered the Embassy
to proceed with the instruction subject to replacement of its next to last
paragraph with the following :
"In view of the cutting off of German coal shipments by sea, Italy has an interest
in energetic defense of her position. The Reich Government will, of
course, do everything it can to effect coal deliveries by the land route, but this
can succeed only in part if Italy does not provide more freight cars."
The telegram added that mention of the convoy idea, contained in the first
version of the instruction, was to be omitted "since for technical naval reasons
we do not wish to see such convoys formed at this time."
No. 395
8I2T/Ki5a2020-2O/l
TTie Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 907 BERUST, November 27, 1939.
Sent November 28 6 : 20 a. m.
zu W VI 4046 II.*
Please speak to Chairman Molotov about the planned tightening- of
British blockade measures which will probably be announced on November
28; they are now supposed to subject even export goods of
German origin which -are owned by neutrals, are on neutral ships,
and are destined for neutral countries, to capture and seizure. I
should be very pleased if M. Molotov would lodge a protest against
this action to the effect that Britain was again violating accepted
international law.
To judge from the great effect achieved by the recent protest by
Chairman Molotov against the contraband list,
2 we promise ourselves
even better results from the protest now being suggested because the
Soviet Union is practically unaffected by the British measure. Consequently,
the Soviet Union would again be able to appear as protector
and defender of international law.
*W VI 4046 II: Document No. 393.
The files contain a German translation of a note Molotov nandea to the
British. Ambassador Oct. 25, 1939, in reply to British notes of Sept. 6 and 11
regarding contraband of war (51/3395O-53) .
260090 54 35
460 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMA3XT FOREIGN POLICY
I suggest that during the conversation you might utilize the fact
that Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Iran
have already protested. Brazil intends to propose a joint protest at
the session of the Inter-American Neutrality Commission, which mil
be held shortly in Rio. Italy has protested to the British and French
Ambassadors and called attention to the injurious effects on Italian
commerce; she informed us confidentially that she did not intend to
put up with this. Spain is likewise considering entering a protest
and setting up convoys of Spanish warships for Spanish merchantmen,
in case other powers, in particular Italy, take similar measures.
Please report by wire.3
RIBBENTROP
* Sdmlenburg reported on Nov. 30 tliat Molotov received the information in
a friendly way and replied that the matter had already been examined and that
Ribbentrop's wishes would receive careful consideration (108/111826). On
Bee. 11, Schnlenburg wired that the Soviet Government that day had sent the
British Embassy a note protesting the British blockade decision of Nov. 28
(103/111865).
No. 396
B21/B005288
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
WASHINGTON, November 28, 1939 2 : 46 p. m.
No. 711 of November 28 Received November 29 4: 45 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 593 of November 27 1 and my
telegram No. 709 of November 27.2
As instructed, I informed the American Government of various
protests by neutrals against the British export blockade and in the
ensuing conversation with the official concerned. Assistant Secretary
Grady, plainly intimated what attitude we believed we could expect
of the American Government, particularly in view of the determined
protests of the American Government in a similar situation during the
World War.
The result of the conversation is briefly as follows :
1. The American Government does not intend of itself to protest
in principle against the British breach of international law or to participate
in any collective protest by other neutrals.
2. The present American Government apparently considers the
export blockade an admissible measure under international law as
retaliation against German mine warfare.
1 Document No. 393.
3 Not printed (B21/B005287). Thomsen reported an American protest
against Allied blockade measures was unlikely, as American policy was guided
by the desire to assist the Allies in every way within the framework of a benevolent
neutrality.
NOVEMBER 1939 461
3. In view of the decline in German exports to this country the
American Government does not consider itself "affected" and therefore
has no material interest at stake. Higher considerations apparently
play no role.
In theory the American Government, as Grady stressed, reserves
to itself all the rights of neutrals. Any kind of protest against England
enters into consideration, however, only in the event of an
individual, concrete case of flagrant interference by England with
American ships or American cargoes which directly affects American
interests.
THOMSEN
No. 397
4T6/229585
Memorandum, T>y the State Secretary
November 28, 1939.
Jurisdiction in relations between the Foreign Ministry and the OKW
or its branches.
1. In all questions on the general conduct of war in which the
Foreign Ministry is interested, the OKW shall have jurisdiction vis-ayis
the Foreign Ministry.
1
2. Questions of naval warfare shall be discussed between the OKW"
and the Foreign Ministry when they have basic significance or when
the Führer is involved.
3. In all current matters of naval warfare the Foreign Ministry
shall deal directly with the OKM, which, if necessary, shall in turn
inform the OKW. This information is necessary mainly when the
opinions of the Foreign Ministry and the OKM differ. It is then the
task of the OKW to reach an agreement with the Foreign Ministry*
taking account of both political and military requirements,
4. The same regulation applies also to the other aspects of warfare
insofar as the Foreign Ministry is interested in them.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister, as directed.2
WEIZSACKER
1 Aa order of Oct. 23 by Hitler specified that economic warfare, Including itsnaval
aspects, should be centrally directed by the OKW, which was also charged
with coordinating the activities of other governmental organs having responsibilities
for economic warfare (51/33920)* An English translation of the order
is to be found in "The Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs," Bra&sey's Navat
Annual, 1948, p. 53.
*
Marginal note in Weizsaeker's handwriting: "Approved by the Foreign
Minister. WCeizsacker], Nov. 28."
462 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
No. 398
5234/ES11105-06
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
-URGENT ROME, November 29, 19392 : 15 p. m.
No. 896 of November 29 Received November 29 5 : 00 p, m.
WHIB56&
.With reference to your telegram No. 967 of November 28.1
1 canceled my visit with. Ciano scheduled, as usual without mentioning
the subject matter, for today.
Moreover, yesterday in the course of my conversation with Giannini,
I brought up for discussion the question mentioned in telegraphic
instruction No. 96S of November 28 [sic] ? regarding the future fate of
German coal deliveries to Italy by sea, and called attention to the fact
that new British measures might make continuance of these shipments
impossible if Italy did not decide to react more sharply ; even with the
best of intentions on our part the shortage in the tonnage brought
in by sea could be only partially compensated for by land deliveries.
Surprisingly enough, Giannini replied that he did not share our
misgivings ; even after the announcement of the new British measures
Italy had sent ships to Rotterdam to take on coal, and was counting on
the continuation of these shipments. Since, as he said, convoys are
not being considered here, the reason for his optimism may be sought
in some sort of British assurances, although Giannini made no mention
of anything of the sort.3
It is significant that Transportation Minister Host Venturi also told
Graejff *
confidentially yesterday that in spite of the sinkings of Italian
coal ships which had already occurred, he was continuing to order
Italian ships to go to Rotterdam and take on German coal. From
.statements made by the British to the Italian Government, it appears
that even after the introduction of the blockade against German exports,
England does not for the time being entirely exclude the delivery
of German coal by sea to Italy. However, England demands in-
.spection of each individual steamer, if possible in British ports, and
* See document No. 394, footnote 3.
2 Document No. 394.
3 In a memorandum of Nov. 3D (1848/421094), Weizs^cker recorded the following:
"I told the Italian Ambassador today that I had the impression that
the Italian Government is not very much concerned about the Anglo-French
blockade of German exports. It almost seemed to me as if Italy hoped to be
.able to continue to use the sea routes for German exports of coal to Italy. Attolico
said that if this was the case England apparently wished to spare Italy,
whefreupon I told him I could not well imagine that Italy would be spared in
,&uch a way for no reason at all.**
4 Friedrich Graeff, Commercial Attach^ in the German Embassy.
NOVEMBER 1939 463
because of distrust of France she even rejects inspection in French
ports. Delivery of coal by the sea route, however, even if not rendered
impossible by the very rigorous British attitude, would be called
into question for all practical purposes if the danger from mines increased.
Host Venturi assumes that Anglo-German naval warfare
will soon take such forms that all navigation to Belgian and Netherland
ports will be paralyzed.
No. 399
8589i/B602615-19
Führer*$ Directive
CHEFSACHE BERLIN-, November 29, 1939.
TCP SECRET MILITARY
The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA No. 215/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. Abt.L I
By officer only
DIRECTIVE No. 9
PRINCmLES FOR THE COKDTTCT OF THE WAR AGAINST THE E2$TEMY?S
ECONOMT
1. In [our] war against the Western Powers, England sparks the
determination to fight and is the leading power of our enemies. To
throw down England is the prerequisite for final victory.
The most effective means to achieve this is to paralyze England's
economy by disrupting it at critical points.
2. The development of the situation and of our armament may, in
the near future, create favorable conditions for extensive warfare
against England's economic foundations. The necessary provisions
uwst therefore "be made as early as possible to strike an annihilating
blow at England's economic strength by concentrating suitable arms
of our Wehrmacht on the most important targets.
The nonmilitary means of warfare, complementary to the measures
of the Wehrmacht, will be put into effect according to special
instructions.
3. As soon as the Army has succeeded in defeating the Anglo-French
field army and in occupying and holding a part of the coast facing
England, the task of the Navy and the Luftwaffe of carrying on the
struggle against England's economic strength will become of prime
importance. Efforts for cooperation of the S- and K- Organization
are to be made.
464 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMA3ST FOREIGN POLICY
4. To the Navy and Luftwaffe will fall the following joint tasks,
enumerated here in the sequence of their importance :
a. Attacks on the main English ports of transshipment by mining
and blocking the approaches to the harbors and by destroying vital
port installations and sea locks.
In this connection the role of the mine-laying planes will be a very
important one, especially with regard to the harbors on the west coast
of England, in narrow waterways, and estuaries.
&. Attacks on English merchant shipping and against the enemy
fleet protecting it.
G. Destruction of English supplies, oil reserves and of food in refrigerated
warehouses and grain elevators.
a. Disruption of English troop and supply transports to the French
coast.
e. Destruction of industrial plants, the elimination of which is of
decisive importance for the conduct of the war; above all of keyplants
of the aviation industry and the factories producing heavy
ordnance, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, and explosives.
5. The most important English transshipment ports which tandie
95 percent of the foreign trade and could not be adequately replaced
by others, are :
Lfowj>ool i
*or imP rts ^ food, timber, and oil, and the
Manchester] Processing thereof.
These three harbors, handling 58 percent of the peacetime
imports, are of decisive importance.
Newcastle Swansea\
Blyth Cardiff I , ,, ^ . ,
Sunderland Barry f
for the *"?<"* of coal.
Hull J
The following may be considered alternate harbors, but to a limited
extent and for certain goods only :
Grangemouth Holyhead
Leith Bristol
Middlesbrough Belfast
Grimsby Newport
Southampton Goole
Glasgow Dundee
It will be necessary to watch continuously for any possible shifting
in the use of these harbors. Besides it will be important gradually
to compress and shift English foreign trade into areas which are
-within easy range of our naval and air forces.
Fren6h harbors will be attacked only in so far as they play a role
in the siege of England, or if they are of importance as debarkation
points for troops.
NOVEMBER 1939 465
6. In harbors which cannot be blocked effectively with mines, merchant
shipping is to be paralyzed by sinking ships in the roadsteads
and by destroying vital harbor installations. Special emphasis is
to be laid upon the destruction of the great canal locks at the harbors
of Leith, Sunderland, Hull, Grimsby, London, Manchester (Ship
Canal), Liverpool, Cardiff, Swansea and Bristol-Avonmouth. Particularly
on the west coast these locks are very important in regulating
the water level and, through it, the harbor traffic.
7. In preparing these actions it will be important to do the following:
a. Continually to check and supplement the basic data available
on English harbors, their installations and capacity, as well as information
about the English war industries and supply depots.
Z>. To rush the development of an effective method enabling planes
to lay moored mines also.
. To provide a supply of mines sufficient for the very high demands
and numerous enough to meet the operational needs of the Navy and
Luftwaffe.
d. To coordinate the conduct of operations of the Navy and Luftwaffe,
as to time and location.
These preparations are to be made as soon as possible. I request
the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and the Luftwaffe to keep
me continuously informed about their plans.
I shall decide later as to when the restrictions still in effect in the
naval and air war will be lifted. This probably will coincide with
the start of the big offensive.
ADOLF TTTTT/BVR
No. 400
The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreiffn Ministry
Telegram
URGENT MILAN, November 30, 1939 3 : 40 p. m.
No. 18 of November 30 Received November 30 5 : 05 p. m.
A former employee of the British Embassy in Rome who for many
years running has pilfered telegram duplicates, rough copies of deciphered
telegrams, and duplicates of written reports, has offered me
two chests full of such material. I was able to cause him to let us
have a few of them to check at the Consulate. It is quite obviously
genuine, very interesting material. The pieces checked concern the
years 1933 to 1935, Palestine, Syria, East Pact, Abyssinia, and other
topics; the entire collection is said to go to 1938.
466 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
Immediate decision is necessary, for otherwise the seller is going to
offer the material to the Italians or Western Powers. The seller, who
certainly expects a high profit for himself, could not be persuaded up
to now to set a price, but insists that the purchaser offer a price after
looking at all the material. I am still trying to get him to state how
much he wants.
Suggest the sending of an official, who is exactly informed about
English policy, who can judge to what extent the contents of the
material is unknown and useful to us. The official must arrive at
the latest by Saturday, December 2. For reasons of distance, perhaps
a visit from Counselor of Embassy Kordt a might be considered. In
case it is absolutely necessary, and instructions are received here by
telephone tomorrow, Friday morning, by 11 o'clock, Attach^ Lierau
can arrive in Berlin with sample documents early on Saturday.
*Tneo Kordt had been at the legation in Bern since September 1939. See
document No. 414.
No. 401
91/100112p-lS
The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 155 of November BO DUBLIN, November 30, 1939.
Received November 30 4: 10 p. HL
At present the opinion is prevalent here that the British would for
the time being probably continue to shrink away from forceful intervention
until the development of the war situation, especially through
intensification of the naval war or a regrouping of the British Cabinet,
should necessitate a basically different policy with respect to Ireland.
I personally assume that the Government would only make concessions
concerning harbors if the British used force ; it might put up armed
resistance or it might not, in view of the small size of the armed
forces. In my opinion the possibility of British action against the
Legation would also have to be expected in that case ; even now suck
action is considered possible, perhaps in a disguised form, in view of
the British methods here which we well know from our own. experience.
The IRA informed us that they would in such a case be prepared
to defend us and take us to safety, but the Government will
probably also be willing to do so. I might mention that the provisional
British representative here is considered in greater danger at present
than we and is constantly under the strictest surveillance.
Since, if Irish neutrality should cease, we should let the British take
the first step if at all possible for reasons with- which you are familiar,
NOVEMBER 1939 467
I recommend once more, with reference to my telegram "No. 150 of
November 27,
1 and in view of the special circumstances prevailing
here and the particular threat to Ireland's position on the part of
England, that Ireland, in case of intensified naval warfare, be accorded
the individual treatment indicated,2 In my opinion it will be difficult
enough to disrupt shipping across the Irish Sea, and if the Irish
export only their own products in return for goods bought in England,
a fact which could presumably be assured, such shipping would at
least for the time being not be important enough in volume to warrant
the serious threat to Irish neutrality which would have to be expected
as the result of disrupting it. If a closed area around England should
be established from which Ireland could not be completely excluded,
I believe an attempt should be made to find a protected route for relatively
small Irish imports of goods from countries other than England.
I request at your convenience an analysis of opinions concerning the
possibility of the U.S. entering the war ;
3 such a step could exert a
decisive influence on the situation here but is not expected for the
time being.
Efe&lPEL,
1 Not printed ( 8344/E590222-23 ) .
*TMs sentence appears to be garbled and it is difficult to maize a precise
translation.
*A brief analysis of opinion in the United States was sent to Dublin in
telegram No. 242 of Dec. 4 (2993/586640) .
No. 402
5506/E395473-75
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to tTie Legation
in Rumania
Telegram
UBfcENT BEEUN, November 30, 1939 12: 00 midnight.
SECRET zuW2782 g.
1
No. 835
For Clodius.
L The Ministry of Economics warns of the progressive drop in
Rumanian oil deliveries, from 70,000 tons in October to less than
60,000 tons in November, while a minimum of 100,000 tons per month
is required to meet the needs of the absolutely essential program*
Every effort must be made to be really sure that deliveries will be
made on that scale at least for approximately the next six months.
Please conclude a separate agreement on that score, if possible, whereby
the Rumanian Government definitely commits itself to guarantee the
1 Not found.
468
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
actual performance of these deliveries. The existing agreements
should be modified accordingly and the attempt should also be made,
if necessary, to have certain major German deliveries, e. g., the powderfactory,
linked specifically with the oil deliveries. In any event, the
necessity of obtaining a satisfactory settlement of the questions of
exchange rates and prices at the current negotiations assumes decisive
importance in this connection. In order to offset the opposition of the
British oil companies, the Rumanian Government might find it nece&-
sary to use authoritarian measures for the regulation of her domestic
oil economy, perhaps by appointing a government commissioner with
powers of seizure and price-fixing.
In view of the importance and urgency of the matter, Schottky and
Eosenkrantz of the Ministry of Economics will fly to Bucharest on
December 2 to obtain information on the situation there.
II. With reference to your telegram No. 920.2
The arms and ammunition scheduled for delivery are being inventoried
and checked for necessary repairs with the utmost dispatch,
but for well-known reasons this will still take some time, especially as
regards the antiaircraft guns. We suggest that a Rumanian expert
be sent here to participate in the work. The Rumanian Military Attache
has already inspected a portion of the stocks.
We will take over speedy reconditioning. It would appear advisable
not to set the prices until afterwards. They will have to be
established in reichsmarks on the basis of the pre-war prices of oil.
With respect to ammunition, we shall probably be able to provide
100,000 rounds for the 37 mm antitank guns, possibly more. No definite
figure can be given as yet because the stocks found belong to various
models of guns and have not yet been sorted out.
WJEHL
2 Not printed (S497/E597091).
No. 403
Fll/0209
Tfie Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
No. 936 [BERUCKr] November 30, 1939.
BAM 588.
For the Ambassador personally*
At a recent conference I instructed you to avoid making any official
inquiries concerning the purchase of Russian submarines by Germany,
but, if the opportunity should arise, to have the Naval Attach.6
find out privately whether the Russian Navy might be inclined to
give up submarines.
NOVEMBER 1939 469
Please send a report by telegram to me personally on whether the
Naval Attache has already made inquiries.
1 If there has not been
any opportunity to do so as yet, please undertake nothing without further
instructions.
2
RlBBESTTROP
J In a telegram of Dec. 1 (Fll/0300), Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that
he fcad taken no action and that the Naval Attach^ had found no opportunity
as yet to do so; they would await further orders. Schulenburg added that
the Military Attache noted some concern by the British Embassy at reports
in foreign newspapers of proposed submarine purchases.
* On Oct. 10 and again on Nov. 22, Hitler had decided against attempting to
get submarines from the Soviet Union. See "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs
1939-1945," Brassey's Naval Awwal, 1$48, pp. 47 and 58.
No. 404
B18/BOO&1&6
Memorandum T>y the State Secretary
StS. No. 933 BERLIN, November 30, 1939.
The Italian Ambassador called on me today in order to learn something
about the hostilities between Russia and Finland and the political
consequences of this conflict. I could tell him very little, because
of the scant information which we have received up to now.
Attolico then told me that the Finnish Minister had just called on
him in order to ask his advice on whether the hostilities could not
after all be brought to a halt at the last minute by German mediation.
Attolico told the Finn that he could not answer as Ambassador, but
only as a good friend. As such he thought he had to say that Finland
ought not to gamble on the moral support of the other Scandinavians
or other friends, but should rather take account of realities. Such a
conflict might perhaps be brought to a halt at the very start if the
causes were eliminated, i. e., the conditions of the opponent were
accepted without further ado. Without such compliance he, Attolicoy
believed that Germany^could certainly not be of service to the Finns,
The right thing would be for Finland to send any colonel she might
wish to the opposing side with a flag of truce and have him state what
she was willing to do.
I told Attolico for my part that I considered it proper that he had
not encouraged the Finnish Minister in any way to make any sort of
request for German mediation.
470
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 405
B2VB0049-55-56
The Embassy m the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
WASHINGTON, December 1, 1939 10:13 a.m.
No. 719 of December 1 Received December 2 2 : 50 p. m.
For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and
Attache Sections, Army and Air.
The reasons cited in prewar reports as to why America's entrance
into the war was not to be expected in the near future are also valid
after the first 3 months of the war.
1. Adequate units of the Army and Air Force as the basis for military
intervention are still not available.
2. The fleet is still tied up in the Pacific Ocean. The United States
is still avoiding the danger that by joining the Allies it may at the
same time become a military opponent of Japan. Even warmongers
are waiting to see how the situation in the Far East develops. It is
not possible to influence this situation decisively in a military way
so long as the Allies are tied up in Europe and the Americans have to
depend upon themselves in the Pacific.
3. There are still no military agreements of any kind with the
Allies. On the other hand, doubt is beginning to be felt regarding
the correctness of the American prewar thesis that economic warfare
would be the decisive factor in the struggle against Germany and that
the present war would follow a course in accordance with the economic
and military experiences of the World War. Thus they are moving
toward a better realization of the limits of their own power.
4. From military considerations, the General Staff is still working
against war sentiment. In contrast to the State Department's sterile
policy of hatred and the impulsive policy of Roosevelt often based
on an over-estimation of American power the General Staff still has
understanding for Germany and her conduct of the war. The influence
of the. General Staff contributes toward the cautious appraisal
of events in Finland. It takes into account the greater activity of
Russia in the direction of the Balkans and the Dardanelles, also
Persia and India, as well as a Japanese-Russian understanding, and
considers dangerous a one-sided position on the part of the United
States. I again have the impression that military expansion serves
primarily to support the hemisphere policy and at the same time to
provide preparedness for any contingency ; I also believe that the plan
is to obtain by military strength a basis for later peace mediation.
The United States, however, will still enter the war if it considers
that the Western Hemisphere is threatened.
DECEMBER 1939 471
For the military activity of the United States the question of the
time required for the preparation of stronger land and air armaments
is still decisive ; in this respect there is no change in my opinion that
no land and air armaments adequate for an aggressive war policy by
the United States are to be expected before the late summer of 194:0.
The armaments and aviation industries are continuing to increase
their capacity. Nevertheless it is to be noted that after the embargo
was lifted the orders expected from the Allies did not come in to the
extent anticipated in the aviation industry and only to a slight extent
in other war industries, and therefore the expectation expressed by
Roosevelt that the lifting of the embargo would lead to a rapid revival
of the armaments industry and thus to greater war preparedness
has for the time being not been fulfilled.
Indicative of the anxiety with which the situation in the Pacific
is viewed is the fact that not all the five new divisions are being called
to the great maneuvers planned in the spring; the Third Division is
being left in California, where it is to participate in extensive exercises
of the fleet.
BOTTXOHER
TBCOMSEN
No. 406
1571/380236-37
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT HOME, December 1, 1939 11 : 50 p. m.
No. 918 of December 1 Received December 2 4 : 15 a. m.
Secret for the Reich Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 978 of November 30.*
I called on Ciano this evening and, stressing that I had special
orders and keeping very close to the wording of the instruction, I explained
to him the necessity of an energetic reaction to the new British
blockade measures. Ciano listened to my statements very calmly and
then remarked that only yesterday he had again called the attention
of the British Ambassador in the clearest manner then he corrected
himself and said in the sharpest manner to the consequences that
might result in Italy from England's unfair attitude in enforcing:
the blockade measures. It also meant an unbearable strain on Italian
public opinion in the long run if Italian ships were detained for a
week and longer. The question of coal supplies by sea was vital for
Italy. Ciano went on to tell me that these transports had not been.
1 See document No. 394, footnote 3.
472 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
interfered with up to now, but that the Italians would also by no
means tolerate interference with them. The present moment, however,
was not the time for more rigorous measures. Thus, for example,
they were not thinking here of having the ships convoyed
a question which, in compliance with instructions, I had avoided
broaching ; the fleet was far too costly an instrument to be exposed to
the wear and tear of convoy service. The fleet here, he interposed, was
at the very peak of its efficiency. This had been demonstrated during
those critical days when it had been ready to go into action within 6
hours. "Therefore Cavagnari 2 still had his job, and if it had beea
the same with the other two 3 many things might hstve taken a different
course." Moreover, in his Ministry he was just on the point
of establishing with (one group garbled) the other three Ministries
chiefly interested a committee which was to take up questions of
economic warfare and necessary defense measures, just as he had also
had such a committee at his disposal during the conflict in Spain.
To my remark that I should be acting in accordance with the wishes
of the Reich Foreign Minister if I brought this matter up for discussion
with the Duce in the same sense as with him, Ciano replied that
naturally he would in any case (one group missing) regarding our
conversation ; but if he should see the Duce tomorrow morning he would
speak to him about nay intention and call me to the Palazzo Venezia
at once if the Duce's schedule permitted.
M^CKENfiENT
*Adm. D. Cavagnari was Under Secretary of tlie Navy, Mussolini retaining
the post of Minister himself.
8
i. e., the Army and the Air Force. Parian! and Valle, Under Secretaries
respectively of the Army and Air Force, had recently been dropped.
No. 407
1370/3570.93-97
Circular Letter of the Foreign Ministry 1
SECRET DECEMBER 1, 1939. W 2789 g. Bs.
Subject: German-Soviet commercial negotiations. Soviet orders in
Germany.
After returning from Moscow on Wednesday, November 29, People's
Commissar Tevossyan and General Savchenko submitted on Thursday
evening, November 30, the final list of the orders to be placed in
Germany by the Soviet Union. It includes war material as well as
machinery and industrial installations. The list, comprising * * -
* The letter was addressed to 16 senior officials representing the armed forces,
the Ministry of Economics, the Commissioner for the Pour Year Plan, and other
offices involved in military production (1370/357198).
DECEMBER 1939 473
typewritten pages, is available at the moment only in the Russian
language. A German translation has been promised for late this
evening;
2 it will be copied and reproduced so that we can count on
sending the list early tomorrow morning.
In submitting the list People's Commissar Tevossyan and General
Savchenko made a number of explanatory remarks, from which the
following is worthy of note :
I. Navy:
1. Warships cvnd plcms for the construction of warships.
Besides the hulls of the cruisers Seydlite and Luteow? the final
order list also includes the delivery of the cruiser Prim Eugen and the
plans of the battleship Bismarck.
2. Trammg sJiip^ repair vessel^ arid tanker.
People's Commissar Tevossyan asked that the Deutsche Werft in
Kiel be persuaded to make the Soviet Government a final offer as soon
as possible on the delivery of the training ship to be converted for it
from a merchant vessel^ the repair vessel now under construction, and
the tanker, also under construction ; negotiations for the delivery of
all three have already been going on for some time.
3. SMpbuildi^ig material.
The amount of armor plating to be ordered has been increased from
15-17,000 tons to 31,000 tons. As regards the quality of the armor
plating, the Soviet Government proceeds on the assumption that it
will receive the best material now being used in the German Navy.
The Soviet Government is not satisfied with the data submitted on
the quality of the armor plating.
4. Torpedoes.
The Soviet Government insists on the delivery of noncontact torpedo
fuses of the latest type.
5. Mines.
It likewise insists on the delivery of mines of the latest type with
magnetic fuses.
n. Air Force:
1. Airplanes.
The Soviet Government insists on the delivery of airplane types
such as the Messerschmitt 209. It assumes that there are also other
types of latest design which it has not been shown, and wishes to see
them and have them delivered too.
"Not printed (1370/357128-83).
^When the armored ship Deutschland (completed in 193$) was renamed
Liitzow late in 193&, the cruiser of that name then under construction became
known as ex-Liitz&w. She and Blucher, Sevdlitz, and Prim Bugem, were 10,000-
ton cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class.
474
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
. Airplane engines.
The same applies to airplane engines.
Re 1 and%:
In return the Soviet Government offers to construct these latest
airplanes and airplane-engine types in the Soviet Union and deliver
one third of them to the German Government.
III. Army:
1. Artillery.
The Soviet Government asks again that it be made possible for its
experts to inspect a complete 24-cm. cannon, possibly at the front.
2. Fire-control equipment for -field artillery and antiaircraft
artillery.
In the ordering of fire-control equipment the Soviet Government
proceeds on the assumption that it will be provided with equipment
of the latest design.
3. Fire-control equipment for airplanes.
The request was made once more that such equipment might be
inspected, and it was pointed out that the use of modern long-range
guns made such equipment absolutely necessary.
4. Powder, easplosives^ and amrmmition.
A list of these is to be submitted in two or three days, as soon as
the inspection still being made has been completed.
IV. Industrial installations:
Carbon hydrogenation.
It was pointed out that during the tours of inspection the Soviet
delegation was not shown the production of catalyzers and antidetonators.
In ordering a carbon hydrogenation plant exact knowledge
of these two apparatuses was absolutely necessary. It was therefore
requested that the necessary inspection be allowed. The Soviet Government
is particularly interested in the production of airplane gasoline.
The Soviet delegation is also particularly desirous to observe
the testing of octane rating in the laboratory, and to receive in writing
the information given it orally heretofore concerning carbon hydrogenation.
The Soviet Government is not satisfied with our offer to deliver a
carbon hydrogenation plant, since this is reputed to permit only the
production of gasoline with an octane rating of 87.
In return for the construction of a carbon hydrogenation plant
of the latest design in the Soviet Union the Soviet Government promises
increased.deliveries of gasoline.
In the interest of the earliest possible conclusion of the negotiations
it is necessary to take a final stand on the Soviet requests as
DECEMBER 1939 475
soon as possible. Probably a decision by the Führer will be needed
for this/ In order to prepare the further steps I have the honor
herewith to issue an invitation to a conference on the Russian order
list on Saturday, December 23 at 12 : 30 p. m. at the Ministry of Economics,
conference room 33 fifth floor.
By order:
4 Next sentence deleted: "People's Commissar Tevossyan has intimated that
if necessary he might he received hy the Ftihrer himself." In the succeeding
sentence "the further steps" originally read "the audience with the Führer."
No. 408
fl$/108128i-29'
The Foreign, Minister to tTie Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
No. 469 BERLIN-, December 1, 1939. W III c 198.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 522,* 524,
a 526.8
1. The Foreign Minister has evidently not denied the accuracy
of his very unfriendly interview in any way.4 It must be considered
rather naive for him to propose cessation of the press feud3 without
a word of apology or explanation at the moment when he is called
to account by us for his own unprovoked press attack. In view of
the promise which you have already made and the purpose which it
serves, we will nevertheless refrain for the time being from publishing
the reply, which has already been prepared, especially since the
interview has so far found hardly any response. Should this situation
change, we must reserve full freedom of action. Please inform
the Foreign Ministry of the above. A further decision with
reference to the press truce is reserved.
2. The Foreign Minister's statements on commercial policy are also
unsatisfactory. A reference to the hardly significant statements by
the Minister of Commerce in the article of November 16 s cannot invalidate
the definite declarations of the Foreign Minister's interview.
The fact that the Foreign Minister wants to make a chromium offer
to us contingent upon the result of an investigation of the possibility
of increasing the output confirms the reports that the available sup-
* Document No. 390.
"Not printed (96/108127) ; in this telegram of Nov. 28, Papen suggested that
the German press at present should not attack Turkish President InSnti as the
latter's peaceful policies and his desire for an economic agreement with Germany
could be played off against Saracoglu.
'Not printed (2121/462408). * See document No. 390, footnote 3.
B See document No. 390.
260090 54 36
476
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
plies and the present output have been or will be sold to America
and the enemy countries as was also hinted in the interview. Therefore,
please insist on a clear answer as to the truth, of these reports
or this intention, for9 if they are true, further negotiations are
pointless.
3. With reference to telegram 526, telegraphic instructions will follow
after a departmental conference. Until then please do not continue
the conversations with the Minister of Commerce. Since his
proposal, contrary to telegram 499,
6 does not provide for payment
from credit balances, it seems hardly possible to accept it as a basis
for negotiations.
4. With reference to telegram No. 499.
Authorization by you to the Istanbul banks to hand over papers for
small amounts of perishable goods weakens the consistency of our
policy, according to the unanimous view held here. You are therefore
requested to make the restriction that papers are to be handed
over only on the basis of special authorization to be obtained by telegram
from us in each individual case.
The Minister of Economics has reports according to which the Turks
are proceeding by legal means to enforce the handing over of papers
or the delivery of goods. Please use your influence to prevent such
steps as long as negotiations are pending.7
REBBENTROP
* Not printed (8489/E596890) .
T In a telegram sent on Dec. 2 (96/108132-33) , Papen reported that he had made
representations to Saracoglu in accordance with this instruction.
No. 409
F3/Q51
Memorandum ty the Director of the Political Department
BERLIN, December 1, 1939.
The Foreign Minister received State Secretary Karmasin x today at
the latter's request, with Minister Bernard and myself present.
After M. Karmasin had briefly reported that Communist, Czech,
and other anti-German influences were making themselves felt very
strongly in Slovakia, the Foreign Minister gave the following directives
:
1 FrantiSek Karmasin, leader of the Germans in Slovakia and State Secretary
in the Slovak government. A memorandum which Woermann submitted to the
Foreign Minister on Nov. 29 (F3/0516) , apparently in preparation for Karmasin'si
visit, recorded the fact that the latter had been receiving subsidies from various
quarters, such as the V. d. A., the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and Beichsstatthalter
Seyss-Inquart. The memorandum concluded that Karmasin was well supplied
with money "so that one could wait and see whether he was going to present new
demands on his part."
DECEMBER 1939 477
1. An effort is to be made to place German advisers in additional
sectors of the Slovak administration and economy. Minister Bernard
is to draw up and submit a plan for this purpose. The matter is to be
handled cautiously so as to sj>are Slovak sensibilities. Things should
be arranged as much as possible so that the request for advisers will
come from the Slovaks.
Any money that may be needed for this purpose should be requested
by Minister Bernard.
No influence is to be exerted by us on the internal structure of the
Slovak state.
2. Germany's cultural influence is to be increased with the help of
the German national group. No details of this were discussed.
At the Foreign Minister's request, State Secretary Karmasin
promised to keep secret from the outside world the influence which the
Reich intended to exert.
The Foreign Minister urged M. Karmasin to contact Minister Bernard
if he should have any requests, or in special cases to ask for the
Foreign Minister in person.
WOERMAISTNNo.
410
582/241930f-42
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, December 2, 1939 10 : 05 p. m.
TOP SECRET Received December 3 51
: 00 a. m.
No. 924 of December 2
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to my telegram No. 918 of December I.1
The Duce received me at noon today in the presence of Ciano.
After my presentation of the Keich Foreign Minister's view he talked
for about 15 minutes, starting out by requesting me to tell the Foreign
Minister that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation
that had arisen for Italy, too, as a result of the new British measures.
For a long time now he had been observing with constantly mounting
indignation the British encroachments on Italian commercial and
shipping interests; filled with anger at the increasing rather than
decreasing chicaneries of the British the French were playing only
a minor role in this respect he had, particularly during the last few
days, pointed out with the utmost seriousness, both to the British
Ambassador here through Ciano and in I/ondon, that his patience
would some day be exhausted and that he had no intention of putting
up ad infinitum with the serious injury to the Italian economy, which
1 Document No. 406.
478 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
was by no means limited to the material side. The step in London
was accompanied by the submission of a long list of particularly crass
cases of chicanery of the most petty kind, and notice was served that
a continuation of the present situation might have the most serious
consequences (gra/vissimi consegruen&e) . The Duce cited a few more
instances in which his ships had been held, in one case for as long as
28 days ; in one of the most scandalous cases a grain ship sent by Italy
to relieve the food problems of the Spanish Government in the most
severely distressed port cities, such as Barcelona, Alicante, and Cartagena,
had even been taken to Malta. The excuses of the British,
who used the pretense that their organization was not yet functioning
properly (which organization, as Giaixo remarked at this point, was
supposed to be in smooth running order by about the middle of the
month) left him cold. The indignation of commercial and shipping
circles in Genoa, Naples, and Trieste, the ones mainly affected, was at
a high pitch.
In the very next few days he would make an unequivocal statement
on the matter, and in a special point on the agenda of the Fascist
Grand Council for December T, which he was now drafting, he would
declare that the measures taken by England directly affected the vital
interests of Italy.
Passing on to relations with us, he stated that ever since the beginning
of the conflict he had made every effort within his power toward
improving the food situation as far as possible and he would continue
to do so. Thus far 17,000
z carloads of food had been shipped from
Italy to Germany and he would continue this with all his might.
There was also a great deal that could be done yet with respect to
supplying Germany with raw materials via Italy and handling German
exports. At this very moment he was setting up an agency in
the Foreign Ministry (he was presumably thinking of the interministerial
body mentioned yesterday by Ciano) , which, in closest cooperation
with us, was to explore the possibilities for having the individual
business transactions incident thereto handled as quietly as possible
by reliable firms; as such. he designated especially the Italian branches
of German enterprises.
The war, in its present stage, was a purely economic war, in which
he intended to help us wherever possible. He hoped that every politically
informed German had realized by now that Italy's attitude,
which had taken form from the situation, had worked out very beneficially
so far in the course of the war. Had Italy become actively
involved in the conflict simultaneously with us, the situation would in
all probability have afforded the Western Powers an opportunity for
a This figure, garbled in transmission, is taken from the copy in the files of the
Home Embassy (2290/483394^-96).
DECEMBER 1939 479
easy victories in Libya to offset, in the public mind, the effect of our
tremendous successes against Poland, which constituted an equally
great defeat of the Western Powers.
In the near future, after solving certain internal Italian problems,
which occupied him at present, he would write the Führer a letter that
would satisfy him.
Passing on to what he referred to as the "general situation," he
condemned in the sharpest terms the conduct of Russia, which, if it
continued, would give rise to the worst dangers. As far as Italy was
concerned, Bolshevism remained enemy No. 1, and Bolshevism and the
Moscow Government were very hard to distinguish. He himself had
at one time advised us to relax in some degree the tension in our relations
with Russia, but only to a certain point, a policy, moreover, for
which he had found complete understanding on the part of Marshal
Goring.
3 There could be no question that the main responsibility for
the present development and this he emphasized by raising his
voice lay with England and France, who had for weeks been on their
knees at Stalin's door ; and he did not for a moment fail to recognize
the necessity which had determined our later decisions, but he hoped
that the present temperature reading on our relations with Moscow
would not be raised further. The greed of these "crooks" [ScMeber]
(he used the German expression) was insatiable. They had taken,
advantage of the tremendous feats of German arms to pocket their
gains without fighting and effort.
The Duce brought the conversation to a close with some personal
remarks.
MACKENSEN
9 See vol. vi, document No. 211.
No. 411
1795/40&T15-16
Circular of the State Secretary a
Telegram
BERLIN, December 2, 1939.
e. o. Pol. VI 2651.
In your conversations regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict please
avoid any anti-Russian note.
According to whom you are addressing, the following arguments
are to be employed : The inescapable course of events in the revision
1 This instruction was sent to all German diplomatic Missions, and to the
Consulates in Bergen, Geneva, Go*teborg, MalmQ and Reykjavik, but to Moscow
and Helsinki for information only.
480
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the treaties following the last Great War. The natural require
ment of Kussia for increased security of Leningrad and the entrance
to the Gulf of Finland. The foreign policy pursued by the Finnish
Government has in the last few years stressed the idea of
neutrality
relied on the Scandinavian states, and treated antagonism between
Germany and Eussia as axiomatic. As a result Finland has avoided
any rapprochement with Germany and has even rejected the conclusion
of a nonaggression pact with Germany as compromising, even though
Finland had a nonaggression pact with Eussia. Also in the League of
Nations, Finland, in spite of the debt of gratitude which she owBd
to Germany for the latter's help in 1918, has never come out for German
interests. [Former] Foreign Minister Holsti is typical of this
point of view and particularly hostile to Germany. Many elements
in Finland emphasize their economic and ideological orientation in
the direction of democratic England. Correspondingly, the attitude
of most of the organs of the press is outspokenly unfriendly to us.
The platonic sympathy of England has confirmed Finland in her
previous attitude and is doing the country no good.
WEIZSACKER
[EDITORS' NOTE. On December 3, 1939, Eudolf Holsti, Finnish
delegate to the League of Nations, presented to the Secretary General
a letter charging that the Soviet Union had attacked Finland on
November 30 and calling for a meeting of the Council and the Assembly
to take the necessary steps to end the aggression. On December
5, Molotov wired to the Secretary General rejecting Holsti's
charges, denying that he represented the lawful Government of Finland,
and stating that the Soviet Government would not be able to
take part in any League meetings called to consider Holstfs appeal.
These meetings were held, however, and on December 14 the Assembly
adopted a report and resolution condemning the Soviet action against
Finland and urging members of the League to provide Finland with
material and humanitarian assistance. On the same day the Council
associated itself with the Assembly's condemnation of the Soviet
action and found that "by its act, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
has placed itself outside the League of Nations. It follows
that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no longer a Member
of the League." See League of Nations, Official Journal (Geneva,
1939) , November-December 1939, pages 496-542.]
DECEMBER 1939 481
No. 412
l>y the (7hairman of the Economic Delegation to tJie
Soviet Union
SHCKBT BERLIN, December 2, 1939. W 2872 g Rs.
THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS
ON DECEMBER 2, 1939, REGARDING THE SOVIET ORDER LIST OP
NOVEMBER 30, 1939 *
Subject : German-Soviet commercial negotiations. Soviet orders in
Germany.
Present : See the appended list of participants.
2
The conference was meant to give a first general view of the order
list drawn up by the Soviet Government. It dealt particularly with,
the questions of Germany's ability to deliver, the delivery dates, the
making available of raw materials, the evaluation of the various items
on. the order list, and the acquisition of manufacturing permits.
I. Decision by the Ftihrer.
It was determined that if the Soviet orders on the following points
are to be filled a decision by the Führer must be obtained :
1. Navy: Delivery of the hulls of the cruisers SeydUtz and Prvn&
Eugen with all of the materials necessary for their completion, and
delivery of the torpedo and mine fuses. In almost all naval deliveries
the decision must also apply to fitting the delivery dates into the
German naval construction program.
2. Air force: Delivery of the Me 209 and He 110 planes, the
Junkers 207 and 208 engines, and the bombs.
3. Army : Demonstration of the 24-cm cannon at the front.
4. Machine tools: Providing productive capacity for the Russian
orders where they could be filled only by postponing the Wehrmacht
orders.
5. Allocation of iron and, steel: Curtailment of the German Army
delivery program in order to fill Soviet orders.3
II. Delivery possibilities.
Except for the points which require a decision by the Führer there
are no fundamental difficulties as far as the Navy is concerned. This
is true also for the delivery of the construction plans of the battleship
Bismairck and the plans for a 15-cm. destroyer.
* In preparation for this conference, German translations of the Soviet list of
Nov. 30 were sent to representatives of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Economics,
the Commissioner for the Pour Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary for the
Economy, Reichsgruppe Industrie, the Plenipotentiary for Machine Production,
and the Reich Office for Economic Development (1370/357192).
Not found.
'See doctiment No. 413.
482 DOCUMENTS ON GERLEA3ST FOREIGN POLICY
As regards the Air Force, the quantities desired by the Russians
would not cause any particular difficulties.
III. Delivery dates.
No general statement can be made here. A small portion of the
short-term delivery dates desired by the Russians could be met. On
the other hand, in other fields, as for instance naval artillery, the
construction of large armored turrets requires three to four years.
With regard to the large machine tools, merely the order designed for
the Hasse and Wrede firm would require the full capacity of the firm
for 20 months.
IV. Furnishing the raw materials.
The question of providing steel, nickel, copper, tin, tungsten, molybdenum,
etc. causes particular difficulty in the carrying out of the Russian
delivery program. It is therefore considered necessary for the
Russians to make available the necessary amounts of nonferrous
metals and refining metals and also to participate in so far as possible
in providing the steel and iron. The calculations of the Ministry of
Economics indicate that 80,000 tons of iron will be needed per month
for filling the Russian orders and delivering them within one year
not counting the deliveries of war material.
V. Estimate of the various items.
The total value of the Soviet order list is estimated at about 1.5
billion reichsmarks. The part falling to the Navy, with delivery of
all three cruisers, amounts to about 700 million RM; the value of the
ship program alone was reckoned at about 420 million RM, not counting
the sum to be added for development costs.
In calculating the prices for the deliveries of war material, not
only the prices paid by the Wehrmacht are to be used as a criterion,
but also those paid on the international market at the moment, some
of which are very much higher than the very carefully worked out
prices at home. Furthermore, in each case an extra amount is to be
added for the cost of development ; it was proposed that about 20 percent
be taken as a standard.
VI. Acquisition, of manufacturing* permits.
It was agreed that the question of acquiring licenses should be handled
separately and that the necessary amounts for this should be
added to the prices calculated as in section V. The details must be
settled with the firms [involved].
The additional data for estimating the value of the Russian orders
and the possibilities of delivery are to be worked out for the next
conference, which is planned for Wednesday, December 6, at 5:00
p. m. at the Economics Ministry.
SCHNUKKE
DECEMBER 1939 483
No. 413
4468/EO&T104 .
Unszgned Memorandum 1
QUESTIONS RESERVED FOR DECISION BY THE FUBCRER
1. Making available 70,000 tons of iron per month for Russian deliveries
; not, however, at the expense of other German exports.
2. Russian demands rejected by us but presented once more :
a. Cruiser Seydlite,
J. Construction plans for the battleship Bismarck^
o. Torpedoes with the most modern fuses,
d. Mines with the most modern fuses,
e. Demonstration of the firing of the 24 cm. cannon.
3. Further method of negotiation.
In view of the Russian demands, agreement on conclusion of the
treaty is to be expected neither with Tevossyan nor with Mikoyan.
In case no agreement is reached, it is proposed that a conference*be
held between Hitter, Schnurre, and Molotov, and that the Foreign
Minister send Molotov a letter regarding interpretation of the Russian
promise of September 28. If no agreement is reached with Molotov,
it should be considered whether a further step must be taken with
Stalin, and what form it should take.
1 This undated memorandum is based on handwritten notes (8435/E593986)
by Bitter, dated Z>ee. 2, of the conference of Dec. 2. See document No. 412.
No. 414
259/169-8.54-55
The Consulate General at Milan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT MILAN, December 3, 1939 5 : 00 p. m.
No. 19 of December 3 Received December 3 9 : 30 p. m.
For State Secretary Weizsacker personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 66 of December I.1
Counselor of Embassy K[ordt] reports : Doubtless genuine material
contains political correspondence of the British Embassy in Rome
from 1933 until the end of 1938. Because of the great amount of it
(two full chests) and the shortness of time only a partial survey was
possible. Instructions and reports written by a great number of
British statesmen and diplomats, among others Simon, Eden, and
Sir Eric Drummond (Lord Perth) give an interesting glimpse into
1 This telegram stated that Kordt had been instructed to go immediately to
Milan and to report from there by telegraph (259/169851) . See also document
No. 400.
484
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the manner of working and the approach to political problems, for
example, the East Pact negotiations, Albania, Yugoslavia, Abyssinia
Spain, Austria. They show the astonishing second-rank role wHch
France played at that time. The mistaken judgments and false prog,
nostications concerning German and Italian policy are revealing,
I have not been able to discover items which could be exploited as
propaganda, which does not mean, however, that such material is not
there. Thorough examination would require more than a week's
work.
Since the collection contains many carbon copies of incoming and
outgoing telegrams, as well as some original ciphers even, the material
is apparently also valuable for Selchow.2 Consider it desirable
for material to come into German hands.
End of the memorandum of Counselor of Embassy K.
Supplement of the General Consulate : The owner, with whom IL
has avoided coming in contact, but who because of his knowledge
and connections might be valuable in the future as an agent, for
wtich he showed an interest, first wanted a million lire. It has
been possible to bring his demand down to 300,000 lire, payable Monday
evening, December 4, at 9 o'clock. The amount is available from
nonofficial funds and could be paid as an advance. Reimbursement
from there could be made on the quiet. A [written report s
] would
follow after payment had been made.
Request in amaj case call to me personally tomorrow Monday before
6 o'clock in the evening. In case the material is to be bought, please
ask, "When will Consul General Bene be in Milan again?" I will
then consider myself authorized to pay 300,000 lire, but will naturally
try to get the price reduced. In case the purchase is to be declined,
please say, "Legationsrat Mohrmann can not come to the meeting."
4
J Curt K. H. Selchow had charge of codes in the Foreign Ministry.
'The words in brackets are from the uncoded copy sent from Milan to the
Embassy in Rome (1044/311285-86) .
4 In telegram No. 20 of Dec. 5, Weber reported that the material had been
purchased for 273,000 lire and that arrangements were being made for Its safe
transport to Germany (1044/311288).
No. 415
585/24)2521-22
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECRET SOFIA, December 4, 1939 7: 20 p. m.
No. 349 of December 4 Eeceived December 4 4 : 00 a. m. \JBM\.
The King took me aside after a private luncheon which he gave for
a German professor yesterday, in order to express his deep concern
DECEMBER 1939 485
over the latest developments in Finland, especially the setting up of
a new Finnish government by the Bussians. Bulgaria was about to
sign an air convention with Russia and to begin economic negotiations,
but what ought she to do if Russia were to raise again the question of
a mutual assistance pact and demand possibly the cession of air and
naval bases against Turkey? How did Berlin feel about that?
Would Germany view a Russian action in the Balkans with indifference?
I replied that the assertion circulated here that Germany
had given the Russians a free hand in the Balkans was obviously
being spread by enemy propaganda ; if the Russians should some day
march into Bessarabia, they would after all take back a former
province, just as in Finland they were only taking back former Russian
territory which they considered indispensable to the defense of
Leningrad. There were absolutely no indications, however, that
Russia wished to reach beyond the prewar frontier. Poland and
Finland were proofs to the contrary. The King told me that Lord
Lloyd had tried to incite him against the Russians, saying that the
Turks would defend their independence against the Russians by force
of arms. The Bulgarians should make up their minds while there
was time. He had replied that if Bulgaria had fought against the
Russians in the World War, that had happened only because Russia
had betrayed Bulgaria in the Balkan War. Nevertheless, the old
feeling of friendship was still alive among the people, and no government
could lightly disregard it. The King asked whether it was not
possible, if the Russians should intend to take some action against
Turkey, to divert them toward the Caucasus. In conclusion the King
said that he would be very grateful for an indication of how we
viewed Bulgaria's situation, so that he might adapt his policy accordingly.
Please send telegraphic instructions as to what I can reply.
1
RlOHTBCOFEK
1 See document No. 454.
No. 416
B1S/B0032KV1-10/2
Memorand/wrn, T>y the Director of the Political Department
, December 4, 1939.
The Finnish Minister called on me this morning in connection with
his telephone conversation of yesterday evening 1 and gave me a memorandum
worded as follows :
1 IJater the same day, Woermann noted the following : "In reply to my further
inquiry at noon today the Finnish Minister telephoned to me at 2 : 30 that the
request for support of the Swedish move in Moscow had been directed solely
to the German Government" (B1S/B003212).
486 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
"The Finnish Government, using the good offices of the Swedish
Government, has addressed the Soviet Government with the continued
intention of settling the conflict peacefully and with the ohject
of presenting new positive proposals. On this basis the Soviet Government
was asked whether it was prepared to negotiate.
"The Finnish Government requests the support of the German
Government in this matter."
I asked the Minister the following questions and received the fallowing
replies :
1. Whether the Finnish Government^had already presented these
new positive proposals in Moscow and, if so, what their content was.
The Minister was not informed on this score.
2. Whether the Finnish Government had also addressed other
governments in the same connection. M. Wuorimaa replied that the
information concerning the step taken in Moscow through the good
offices of the Swedish Government had been transmitted to all governments;
he did not know, however, whether the request for support
had also been made of other governments.
3. Whether the Minister knew that the Soviet Government had
recognized a Finnish "People's Government" and had already concluded
a treaty with it. The Minister replied that he had read about
it in the newspaper; this was not a real Finnish Government, however,
and he could not take any cognizance of the negotiations of this
"Government".
No. 417
1821/416648-49'
The State Secretary to the Legations in Finland and Sweden *
Telegram
URGENT BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
No, 442 to Helsinki Sent to Helsinki, December 5 11 : 45 p. m.
No. 575 to Stockholm Sent to Stockholm, December 6 2 : 45 p. m.
zu Pol. VI 2679,* 2680,
8 2695.*
For the Minister personally.
I. On the morning of December 4 the Finnish Minister here informed
us by direction of his Government of the good offices of the
Swedish Minister in Moscow with the Soviet Government for the pur-
*A copy of this telegram (minus the second paragraph of section I, and section
in) was also sent as No. 980 for information to the Embassy in Moscow
(B1S/B003225). The entire text was repeated as telegram No. 476 to Oslo, and
as telegram No. 463 to Copenhagen (1795/408762-63) with instructions to tell
the Foreign Ministers concerned that in the German view the Finns could have
expected no other answer.
* Pol. VI 2679 : Not printed ( 8484/E596811 ) .
Pol. VI 2680: Not 4 printed (1821/416646). Pol. VI 2695: Not printed (1821/416647).
DECEMBER 1939 487
pose of settling the Finnish-Russian conflict in a peaceful way and
with the aim of making new positive proposals.
5 The Finnish Government
asked for the support of the German Government in this
matter. Upon inquiry the Finnish Minister added that all governments
had been informed of the step taken by the Swedish representative
in Moscow, but that a request for support had been made only of
the German Government. With regard to the treaty of the Soviet
Government with the Finnish "People's Government of Kuusinen,"
the Finnish Minister said he could not take any cognizance of the
negotiations of this "Government."
Molotov told Count Schulemburg yesterday 6 that the Swedish
Minister had informed the Russian Government in writing that the
Swedish Legation in Moscow would look after Finnish interests, and
had asked orally about the possibilities for the Ryti Government to
negotiate with the Soviet Government. Molotov took a negative
attitude toward both demarches. The Soviet Government had recognized
the Finnish People's Government and could therefore not negotiate
with the government in whose name the Swedish Minister was
acting. The Soviet Government took the stand that the Soviet Union
was not waging a war with Finland, and the Soviet Government would
also inform the League of Nations to this effect, if necessary.
7 The
Soviet Government did not believe that the hostilities would last very
long, in spite of the present unfavorable weather conditions; however,
the many land mines delivered by England were causing difficulties.
If the Finnish Minister here should approach us once more with
regard to yesterday's request for German support, he will be told that
because of the Russian rejection, the question is no longer of any
importance and no other answer could have been expected from th
488
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
from the Russian Government. There is no occasion for German
mediation.
III. If you should be approached by the Finns 11 with regard to
the above questions please express yourself along the same lines,
WEIZSACKER
31 The words "by tlie Finns" were deleted in the copy sent to Stockholm.
No. 418
B18/B003233
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJBGENT HELSiNKi-GRANKUi,!^, December 5, 1939 5 : 15 p. m.
No. 388 of December 5 Received December 6 12 : 45 a, m.
[Pol. VI 2702].
The Finnish. Government has the reins firmly in hand. Despite
the deep impression caused by the bombings of the residential section
of Helsinki, the transfer of the city's population to the country was
effected in exemplary fashion. There has been no new bombardment
of the capital since December 2. The meager military success of the
Russian army is strengthening the conviction here that Russia is weak.
The manifestations of sympathy by the entire world, excluding Germany,
have given a great lift to morale.
I have no contact with the Government at the moment. Finns who
have remained pro-German complain to me that Germany's policy is
driving Finland into the arms of England. They believe that the
abhorrence of the whole world occasioned by the Russian bombings
will turn against Germany, too, and they hope that in view of Russia's
weakness, which has now been revealed, Germany will turn and conquer
Russia with a few motorized divisions. The situation has been
aggravated by the organization of the so-called Kuusinen government,
for such a government is categorically rejected by over 90 percent of
the Finns.
Should the efforts at reaching an understanding be continued,
nevertheless, it will be essential for Germany to step in lest we lose
all influence in Finland. I want to stress once more that for the sake
of the copper and molybdenum alone we have a considerable interest
in a prompt reconciliation, and that, on the other hand, if the war
continues the tenacity and stamina of the Finns, together with the
feeble offensive power of the Russians, promise a long-drawn-out
struggle. Its continuation is contrary to our interest also for the
reason that if the Finns gain the upper hand our position in the
DECEMBER 19S9 489
country will be lost, while if the Russians win the wealth of the
country will be destroyed and there will be nothing left for us.1
The German radio with its anti-Finnish and sometimes even absurd
reports is doing a great deal to arouse the Finns against us,2
BLitJCHER
1 Marginal notes: "Siegfried: Has Bliicher received our instruction for guidance
of conversation? W[eizsacker] December 6."
"Not by telegraph but by courier, who goes via Stockholm under Swedish convoy
to Abo [Turku] ; ought to have arrived already, according to Herr von
Grundherr. Si[egfried] t December 6."
2 In a telegram of Dec. 19 (B18/B003291), Blticher endorsed a complaint by
Otto von Zwehl, DNB representative in Helsinki, on the "incorrect and misleading
rendering of his reports by the German radio which made such difficulty for
him that his position had become untenable." He was willing to- continue at
his post only if assured that his reports would be rendered as he wrote them.
In a telegram of Dec. 21 (B18/B003292), Ribbentrop rejected this complaint
and stated as follows: "I hereby express my astonishment at the position you
[Bliicher] have taken in regard to the reported attitude of the DNB representative.
He, like any other German, has his duty to perform and since, his recall
is at the moment not opportune for our foreign policy, he must remain there."
BibJbentrop added that the representative's duty was to report on events, not to
criticize measures of the Reich Government, and that Blticher might have been
expected to make this clear without referring to Berlin. Ribbentrop then directed
Bliicher to instruct Zwehl to act in accordance with directives on foreign
policy ; any future violation would lead to Zwehl's instant recall. Then on Jan.
10, Blticher wired that Zwehl, whose requests to resign he had refused, wrote
that he had entered the Finnish Army as a volunteer (B18/B003343).
No. 419
103/111834
Memorand/urn ~by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 949 BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
Colonel General Keitel telephoned me today on the following
matter: Lately there have been repeated wrangles on the boundary
between Russia and the Government General, into which the Wehrmacht,
too, was drawn. The expulsion of Jews into Russian territory,
in particular, did not proceed as smoothly as had apparently
been expected. In practice, the procedure was, for example, that at
a quiet place in the woods, a thousand Jews were expelled across the
Russian border; 15 kilometers away, they came back, with the Russian
commander trying to force the German one to readmit the group.
As it was a case involving foreign policy, the OKW was not able
to issue directives to the Governor General in the matter. Captain
Biirkner of the Navy will get in touch with the proper officer at the
Foreign Ministry. Colonel General Keitel asked me to arrange for a
favorable outcome of this interview.
WEIZSAOKER
490 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
No. 420
34/23642
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 950 BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
Colonel General Keitel called me on the telephone today to say that
the Russian list of requests for deliveries of German products was
growing more and more voluminous and unreasonable. The negotiations
with the Russians would necessarily, therefore, become more and
more difficult. The Russians, for example, wanted machine tools
for the manufacture of munitions, while the OKW could not spare
such machine tools in the present state of the war in any circumstances.
The same was true in respect to supplies of air and naval
war material.
I confirmed to Colonel General Keitel that the Foreign Ministry,
too, intended to put a curb on Russian demands. We had not yet
quite made up our mind how to do it, whether in Moscow or here
through the Russian Ambassador. The Reich Foreign Minister, too,
had yet to be informed.
In conclusion, Colonel General Keitel said that he was willing.
either through General Thomas or by his own participation, to bring
about a meeting, if necessary.
WEIZSACKEK
No. 421
174/1362.04r-0
Memorandum T>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, December 5,
The attitude taken toward us by Japan since the outbreak of the war
on questions connected with economic warfare has thus far been very
unsatisfactory. It has been by no means what might be expected of
a friendly country, particularly in view of the fact that we have continued
to lend Japan undiminished support in her action against China
by maintaining our ban on deliveries of war material to China.
Our points of grievance against the Japanese attitude thus far will
be evident from, the enclosed memorandum. At the end of the memorandum
three points are listed that seem to indicate that the Japanese
Government is beginning to take a more understanding attitude
toward us.
I propose that in one of the first regular conversations with the new
Japanese Ambassador the Japanese attitude on these questions be
DECEMBER 1939 491
taken up with tlie statement that we believe we have a right to expect
greater understanding in future.1
Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign
Minister.
*A memorandum from Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to
Weizsiicker on Dec. 6 (174/136203) conveyed the Foreign Minister's request that
the State Secretary act on this suggestion by Wielal. Record of action taken by
WeizsS-cker has not be found.
[Enclosure]
MEMORANDUM OK JAPAN'S AT.TITUJUE TOWABD GERMANY IN ECONOMIC
MATTERS SINCE THE OUTBREAK: OF THE WAR
1. Despite our request to unload in neutral ports, particularly in
Italy, the merchandise carried for Germany by Japanese ships, the
Japanese directed these ships to British ports immediately after the
outbreak of the war in obedience to British instructions, or even in
anticipation thereof and unloaded the German merchandise there.
(Steamers Kashima,) Hakone^ Fushimi^ Hakosaki, Sado, SaJcito, Noto
Maru.)
2. In other respects, too, Japan has since then complied submissively
with the British naval warfare measures and negotiated with England
regarding the smooth execution of the measures dictated by England.
This is true especially with regard to the following :
a. Extension of the list of contraband goods : Japan has accepted
without serious protest the extension of the list of contraband merchandise
to practically everything that could reach Germany in any
way. The information bulletin of the Japanese Foreign Ministry of
October 11 quotes without comment the English standpoint that "in
view of the difficulties of distinguishing between conditional and absolute
contraband, there is no other way than to treat both alike."
b. Putting in at the British control stations at Haifa, Gibraltar,
etc., and the prior submission of freight lists for the purpose of facilitating
inspection.
3. Japan made no protest against the blacklists which declare firms
registered in Japan in which there is a German interest to be enemy
firms.
4. On the German side the order has been in effect since the beginning
of the war that deliveries overseas, therefore also to Japan, must
be paid for upon shipment from a neutral port (for instance, Rotterdam)
and title pass to a neutral. This measure was unavoidable since
goods of German ownership are in danger of seizure.
Japan is applying the same principle to us, although no danger
exists for Japan that Japanese goods to neutral consignees can be
260090 54 37
492
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
seized. Nevertheless, the Japanese standpoint in the case of shipments
to European neutral ports could be understood since in this case
English interference with ocean transport would not be unlikely,
Japan goes further, however, and demands even in the case of deliveries
to Vladivostok and Dairen, that we pay for and take over the
goods in the Japanese port of export ; this is not justified by necessity
on the part of Japan, but is simply chicanery*
At the same time Japan is delivering to England, C. I. F. British
ports, and in addition is even extending S months credit.
Thus Japan is treating England better than America is doing and
is applying "cash and carry
5 ' terms only to us.
5. Japan is giving us no help with transactions to transfer raw materials,
for instance with the purchase of tin, rubber, etc., in the Netherlands
Indies. The firm of O. Wolff which had concluded such a
transaction with a Japanese firm was informed by their Dairen branch
that the Japanese Government had forbidden such transactions for
Germany.
An inquiry by the Embassy in Tokyo revealed that though no formal
prohibition existed, the Japanese Government gave numerous reasons
why it considered such transactions undesirable.
6. The Japanese Government took the same attitude when we tried
to obtain the release from the Japanese occupation authorities of a
cargo of tungsten ore (513 tons) purchased in Canton in October 1938.
At the intervention of Ambassador Oshima, release was promised us
only on condition that we once more deposit 80 percent of the price
(already paid) in foreign exchange. But in this case also the Japanese
Foreign Ministry does not believe that shipment to Germany (which
could be accomplished without difficulty with Japanese assistance) is
possible.
7. Because of the neutral cargoes on German ships, all sorts of disputes
arose after the outbreak of the war between the German shipowners
and the neutral consignees or addressees over emergency port
costs, freight rates, unloading costs, etc. These disputes were settled
amicably or juridically between the parties in all other countries.
Only in Japan did the Japanese Government interfere, make unjustified
and very substantial demands and, so long as we did not comply
with these demands, prevent the sailing of German ships. This suggests
that the Japanese Government would like to make the ships
Japanese property.
Recently the Japanese Government has seemed inclined to take a
more understanding attitude, as indicated by the following :
1) The Japanese Government, despite British opposition, has declared
itself ready to deliver to us, as heretofore, 50,000 tons of whale
oil out of the next catches and has proposed, for its part, special pre
DECEMBER 1939 493
cautions whereby this transaction could be concealed from the British.
2) The Japanese Government was the first of the neutrals to voice an
official protest against the British measure to cut off German exports
and, through the Japanese press, saw to it that this got strong publicity
and that countermeasures were threatened in the event of injury to
important Japanese interests. Whether it is really prepared to follow
up this threat with deeds remains to be seen.
3) The Japanese Government also seems ready to alter its adverse
stand on the question of raw material transfer transactions (particularly
tin and rubber from the Netherlands Indies) .
No. 422
849e/E59T
494
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
would leave at once and that then we would dictate (group garbled)
from Berlin in the same unilateral way as Rumania was now doing,
did the Minister President concede that if the negotiations of the next
few days should prove that other methods were impracticable he would
even accept an increase in the exchange rate of the reichsmark, I
stated that no compromise was possible in the matter and that we
were convinced after a careful exploration of all possibilities that
a relatively modest increase in the rate of exchange was the only
way to prevent the German purchases in Rumania from coming to a
total standstill.
CLODTUS
FABBICIUB
No. 423
lOa/111836-37
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 1003 BERLIN, December 6, 1939.
e. o. Pol. VI 2714 Ang. III.
With reference to instruction Pol. VI 2651 Ang. II.1
In amplification of the telegraphic circular of December 2 1 the
following additional circular instruction was sent today to all important
diplomatic missions :
Please bring out the following additional points of view in your
talks about the Finnish-Russian conflict :
Only a few weeks ago Finland was about to come to an understanding
with Russia, which could have been reached through a prudent
conduct of Finnish policy. An appeal by the Finnish Government
to the League of Nations is the least suitable means for resolving
the crisis.
There can be no doubt that British influence on the Finnish. Government
in part operating through the Scandinavian capitals determined
the Finnish Government to reject the Russian proposals and
thus brought about the present conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-
Finnish conflict should be stressed especially.
Germany has no part in these events. In conversations, sympathy
is to be expressed for the Russian standpoint. I request that you
refrain from any expression of sympathy for the Finnish position.
End of the telegraphic instruction.
WEIZSACKER
VI 2651 Ang. II is the copy of document No. 411 sent for information to
Moscow and Helsinki
DECEMBER 1939 495
No. 424
1859/422744
The Charge d?Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST "ORGEAT OSLO, December 7, 1939 1 : 50 p. m.
No. 442 of December 7 Received December 7 2 : 45 p. m.
Pol. VI 2719.
With, reference to your telegram No* 476 of December 5.1
As instructed I conveyed to the Foreign Minister the stand of the
German Government. During the conversation the Foreign Minister
raised two questions which he would like to have answered :
1. Is it correct that, as indicated by reliable information received
by the Norwegian Government, negotiations are in progress between
Moscow and Berlin concerning the occupation of ports in northern
Norway by the Soviet Union?
2. The Norwegian Government does not explicitly intend to declare
neutrality in the Russo-Finnish conflict and is prepared to permit
arms, ammunition, etc., to be shipped to Finland through Norwegian
territory. If such shipments come from America, for instance, will
the German Government stop them or permit them to pass ?
NETJHAUS
1 See document No. 417, footnote 1.
No. 425
183>/860a&
TJie Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BEKW, December 7, 1939 11 : 15 p. m.
No. 521 of December 7 Received December 8 t : 00 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 519 of December 6.1
Since it was impossible becaiise of Motta's 2 illness to obtain any
satisfaction from the Political Department as to what steps the Federal
Council might take regarding the League of Nations in order to
prevent anti-German propaganda at the forthcoming session of the
League of Nations Council and Assembly, I have personally and confidentially,
pursuant to telegraphic instruction No. 396 of November
10,
3 called the attention of ex-Federal Councilor Schulthess to the
*Not printed (183/86027). In this telegram, K6cher passed along a confidential
Swiss report that initiative for calling a League session had come from
Sweden and Norway, and that Great Britain was uneasy about it.
'Giuseppe Motta, Federal Councilor, chief of tae Political Department, or
Swiss Foreign Ministry.
'Document No. 343.
496
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
danger that Switzerland would incur from such a propaganda. Of
the subsequent talk between Schulthess and Motta it was learned that
the latter on behalf of the Federal Council had written Secretary-
General JLvenol to inform him that Switzerland demanded that the
discussion be exclusively confined to the Russo-Finnish conflict. To
AvenoPs affirmative reply Motta had answered that Switzerland reserved
her freedom of action in case there should, contrary to the
promise, be a discussion of Polish, Czech, or other questions to be
utilized for propagandistic purposes against Germany. Please give
this matter no publicity and in particular avoid in any circumstance
mentioning Schulthess' name, because he is of great value to us as an
intermediary.
KOCHER
No. 426
2196/473590^9$
Minister Blueher to State Secretary Wei&saclcer
Knx), December 7, 1939.
DEAR BAROJT WEIZSACKER: Thank you very much for your kind
letter of December 2.1 Thank you in particular for the understanding
I should almost like to say consoling words which you find
for the unpleasant position into which circumstances have forced me.
You write that now "disaster has descended upon my host country".
That is only too true, and of course I have a strong personal sympathy
for the people and things that I have come to know and to love. But
my real concern is less for Finland than for Germany. I cannot avoid
th.e impression that with the attack by the [Russians on Finland a
disaster is also descending upon Germany.
I gather from your telegraphic instruction No. 442 of December
5 that any participation in attempts at a settlement, which I suggested
in my telegram No. 388 of the same day, is now out of ,the
question.
2 And thus the current of events must flow on freely, without
dam or dike.
For someone who has had an opportunity here to observe the resolute
unanimity of this nation, which, though small, is tenacious, hardened
by sports, and militarily proficient, for someone who knows the country
with its swamps, lakes, cliffs, forests, and harsh climate, it is difficult
to believe that the Russians will have an easy time of it. On the
contrary, the war may last a long time, may bring the Russians many a
defeat and must cause them severe losses.
The war will probably take the following course : The Russians,
because of the inaccessibility of the Finnish coast, will forego any
* Not found.
* Documents Nos. 417 and 418.
DECEMBER 1939 497
landing attempt and will employ their land forces at the Karelian
Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga, where they will be forced to
fight for every foot of ground. At the same time they will try to
destroy cities, factories, railroads, and bridges by air raids on a very
large scale, in order to crush the resistance of the Finnish people.
Since the cities and large factories have been evacuated, the Russians
will cause only property damage by this action. Within a matter of
a few months this flourishing country, which in the twenty years of
its independence has doubled its agricultural production and tripled
its industrial production, will be transformed into a heap of rubble.
This will not mean the defeat of the people, for all elements are
willing to return to the most primitive conditions and continue their
fight for freedom. But for us this means that Finland is eliminated
as a supplier of very important raw materials for the war copper,
molybdenum, and possibly later nickel and iron and also animal
foods, especially fish from the Arctic Ocean. Herr van Scherpenberg
can tell you in detail what this means to us.
Furthermore, the only sea on which our ships have heretofore been
able to carry on trade and commerce as in peace time will become
a theater of operations with the danger of mines and all other
restrictions.
And finally it can in no wise be predicted how far the conflagration
in the North will extend now that Russia has hurled the torch of war
into Finnish territory. Questions such as the ore supply from Sweden
arise inevitably.
In summary I should like to say that Russia, which has nothing
whatever to lose in Finland or the rest of the North, is paying for
her present course out of Germany's pocket. The Russian action
is costing Germany :
1. Paralysis of shipping traffic to Finland ;
2. Cessation of trade with Finland ;
3. Evacuation of the entire German element and squandering of
the assets that the Germans have created by decades of work ;
4. Danger of paralysis of all Baltic Sea commerce and of extension
of the war to the rest of the North.
In closing I do not need to assure you that I am keeping strictly
to the instructions given me in all conversations with third parties, but
with my superiors I consider it my duty to express the thoughts which,
arise from the perspective of my post.
If I might ask a favor, I should appreciate your informing Herr
von Grundherr of this letter.
Thank you once more for your friendly lines. I kiss the Baroness's
hand; all best wishes, especially for your sons with the Armed Forces.
Heil Hitler!
Yours, etc.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 427
169/82949-52
The Minister in Ewnania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BUCHAREST, December 8, 1939 7 : 40 p. m.
SECRET Received December 9 12 : 30 a. m.
No. 975 of December 8 [Pol. II 2572 g].*
Foreign Minister Gafencu spoke to me two days ago about Eumania's
difficult situation. The- threat from Soviet Russia was continuing;
he knew that Germany was unwilling to check Russia, and
as a result Hungary, too, had become more irritating again. Rumania
could not and would not call upon England and France for help, which
the Foreign Minister himself described as of little value, because of
the difficulties such a step would create between Rumania and Germany.
The policy of neutrality would be maintained and the trade
agreement with Germany would be lived up to. Despite the unceasing
British attempts to block the petroleum shipments, Rumania
would loyally deliver them if Germany also continued the shipments
of arms. Rumania would like to conclude a nonaggression pact with
Russia, but not an assistance pact. Rumania had no information as to
Russia's intentions. If Russia intended to push to the Bosporus, this
would mean Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism, in the Balkans., and it was
impossible that this could please Germany and Italy.
I remained entirely noncommittal with respect to these statements,
in accordance with my instructions from Berlin.
Yesterday afternoon Gafencu reverted to this conversation. The
occasion for this was an article by Stefanov on Bessarabia and
Rumania in KommwnistetsGJiekii international [s&?], in which the
economic situation of the Russian [sio\ Republic was described in the
most dismal colors and the Rumanian Communists were exhorted to
prepare for Bolshevist penetration. Rumania, like the Baltic states,
would have to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia.
The article had been reprinted by I&vestia, and thereby assumed very
grave importance with respect to Rumania.2
1 From 2281/480315-17. * In a Moscow telegram of Dec. 7, Schulenburg, reporting the publication of
this article and quoting some passages from it, remarked that this was the first
time that the Soviet press had discussed Russo-Rumanian relations! in that
manner (169/82947). A further Moscow telegram sent on Dec. 9 mentioned
a press statement issued by the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the effect
that the article in question in no way represented official Soviet policy
(169/82960). Meanwhile, Gafencu had corrected his earlier statement made to
Fabricius, saying that the article denouncing Rumania had not been reprinted
by Izvestia and therefore did not have the same grave importance (169/82953).
See also document No. 455.
DECEMBER 1939 499
Rumania was firmly resolved to fight for Bessarabia. Such a struggle
would severely dislocate Rumania's whole economy, however, and
if Rumania should suffer defeat as the result of the hostile attitude
of Hungary and Bulgaria the outcome would be chaos, and the gates
would be open to Bolshevism. On that account he wanted to ask once
more for our advice because after all we were interested in the preservation
of the Rumanian economic area, in view of the petroleum and
grain we draw from it. Should we be unable to give military assists
ance to Rumania against Russia, as he unfortunately had to assume
from my earlier intimations, there was still the possibility of benevolent
neutrality or perhaps also of diplomatic support in Moscow. He
wanted to ask us the following :
1. Whether in the event of a Russian attack we would be able to
induce Hungary to remain passive ;
2. Whether we would continue to furnish armament in return for
petroleum ;
s
3. Whether we would give our assent if Italy, which did not desire
Russian penetration in the Balkans, came to Rumania's aid.*
Gafencu said that if Berlin was unwilling to give an "official" reply,
then I might perhaps be able to drop him some hint or "advice
personally."
The distress in which the Rumanian Government finds itself is evident.
I asked Gafencu whether the decision to answer Russia with
arms in the Bessarabian question was irrevocable; (group missing)
replied: Yes, because in the first place Bessarabia was inhabited
mostly by Rumanians, and in the second place an advance by Russia to
the Danube would be too serious a threat of the spread of Bolshevism
and Pan-Slavism in the Balkans. He hinted, however, that should
Russia's demands be aimed only at the northern areas of Bessarabia
which were inhabited by Ukrainians, there might perhaps be a basis
for an understanding, although even this would be very disagreeable
for the Rumanian Government during the present conflict. Gafencu,
with whom I have never discussed this question, then began to talk
spontaneously about the proposal contained in my report No. 5965 of
November 4 :
5 Germany could secure a lasting influence for herself
in Rumania if she could induce Russia to accept such a solution of the
Bessarabian problem.
'Marginal note in WeizsSLcker's handwriting: "When?"
4 Marginal note in Weizs&cker's handwriting: "Italy's intention?"
"Not printed (1921/431289-94). This report on the foreign and domestic
problems facing Rumania actually did not mention, any proposals for a Busso-
Bumanian settlement; it referred, however, to several conversations between
Fabrieius and Gafencu in the course of which the Rumanian Foreign Minister
had expressed his country's willingness to make small concessions as well as its
determination to resist by force those demands which would amount to a
destruction of the Rumanian State.
500 DOCUMENTS O1ST GBRMAJXT FOREIGN POLICY
I then asked Gafencu once more about Lord Lloyd's e
activity -
respect to the cession of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The Foreign
Minister replied : The King had flatly told Lord Lloyd that he would
not allow any British mediation in this matter. However, Gafencu
added, a solution of the question might be achieved through direct
negotiations with Bulgaria.
I have the distinct impression that Horthy will yield in this
regard in order to (group missing) free in the struggle with Kussia.
Inasmuch as the Turks, reportedly at British instigation, have withdrawn
their troops from the Bulgarian frontier, I would be inclined
to believe that the British intervened also with reference to Dobruja,
and it is my opinion that we ought to use our influence here. If we
are interested in the tranquility of this economic region, it would be
to our advantage if we became politically more active than heretofore
and attempted, through negotiations with Rumania and her neighbors,
to bring about a reasonable settlement of territorial questions, which
would assure us of a continuous and regular supply of Rumanian
products (group garbled). If at the same time we succeed in preventing
Russia from penetrating too far into the Balkans and from
advancing to the mouth of the Danube, we would exert decisive
influence in the Balkans even after the war is over. It cannot be in
our interest to let Italy take the lead in this matter.
FABBICIUS
*A previous telegram from Bucharest sent on Nov. 20 (169/82912) had reported
alleged efforts "by Lord Lloyd, then in Budapest, to promote a Bulgarian-
Eumanian rapprochement on the basis of Rumania's ceding southern Dobruja.
No. 428
2290/483400
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 971 of December 8 KOME, December 8, 1939 12 : 15 p. m.
The reference to Kussia is worth noting in the statement of the
Fascist Grand Council x which, in justification of the newly confirmed
nonparticipation in the war, explicitly mentions the development of
the situation from the Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains; while
disinterest in this area is expressed, it is emphasized on the other hand
that there is the strongest interest in the Balkans and the Danube area.
* On the night of Dec. 7-8, the Fascist Grand Council held its first meeting
since the outbreak of war and adopted an order of the day confirming Italy's
policy of "nonbelligerency." The text is published in the Popolo d'ltaUa of
Dec. 9, 1939.
DECEMBER 1939 501
Particularly pleasing for us is the renewed confirmation of Axis
policy and the clear statement on British blockade policy (cf. paragraph
2 of telegraphic report No. 924 of December 2) ,
2 in which the
word prestige occurs for the first time.3
'Document No. 410.
This latter passage in the statement of the Fascist Grand Council read:
"Italy intends to obtain security for her maritime trade in the most decisive
manner, out of consideration for her prestige as well as for her absolutely vital
requirements."
No. 429
18l/4166'56-57
Circular of tTie Foreign Minister *
Telegram
BEKCJN, December 7, 1939.
Sent December 8 8 : 20 p. m.
e.o. Pol. VI 2714 Aug. I.
With reference to our telegraphic instruction No 2
In conversations about the Eusso-Finnish conflict please make use
of the following additional considerations :
A few weeks ago Finland was on the point of reaching a settlement
with Russia, which would have been possible had there been a wise
Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations by the Finnish
Government is the least suitable way of solving the crisis.
There is no doubt that English influence on the Finnish Government
operating partly through the Scandinavian capitals induced
the Finnish Government to reject the Russian proposals and thus
brought about the present conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-
Finnish conflict should be especially emphasized.
Germany is not involved in these events. In conversations sympathy
with the Russian, standpoint should be expressed. Please
refrain from any expression of sympathy for the Finnish position.
Supplement for Tokyo :
With reference to telegraphic report No. 731.3
The British Government, by means of propaganda, will make a
determined effort in Japan to exploit the Russo-Finnish conflict to
its own advantage. Please counter these attempts energetically in
every respect.
(The Foreign Minister)
1 This Instruction was sent to aU German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulates
in Bergen, Geneva, GQteborg, MaLmo, and Reykjavik, but to Moscow and
Helsinki for information only. 2 The reference is to document No. 411; the appropriate number for each
addressee was to be written in before dispatch.
Not printed (1859/422733).
502
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 430
1870/357108kl2
Memorandum ~by Ambassador Bitter
BERLIN, December 8, 1939.
FOR A REPORT TO THE FTJHRER
TRANSACTIONS WITH RUSSIA
Iron requirements for the Russian transactions
The iron requirements for the Russian transactions are estimated
at approximately 70,000 tons a month. According to the previous
attitude of the domestic agencies, it was to be expected that these
requirements would be met. Of. Annex I, letter of November 16 from
Field Marshal Goring to the Minister of Economics. The negotiations
with Russia to date were conducted on this assumption.
On December 6, I was informed by General von Hanneken that
Field Marshal Goring and Minister of Economics Funk had decided
that on account of the newly announced requirements of the Wehrmacht
no special allocation of iron could be made for the Russian
transactions. The 703000 tons would have to be taken from the quota
of 185,000 tons set aside for export. Of. Annex 2. At the same time,
however, this export quota itself was to be considerably reduced (by an
amount not yet fixed) on account of the new requirements of the
Wehrmacht. Of the 185,000 tons practically nothing would thus be
left for our other exports (the Balkans, Scandinavia, Italy, etc.)
which is impossible in view of the essential imports from these countries
e, g., petroleum, iron ore, wheat, copper, etc. This means that
no iron is available for the Russian transactions.
Consequently there are the following choices :
Either to revise the Goring-Funk decision and reduce the iron
allocated for the needs of others (see Annex 2) ;
Or to give up the Russian transactions ;
Or else to try to place the entire Russian business on a basis different
from that provided for in the Ribbentrop-Molotov exchange of notes
of September 28,
1 that is, not on a reciprocal-transaction basis, but on
that of unilateral deliveries by the Soviet Union in other words, a
sort of subsidy treaty. This would require a new political departure
for the negotiations.
RTTTER
1 Document No. 162.
DECEMBER 1939 503
Marginal note : "Field Marshal Goring will try to see to it that the
70,000 tons are made available. He will let us know on Monday,
December II.2 I request that Ambassador Hitter get in touch with
the men of the Four-Year Plan. Furthermore, we must try to get
the Russians to reduce the 70,000 tons by one-half or, better still, by
two-thirds. R[IBBENTROP]
"
[Enclosure 1]
The Commissioner for the Fowr Year Plan to the Minister of
Economics
SECRET BERLIN,, November 16, 1939.
Received in Foreign Ministry November 29.
St. M. Pev. 10428/39 g W IV 4817.
(II L 2068/39 g)
With reference to the letter of November 6, 1939 II L No.
1944/39 g *
In view of the present situation it is obvious that the negotiations
with the Russians certainly must be brought to a positive conclusion.
Certain difficulties anticipated in supplying the domestic market and
to some extent also the Wehrmacht if the Russian orders are filled will
have to be faced as things now stand. However, I believe it is possible
to mitigate these consequences considerably. In the first place,
in view of the situation that has arisen for Germany as a result of the
war, we must stipulate delivery dates which will be practicable for
us. For another thing, we must try in every way to promote the import
of Swedish ore via Narvik. As appears from the discussions
with the Minister of Transport, the prospects for this are indeed good
as far as transportation is concerned. All the ore that can be obtained
via Narvik is to be regarded as in excess of the import program drawn
up recently with respect to the raw material balances. The quantities
of iron thus obtained are to be used, in the first place, for filling the
Russian orders and, in the second place, for expanding the construction
of freight cars. I request you to ensure that action will be taken
accordingly and that none of the excess imports will be used for other
purposes.
Moreover, I regard it as an especially important task for our negotiators
that they should try to get the Russians to take a certain volume
2 In a memorandum of Dec. 15, Ritter described a conversation of the
previous day with GSring, who repeated his statement of Dec. 9 to Ribbentrop
that the 70,000 tons of iron per month would be forthcoming. Ritter also- protested
to Goring about a letter (not found) by Bltze of Reichsgruppe Industrie
which might have led to a breakdown of negotiations. "But the present negotiations
with the Soviet Union must not be aUowed to break down," Ritter added
(1370/357339-200).
'Not found.
504
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of consumer goods, too, and not confine their demands exclusively to
the most valuable capital goods. Perhaps this cannot yet be achieved
during the present negotiations, but it ought to be brought up as soon
as possible and energetically pressed in future negotiations.
[Enclosure 2]
Present Plan of Iron Production and Allocation per Month
Total production 1, 500, 000 tons
Amount allocated to the Wehrmacht 850, 000 tons
Amount allocated to the Four Year Plan, railroads,
domestic economy, exports 650, 000 tons
Amount allocated for exports 185, 000 tons
No. 431
2810/548597-600
The Consul Cren&rdi at New York to the Foreign Ministry
NEW YORK, December 8, 1939.
Received January 3, 1940.
Pol. IX 26.
Subject: Conviction of Bund [Leader Fritz Kuhn of the German-
American Bund.
At the end of last May the local press reported with big headlines
the arrest of Bund Leader Fritz Kuhn of the German-American Bund
on charges of grand larceny and fraud. Kuhn was accused by the
authorities of having embezzled and used for his own purposes funds
totaling approximately $14,500, from the German-American Bund
as well as the German-American Siedlungsbund, an affiliate of that
organization. A few hours after his arrest Kuhn succeeded in regaining
his liberty by posting bail for $5,000. Early last October
he had to increase his bail to $50,000 upon order of the court, because
he had come under the suspicion in the meantime of intending to
evade the impending trial by flight across the border. The trial,
which lasted approximately 3 weeks, started in the middle of October
and was reported at length by the entire local press, in some instances
under sensational headlines. The jury having found him guilty a
few days ago, the judge has now sentenced Kuhn to a prison term of
from %y2 to 5 years for embezzlement and forgery. The condemned
defendant has meanwhile been transferred to the well-known state
prison of Sing Sing, where he has been housed for his own safety in
a separate wing, segregated from the other prisoners.
DECEMBER 1939 505
In general the following must be said regarding the trial and the
sentence of Bund Leader Kuhn :
While it was ascertained that some of the charges which the prosecution
made against Kuhn broke down and the sum allegedly embezzled
was only a fraction of the $14,500 named at the outset, the
various phases of the trial nevertheless did bring out some highly
unsavory facts. A not unimportant part was played here particularly
by some silly, high-flown love letters which Kuhn, a married man and
the father of two children, wrote to an American woman, Mrs.
Camp who, moreover, figured in the trial as a witness testifying
against him. The noisy performance of his defense counsel, who
endeavored to excuse the contested expenditures of the Bund Leader
by invoking the Fuhrer principle observed in the German-American
Bund, was likewise little adapted toward exonerating Kuhn in the
public eye, not to speak of the highly deplorable effect on the distorted
picture of German conditions which prevail here.
There can hardly be any doubt that Kuhn is now considered politically
finished not only by the American public but also by all thinking
Germans of national sentiment here. To be sure, the organ of the
German-American Bund, the Deutsoher Weckruf und Beobdchter^
tried in its last issue to picture him as a victim of American justice,
headlining its article in poor taste with "Kuhn a prisoner of war",*
but actually this will convince hardly anyone. The fact that, by
German standards, the trial throws a strange light on American legal
procedure is another matter. However that may be, not only German
circles in general but also many confirmed Bund members are deeply
upset by the turn of events and tax Kuhn and justly so at least
with having acted in an extremely frivolous and undignified manner.
To what extent the existence of the German-American Bund is affected
by these occurrences cannot be estimated at the moment. According
to inquiries and observations a portion of the Bund membership
has resigned in disgust. An additional factor is that the other
leading patriotic organizations of Germans in America, which had
in any case been annoyed with the methods of the German-American
Bund for some time, will now feel less inclined than ever to cooperate
with an organization which was headed for several years by a man
now serving time in prison for embezzlement and forgery.
Fortunately, neither the trial proceedings nor their treatment in
the newspapers implicated the official German agencies here, either
directly or indirectly. For years the Consulate General has been
maintaining a pointed reserve vis-^-vis the German-American Bund
after Kuhn, who would not take any advice, made one gross tactical
1 In English in the original.
506
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
blunder after another to the detriment of German interests. In re.
porting to the Foreign Ministry and to the Auslandsorganisation of
the NSDAP we stressed repeatedly that it was absolutely essential to
have a clean separation between Reich-German citizens and the
German-American Bund, and, further, between the official German
agencies and that organization. Quite apart from the political aspect,
this attitude has again been proved very sound during Kuhn's trial.
It goes without saying that we shall carefully adhere to this policy in
the future, too. The less official German agencies concern themselves
with the activity of the Bund, the better will the cause of the German
Eeich be served in the USA. It has been observed that officers of
the Bund insistently point to their supposedly very friendly relations
with German authorities. The names of the Volksdeutsche Mlttelstelle
and the Auslands-Institut in Stuttgart are particularly mentioned
in this connection. I would suggest that the offices concerned
be reminded that given the whole development it is by no means in
Germany's interest if such relations continue to be cultivated and
maintained today with the German-American Bund, even on a purely
personal basis.2
I am enclosing several newspaper clippings 3 about the trial.
The Embassy in Washington is receiving a copy of this report.
BOUCHERS
* Copies of this report were forwarded without comment to the above agencies
and to other party and government departments on Jan. 8, 194O (8130/E582Q37)
Not found.
No. 432
10^/11185,0
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST -URGENT Moscow [December 9, 1939],
No. 903 of December 9 Received [December] 9 9 : 15 p. m.
Molotov asked me to call on him this afternoon and told me with
visible 'agitation that during the last few days Italy had delivered
about 50 pursuit planes to Finland, and that Germany had permitted
the transit of these planes. Molotov declared that Italy's conduct was
"provocative" and "outrageous" and that the Soviet Government
would demand an explanation by Italy on this account. Germany's
complicity, however, was completely incomprehensible to the Soviet
Government. When I replied that this report could not possibly be
true and could only be aimed at disturbing German-Soviet relations,
Molotov answered that the entire foreign press was filled with these
DECEMBER 1939 507
reports and that the Soviet Government had proof of their correctness.1
I repeatedly declared that I still did not believe the report and
would immediately take steps to obtain clarification. Please send
telegraphic instructions.
1 Marginal note:"?'1
No. 433
103/111867
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT Moscow, December 9, 1939 9 : 40 p. nu
No. 905 of December 9 Received December 10 2: 00 a. m.
Only for the State Secretary personally.
For the High Command of the Navy and the Wehrmacht.
The Soviet Naval Committee [Sowjet--Marineait$schws~\ informs us
in strict confidence that a submarine blockade against Finland is
planned in the Gulf of Bothnia. The Chief of the Naval Staff inquires
whether German steamers on the regular route to northern
Sweden could take fuel and food for secret delivery at sea to Soviet
submarines there. The quantities delivered would be returned in kind
wherever we wished, for example, in any Soviet port where our naval
forces had similar needs. The Russians will communicate the details
of their wishes, the place of contact, etc., as soon as Germany has
indicated her agreement in principle. The Russians ask for utmost
speed, since they are planning on the first deliveries at sea in just
three or four days. I strongly recommend taking into consideration
compliance with the Russian request because, first, such assistance
would have little effect on the Finnish position and be of minor consequence
for the outcome of the conflict ; second, because return deliveries,
for example in the Far East, would offer great possibilities for naval
operations; and third, because the German Naval authorities on the
strength of such assistance can make demands on the Soviet Navy in
the future. 448GKdos. BAUMBACH
SOHTILENBTJRG
26009054 38
508
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 434
180J9/422745-
The Foreign Minister to the Legation m Norway
Telegram
TJKGENT BEKCIK, December 9, 1939 10 : 20 p. m.
No. 497 zu Pol. VI 2719 Aug. I*
With reference to your telegram No. M2.1
Please convey the following to the Foreign Minister in reply to his
questions :
Re I : Theinquiry has astonished usto the utmost and appears utterly
incomprehensible. We fail to understand how the Norwegian Government
could take seriously any such information as it allegedly
received. We can characterize such allegations only as malicious
slander ; we would be interested to know the source.
Re 2: The German Government is not involved in the Russo-Finnish
conflict. Its naval measures, in conformity with the accepted principles
of international law, result exclusively from the state ox war
existing between Germany on the one hand and England and France
on the other.
(Reich Foreign Minister)
1 Document No. 424.
No. 435
103/111852
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
MOST URGENT BEHUEST, December 10, 1939.
Mo. 1039
With reference to your telegram No. 903.1
DNB released the following report today :
Certain Swedish newspapers are publishing sensational reports of
German war material deliveries to Finland ; in addition, the assertion
is made that a foreign power recently supplied Finland with planes
and that Germany permitted and expedited their transit.
This report is sheer invention and aimed solely at disturbing German-
Russian relations. We have learned from an informed source
that since the beginning of the conflict between Soviet Russia and
Finland no war material of any kind has been shipped to Finland
either by or through Germany.
End of DISTB report.
Please bring this to Molotov's notice and take definite steps to counter
the suspicion and mistrust of the Russian Government. It is true
1 r>oeument No. 432.
DECEMBER 1939 509
that we have received requests for transit of war material from third
countries since the outbreak of hostilities, but we have strictly rejected
them.
I further request that you see to it that in the future Tass refrains
from casting such unfounded suspicion upon Germany and gets in
touch with the German Embassy as a matter of routine when such
reports come up.
2
RIBBENTROP
* On Dec. 11, Schulenburg wired as follows : "With, the same prominence that
the Soviet press gave yesterday to the Swedish news report, it has published
today the Transozean agency text of the dementi regarding alleged German arms
deliveries to Finland and alleged transit of Italian airplanes for Finland."
(103/111866)
No. 436
314/190778-81
Memorandum of the DienststeTle RiVbentrop x
BERLIN-, December 10, 1939.
1. Reichsleiter Dr. Ley transmitted to the Foreign Minister about
the beginning of September 1939 a letter of his liaison man to the
Italian Confederations in Rome, Dr. Bust, in which the latter reported
a conversation with the present State Secretary in the Italian Ministry
of Corporations, CianettL2 According to Dr. Rust, State Secretary
Cianetti had made very unfriendly remarks about Germany in
this conversation. He has asserted that the military clauses of the
German-Italian treaty of alliance were to have become effective only
in the year 1941 and that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had deceived
the Italian Government by deliberately concealing the seriousness
of the actual situation.
2. The Foreign Minister refuted point by point the false assertions
of Cianetti in a letter to Dr. Ley from the Führer's headquarters,
3 and requested Dr. Ley to meet with State Secretary Cianetti as
soon as possible in order to correct his statements.
3. On instructions of Reichsleiter Dr. Ley, Dr. Rust tried for weeks
to arrange a meeting between Dr. Ley and Cianetti, but the latter continually
evaded this and finally declared that the things that he had
implied earlier had been superseded by the agreements made later
between the Führer and the Duce.
4. Since the Foreign Minister, however, felt obliged to insist upon
straightening out once and for all the misunderstandings which had
obviously arisen, he instructed Ambassador von Mackensen to arrange
the Dr. Ley-Cianetti conversation as soon as possible. This was ac-
* The memorandum is unsigned but conies from a file of the Dienststelle
Ribbentrop. 2 See the enclosure to document No. 24.
"Document No. 68.
510
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
complished within a very short time. Ambassador von Mackenseu
reported by telegram
4 that State Secretary Cianetti would be available
on December 9 and thereafter transmitted the official invitation.
5. It was the Foreign Minister's view that Dr. Ley should utilize
his stay in Italy to make brief visits to the Duce and Count Ciano.
After the Führer's approval had been obtained, the Foreign Minister
had a conversation with Reichsleiter Dr. Ley the week before the
latter's departure in which the Foreign Minister gave Dr. Ley information
for his trip and in particular for the talks with State Secretary
Cianetti. He requested Dr. Ley to give clear expression in his
talks in Italy to Germany's absolute confidence in victory. Germany
would not lay down her arms, he said, until France and England had
received crushing blows and begged for peace. He further requested
Dr. Ley in his visits with the Duce and Count Ciano to avoid foreign
policy discussion as much as possible and in particular not to
go into the Russian question. The friendship with Eussia was firm,
he said, and had already proved itself. With respect to relations with
Italy, the Foreign Minister declared that the Fuhrer, and therefore
Germany, had a firm confidence in the Duce. Dr. Ley was to give particular
expression to this. Dr. Ley had indeed plenty of material to
discuss in connection with questions in his own field of work. The
Foreign Minister would be glad to see the mutual exchange of tourists
and workers renewed to a certain extent. Moreover, the Foreign
Minister had already directed that the cultural relations between
Germany and Italy should be continued and rendered more active.
On leaving, Dr. Ley promised the Foreign Minister to make an immediate
report after his return from Italy.
6. As Dr. Ley told the section head in the Dienststelle Kibbentrop,
Party Comrade Wiister, who accompanied Dr. Ley to Italy on the
Foreign Ministers instructions, he had received instructions from
the Fuhrer before his departure for Borne. The scope and content of
these instructions were not conveyed to the Foreign Minister by Dr.
Ley before his departure.
7. Reichsleiter Dr. Ley returned from Rome on Saturday, December
9, and did not inform the Foreign Minister of the content of
his talks with the Duce, Count Ciano, State Secretary Cianetti, and
other personalities,
5 Only from a memorandum which Count Ciano
4 Not printed ( 8332/E589835 ) .
5 A memorandum of Dec. 12 (314/190771-73) by Btittner, the Foreign Ministry
liaison man to key, states that he met Ley on his arrival at the railroad station,
hut was unable then or in later contacts with Ley's staff to arrange a meeting
between Ley and Ribbentrop.
DECEMBER 1939 511
gave Eeichsleiter Dr. Ley,
6 the content of which was known to Party
Comrade Wiister because he participated in its translation, and from
the oral reports of Party Comrade Wiister, did the Foreign Minister
learn that. Eeichsleiter Dr. Ley in his talks with the Duce, Count
Ciano, and State Secretary Cianetti did not abide by the directives
given him by the Foreign Minister. Rather he had made the most
detailed statements concerning German foreign policy and the military
aims of Germany, in particular to the Duce and Count Ciano. It
is set down in the memorandum that Reichsleiter Dr. Ley informed
Count Ciano of Germany's intentions with respect to the situation to
be established in the east and concerning military intentions in the
west. Accordingly, Italy is informed in detail of Germany's plans.
8. According to Party Comrade Wiister, the Duce complained to
Beichsleiter Dr. Ley that his Government was not sufficiently informed
either in Eome or in Berlin, and in particular he felt obliged to complain
that Ambassador Attolico had received and was receiving only
inadequate information from the Foreign Minister. Dr. Ley was the
first, he said, who had brought the Duce a clear picture of Germany's
intentions.7
'Not printed (314/190774r-77). This document, marked "Translation/* is a
point by point summary of Ciano's memorandum of his conversation with Ley
which is published in Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 321-327. For the Italian
version see Europa verso la catastrofe, pp. 484-493.
7 On Dec. 13, Weizsacker wrote to Mackensen to inquire what he knew about
Ley's visit in Rome (472/228663). Weizsacker said that he had not been able
to learn any details, although Ley had written a long memorandum which he
had handed to the Führer personally. Mackensen replied on Dec. 22 (472/
228664^-65) that his only additional information concerned Ley's statements to
Minister of Corporations Ricci and some others to whom he had spoken mainly
of German confidence in victory and intention to destroy the British Empire.
Ricci had found Ley's statements on the subject of Russia particularly reassuring.
No. 437
108/111808
Me(mtorandwn by cm Official of Political Division I
BERLIN, December 10, 1939.
Drafting officers : Counselor Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch ; Secretary
of Legation Federer.
With reference to telegram No. 905 of December 9 from Moscow,1
Admiral Fricke informed us at 1 : 00 p. m., by direction of Grand
Admiral Raeder, that the Grand Admiral requests that the Russian
inquiry as to whether German steamers on the route to Northern
Document No. 433.
512
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Sweden could supply the Soviet Russian submarines with fuel and
food should in principle receive an affirmative reply.
Shortly thereafter Admiral Fricke reported that the Führer had
given his approval and that the Navy would therefore send appropriate
instruction to Moscow through the Foreign Ministry.2
FEDERER
a ln a telegram of Dec. 10 to the Embassy in Moscow (B18/B003257)
Weizsacker stated that the proposal had been approved in principle and that one
or more small ships could probably be made available within a few days instead of
the LuleS, steamer which was unsuitable. He asked lor details as to the fuel
and food desired and the size of oil intake couplings on Soviet submarines.
No. 438
"by the Foreign Minister
, December 11, 1939.
RAM No. 60.
I. I asked the Russian Ambassador to see me today at 5 p. m.
At the beginning of our Conversation, I indicated to M. Shkvartsev
the inappropriateness of the report given out by the Tass agency
yesterday, dealing with alleged armament supplies by Germany to
Finland. I stressed the fact that this report had been denied yesterday
by German sources. All the more did I regret that this report,
apparently launched from English sources via Sweden and only designed
to create discord between Germany and the Soviet Union, has
been taken up in so striking a fashion by the official Russian agency.
On the armaments business with Finland I made the following
statement * to him :
1) Before the commencement of hostilities last summer Germany
had contracted with Finland for the supply of certain antiaircraft
guns in exchange for nickel shipments from Finland. After the
hostilities began, further shipments ceased*2
2) The Italian Government had inquired in October whether Germany
was willing to permit the transit of fifty aircraft to Finland.
1 On another copy (F18/395-393) the word "proposals" is used instead of
"statement."
*In a memorandum of Dec. 11, Weizsacker noted that on the previous day
Kapit&n zur See Biirkner of OKW, after consulting Generals Thomas and
Jeschonek, told him the following: "In the past four weeks, i. e., prior to tlie
outbreak of the Russo-Finnish hostilities, only two shipments, each consisting of
twenty to thirty 20 mm. antiaircraft guns, had gone to Finland from Germany.
There had been no further shipment of war material to Finland from Germany
during that period.
"There has been no transit of foreign aircraft to Finland through or over
Germany before or since the outbreak of hostilities." (103/111867)
DECEMBER 1939 513
At that time the threat of military measures between Russia and Finland
could not yet be foreseen. Therefore, the German Government
had, to be sure, refused transit by air, but raised no objection to transit
by rail. The Italian Government, however, did not refer to this
matter again, and neither the Italians nor the Finns made requests
for a transit permit for the planes.
3) Some time ago an application was made to ship certain war
materials for Finland from Belgium through Germany. This application,
too, had been rejected.
I now ask the Russian Ambassador to inform his Government of
the foregoing and to point out that with publications such as the Tass
report mentioned, only England's game is being played. England
stands behind Finland and according to intelligence available to me,
England is also responsible for the failure of the Russo-Finnish negotiations
last November. I should be grateful if the Russian Government
would cause the Tass agency, before releasing such reports in
the future, first to get in touch either with the German Embassy in
Moscow or with Berlin, in order that such unpleasant incidents might
be avoided.
The Russian Ambassador showed appreciation of my viewpoint
and promised to report to his Government accordingly.
II. I then spoke to the Russian Ambassador about the extensive
demands for military supplies put forward by the Russian trade
delegation. I wanted to say beforehand that I had given instructions
to comply with the Russian requests in any conceivable way, within the
limits of possibility. But it should not be forgotten that Germany
is at war and that certain things are simply not possible. As I had
since been told, a new basis had been found in the meantime, upon
which the further negotiations can soon be concluded in Moscow,
between the Russian delegation which has just returned there and our
negotiators.
3 I asked the Russian Ambassador, however, to point out
in Moscow that from the German side everything humanly possible
has been done and that beyond that one could not go.
The Russian Ambassador promised to report to Moscow in this sense
and stressed the point that from the Russian side any military information
obtained here by the Russian delegation would, of course^
be kept secret.
I told the Russian Ambassador that we had complete confidence in
the Russian promises, but it should be understood by the Russians
that there was certain material that we could not supply during the
war.
R[iBBENTROP]
3 See Document No. 442. According to a Foreign Ministry statement to DKB,
the Soviet delegation actually left Berlin on the evening of Dec. 13 (1370/35T202) .
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 439
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET ROME, December 11, 1939 6 : 15 p. m.
No. 991 of December 11
With reference to your No. 1014 of December 10.x
During the economic negotiations here early in October Giannini
asked Clodius for German consent to the transit of Italian planes to
Finland. After inquiry by telephone [to Berlin] Clodius replied as
instructed that there was no German objection in principle to transit
by rail and that the necessarytransit authorizations were to be fetched,
according to circumstances, by the shipper, carrier, or receiver, supported
by the proper foreign diplomatic Mission in Berlin, from the
proper offices.
Consorzio Italiano Esportazioni Aeronautiche informed this Embassy
that at the end of November or beginning of December two
fighter planes with parachutes in cars 685369 and 685321, two planes
in cars 685386 and 685197, five tons castor oil in car 1664=92, airplane
ammunition (calibre 12.7) in cars 1011057, 100533, and 163117, and
airplane materiel in cars 685158, 685141, 685323, and 685373 were
loaded for shipment to Germany with destination Finland via
Sweden.2
*Not printed (2131/466568-69). In this telegram, Wiehl quoted the telegram
from the Moscow Embassy printed as document No. 432 and added : "Please
ascertain when, by what means, and how many Italian planes have been sent to
Finland. Immediate telegraphic report requested." a On Dec. 15, Woermann recorded that Magistrati had told him that the
Italian Government had ordered the return to Italy of ten cars with planes for
Finland then at Sassnitz, the southern terminus of the German-Swedish railway
ferry (1571/380247).
No. 440
103/111872,
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 923 of December 11 Moscow, December 11, 1939 9 : 31 p. m.
Received December 12 2 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1039 of December 1C.1
I carried out the instruction with Molotov today and expressed our
astonishment that the canard was published by Tass before we had
an opportunity to expose its falsity.
1 Document No. 435.
DECEMBER 1939 515
Molotov replied that his information had been based not only on
newspaper reports. Moreover, the numerous foreign press reports
of arms deliveries to Finland via Germany had gone undenied hy
Germany for several days. He noted with satisfaction my disapproval
today and now considered the matter cleared up.
SOMUJjENBURQ
No. 441
22/15744
The Minister i/n Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 463 of December 11 OSLO, December 11, 1939 11 : 31 p. nu
Received December 11 3 : 40 p. m.1
For Minister Altenburg.
State Councilor [Staatsrat] Quisling, the former Minister of War
and present leader of the Nasjonal Samling, which has lost much of its
importance, left for Berlin last night in the company of Dr. Noack,3*
and will pay a call there. Quisling wishes to establish contact with
leading German authorities to discuss certain plans relating to Russia.
Quisling's visit has been prepared by Noack. The Legation was called
upon in this matter only with regard to passport technicalities.
Shortly before his departure, Noack apprised me of Quisling's ideas,
which are ambiguous and based on his personal knowledge of Russia ;
a
they need not be taken seriously, however, and are completely con-
. trary to our policy. I have the impression that NToack has already
gone very far in the positive consideration of Quisling's idea. Inasmuch
as Noack continually stresses his connections with leading German
elements, his talk might possibly have an adverse effect on the
policy we pursue (group garbled). I would suggest that Noack be
reminded of the limitations of his authority and enjoined to observe
the necessary reserve.4
* The timing appears to be In error. Quisling was in Berlin on Dec. 11. See
document No. 443, footnote 2.
* See document No. 242, footnote 8.
* Noack had written extensive reports on Dec. 8 and 10 concerning conversations
with Quisling1 (2973/579490-93, 579496-99). Excerpts from these reports
are published in his book Norwegen zwischen Friedensvermittlung und Fremfc
herrschaft, pp. 33-37.
4 See document No. 452.
'Curt BrS.uer, formerly Counselor of Embassy in Prance, was designated
Charg4 d'Affaires in Norway Sept. 28, and took up his post somewhat later. After
the death of Heinrich Sahm, Minister to Norway since 1936, Brauer was appointed
Minister. Hepresented his credentials on Nov. 18.
516
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 442
1370/357205-10
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
URGENT BERLIN, December 11, 1939.
No. 1045 Sent [in two parts] December 12 4:00 a. m.
11 : 00 a. m.
e. o. WIV 5043.
For the Ambassador.
You are requested to bring the following to the attention of Mikoyan
or Molotov or both, according to your awn discretion, in a very friendly
but quite serious manner :
L After weeks of inspection trips the Soviet Commission here finally
submitted a list of military orders a few days ago. The list has caused
very great astonishment here. According to rough estimates it runs
to more than a billion reichsmarks. It contains all of the very latest
materiel that has been introduced in the Wehrmacht or is in the
process of development. In addition, the Soviet Commission maintains
in full the list of industrial orders previously submitted,
1 which
amounts to about 300 million reichsmarks, and demands prompt delivery
of both lists if possible before the end of 1940. It intends,
moreover, to order some large industrial installations which would
also run into several hundred million reichsmarks. The result is that
the orders of the Soviet Commission here amount to a total of about
one and a half billion.
II. We referred the Soviet Commission very emphatically to the
point of departure and the treaty basis of the negotiations in Moscow
and here, namely the Eibbentrop-Molotov letter of September 28 and
the Credit Treaty of August 19, 1939.2 The order lists submitted
were inconsistent with these documents. The first document specifically
set forth as the basic assumption of the agreement that the Soviet
Union would make deliveries to Germany and that Germany would
then compensate Eussia for these deliveries, but only with industrial
deliveries spread over a more extended period of time. So far
Mikoyan has promised us deliveries only in the amount of 420 million
reichsmarks, of* which 90 million reichsmarks come under the first
annual installment of the Credit Treaty. It would be turning the
treaty basis virtually upside down if the Soviet Commission here
1 See document No. 407.
9 See vol. TH, document No. 131.
DECEMBER 1939 517
now demanded that we pledge German deliveries in the aforesaid
amount. Germany's deliveries must obviously depend on the deliveries
of the Soviet Union to Germany for which compensation is due.
In addition to this over-all disparity the disproportion in regard
to the military orders was still more glaring. The first document
made no mention of military orders at all, but clearly only of industrial
orders. In the second document, Germany promised military orders
only in the amount of 58 million reichsmarks. During the Moscow
negotiations, to b sure, a German offer had at first been under consideration
for additional military deliveries over and above these 58
million reichsmarks, specifically in partial compensation for raw
materials wanted by us, such as tin, copper, rubber, etc., which the
Soviet Union would procure in third countries. But this proposal
had been rejected by Mikoyan. This special offer had thereby been
nullified and eliminated from consideration. Thus there remained
only our offer and commitment to fill military orders for 58 million
reichsmarks. Although we were prepared in practice to go a long
way toward meeting further wishes of the Soviet Union with regard to
military orders, it was necessary when judging whether our promises
were "satisfactory," as Mikoyan understood that term, to take the
treaty basis of the negotiations as the point of departure. In this
connection we repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Commission here
acted in opposition to the Uibbentrop-Molotov agreement, which was
fully approved by Stalin and signed in his presence. To this, People's
Commissar Tevossyan replied that the two aforesaid documents were
of course law for every Soviet citizen and that lie was strictly adhering
to them. Nevertheless, he insisted that we give pledges for the total
amount of the military and industrial lists, and with short delivery
terms at that.
III. While maintaining our fundamental position, we did give a
qualified promise with respect to military orders in the amount of
about 660 million reichsmarks, on three conditions : first, that German
deliveries would be made only in the amount of the Soviet deliveries;
second, that the question of iron first had to be solved in a. manner
satisfactory to us; and, third, that the nonferrous and hardening
metals would be delivered in time to be on hand in Germany before
manufacturing was started. Under these three conditions deliveries
for 660 million reichsmarks could be made partly at once, and in the
main during 1940 and running into the first quarter of 1941. Thus
we made commitments for the short-term delivery of orders eleven
times larger than the 58 million reichsmarks provided by the treaty.
518
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In addition, with only a few exceptions we also promised in
ciple to supply the remainder of the military orders, providing, however,
that setting the terms of delivery should be reserved for later.
Still Tevossyan said that our promises were unsatisfactory.
IV. Thus a very muddled situation has arisen here, which is wholly
in contradiction to the two aforesaid documents. It is hopeless to
clear up this contradiction with the Soviet Commission here. Obviously
the Soviet representatives here are not sufficiently informed
about the background of the two documents and about the Moscow
negotiations with Mikoyan. We have therefore proposed to M.
Tevossyan that the further negotiations be transferred back to Moscow.
Apparently he, too, realizes the futility of further negotiations
here and is prepared to transfer the negotiations back to Moscow.
We therefore propose that after clarification of a few remaining technical
points, the negotiations be transferred to Moscow toward the
end of this week.
V. I recommend that you emphasize there, too, that the negotiations
here deviate totally from the basis agreed upon with M. Stalin. I
recommend that in your conversation you also drop a plain remark
to the effect that the whole conduct of the Soviet Commission, and
especially its stubborn insistence on seeing things which either do not
exist or for certain reasons cannot be shown, have required the
greatest patience and self-control on the part of the German generals,
admirals, and other high officers concerned. Our officers placed themselves
at the disposal of the Soviet Commission in a really unprecedented
manner. Very often the conduct of the Soviet experts
reminded us of the behavior of the Inter-Allied Disarmament Control
Commission during the post-war years. We believe that such a critical
remark will at the same time be a favor to the members of the
Soviet Commission, because it will show Moscow with what zeal and
utter unrestraint they devoted themselves to their tasks here.
VI. After so much time has been lost through the Soviet Commission's
method of procedure, we positively anticipate that the signing
of the agreement can still take place before Christmas.
Please send telegraphic report.
3
HITTER
* Not found.
DECEMBER 1939 519
No. 443
Nuremberg document No. 064-C
Exhibit OB-86
Report of the Commander in OMef of the Nawy to the Fuhrer^
December 1&, 1939, at Noon a
Also present : Colonel General Keitel,
Major General Jodl,
Lieutenant Commander v. Puttkammer.
Subject : The Norwegian Affair.
The Commander in Chief of the Navy received MM. Q[uisling]
and H[agelin].
2
Q., former Minister of War and leader of the National
Party, made a reliable impression* He reported the following :
Public opinion in Norway is very hostile to Germany, as a result of
the conflict between Russia and Finland even more so than formerly.
England's influence is very great, above all through the President of
the Storting, Hambro (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha), who
is at present all-powerful in Norway. Q. is convinced that there is
an agreement between England and Norway about a possible future
[evmtuell~\ occupation of Norway. There is a very real danger that
Norway may be occupied by Britain, possibly soon. Sweden would
then also turn against Germany. The Storting, and with it the Government
of Norway, will no longer be legal from January 11, 1940,
since it decided to extend itself for a year, contrary to the constitution.
This would provide an opportunity for a political revolution. Q. has
good connections with officers in the Norwegian Army and has followers
in important places (e. g., railways). Should the occasion
arise, Q. is prepared to take over the government and to ask Germany
for aid. In addition, Q. is ready to discuss preparations of a military
nature with the German Wehrmacht.
The C.-in-C., Navy, points out that it is impossible to know with
such offers how much the people concerned wish to further their own
party schemes and how important German interests are to them.
Caution is therefore advisable. It must be made impossible for Norway
to fall into British hands, as this could be decisive for the outa
Ttie German text of this document is printed in Trial of the Major War
Criminals, vol. xxxiv, pp. 271-273.
2 A record of Raeder's conversation of Dec. 11 with Quisling and Hagelin is
printed in "Ffthrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," Brassey's Naval
, 1948, pp. 65-66.
520
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
come of the war; Sweden would then be entirely tinder British influence
and the war would be carried into the Baltic Sea, thereby completely
disrupting German naval warfare in the Atlantic and in the
North Sea.
The Führer also regards the occupation of Norway by Britain as
unacceptable. The C.-in-C., Navy, points out that German occupation
of Norwegian coastal bases would naturally occasion strong
British countermeasures for the purpose of interrupting the transport
of ore from Narvik. Severe surface warfare off the Norwegian
coast would be the result, and the German Navy is not yet prepared
to cope with this for any length of time. In the event of occupation,
this is a weak spot.
The Führer considers whether he should speak to Q. personally, in
order to form an impression of him ; he would like to hear Beichsleiter
Rosenberg's opinion first, as the latter has known Q. for some
time.3
The C.-in-C., Navy, suggests that if the Führer is favorably impressed,
the OKW be permitted to make plans with Q. for preparing
and executing the occupation either : (a) by friendly methods, i. e.,
the German Wehrmacht is called upon by Norway; or (6) by force.4
2. The C.-in-C., Navy, recommends keeping a clear policy with
regard to the Russo-Finnish conflict. No armament is to be sent in
support of Finland (via unreliable Sweden). The Chief of Staff,
OKW, declares that the Foreign Ministry has been informed that arms
would be delivered to Sweden only if the Swedish Government guarantees
in writing that they are to be used solely by the Swedish Army.
On the other hand, the C.-in-C., Navy, recommends accommodating
Russia, for example in the matter of oil supply for submarines, as
Rosenberg wrote to Baeder on Dec. 13, indicating that he thought it would
be a good idea for Hitler to see Quisling. He enclosed a memorandum about
Quisling and his plans. This memorandum is printed in Trial of the Major
War Criminals, vol. xxxrv, document No. 065-C, exhibit GB-85, pp. 273-275.
Bosenberg's letter is printed in F. Palmstr0m and R. N. Torgersen, Preliminary
Report on Germany's Crimes Against Norway (Oslo, 1945), pp. 35-36.
4 Marginal note in handwriting at (o) : "The Führer agrees." In the Jodl
diary introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document
No. 1811-PS, but not included in the published collection, there is an entry
for Dec. 13 stating that on that date Hitler received Quisling and later on the
same day ordered "that investigations on how to seize N[orway] should be
conducted by a very restricted staff group." Excerpts from the Jodl and Haider
diaries on Denmark and Norway have been arranged chronologically and printed
in Walther Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung von Danemarto un& Norwegen,
1940 (Gb'ttingen, 1952), pp. 379-403. Minutes of Hitler's two conversations with
Quisling the second was on Dec. 18 have not been found. Of. Rosenberg's
retrospective account of June 15, 1940, published in Trial of the Major War
Criminals, vol. xxv, document No. 004r-PS, exhibit GB-140, pp. 26-34, and Raeder's
account of Jan. 30, 1944, ibid., vol. xxxiv, document No. 066-C, exhibit GB-81, pp.
276-282. Incorrect dates for the first Hitler-Quisling conversation are given ID
the Rosenberg and Baeder accounts.
DECEMBER 1939 521
Russia also offers us practical advantages, e. g., holding foreign ships
in Murmansk for 3 days after the departure of the Bremen.
The Fuhrer agrees on both points.
Countersigned:
No. 444
2131/466577
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
in Italy
Telegram
No. 1023 of December 12 BEBLTN-, December 12, 1939 10: 00 p. m.
Received December 13 3 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 991 of December 12
Please inform the Government there as a precautionary measure that
the consent we originally gave to the transit of Italian war material
to Finland has been nullified by the outbreak of the war between
Finland and Russia. Permission for such transit shipments can no
longer be granted by Germany.
For your information :
We have not yet been able to determine whether the material mentioned
in your telegraphic report x had already crossed the frontier
into Germany. Transit applications for the shipments in question
have not been made as yet.
WlEBJi
1 Document No. 439.
No. 445
127/69620
Under State Secretary Habicht to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
TJEGENT BBKUNT, December 12, 1939 10 : 26 p. m.
No. 1049 of December 12 Received December 12 5 : 40 a. m. {sio\.
For the Chief of Mission personally.
Dr. Kleist has been charged with making preparations in Moscow
for the Dr. Schafer and Sittiq Khan business and for this purpose
to establish contacts with the Embassy and the appropriate Russian
authorities. Please support Dr. Kleist in his plans in every way, and
in particular arrange for contacts with the appropriate Russian
authorities.
HABICHTT
522
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 446
319-/1928C7-0&
Memorandum by\ the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BEBLIN, December 12, 1989.
Subject : Deliveries of arms to Sweden.
During the last few days the Swedish Government has been trying
very hard to get large quantities of arms delivered as soon as possible.
It has approached the Rheinmetall Borsig firm with regard to delivery
of antiaircraft and antitank guns and 105 mm. field howitzers
together with ammunition for them, if possible within 3 months.
Furthermore, the Swedish Military Attache, accompanied by several
officers who came here especially for the purpose, called on the Defense
Economy Staff \_~Wehrwirtsc7iaftsstdb'] and asked that the following,
materiel (around 100 million BM in value) be relinquished, if possible
at once, from Army stocks :
32 antitank guns
54 field howitzers
350 20 mm. antiaircraft guns
18 37 mm. antiaircraft guns
30 20 mm. antitank rifles
500 submachine guns
10,000 hand grenades
100 armored cars
According to information from the Defense Economy Staff, the
Führer, after a preliminary report by General Keitel, agreed to arms
deliveries to Sweden in so far as we do not deprive ourselves thereby.
An investigation of what could be released is under way. Probably
only part of the requested arms can be delivered, at most about 60
million KM in value.1 At the moment the Swedish military delegation
is on an inspection trip which will be completed on Friday,
December 15. By that time the basic approval of the Foreign Ministry
is desirable.
Arms deliveries to Sweden have been undertaken regularly in the
past. From April to October, for example, 12 Heinkel planes valued
at 3,800,000 KM were delivered, and contracts have been concluded
regarding 12 Heinkel planes and 12 Focke-Wulf planes which are
supposed to be delivered from December 1939 to March 1940.
I suggest that consent be given on condition that the Swedes promise
us equivalents in valuable raw materials which we particularly need
at the present time, especially copper, nickel, tool steel, etc. ; moreover,
these deliveries should be supplementary to the quantities of these
raw materials which Sweden normally delivers to us.
*In an agreement of Jan. 27, 1940 (319/192834r-37), the Swedish and German
Governments arranged for Sweden to receive armament and munitions worth
about 25,000,000 RM in exchange for gold and raw materials.
DECEMBER 1939 523
Considering the arms deliveries which, according to press reports,
Sweden has recently made to Finland, it is important that the Swedes
have on their own initiative proposed a clause in the contract in
which they obligate themselves not to sell to third parties the arms
which they obtain from Germany.
Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign.
Minister.
WXHHI,
No. 447
6783/2513635
Memorandum oy the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, December 12, 1939. W 3141 g.
DEUCVEBIES or ARMS TO HOLLAND
At the economic negotiations with a Dutch delegation starting here
tomorrow, it is intended to put pressure on the Dutch by the announcement
that we will no longer supply them with commodities of importance
to them so long as they cannot supply us with commodities that
are especially important to us, e. g., rubber and tin from the Netherlands
Indies. Accordingly, they are to be told that we are not prepared
to make any further deliveries of arms for foreign currency,
even those already contracted for. On the contrary, we can make
deliveries of arms in the future only if we receive full value in raw
materials of importance to us.
A list of the principal arms contracts with Holland is annexed
hereto.1 They refer in the main to about lit) antiaircraft guns with
ammunition, for immediate delivery, and the closing of a contract for
18 bomber planes, to be delivered by the middle of next year, which,
however, has not yet been approved by the Field Marshal.
The OKW has already, of its own initiative, stopped delivery of
the antiaircraft guns.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary with the request for approval of the proposed procedure.2
*Not printed (6783/B513636). Under antiaircraft artillery were listed: "80
guns of 7.5 cm. with substantial quantities of ammunition. Four guns have
been delivered. Further, 36 guns, complete with ammunition, ready for delivery,
but retained by the OKW. The treaty was just concluded in October."
*At the bottom of the document is the note: "Deliver slowly and in small
amounts. R[ibbentrop]."
Bibbentrop's comment was based on a penciled note of I>ec. 14 : "The Ftthrer
is of the opinion that the arms should be delivered to the Dutch slowly and in
small lots. Hewel." (6783/E513637)
A. further Hitler order of Jan. 24, 1940, directed that deliveries of antiaircraft
guns to the Netherlands were to be delayed and that no 7.5 cm. antiaircraft guns
were to be supplied (6783/B513647).
260090 54 39
524
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 448
Memorcmdwm, T>y the Chief of Protocol
EM 62 BERLIN, December 12, 1939.
The Foreign Minister today received the newly-appointed Japanese
Ambassador, Kurusu, who was making his first official call.
The Foreign Minister began the conversation by tracing the development
of German-Japanese relations during recent years as
follows :
Since 1934 the Foreign Minister had devoted special attention to
cultivating German-Japanese relations. In this he had been supported
to the fullest extent by the then Military Attache and [word
illegible] Ambassador Oshima. In countless conversations [several
words illegible] all points [several words illegible] cooperation were
discussed and it was established that the views of both sides were in
complete harmony. From this cooperation there had developed a
relationship of trust which had contributed considerably toward promoting
German-Japanese relations. An essential step in this field
had been the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He, the Foreign
Minister, had then attempted to obtain a mutual alliance of
Germany, Italy, and Japan. This alliance did not come about. For
6 months the German Government had been prepared to conclude
this alliance, but the Japanese Government had not been able to reach
a decision. Thereupon Germany had signed with Italy alone. Further
efforts to reach agreement with Japan after the conclusion of
the treaty with Italy also remained unsuccessful. Meanwhile France
and England had negotiated with Russia, in order to draw Russia
into the encirclement of Germany. German policy had foiled this
attempt, however, and had reached an understanding with Russia
which was in the interest of both countries. On his visit to Moscow
the Foreign Minister had urged the Russians to reach an understanding
with Japan x and had also instructed Ambassador Ott in Tokyo
to make representations to the Japanese Government in the same
sense.2
The Ambassador then replied that the good relations between
Germany and Japan were deeply anchored. He attributed this principally
to the fact that German influence was very great in Japan in
the artistic as well as the scientific field, for many professors in Japanese
universities had received their earlier training in Germany and
had transmitted their thoroughly deep friendship for Germany to the
1 See vol. vn, document No. 213.
* See document No. 40.
DECEMBER 1939 525
younger generation in Japan. These were the roots of a friendship
which, no matter what time might bring, could never die out. This
friendship could be compared with Mount Fujiyama, which might
sometimes be covered by clouds, but which was nevertheless always
there and could never disappear. But he had to say that Germany's
friends in Japan had been disappointed by the German-Russian pact.
He believed that Ambassador Oshima, too, had suffered within himself
because of that agreement. But General Oshima was in every respect
a soldier; he would not brood over a lost battle, but employ all his
strength for the task which he had recognized as the right one.
Here the Foreign Minister interposed that this alleged disappointment
had been unjustified. Did Japan think that it would be more
advantageous for Japan if Russia were today among the enemies of
Germany? Moreover, he had spoken with General Oshima already
in 1937 of the fact that a kind of adjustment between Germany and
Russia and Russia and Japan was necessary. Oshima had shown
understanding for this policy and had told him, the Foreign Minister,
that he had conveyed this idea to the military authorities in Japan in
numerous telegrams.
At this Ambassador Kurusu replied that Oshima, who was a close
personal friend and one of whom he thought very highly, had never
spoken to him of that. He was, however, convinced of the correctness
of that conception, for he too had felt for years that such a development
would have to take place, and he had to admit that in the Foreign
Minister's place he would have done exactly the same. But it
was very difficult to bring this idea of adjustment home to the Japanese.
The Japanese had always been taught that Russia was their
real enemy. This attitude was particularly prevalent in circles of
the armed forces, and it was, of course, difficult to eradicate it now,
The Foreign Minister replied that he fully understood this, but the
time had come for the Japanese Government to recognize clearly that
Japan's real enemy was England. The [one word illegible] of Japan's
China policy with England was impossible, for England would never
voluntarily give tip the 600,000,000 pounds she had invested in China.
Agreement with England would mean renouncing the expansion of
Japan. Only in opposition to and in struggle against England could
Japan grow strong, just as Germany could attain her goal only by
struggle against England. He knew very well that there were strong
forces at work in Japan in favor of collaboration with England.
These forces were anchored mainly in business, for the business mind
again and again made the mistake of selling its political birthright
for a mess of economic pottage. (As the Ambassador did not understand
this comparison, it was explained to him by a simpler
formulation.)
526
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germany had taken absolutely firm decisions on the basis of the
situation seen as a whole, Germany would win this war. There
was no longer any question of a desire for peace. At the conclusion
of the Polish campaign the Führer had again held out to the British
the hand of peace. This had been rejected, and now Germany no
longer wanted peace; on the contrary, Germany wanted to carry
through this war and would bring it to a victorious conclusion. The
Minister did not want to prophesy, but he was convinced that we would
defeat France and that England would approach us within the course
of the next year with a plea for peace.
After these words the Foreign Minister intended to conclude the
conversation, but Ambassador Kurusu requested to be allowed a few
more words in reply. He wanted to draw the Foreign Minister's
attention to the Pacific side of Japanese policy. He himself had
lived in the United States for a long time, his wife was an American,
and he knew the sentimental side of the American temperament. He
also well knew that the American Government was holding firmly to
its goal, and that this goal was to block a strong Japan. On that point
England and America, were agreed. Japan was acquainted with this
political objective but she would not allow herself to be arrested in
her course. The people and the Government were firmly determined
to end the China conflict in Japan's favor, even if and he would
admit this quite frankly the economic side and the food situation in
Japan were difficult at the moment.
The Foreign Minister agreed with the Ambassador's statements to
the extent of saying that Germany and Japan would have to become
great and strong by their own efforts, and that this was possible only
by opposing England. The British were willing to use any means to
reach their goal. This was proved anew by the measures against
German exports. He did not wish to give advice to the Japanese
Government, but he was convinced that England would immediately
desist from searching Japanese ships for German goods if two British
ships were halted and searched in Chinese waters for every Japanese
ship stopped. Germany wanted nothing from Japan, but the identity
of interests as regards England made close collaboration
The following passage appears in the margin in Ribbentrop's handwriting as
an addition to this paragraph : "I told the Ambassador that Japan today could
have only one interest, and that was a German victory over England. So there
was, in my opinion, only one policy for Japan with all available means to help
Germany in her struggle, and to avoid anything that would mean strengthening
pur enemies directly (England and France) or indirectly [two or three words
? iSf^S?
eaes 1UeSiWe]. Only in the event of a German victory would Japan
Hold. China ; otherwise a world coalition would take China away from Japan
again. R[ibbentrop]"
DECEMBER 1939 527
The Ambassador thanked the Foreign Minister for his interesting
and important statements and assured him that he, the Ambassador,
valued this collaboration most highly; he would immediately inform
his Government of the present conversation.
No. 449
Nuremberg document No. 1287 PS *
Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt
BERLIN, December 12, 1939.
Subject : Operation against India.
According to reliable confidential information the Foreign Ministry,
in agreement with Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr, has decided in
principle on a joint action with Soviet Russia against India under the
banner of Amanullah.2 Discussions with Soviet Russia are to be
started immediately.
The recently appointed Under State Secretary Habicht has primary
responsibility in the Foreign Ministry. At first, he had to start
from scratch to become acquainted with the problems of the Middle
East. To brief him he had Ministers von Hentig (specialist on the
Middle East in the Foreign Ministry) and Dr. Grobba (for Iraq and
Saudi Arabia) . The views of these two as to actions to be taken were
diametrically opposed.
Dr. Grobba is said to have taken the position that one must cooperate
with the present Afghan Government. The latter should be urged
to make the attempt to reconquer, with the help of Germany and
Soviet Russia, the areas up to the Indus River which were inhabited
by as many Afghans as was the Kingdom itself. In this connection,
assurances would have to be given to the Afghans that agreements
would be made with Soviet Russia to preserve the independence of
Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that Russian support was indispensable.
Grobba's view is said to have prevailed in a meeting about three
weeks ago. On this occasion he suggested, moreover, that Counselor
Ripken, the Foreign Ministry official in charge of economic affairs for
the Middle East, should go to Kabul to establish contact with the Afghan
Government. Grobba's attitude is noteworthy inasmuch as he
had not been able to observe personally, because of his activity as
1 This document was not published in the Nuremberg collection. It is in the
custody of the National Archives in Washington. a See document No, 60.
528
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Minister [in Iraq], the development of Germany's political and economic
relations with Afghanistan in recent years. For this
reason,
also, the strong position which Germany had meanwhile established
in Afghanistan was unknown to him. In carrying out these proposals
the personal contacts with the Afghan Government, gained by
years of work, as well as the strong German colony which is active in
all spheres of military, economic, and cultural life, could have been
immediately utilized for the struggle against England.
Nevertheless, in a recent meeting to which, significantly, Dr. Grobba
was not invited, the view of Minister von Hentig won out, i. e., that
the present Afghan Government be eliminated by the instigation of
insurrections and the restoration to power of Amanullah.
Hentig has always taken the position that the present Afghan Government
is subservient to England. It is known that he has lacked
any understanding of Germany's successful penetration during recent
years. It is indicative of his sabotaging attitude that the German
Government delegation which went to Kabul last summer (Counselor
Ripken, Oberregierungsrat Ter-Nedden of the Economics Ministry,
Oberregierungsbaurat Schnell, representing the office of Dr. Todt)
has not been able, so far, to present its views to Under State Secretary
Habicht.8 Having spent several months in Kabul, the members of the
delegation here openly stated that they have now adopted the views
of the Aussenpolitisches Amt. The President of the Afghan Bank*
was absolutely the most powerful person in the Afghan Government,
and one could rely fully and completely on his efforts to expand
steadily political cooperation with Germany (see enclosure) *
5
Even if the assumption were correct that the present Afghan Government
is subservient to England, all the necessary prerequisites for
the intended action with Amanullah are at present lacking. With
respect to military strategy and personalities, no preliminary plans,
based on a comprehensive and exact examination of the problems over
a period of several months, exist. (Cf. the exposition by Colonel
Niedermayer "Policy and Warfare in the Near East.")
6
The Afghan personage designated by von Hentig to carry out
[these plans] must be completely rejected. He is Amanullah's
former envoy and Foreign Minister, Gulam Sittig (Berlin).
7 He
is known to the Aussenpolitisches Amt as untrustworthy on account
*A memorandum of Nov. 7 by Counselor Bipken summarized the political
impressions gained on the basis of conversations with Afghan statesmen during
the economic negotiations in Kabul, June-August 1939 (2277/479899-911). * Abdul Medjid Khan.
8 This enclosure listed a program for continued German cooperation with the
present Afghan Government on the basis of German military, technical, and
economic assistance.
* Not found.
7 See document No. 269.
DECEMBER 1939 529
of his obscure relations with England. Amanullah himself as he
has made known has no confidence in him either. Heretofore Gulam
Sittig has been rejected also by Canaris' Abwehr Department and by
Minister Grobba, who had met him in 1928 when he was specialist for
the Middle East.
It is worth mentioning that Afghan supporters of Amanullah residing
in Germany who are living in extreme want and are waiting
only for the day when they will assist Amanullah in getting restored
to power, have stated that improvised insurrections would never be
successful. The Afghan army with its modern equipment (from Germany
!) would have to be opposed by a similarly equipped force, while
simultaneously the present leading figures of the government would
have to die at the hand of assassins.
Yet the decision has now been made to achieve the goal by fomenting
insurrections. Dr. Grobba has rightly expressed the view that such
an action would merely lead to a civil war inside Afghanistan which
would be advantageous, rather than harmful, to the English and
would presumably destroy Germany's strong position in Afghanistan.
It has been further decided to send within a short time Gulam
Sittig, accompanied by Party Comrade Kleist of Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop's Secretariat s to Moscow for the purpose of concluding
final agreements with Soviet Russia.
* Actually, Kleist was a member of Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
No. 450
F19/037-038
Memorandum, "by the Foreign Minister
RM 61 BERLIN, December 13, 1939.
The Hungarian Minister, on instruction from Count Csaky, suggested
to me that Germany conduct negotiations for a settlement
between Russia and Finland. Hungary was depressed by the thought
that Russia might attempt to realize her aspirations in the Balkans
after her victory in the north, which was ultimately inevitable. Hungary
would like to prevent this and was staking her hopes on Germany.
I pointed out the following facts to the Hungarian Minister :
1. Russia was a nation with which we were on friendly terms and
whose desire to safeguard her position on the Baltic Sea we understood
perfectly well.
2. According to our information, Russia and Finland could very
well have come to a mutual understanding if the British had not
thwarted it. Because England was backing Finland, she was also
responsible for the latter's foolish policy.
530
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. Germany had had unfortunate experiences with such mediations
and arbitrations, as for example the Vienna Award. At that
time she thought that she had metHungary's wishes to a great extent;
she had, however, received nothing but criticism and worse
from the Hungarian statesmen. Nor had Slovakia been satisfied with
the decision.
The Hungarian Minister declared that Csaky was in the possession
of reliable information to the effect that the Finns now desired to
comply with Kussian wishes and to conclude peace with Russia.
I replied that this was nothing new. Finland had been pursuing
a miserable policy. To begin with, she had rejected the Russian
proposals; Eussia had scarcely started the war, however, when Finland
had informed us that she was prepared to negotiate with the
Russians and asked us to mediate. On the same day, however, the
treaty between Russia and the Kuusinen Government had been concluded
in Moscow,1 so that the Russians, in my opinion, could not at
present negotiate with another Finnish Government.
The Hungarian Minister then presented a memorandum regarding
Hungarian ammunition deliveries to Turkey and asked how Germany
in principle looked upon such deliveries.2
I told him that Germany would consider arms deliveries to Turkey
as military deliveries to an ally of England and France.
Thereupon the Hungarian Minister remarked that this was the
end of the matter as far as Hungary was concerned.
R[IBBENTROF]
* On Dec. 2 a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance had been concluded
between Russia and the Soviet-sponsored "People's government of the democratic
republic of Finland," headed by Otto Kuusinen.
"Not printed (F19/039). Turkey had asked Hungary to supply her with
munitions and to assist in the construction of a munitions plant in Turkey*
No. 451
8496/E597081-83
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
BUCHAREST, December 14, 1939 2 : 45 a. m.
No. 1009 of December 14 Received December 148 : 30 a. m. WIII b 897.
With reference to our telegram No. 963.1
L Failing to make any progress with the Minister President in regard
to the exchange rate question, I brought the matter to the atten-
* Document No. 422.
DECEMBER 1939 531
tion of the King in a suitable way. As a result I was informed
yesterday by the Court Minister that the King himself, for political
reasons and against the counsel of all of his advisers, had ordered that
the exchange rate be raised. The Court Minister then detailed to me
once more the King's ideas concerning political and diplomatic assistance
which Rumania expected of Germany vis-k-vis Russia.
Furthermore the King again urgently requested that the deliveries
of war material be hastened and increased.
In a subsequent conversation with the Minister President, he told me*
using similar arguments, that Rumania could not accept as justified
any of the economic reasons for an increase in the rate of exchange,
which we had advanced, but that she was nevertheless willing, solely
for political reasons, to raise the rate by 15 percent, from 41 to 47
lei. I told the Minister President that the raise was insufficient, and
sought to obtain his agreement to a larger increase. The Minister
President assured me that the proposal was the utmost that could be
offered, and urged me to accept it. I promised that I would obtain
the decision of the Reich Government, but insisted that I personally
could not regard the exchange rate as sufficient,
II. England and France have lately exerted increasingly severe
pressure on Rumania with a view to preventing a raise in the exchange
rate. Only yesterday, the French Ambassador addressed a letter to
the Minister President I was informed of the contents in which he
stated, among other things, that an increase in the rate of exchange
of the reichsmark represented a unilateral and wholly unjustified
favor to Germany, which was incompatible with neutrality. The rate
of exchange question had thus become more and more a matter of
political prestige. The increase in the exchange rate is generally regarded
here as an important political triumph for Germany. Seen
from the economic viewpoint, the proposed exchange rate meets our
demands only in part, but this is supposed to be made up for, as the
Minister President has promised, not only by prevention of any rise in
prices but also by a lowering of domestic prices and the exchange
rates of foreign currencies. Moreover, the Minister President confirmed
the promise to guarantee petroleum deliveries regardless of
value and in disregard of our purchases (group garbled) quota of 25
percent of the total export. I shall nevertheless endeavor to secure
an agreement on the basis of a higher figure. I believe, however,
that for political reasons it would be unwise to carry the matter to
extremes. So far it has been possible, despite the peremptory [ultimatw~\
manner in which the negotiations were conducted, to secure
substantial concessions in the petroleum and exchange rate questions
without causing any political or personal ill feelings.
532
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
III. Since the Hungarian Government has been urging me for days
to come to Budapest, if only for a short time, and has placed a plane
at my disposal to that end, I shall fly to Budapest tomorrow for a day
and shall be back in Bucharest on Friday morning.
CLODIUS
FABKIGTCTS
No. 452
2973/6.79484-S6
Minister Alteribwrg to Minister Brduer
, December 14, 1939.
DEAR HERR BRATJER : Sincere thanks for your letter of December
II.1 I have spoken just as you did to Herr Noack. He has been
strictly enjoined to abstain from "high policy" and, along with his
scholarly work, to devote himself solely to cultural and propagandist
questions, the latter obviously only in closest touch with the Legation
or yourself. I have urged Herr Nback to visit you immediately after
his return to Oslo and to ask you to tell him how you can build Mm
into the cultural and propagandist work of the Legation. I should be
grateful if you would speak to him along these lines. In addition, I
have told Herr NToack not to meddle in political matters and if demands
of that sort are made upon him, to refer those involved directly
to the Legation or yourself. If therefore in the near future, he should
refer to contrary instructions, this would not conform to the facts.
Otherwise, during this visit he again made upon me the favorable personal
impression which he also made upon you earlier. Accordingly,
I hope that now after the admonitions from all sides, things will
straighten out for him again. If contrary to expectation this does not
happen, I should appreciate a report. We would then have to consider
what to do.
As for the occasion of his present visit in Berlin the trip of Councilor
Quisling I immediately characterized the whole business to
him as naive and then put him in touch with the proper official, Herr
von Grundherr. Their conversations had the desired effect, that
Quisling gave up his plan to take his project to the Foreign Minister
or even to the Fuhrer.2 Even the easy solution of a conversation with
the State Secretary was given up.
So far as I know, Herr Noack came again here to the Cultural Policy
Department and spoke with Riihle, Both, and Kolb. The conversa-
*Not printed (2973/579488-89). This letter supplemented BrSuer's telegram
No. 463, printed as document No. 441.
2 See document No. 443, footnote 4.
DECEMBER 1939 53JJ,
tion concerned a book or teaching aids exhibit for which Herr Noack
apparently was able to make suggestions that were readily accepted^
That was about all.
With sincere greetings and Heil Hitler.
Yours, etc., ALTENBTTOG
No. 453
22/13745
The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway
Telegram
No. 511 BBBLIX, December 15, 1939.
With reference to your No. 463.1
For the Minister personally.
Please telegraph immediately what else ^ou know about State
Councilor Quisling and his movement, as well as about Director
Hagelin, who also is now in Berlin, and the standing of both figures.
I expressly request, however, that you refrain from making inquiries
outside the Legation and confine inquiries within the Legation to a
very limited circle. What has been Quisling's attitude toward
England during the past decade ? However, we are especially interested
in Quisling's attitude in recent times. Do Quisling and Hagelin
pursue a distinctly anti-Russian policy at the present time, and what
is their present position on England?
Reply is requested by Monday morning, December 18.2
WEIZSACKER
1 Document No. 441.
3 See document No. 466.
No. 454
685/242523-27
The State Secretary to the Legation in Bulgaria
Telegram
TOP SECRET BERLIN, December 15, 1939.
No. 489 Pol. II 1849 g Rs.
With reference to your telegram No. 349.1
If it is necessary to take up again with the King the questions
brought up by him, you are requested to tell him the following: [We
fully understand his concern, but he for his part will also understand
that it is impossible for us to answer hypothetical questions of this kind
1 Document No. 415.
534
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in advance- Our own policy is determined by the fact of our war and
by our treaties with Italy and the Soviet Union. We expect that
Bulgarian policy will be conducted in such a way that Bulgaria does
not come into conflict with the Soviet Union, in which, despite all our
friendship for Bulgaria and all our willingness to help her in difficult
situations, we could not, in view of the present situation, support
Bulgaria. Nor do we believe that there is any possibility of such, a
conflict.]
2 On the basis of all reports received from Sofia so far we are
of the opinion that Bulgaria's military preparations have not yet
progressed to a point where she could wish at this time to become
involved in a war. In this respect our interests, which are directed
toward the preservation of peace in the Balkans, coincide with those
of Bulgaria. Moreover, we also continue to rely on the promise that,
for her part, Bulgaria will not strike the first blow without having
assured herself of our consent. Any reply to Soviet wishes for the
conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact and cession of air and naval
bases would naturally depend in the main on the time and the circumstances,
especially on whether Bulgaria's national aspirations could
thereby be fully realized. Did the Soviet Union actually make a
demand for the cession of air and naval bases? According to the
reports available to us this is not the case, nor do the Soviets have any
intention of pursuing an aggressive policy in the Balkans. If such
demands should be made, it would presumably still be time enough
to examine the situation in the light of the circumstances prevailing
at the time. Moreover, you might sometime point out casually that
Italy, too, is after all interested in these questions. Does the Bulgarian
Government know the Italian view?
In reply to the King's question whether it would not be possible to
divert the Russians toward the Caucasus if they should intend to take
some action against Turkey, you might tell the King, as your personal
opinion, that the article in the Volkischer Beobachter of December 6,
"Troop Reinforcements on the Caucasus Front," should probably
lend itself to an interpretation in that sense.*
* The passages in brackets were deleted from the final version of this telegram.
The following notes refer to these changes in the text: "Herr Under State
Secretary Woermann. Would you object to omission of bracketed passages?
WeizsHcker], December 8."
"No ! W[oermann] , December 8."
"The Foreign Minister has taken along to a conference with the Führer the
corrected draft of a telegram to Sofia in reply to telegram No. 349. Herewith
respectfully returned to State Secretary Weizs&cker. Schmidt, Berlin, Dec. 9,
1939,"
8 See document No. 376, footnote 10.
DECEMBER 1939 535
No. 455
169/82964-56
The State Secretary to tTie Legation in Rwnawia
Telegram
BEOKBT BERLIN, December 15, 1939.
No. 891 zu Pol. II 2572 g.
1
2573 g.
2 Ang. I.
For the Minister personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 975 of December 8.s
Although to judge from your telegram No. 183 4 of December 9 a
measure of calm has returned there and the panicky mood of the preceding
days, which was' reflected in Gafencu's statements of December
6 and 7,
5 has been dissipated, I nevertheless consider it advisable
that you do not let matters rest with respect to the conversation on
Russo-Rumanian relations which the Rumanian Foreign Minister
entered into with you, but rather continue it at a suitable opportunity.
No reply, however, either official or unofficial should be made to the
question addressed to you by Gafencu as to our attitude in the event of
a Russian attack upon Rumania ; for it is impossible to take any stand
whatsoever on questions of this sort dealing with a purely hypothetical
situation. Approximately the following could be pointed out :
1. As regards the Soviet Russian attitude toward Rumania, we have
no evidence that Russia is entertaining any aggressive intentions directed
toward the Balkan Peninsula. As is known, Stefanov's article
in the Communist International has after all meanwhile been the subject
of an explicit dementi by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs,
published by the Tass Agency, and thus need no longer be regarded as
having any significance.
2. Gafencu told you that Rumania's decision to answer Russia with
arms in the Bessarabian question, if necessary2
was irrevocable because
Bessarabia was inhabited mainly by Rumanians and because an advance
by Soviet Russia to the Danube would constitute too serious a
threat of Bolshevism and Panslavism spreading in the Balkans. At
the same time Gafencu hinted to you that a solution might be found
in a voluntary renunciation by Rumania of the northern portion of
Bessarabia, and suggested that we bring our influence to bear on Soviet
Russia in the direction of such a proposal.
1 Pol. II 2572 g : Document No. 427.
a Pol. II 2573 g : Not printed (2281/480319) . This was Bucharest telegram 983
of Dec. 9 which reported that the recent Tass statement on the subject of the anti-
Bumanian article in the Comintern journal had calmed Rumanian apprehensions
considerably.
'Document No. 427.
4 This is apparently an error and should read No. 983 ; see footnote 2.
* See document No. 427.
536 DOCUMENTS ON* GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The arguments advanced by Gafencu in support of an intransigent
attitude are not very convincing, since the Rumanians' are quite aware
of the fact that Bessarabia was a component of the Russian Empire
prior to 1918, and that Soviet Russia never recognized the cession of
this area to Rumania. We have always held that the awarding of this
territory to Rumania was truly a Greek gift of the former Paris
Conference of Ambassadors', and that Rumania would hardly be able
to retain it in the long run. On the other hand, of course, we would
deeply regret it if that issue led to a conflict between Rumania and
Russia. Therefore, we would like to see such an eventuality precluded
and hoped, though we were not informed as to Russia's intentions,
that Rumanian concessions at the right moment and of the
required s'cope would make it possible to reach a peaceable compromise.
In your conversation with Gafencu please avoid giving the impression
of any attempted pressure or mediation, and do not show that yon
have any instructions from here.6
WEIZSACKER
*On Dec. 22, Fabricius reported (2281/480342-46) that he had had an opportunity
to discuss the Bessarabian problem with Gafencu in accordance with this
instruction. Gafencu then claimed to have documentary proof that Rumania had
originally seized Bessarabia at the suggestion of Field Marshal Mackensen in connection
with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1918, and that the Conference of Ambassadors
gave its sanction only later. For the rest, Gafencu had emphasized
again that Rumania would fight in defense of Bessarabia.
No. 456
141/127408-1O
Memorandum T>y the State Secretary
St.S. No. 992 BERIJN, December 15, 1939.
The Belgian Ambassador called on me today for a talk, the purpose
of which he did not specify, in the course of which he touched upon
the following points :
1. Belgium's need for an early resumption of trade talks. Ambassador
Hitter had been awaiting new developments in the economic
field from the Belgian side. They had materialized, but they would
have to become the subject of negotiations.
2. The allegedly sincere and absolutely neutral attitude of the
King as the determining factor in Belgium. With his new policy
of independence the King, as was known, had severed every military
link with France and would continue to pursue that line. More in
memory of the past November than in regard to the future, M. Davignon
spoke of the insistence with which not only England but also
France had sought to foment a German invasion of Belgium because
Belgium had, for her part, refused to open her borders.
^
3. The prospects for a termination of the war. Davignon himself
viewed these prospects as very small and acknowledged that in Eng
DECEMBER 1939 537
land, and lately also in France, they were piling up almost insurmountable
barriers to peace through public speeches, despite the utter
senselessness of wanting to fight it out to tne end. In the western
theater of the war no real decision could be found. If once the battle
should flare up there in its full fury, it would end only in political
chaos. Possibly Russia's expansionist tendencies might yet give
pause to the British and French.
Davignon thought that the only hope in the situation, of which he
took such a gloomy view, was the possibility of surprises of which
there had indeed been no lack in this war.
I conducted the conversation for my part with all the reserve indicated
by the situation.
No. 457
1370/357201
MeTTiorandvim l>y Ambassador Ritter
BEKLI:N-, December 15, 1939.
To be submitted to the Foreign Minister.
In accordance with instructions, I spoke with Grand Admiral
Eaeder with regard to the possible sale of the plans and drawings of
the cruiser [sic'] Bismarck to the Soviet Union.1
The Admiral naturally also proceeds on the assumption that the
plans and drawings will not fall into the wrong hands, particularly
British hands. But he favored the sale even at the risk of their
falling into British hands. He did not fear that this would entail
any danger to the German naval forces or especially to the cruiser
Bismarck.
The Admiral told me that the Fuhrer's scruples were of another
kind, namely that the plans and drawings showed that the cruiser
had been planned and projected on a larger scale than was permissible
at the time under the international agreements.2 The Admiral was
prepared to brush these scruples aside, provided always that the Soviet
Union pays a very high price for the plans and drawings.
1 Under date of Dec* 8, the "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945,"
Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, p. 63, includes tlie following paragraph: "13.
Sales to the Russians. The Führer decides that sale of the Sey&litz and the
Prims JSugen is to be refused, also sale of the turrets of ships. "H" and "I"
[battleships under construction]. Sale of 20-cm. guns intended for the Lutsow
is to be put off (they must be returned to the Army first) . If after the offensive
a war of position ensues, though we hope this will not be the case, 20-cm. guns
will be needed by the Army ; otherwise they can be sold. Plans for the Bismarak
are discussed. What is the price? The Führer will then make a decision.
The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees, as only two ships are being built and
the Russians need at least six years to copy them."
a A limit of 35,000 tons standard displacement was set for warships by art. 4
of pt. ii of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 17, 1937, by which
Germany adhered to the London Naval Treaty of Mar. 25, 1936,
538
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 458
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the
Foreign Ministry
TOP SECRET PRAGUE, December 15, 1939.
Kxilt. Gen 1850 g. 3&
Subject: Political report.
With reference to report D. Pol. 4 of December 7.1
The Reich Protector was recently ordered to Berlin by the Fuhrer
for a conference. As Freiherr von Neurath has told me in strict confidence,
policy directives for the immediate future were laid down at
that conference. Abolishing the Protectorate is not being considered
at present, especially since there are not enough German civil servants
available for direct administration. Nor will there be any largescale
settling of the country with Germans, because the Germanization
of the new German East has precedence and there are hardly enough
settlers available even for that program. The customs border is to
be abolished on April 1, 1940.3 The German authorities are to avoid
anything that is likely to provoke Czech mass actions, but any Czech
defiance must be crushed with the harshest means from the outset.
The Czech universities will remain closed,
3 but their research institutes
and libraries are to be reopened. In doing so precautions must be
taken to prevent these institutes from becoming underground schools.
Following his return from Berlin, the Reich Protector had State
President H&cha and his daughter as guests for luncheon. The invitation
was not publicized in the local press, but the news was released
to the foreign correspondents as a token of the good understanding
between the Eeich Protector and the Protectorate Government.
To the outward observer there has been a noticeable improvement
in Czech public sentiment, especially as many people have realized
the futility of active resistance. They want to wait and see, and
meanwhile not risk anything. It is on this account that the loyalty
declarations of the Protectorate Government and the Czech leaders
have found approval ; they probably take comfort in the thought that
these declarations compromise no one because they will be regarded
abroad as having been made under coercion. But there is no question
1 Not found.
1 On Feb. 28, Woermann recorded that on this day Hitler had decided to postpone
until further notice the intended abolition of the customs border between
the Reich and the Protectorate (331/195881). * The Czech universities had been closed after the anti-German demonstrations
in Prague on Oct. 28.
DECEMBER 1939 539
of any coercion ; the people have actually made these declarations voluntarily
since they are fully aware that it is to their own interest to
do so.
DR. ZXEMKE
No. 450
1859/422829-32
The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Tgb* No. 132 OSLO, December 15, 1939.
Received December 17.
Pol. VII [sic] 2838.
POLITICAL REPORT
Subject : Norway in the Russo-Finnish War.
The ferment caused in Norway by the Russo-Finnish conflict continues
and intensifies the more the belief grows that Russia will
stretch out her hand toward northern Norway once her objectives
in Finland are attained. It is widely believed in Norway, to be sure,
that England would not stand by idly if Russia occupied ports in
northern Norway, but would try to forestall the Russians by occupying,
for instance, the port of Tromsjl It is being pointed out that
England would then be in a position to close the North Sea completely
also in the North, and that on that account, England probably
would not in the least mind such a development in Scandinavia,
for it would bring her nearer to the consummation of a wish expressed
even a year before the war; namely, to make of Norway
"one big Gibraltar" (cf. report A-IHa of June 28, 1938).
*
Norwegians of all parties are convinced that Finland is fighting
her defensive war against Russia not for herself alone, but for all
of Scandinavia, and that Norway is therefore honor-bound to support
Finland in this struggle. The Norwegian Government is surely determined
to remain neutral. Although it will wish to help Finland indirectly
by sending arms, etc., it will not for a moment lose sight of
the fact that any direct assistance to Finland would inexorably drag
Norway into that war. It was on the basis of this consideration that
Norway refrained from voting at the meeting of the delegates at
Geneva on Russia's expulsion from the League of Nations,
2 an action
which has the approval of the entire country. Moreover, the attitude
of the'Norwegian Government is in accord with the statements made
1 Not found.
* See Editors' Note, p. 480.
26009054 iO
540
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to me by Foreign Minister Koht during our talk on December 12, on
which I have reported by telegraph.
3
While the Government is in this way endeavoring to preserve
neutrality, it is on the other hand compelled to a certain extent to take
into account the sentiment of the people. The Commanding General
of the Norwegian Army has issued, for officers only (the Norwegian
Army has no noncommissioned officers), a ban against volunteering
in Finland on the ground that Norway herself needs all her officers
in these critical times. On the other hand, however, the Government
seems disinclined to prohibit participation of Norwegian volunteers
in the Russo-Finnish war by invoking a Royal Resolution on the
basis of the law of March 11, 1937, as it did in the Spanish Civil War.
This attitude is explained on the ground that, in contrast to the
Spanish war, the conflict between Russia and Finland is not a civil
war. The recruiting of soldiers being prohibited by article 133 of
the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, the various agencies which have
been formed to assemble volunteers will confine themselves to organizing
and equipping them ; there is no recruiting in the proper meaning
of the term, however, especially since enough volunteers are
reporting. There are rumors of a thousand volunteers, but this figure
is probably too high.
I have pointed out in previous reports
* that Norwegian feeling regarding
Germany is deteriorating in proportion as the Russo-Finnish
conflict sharpens. Recently the rumor has been assiduously spread by
word of mouth, especially via Sweden, that Germany would take advantage
of Norway's increased involvement in the north to invade
Scandinavia from the south. This rumor has been attacked with
gratifying severity in the newspaper Tidens Tegn by Benjamin Vogt,
who was for many years Norwegian Minister to London, Nevertheless,
as I hear from Norwegian quarters, the rumor has by no means
been silenced thereby.
This alleged threat from the south is offset by the much more concrete
danger in the north. I have information from a reliable source
that until very recently Norwegian Army personnel with communist
leanings showed a marked consistency in volunteering for service in
northern Norway. In connection with the events of the last weeks
this matter has acquired a decided relevancy owing to the fear that
it might be part of a plan, inspired by the Comintern or some other
* BrSuer had a talk with Koht on this subject on Dec. 11 concerning which
he reported by telegram No. 462 (1859/422784-86) , but no record has been found
of such a conversation on Dec. 12.
4
e. g., telegram No. 417 of Dec. 1 (1859/422727) .
DECEMBER 1939 541
Russian organization operating abroad, to set the stage for a possible
Russian invasion of northern Norway. This collaboration is thought
to be contemplated on a political rather than military plane, and would
probably work out in such a way that in the area in question a communist
puppet government [Scheinreffierung'], patterned after Kuusinen's,
would call upon Russia for revolutionary liberation. Nationally-
oriented elements have already undertaken countermeasures
to replace this Communist army personnel and so neutralize that
potential trouble spot.
Norwegian military authorities take the view that the Norwegian
Government should do nothing to prevent nationals of foreign countries
from assembling on Norwegian territory to go to Finland as
volunteers. This should be subject to the condition, however, that
these volunteers arrive as civilians and have a regular passport with
a Norwegian entrance visa. This seems to me a point to which particular
attention ought to be given by Germany.
BRATTBR
No. 460
8623/E597470/1
The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939 12 : 35 a. m.
No. 182 of December 15 Received December 167: 00 a. m.
Pol. I M 10371 g.
With reference to our telegrams No. 178 of December 14 x and No.
181 of December 15.2
The Legation's request for a 14-day period has been denied. The
Government agreed to the same 48-hour period hitherto granted the
British. The Council of Ministers went beyond that and granted 72
hours. It was announced here tonight that the period extends to
Sunday noon [December 17]. Naturally, I did not recognize the
position adopted by the Uruguayan Government. A further report
follows tonight. .
1 Not printed (51/34098) .
a Not printed (51/34104) . A description by the Naval Attache* of the Legation
in Montevideo of severe damage sustained by the pocket battleship, Admired
Graf Spee, in an encounter with the British cruisers HMS Ajax, Achilles, and
Exeter on Dec. 13. Graf Spee had reached Montevideo the same evening. It
was judged there that at least 14 days would be needed for repairs, and this
length of time was requested on Dec. 14.
542
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 461
The Legation in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939 1:06 a. m.
No. 183 of December 15 Received December 16 1 : 45 a. m.
Pol. I M 10372 g.
[For] High Command of the Navy.
1. Strategic position off Montevideo : Besides the cruisers and destroyers,
Ark Royal and Renown. Close blockade at night. Escape
into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless.
2. Propose putting out as far as neutral boundary. If it is possible
to fight our way through to Buenos Aires, using remaining ammunition,
this will be attempted.
3. If a break-through would result in certain destruction of Crraf
Spee without opportunity of damaging enemy, request decision on
whether the ship should be scuttled in spite of insufficient depth in the
estuary of the La Plata, or whether internment is to be preferred.
4. Decision requested by radiogram.
Captain^ Graf Spee
LAN-GMANNNo.
462
S519/E597441
The State Secretary to the Legation in Uruguay
Telegram
MOST TJBGENT BERLIN, December 16, 1939 3 : 30 p. m.
No. 267 B 31732.
With reference to your telegram No. 182.1
The present decision of the Uruguayan Government regarding the
length of stay is utterly incomprehensible in view of the condition of
the ship and the legal situation, which is known there. You must
therefore use every effort in concurrence with the captain of Ghraf Spee
to obtain the longest possible extension of the time limit and to counteract
in the most energetic manner the British influence working
against us.
In reply to telegram No. 183 2 the captain of Spee will at the same
time receive direct radio instructions from the Naval Staff.
WEIZSACKER
1 Document No. 460.
Document No. 461.
DECEMBER 1939 543
No. 463
Memorawclwm, ~by an Official of Political Division I
SECBET BERLIN, December 16, 1939.
The High Command of the Navy, (Lieutenant Commander Neubauer)
, has conveyed the following :
The Naval Command has decided to issue the following instruction
to the captain of the Admiral Graf Spee:
1. Attempt by all means to extend the time limit.
2. Be paragraph 2 of telegraphic report No. 183 :
* Approved,
Be paragraph 3 : No internment in Uruguay.
In addition Commander Neubauer requested that our Legation in
Montevideo be instructed as quickly as possible to seek extension of the
time limit until seaworthiness is restored and say that we consider the
matter a violation of the provisions of the Hague Convention.
On receiving this report, the State Secretary reported the matter
to the Foreign Minister in the presence of Under State Secretary Gaus.
The Foreign Minister gave instructions for the immediate sending of
a telegram to Montevideo in accordance with the Navy's suggestion.
The telegram is to be dispatched by two routes, first the usual channel
through the Foreign Ministry and, second, through Naval radio
facilities.
A telegram to this effect was then dispatched to Montevideo after
being cleared with the Navy.2
HEYDEN-RYNSCH
1 Document No. 461.
a See document No. 402.
No. 464
120&/331830-31
The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT MONTEVIDEO, December 16, 1939 9 a. m.
No. 184 of December 16 Received December 16 6 : 10 p. m.
Pol. I M 10373 g.
I. With reference to our telegrams Nos. 182 * and 18S.2
The attitude of the Government and the populace is not unfriendly,
but British pressure is very strong. The Government obviously feels
in the face of the far-reaching British demands that a 72-hour period
1 Document No. 460.
'Doeximent No. 461.
544
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
is all it can grant without courting economic suicide. The Foreign
Minister stated confidentially that he would try to persuade the
Council of Ministers to let the 72-hour period start at the time of
the return of the investigating commission from aboard the ship so
that it would actually be 96 hours. The Foreign Minister stated that
he had to inform me with a heavy heart and in full appreciation of
our situation that the decision of the Council of Ministers on the 72-
hour period was final. He said that Uruguay has to contend not only
with pressure from England, but also from France, and that the
Neutrality Decree is not a treaty, but an act of Uruguayan sovereignty.
When I pointed out that such a sovereign act constitutes a binding
international commitment, he countered that Uruguay has the sole
right to interpret the Decree and that the terms provide that a report
by Uruguayan experts would be the basis of a decision by the Government.
The experts (group garbled) 72 hours sufficient for restoring
seaworthiness. Our questioning the qualifications of the experts
does not in my opinion change the situation in any respect because
the Hague Convention does not provide for any impartial experts
and because the decision of the Government is actually based on a
political horse trade with the Western Powers. Our argument that
an interpretation of the Decree would not [ought not?~\ reverse the
original meaning could not change the situation. It goes without
saying that I left no doubt as to the seriousness of the situation
created by Uruguay.
II. No debate on the law can change anything as regards the
pressing need for a decision on the G-raf Spee. Superior heavy forces
which were sighted and verified beyond aoiy doubt by the ship have
convinced the captain that it would be impossible to shake off the
ships trailing him and so make good a break for home. A. 2-weeks
time limit would not change anything in the situation ; on the contrary>
it would only favor the concentration of enemy forces.
Ill* I am in accord with the Naval Attach^ in regarding internment
of the ship the worst possible solution in any event. Blowing up the
ship, even in the shallow La Plata waters, and subsequent internment
of the crew would be preferable. The reason : exhaustion of ammunition.
IV. I have learned confidentially from a dependable source that
the British Minister bluntly demands that 8pee leave the harbor
within 46 [sc] hours and that relations with Germany be severed in
the near future. The President 8 energetically objected to a break
before Argentina and Brazil. How long the President will be able
to hold out against the arguments inspired by England and several
Ministers remains a question. The reports of a number of agents
Alfredo Baldomir.
DECEMBER 1939 545
agree in corroborating the present pro-German attitude not only of
the President but also of the Foreign Minister.* Privately the President
has voiced hope of the early arrival of German submarines to
break the blockade of the La Plata river.
V. Please send instructions 5 as to further steps. Diplomatic break
on the part of Uruguay essentially (group garbled) .
* Alberto Guani.
* Telegram No. 272 of Dec. 16 stated that the captain of the Graf Spee had the
necessary instructions; not printed (8523/E597470). See also document No. 467.
No. 465
91/100-122-23
The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECRET DUBLIN*, December 16, 1939.
No. 182 of December 16 Received December 16 3 : 20 p. m.
For Under State Secretary Woermann personally*
Pfaus, of the Fichtebund of Hamburg,1 who was in Ireland before
the war, has lately again been sending propaganda material, some of
which is allegedly very strong, to radical Irish-nationalist personalities.
The explanation for the striking circumstance that the British,
who generally suppress mail to Ireland "which they do not like, permit
this material to pass, is in my opinion, in view of the compromising
choice of addressees, that England looks forward to further exposure
in order to be able at a given time to point to German connections
with subversive Irish elements and to a breach of neutrality. I am
confirmed in this by a number of requests for aid to the IRA with
which I have recently been approached through suspicious channels,
and by offers of dangerous services which I have good reason to consider
provocations. The responsible radical Irish-nationalist groups
are opposed, for reasons known from my previous reports, to approaching
the Legation in such a fashion. Fichtebund's propaganda in
radical circles is arousing the concern of the Government, as Walshe
indicated to me yesterday, lest German agencies not under the control
of the Foreign Ministry should establish more extensive connections
with the IRA. I had the impression that the Government believes it
has indications to this effect. I have no reason to believe that financial
support is being given, although this is asserted again and again, nor
that there is political incitement of the IRA going beyond pure propaganda.
In this connection I should like to mention, however, that in
1 Oscar O. Pfaus of the Deutseher Fichtebund (headquarters in Hamburg).
The Fichtebund was an organization, founded in 1914, engaged in world-wide
dissemination of German propaganda, principally in the cultural field.
546
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
my opinion the liaison mentioned in telegrams Nos. 122 a and 123 of
November 9 3 did exist, but it is uncertain whether with the Fichtebund,
or another German agency, or even with the British provocation
service [Provokationsdienst]. Walshe also told me that the Government
was now (group garbled) to put a stop to the propaganda of
both sides and with reference to British propaganda place a complete
ban on the malignant press; earlier I had repeatedly suggested such a
step in connection with provisions successfully put through concerning
a number of gross insults to Germany which appeared in British
papers sold here. I request that the matter, especially in so far as
possible where steps with reference to the Fichtebund or the Propaganda
Ministry are concerned, be handled with the greatest caution
and without any mention of my part, since I must in no case be compromised
in connection with the Irish nationalist movement.4
3 Not found.
*Not printed (91/100097). See document No. 355, footnote 1.
4 In telegram No. 192 of Dec. 20 (91/100126-27), Hempel urged that
assistance for travel to Germany be given to- Francis Stuart as a representative
of responsible Irish nationalists. He was to serve as a lecturer at the University
of Berlin, On Jan. 26, 1940, Under State Secretary Woermann recorded in a
memorandum (91/100147), that Stuart had reached Berlin and visited him,
Hempel transmitted through Stuart a repetition of his request that the propaganda
efforts of the Fichtebund be stopped. Woermann assigned further liaison
with Stuart to Stolzmann of the Cultural Policy Department.
No. 466
The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
OSLO, December 17, 1939 1 : 20 p. m.
No. 482 of December 17 Received December 17 10 p. m,
With reference to your telegram No. 511 of December 15.1
For the State Secretary personally.
For several years after the World War, Quisling was Norwegian
Military Attache in Moscow, where he married a Russian woman and
after at first being in great sympathy with Bolshevism became its
most violent opponent. Subsequently he was Military Attache in
Finland for 3 years. After being Minister of War in the Hundseid
Agrarian Cabinet (until February 1933) , he founded that same year
the Nasjonal Samling, which drew many of its ideas and its organization
from National Socialism. This movement, which showed some
modest growth at the outset, has suffered a great decline since the
parliamentary elections of 1936, in the main probably because the
social and economic conditions essential for the movement were lack-
1 Document No. 453.
DECEMBER 1939 547
ing in Norway. Despite his personal prestige. Quisling's political
influence and prospects are on that account very slight. His newspaper
Fritt Folk has a maximum circulation of 1,000 copies and is
now to be subsidized by us (cf. Instruction P VI 16981 of December
9).
2
Quisling considers Bolshevism the greatest menace to Europe. His
political outlook since the conclusion of the Russo-German pact is
dominated by the fear that the Soviet Union might wish to use Scandinavia
as a bridge for carrying the world revolution into Europe.
He is greatly influenced in this by memories of Bolshevist plans in
1931 which were supposed to have provided for the establishment of
a Scandinavian Soviet Federation under Kuusinen. The Norwegian
proponent of this plan was Stjztetad, now Norway's Minister of Social
Affairs. When we met at the book exhibition, Quisling explained to
me that Russia had not abandoned her plan for world revolution and
had no intention of helping Germany to implement the German-
Russian treaty. Even if Russia wished to do so, she would be unable
to give any material assistance on account of the present level of her
production and organization.
Quisling is imbued with the idea that the Germanic race should
work together. This accounts for his advocating German-English
collaboration and a German-Scandinavian-British bloc. His inclination
toward Germany is much stronger than his sympathy for England.
He need not in any way be regarded as an exponent of England.
Since the outbreak of the war he has vehemently attacked England
for her insatiable imperialism which is driving her to seek Germany's
extermination. Quisling shares with the men around him a sincere
admiration for the German nation and its Führer, but since the
Russo-German settlement and the outbreak of the war he is in a
serious inner conflict as a result of the attitude described above.
Director Hagelin is not known to the Legation.
JBRATTER
*N* found.
No. 467
852&/B59T466/1
The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Mwdstry
Telegram en clair
MONTEVIDEO, December 17, [1939] 9 : 17 p. m.
Received December 18 2 a. m.
Pol. I M 9632.
The pocket battleship Admiral GHraf Spee put out at 4 : 56 p. m.
local time. She was blown up by the crew outside the three-mile zone.
548
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
A note in accordance with telegraphic instructions * was delivered to
the Political Director. The captain of the pocket battleship Admiral
Graf Spee made a formal protest to me over the decision of the
Uruguayan Council of Ministers regarding the time limit for his
ship,
communicated to me on the 15th of this month. Accordingly I am
protesting in due form on behalf of my Government to the Uruguayan
Government over its refusal, in most flagrant disregard of international
law and custom, to allow the damaged warship the period
necessary for restoring her seaworthiness, which in the circumstances
was due her as a matter of course. Formal close. At the same time
I have released for publication the detailed letter of protest addressed
to me by the captain.
LANGMANK
1 Telegram No. 274 of Dec. 17 : Not printed (64/44228).
No. 468
127/e9608
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
No. 965 of December 18 Moscow, December 18, 19392 : 50 p. m.
For Habicht.
With reference to your telegram No. 1099 of December 16 * and No.
1101 of December 17.2
The information which I brought along has been discussed with
Molotov. Molotov continued to indicate his willingness to support the
plans, if the occasion should arise, provided he received more detailed
information about the basis of the operation and the methods to be
applied. Only then would it be possible to consider more closely the
idea of dispatching Schafer and the Afghan to Moscow. I therefore
propose that I return to Berlin in order to work out the particulars
requested by Molotov and that I depart again for Moscow in a short
time. On the 19th the Soviet authorities concerned will give a reception
for me. Departure on the 20th.
KJLiEIST
SCHULENBURG
1 Not printed (127/69611). 2 Not printed (127/69609).
DECEMBER 1939 549
No. 469
3571/B3996S1
Minute ly an Official of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, December 18, 1939.
zu W 3019 g.
1
The enclosures to the report of Minister Clodius * set forth in detail
the Hungarian requests for deliveries of war material. (Of. also telegraphic
report No. 619 from Budapest of December 15,2
) The total
value of the Hungarian requests amounts to more than 127 million KM.
Eecently we informed the other departments (W 2260 g III of
November 3, 1939 8
) that we agree in principle with new contracts, in
so far as they involve small current transactions, and that if the Hungarians
should present major requests, an understanding between the
departments concerned would have to be reached in each separate case.
It appears practical, even in transmitting the large list of Hungarian
requests which is at hand, to inform the other departments to
what extent the Foreign Ministry attaches importance to complying
with these requests for reasons of foreign policy. If the list of requests
is merely passed on, without such a view being expressed, it
is to be expected that the other departments will reply that the Hungarian
requests cannot be considered on account of production for
Germany's own needs.
I therefore respectfully suggest that the State Secretary be asked
for a decision.4
Herewith submitted to the Director of the Economic Policy Departmentthrough
MinisterMoraht.
ADAMOVIO
1W 8019 g : Not printed (5571/E399670-81) . This report was sent from Budapest
on Dec. 15.
a Not printed (5571/B399668).
'Not printed (5571/E399625-26).
4
Marginal note: "Decision of the Foreign Minister: Delivery only of such
arms and in such quantities as we can spare easily. W[iehlJ December 18,"
550
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 470
4612/B31S2682-9'7
Memorandum of the AussenpoHtisoTies Amt
BERLIN, December 18, 1939.
AFGHANISTAN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ATJSSENPOLJTISCHES AMT OF
THE NSDAP 1
In 1936-37, during the visit of the Afghan Minister President and
several of his Ministers, who were the guests of Reichsleiter Bosenberg
in Berlin, the German Reich and Afghanistan concluded a number
of basic treaties covering military, cultural, and economic matters,
on the preparation of which this office had worked for years.
2
Their purpose was to aid Afghanistan systematically to realize her
ambition of becoming more independent of her neighbors. It was
the objective of the Aussenpolitisches Amt to make it possible for
Afghanistan to remain neutral in the case of a war, or, if the opportunity
arose, for the country to be used by Germany for operations
against British India or Soviet Russia. The implications of such a
program for the British Empire in the event of a war are also shown
by the World War, when Germany failed to take advantage of the
balance of forces in the Near East (cf. also Churchill, Tfie World
Crisis 1916-18}.
In close collaboration with the present Afghan Government the
Amt drew up a comprehensive plan for all sectors of the Afghan
state and arranged for the appointment of German experts to positions
in the Afghan government service as an essential condition for
the successful implementation of the plan. By means of such experienced
German personnel a network of strong points was to be established
in the vital positions providing Germany with the possibility
of utilizing them in the event that Afghanistan should take military
action with German aid.
Results of planning and cooperation
The German colony developed during that time from an insignificant
group to the largest group of Europeans in Afghanistan.
1 This memorandum was sent to Lammers on Dec. 21 by Arno Schickedanz,
the head of Rosenberg's staff in the Aussenpolitisches Amt, with a cover letter
(4512/E132681) explaining that the memorandum dealt with topics which had
been discussed by Lammers and^ Schickedanz on Dec. 19, It is not unlikely
that the APA memorandum of Dec. 12 printed as document No. 449 was drafted
in preparation for this conversation between Lammers and Schickedanz.
a The basic treaties referred to are filmed in the following serials : 6666, 6668,
8527, 8528, 8531, 8532, and 8534.
DECEMBER 1939 551
The extent and the progress of German-Afghan collaboration to
date are outlined in the enclosure.3
Particularly noteworthy are the
effects of the Dr. Todt agreement* and of the economic agreement
concluded last August.6 The agreement provides for a tenfold increase
in the exchange of goods as compared to 1937, including strategic
materials such as cotton and wool, commodities for which Afghanistan
and Iran are the only sources at the present time with the recent
exception of Soviet Russia.
The equipment of the Afghan army was modernized and its potential
considerably increased by means of German deliveries (delivery
of German antiaircraft guns, trench mortars and mountain artillery
in the approximate amount of 9 million reichsmarks) . Moreover, the
army has 2,500 new machine guns (Briinn) , 20 new mountain howitzers
(Skoda) and 40 old but serviceable mountain howitzers of Austrian
origin. Between 30,000 and 40,000 men are equipped with modern
infantry rifles. In addition to this the army has an excellent
cavalry equipped with modern arms, and about 30 planes (Italy)
with well-trained pilots ; the Afghans have shown remarkable aptitude
for the air arm (training is under a German aviation instructor) .
The training of the army by German instructors (Major Schenk and
Captain Horlock) has, according to their reports, made unexpectedly
good progress. Because of their manual dexterity the Afghans are
in every respect adapted for the operation and maintenance of complex
weapons. Furthermore, the German instructors have trained
a corps of capable officers and technicians. Conspicuous evidence of
the present level of training of the Afghan army was provided this
year by the excellent two-day demonstration of sharpshooting on the
occasion of the parade, as well as by the swift suppression of revolts,
German police officers have completely reorganized the police and
the secret state police of Afghanistan. Thus, within a short time a
hard-hitting, well-disciplined police force has been created which
enjoys great respect among the population.
The policy and strength of the present Government
The principal advocate of Afghanistan's political orientation
toward Germany is Abdul Medjid Khan, the Afghan Minister of
Commerce and president of the National Bank, who may also be regarded
as the most powerful figure in the Government today. He
assumed a very great personal risk in order to put through the pro-
* Not printed (4512/E132698-700). * Not printed (8531/E597625-32) .
*Not printed (8530/E597572-616). There is also in the files a memorandum
by Ripken dated Dec. 1, summarizing the German-Afghan economic negotiations
which led to the agreements of Aug. 3 (2277/479912-37).
552
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
German policy in the past few years, but always lived up to his
promises.
The actual developments are proof that his confidential information
on the weak and strong points of the Afghan Government was correct.
The German Government delegation, too, declared after their
return from Kabul last September that they now fully shared the
views of the Aussenpolitisches Amt about the importance and reliability
of Abdul Medjid. Nor was any change in the political course noticeable
after the outbreak of the war in September. Abdul Medjid
is sending urgent telegrams even to this day, requesting more German
experts for the government service.
German influence in the Afghan Government has doubtless greatly
increased. The Germans are very popular everywhere in the country
and are the only Europeans who have succeeded in gaining access to
the strictly orthodox warrior tribes. British prestige, on the other
hand, has dwindled despite the constant political pressure being
exerted on the Afghan Government.
According to the reports of the German instructors, the army is
absolutely loyal to the Government. Only the following can be regarded
as being in opposition to the Government :
1. The followers of Amanullah, largely confined to the chauvinistic
youth, who hope for reunion with the tribes living east of the national
border all the way to the Indus as many pure Afghans are said to
be living there as in the Kingdom itself) and who object to the present
government by the "cautious old men" on the grounds of insufficient
nationalist activity; so far, however, this pro-Amanullah movement
is completely unorganized and cannot therefore be considered as
dangerous.
2. A few tribes which are suffering as a result of Abdul Medjid's
monopolistic economic measures. From time to time they become
restive and are then either promptly subdued by the army or readily
pacified by economic concessions.
In conclusion it may be stated that with the support of the present
Afghan Government Germany has for the first time assumed political
significance in Afghanistan.
Opposition in the Foreign Mwdstry
The consistent policy of the Aussenpolitisches Amt was carried into
effect despite the opposition of the Foreign Ministry's policy officer
responsible for the area, Minister von Hentig, who had until recently
been claiming for years that Afghanistan was of no political interest
to Germany. Our systematic work in Afghanistan was thus made
possible only by several special directives issued to the head of the
Amt.
DECEMBER 1939 553
The present sudden change in Hentig's view as regards Afghanistan's
importance and his promoting of Amanullah as an instrument
of our fight against British India is paralleled by his handling of
Saudi Arabia, which likewise showed his lack of any political conception
whatever.
Plans involving AmanuUaJi
Several months ago ex-King Amanullah had a friend inquire at
the Amt as to whether he could count on German support if he should
attempt to regain the throne of Afghanistan. The Intelligence Department
of the High Command of the Wehrmacht has been studying
the question for the past year and to that end had one of its men
stationed in Tehran for a year. The only thing apparently done in
the matter was to establish contact with Amanullah's Court Minister,
who lives in Tehran. This contact and the statement of the Court
Minister that he had everything set for a revolution seem to have been
all that was deemed necessary to conclude that the time was ripe for
a move aiming at the overthrow of the present Government and the
reinstallment of Amanullah.
The superficial character of the preparations is illustrated by the
fact that no consideration was given to the revolutionary Amanullah
group in Germany, which includes former officers as, for instance,
Abdul Geni, who some years ago, with the authorization of Eeich
President von Hindenburg and by instruction of King Amanullah,
served some time in the German Army and later devoted himself to
military studies in Germany. Even this follower of Amanullah
always stressed that no coup in behalf of Amanullah could be successful
without careful military preparation. The Afghan army with its
modern equipment would have to be confronted with a force similarly
equipped, while the present leaders of the Government would have to
be assassinated. It would be utterly misjudging the present situation
in Afghanistan to think that the goal could be attained just by sending
money, arms, and planes to the tribes disposed to revolt.
The project of the Foreign Ministry
N"ow that the Amanullah idea has been proposed to them, the Foreign
Ministry seems to consider embarking on an even rasher adventure.
The Foreign Ministry has also decided to overthrow the present
government by revolt and to put Amanullah back on the throne. The
project is to be executed, however, by Gulam Sittig (Berlin) , Amanullah's
former Foreign Minister and envoy, without any active support
whatever by Germany and Soviet Russia. Gulam Sittig is known to
the Aussenpolitisches Amt for his ambiguous connections (England).
554
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
He had been rejected so far by Canaris' Intelligence Department as
well as by Minister Dr. Grobba, who made his acquaintance in 1928
while he was the [Foreign Ministry] officer for the Middle East. AH
the preparations for carrying the project into effect seem to consist
in accepting Sittig's statement that he is able to realize these plans.
It would probably not be wrong to assume that the guiding spirit
of this project is Minister von Hentig, who already on previous occasions
designated Gulam Sittig as Amanullah's representative in Germany.
Habicht, the new Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry,
seems to have adopted this view together with the explanation
for it. For Party Comrade Habicht has stated, in full accord with the
interpretation which von Hentig has always advanced, that the present
Government of Afghanistan is weak and subservient to England,
that the Afghan army, air force, and police are no good, and that
Gulam Sittig consequently would find it easy to sweep away that Government.
The plans involving him have progressed to the stage where
Gulam Sittig and Party Comrade Kleist, of Minister Ribbentrop's
Secretariat, are at present negotiating in Moscow for the assent of
Soviet Russia, following previous inquiries by Count Schulenburg e
with Molotov.
The position of tTie Aussenpolitisohea A.mt
In the opinion of the Amt, Gulam Sittig's projected coup would
result only in setting off a civil war in Afghanistan without achieving
the desired goal. It is even possible that the present Government,
out of fear of far-reaching military action by Germany and Soviet
Russia, might feel compelled, as a precautionary measure, to appeal
to England for help (planes, etc.) and thus fall back into its former
policy of dependence. Such a step, however, would destroy Germany's
whole position in one blow, and Afghanistan would be lost as a base
for a German thrust against British India.
The inquiry already made in Moscow was especially dangerous because,
in the absence of any previously obtained guarantee of Afghanistan's
boundaries, it virtually challenges Soviet Russia to take advantage
of the civil war to annex the northern provinces (in analogy
with the penetration of the Baltic countries) and so exclude German
influence in that region.
It therefore appears urgently necessary :
1. To put an immediate stop to the action planned by the Foreign
Ministry and to recall its emissaries from Moscow, because if the
Afghan Government should learn of the current discussions it would
see in them a confirmation of the rumors launched by the British in
Kabul that Germany and Soviet Russia are planning a thrust against
See documents Nos. 60, 353, and 369.
DECEMBER 1939 555
British. India through Afghanistan, and would of necessity draw its
own conclusions.
2. To try to put pressure on the present Afghan Government to
have it open the borders to the warlike Afghan tribes in the so-called
no-man's land, which in deference to England it has hitherto left to
their own devices in their revolts, and unofficially to give them systematic
aid; meanwhile, a benevolent attitude will be taken by Germany
and Soviet Russia. Moreover, the present Government should
be prevailed upon to agree to a studv of the possibilities of war against
British India, as well as to general staff consultations ; to that end it
would be desirable to send to Kabul a prominent figure familiar with
the Orient, e. g., Minister Dr. Grobba.
3. As a preliminary condition, to obtain Soviet Russia's agreement
to a guarantee of Afghanistan's present boundaries; in other words,
to have her renounce her aspirations to access to the Indian Ocean via
Afghanistan.
4. In the event that the negotiations with the present Government
of Afghanistan should be unsuccessful, to give careful consideration
and preparation in all respects to every other project, such as, for
instance, that relating to Amanullah, so as to give due regard to
Afghanistan's significance as a bridge to British India.7
outcome of this conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the Aussenpolitisclies
Amt on policies toward Afghanistan can be learned from a document
of a much later pejriod. On July 12, 1941, the Aussenpolitisches Amt sent
a letter to Lammers protesting the contemplated appointment of Hentig as
Minister to Afghanistan and, in support of this position, submitted a critical
appraisal of Hentig's policies in the Middle East in the form of a note dated
July 8, 1941. With reference to Afghanistan, the memorandum reviewed the
controversy dealt with in the documents printed and then stated : "Fortunately,
by means of a report sent by the Amt to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, this
Amanullah action was prevented at the last minute.'* This document is Nuremberg
No. 281-PS, but was not published in the Nuremberg collection. It is in
the custody of the National Archives in Washington.
No. 471
452/223389-92/1
Minister Blucfier to State Secretary Wei&sacker
PERSONAL AND coN^iDENTCAij Kmo, December 18, 1939.
DEAH BARON WEIZSACKER : In my letter of December 7 * I took the
liberty of pointing out that the Russian attack on Finland will entail
severe damage to our war economy. In the meantime, unfortunately,
all this has come to pass. The Russians have blockaded the western
coast, they have sunk a German ship, and since then all sea connections
between Germany and Finland have been severed. To take one
example, 600 tons of copper and one million eggs destined for Germany
cannot be shipped.
Document No. 426.
260090 54-41
556
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I must continue to play the role of Cassandra, which is not at aB
to my liking,
You know that in spite of three weeks of war the Russians have not
achieved any decisive victories and that in equipment and manner of
fighting the Bed Army exhibits notable shortcomings. In all probability
the war will last for a long time and numerous complications
may arise. But if we suppose that within the foreseeable future tie
Russians will have occupied the Finnish territory, after it has been
ravaged by fire and deserted by its inhabitants, how will the situation
appear then ?
It is not Sweden which possesses the key position in the Baltic Sea,
but Finland, including the Aland Islands. We would have the EU&-
sians in Liepaja, Ventspils, Saare, Hiiu, and also in Aland and
Tornio.2 This was the case even in the time of the Tsars, to be siire,
but today, with the effectiveness of modern weapons, this gives Russia
quite a different position. A great power holding these positions
dominates the central and northern parts of the Baltic Sea, and also
Sweden, whose capital and whose mines are exposed to the action of
modern weapons based at Aland and Tornio. The entire North would
then come under Russia's influence.
No counteraction is possible against this, especially not from
Swedish territory.
I know that I am not saying anything new, but this letter is meant
to show that these thoughts have come up anew and in definite form
precisely under the impact of the first weeks of the war, which I am
experiencing here. Therefore I am also sending you a report at the
same time, which deals with the same subject.
3
In this private letter, however, I want to go beyond the report and
add something which I cannot take up in the report, since I have
received the strictest instructions from you that there is no chance
of mediation.
The little less than three weeks of war must have brought intelligent
Russians to the realization that the sacrifices which they have
made are out of all proportion to the results achieved ; that it is more
than doubtful whether and when they can gain possession of Finland;
and that even if they do have possession this will mean aside from
a gain from the standpoint of power politics only new and great
difficulties.
On the other hand, the Finns have seen that the Russians are in
earnest, and they are well aware of the dangerous nature of the situation.
It seems to me that there is no doubt that the Finnish Governa
lAbau, Windau, Osel, Dag, Aland, and Tornea In the German original.
* Not printed (1821/41671^-22) .
DECEMBER 1939 557
ment would now be willing to give in on the main point of contention,
Hango.
If the role of honest broker was ever appropriate to a political
situation, it is here, and no country but Germany is in a position
to play this role.
The Russian adventure in Finland, if it is pursued further, can
have only bad consequences for Germany. Therefore we for our
part have the greatest interest in tactfully guiding the two opponents
toward a settlement.
That is all, and I expect that you will anathematize the heretic.
If I might ask a favor, I should appreciate it if Herr von Grundherr
were informed of the contents of this letter.
With Heil Hitler, a kiss to the Baroness's hand, and the best wishes
for the new year, I remain,
Yours, etc.,
No. 472
25^/169-866
The Minister in Denmark to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TTKGENT COPENHAGEN, December 19, 1939 1 : 00 a. m.
Bb. 320 of December 18 Received December 19 5 :15 a. m.
For the State Secretary.
In the talk which the Danish merchant Pless-Schmidt had with
Lord Halifax yesterday, the latter is said to have shown lively interest
in an early peace and readiness to enter negotiations. The conversation
was apparently based on the following proposal drafted together
with former Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko :
1. Poland is to be reconstituted as an independent state, bounded in
the west by the German border of 1914, in the east by the Russian
border of September 1939.
2. Czechia is to be given a government of her own under German
suzerainty and remain part of Germany's military sphere of interest.
3. Return of the colonies.
4. An alliance between the belligerent countries, together with Italy
and Spain, to guarantee the pea^e in Europe (Russia omitted!).
5. A guarantee of the integrity of Finland and the Baltic states.
The Finnish Minister 1 will probably try to arrange a meeting between
the Reich Foreign Minister and Pless-Schmidt, who is flying to
Berlin tomorrow as a Finnish courier.2
J Aarne Wuorimaa.
Nothing further has been found on this incident
558
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 473
1860/422839
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign
Telegram
MOST TJKGEOT? HELSINKI, December 19, 1939 2 : 45 p. m.
No. 428 of December 19 Eeceived December 19 4: 10 p.* m,
Pol. VI 2859.
1. It is assorted in authoritative circles here that the German. Government
has told the Swedish Government that if Sweden should
intervene on the side of Finland the result would be military action
by Germany against Sweden. Please wire instructions on whether I
may deny this assertion.
2. I hear that England and France are exerting pressure on the
Swedish Government to intervene in favor of Finland. The Finns
suspect that the Western Powers may create a secondary theater of
operations in the North, possibly with airbases in Southern Sweden.
3. The Finnish military wish to keep the Russo-Finnish war isolated
from the larger war, and they desire Sweden to come in on the Finnish
side.1
1 Marginal note : "The Minister should not participate in such gossip. We are
neutral in this conflict and have other things to do than occupy ourselves with
such hypothetical possibilities. The basis for our attitude on the northern question
is our friendship with Soviet Russia. K[ibbentrop]."
No. 474
113a/324645^-4<&
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJKGENT [Moscow, December 19, 1939],
SECRET
No. 968 of December 19
For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary von Weizsacker only.
I. The first conversation with Mikoyan today led to the expected
difficulties :
1
Mikoyan insisted that the German compensatory deliveries had to
consist almost entirely of military deliveries. The Soviet Government
demanded a positive reply on the entire military list submitted in
Berlin, even on the Individual items definitely rejected in Berlin.
As you know, we rejected the following very important items in
*The economic negotiations had been transferred back to Moscow; see document
No. 442.
DECEMBER 1939 559
Berlin : the two cruisers Seydlitz and Prinz Eugen, plans of tlie battleship
Bismarck, heavy naval artillery, 24 cm. cannon, the most modern
mines and torpedoes, machine tools for the manufacture of artillery
ammunition. The Soviet Government considers delivery of the entire
list the only satisfactory equivalent for the deliveries of raw materials,
which under present conditions are not otherwise obtainable for
Germany on the world market.
I pointed out very emphatically to Mikoyan that in making this
demand he was acting contrary to the spirit of the correspondence
between Ribbentrop and Molotov of September 28, which mentioned
only German compensatory deliveries of an industrial nature. Actually
the only contractual claim to deliveries of military supplies lay
within the framework of the Credit Treaty of August 19. Even though
we did not want to restrict ourselves to this limitation in all circumstances,
we nevertheless had to reserve the right to decide what military
equipment we could and wished to supply. Mikoyan, however,
persisted in his demand.
I definitely rejected it. The negotiations have therefore failed in
this instance.
II. If the other side does not bring up the matter again on Wednesday
on their own initiative, I shall first of all call on Molotov on Thursday
in order to bring the negotiations back in line with the correspondence
of September 28 between Ribbentrop and Molotov.
RlTTER
No. 475
The State Secretary to the Legation in Fi
Telegram
URGENT BERLIN, December 20, 1939- 10 : 45 p. m.
No. 493 zu Pol. VI 2859.
For the Minister personally.
The Foreign Minister requests that you avoid discussions of hypothetical
possibilities such as are described in paragraph one of telegraphic
report No. 428.1 Germany is neutral in the Eusso-Finnish
conflict. The basis for our attitude on the northern question is our
friendship with Soviet Russia.
For your information : Germany has not made the alleged statement
to the Swedish Government.
WECZSACKBR
1 Document No. 473.
560
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 476
103/H1808
The F.oreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 1124 BEKUN, December 20, 1939.
BAM No. 609.
Far Ambassador Bitter.
With reference to your telegram No. 968 of December 19.1
I entirely agree with your procedure and request that on my express
authority you influence Molotov to get the negotiations returned
to the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28. There can be
no question of deliveries of military equipment alone or of delivery
of the separate items already rejected in Berlin.
Tell M. Molotov also that I am very much surprised at Mikoyan's
attitude and can hardly assume that it has the approval of Stalin and
Molotov.
BlBBENTBOP
1 Document N6. 474.
No. 477
Nuremberg- document 2233-PS
Exhibit Frank-lO
Unsigned Menwrandwrn* x
KRAKOW, December 20, 1939.
CONVERSATION OP THE GOVERNOR GENERAL 2 WlTH MlNTSTBR VOK
WfiHXdBGH 8 ON* DECEMBER 20, 1939
Among other things the Governor General was informed of the
complaint made by the Soviet Union that again and again Jews were
being deported from the Government General to the Soviet Union by
official organs of the German Reich.
The Governor General authorized Minister von Wiihlisch to inform
SS-ObergruppenFührer Kriiger
*
directly that any action of this kind
1 This document is found on p. 110, vol. i, of the Frank Diary, a microfilm copy
of which is in the custody of the National Archives in Washington, D. O.
* Hans Frank had assumed his functions as Governor General of the General
Government of Poland on Oct. 25.
* J. Wiihlisch was the Foreign Ministry's representative with the Oberbefehlshaber
Ost, the Chief of the military administration in occupied Poland.
4 Friedrich Wilhelm Krtiger, high SS and police official in the Government
General, 1939-43.
DECEMBER 1939 561
was to be discontinued in the future. The complaint made by the
Soviet Union is to be taken absolutely seriously ; disturbance of the
necessary friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany
by such actions must in all circumstances be avoided.
[EDITORS' Ncxns. No record in the files of the Foreign Ministry has
been found of the conversations which, according to The Oiano Diaries,
p. 181, took place between Mussolini and Himmler on December 20,
and between Ciano and Himmler on December 21J
No* 478
495/233448
Memorandum "by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 1016 BiatLiN, December 21, 1939.
During his visit today on routine business, the Italian Charge
d'Affaires once more reverted to Ciano's speech 1 and the impression
it made in Germany. He wanted to make it clear to me at some length
in what a pro-German manner Ciano had spoken and how excellent
the speech had been.
I let Magistral! talk himself out and then referred hfrn to the
French, British, and neutral expressions of opinion, which had interpreted
Ciano's speech somewhat differently.
Magistral! associated my reference mainly with the well-known
passage in Ciano's speech that mentioned the periods of several years
which Italy and Germany had specified were still necessary for their
material preparations for war.2 This passage had only served the
purpose of showing the peaceful character of the German-Italian
alliance, etc. I then let the matter drop.
1 The Fascist Grand Council in its declaration of Dec. 8 (see document No. 428,
footnote 1), requested the Italian Foreign Minister to make an early statement
on the international situation to the Chamber of Corporations. Ciano did so on
Dec. 16. The text of his speech was published in the Giornale &Italia of Dec. 17,
1S39.
3 In his speech Ciano reviewed the negotiation of the Axis alliance at Milan on
May 6-7, 1939, and said that at that time Germany and Italy "were in full agreement
as to the need for every effort to preserve peace in Europe for a long period,
if only to assure to both countries the time necessary for finishing their construction
programs and completing their armaments." He went on, "The length of this
period was estimated by us as 3 years, by the Germans as 4 or 5."
562 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
No. 479
64/44234
TTie Minister in Uruguay to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT MONTEVIDEO, December 22, 19390 : 31 p. m.
No. 191 of December 22 Received December 23 6 : 35 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. (group garbled) of December
21.1
I urge that the D!NB be told to stop and deny the false report about
improper conduct of British sailors at the graves of the men from
Graf Spee. The untruth of the report is obvious here and merely
impugns the credibility of all D]STB reports without doing any good.
The chivalry of the captured British sailors has been sufficiently publicized
in the American newspapers by the United Press, which at tie
same time gave recognition to the good conduct of the sailors of
Graf Spee towards them, so that the DNB report of the (group
garbled) of the dead is being exploited against us as being unworthy
of belief; this has already happened in several newspapers. The attitude
of the South American public toward those who died on Spee
is so full of admiration and sympathy that such false reporting
needlessly destroys this popular sympathy for Germany once and for
all and drives the public irretrievably into the arms of the enemy
propaganda. Up to now as a result of our counterpropaganda the
man in the street was suspicious in the face of the large-scale press
propaganda of the enemy and had confidence in the German reports.
LAINTGMANN
1 Not found.
No. 480
APA Reel No. 290
JStabsleiter Sehiekedanz to ReicJisminister Lctmimers*
Schi./L 4957/39 DECEMBER 22, 1939.
DEAR HERR I&EIGHSMIN'ISTEK DR. XJAMMERS : I am enclosing two mor&
memoranda for your information on the matter indicated.2
Heil Hitler !
*The document and the two enclosures are unsigned but are from a file of
the Executive Staff tStaftsleitunff] of the APA, headed by Schickedanz, Rosenberg's
chief of staff. The file is in custody of the German Military Documents
Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U. S.
Army, No. 250-d-ia-42/l. * The second memorandum, not printed, recorded a telephone call of Dec. 22
from Grundherr who had wished to see Scheldt before he went to Oslo.
Schickedanz told Grundherr that Scheldt had already left, but assured him that
Scheldt was going purely as an observer and would give a full report on his
return.
DECEMBER 1939 563
[Enclosure]
Stabsleitung BERUN, December 22, 1939.
REiCHSuerrER ROSENBERG'S CONVERSATION WITH COTJNSEIXDR HEWEI*,
DECEMBER 21, 1939, IN THE PRESENCE OF REICHSAMTSLEITER SCHEEDT
Subject: Norway.
Hewel gave a few explanations about the Foreign Ministry's discreet
investigations concerning Quisling and his organization. He
emphasized moreover that the Foreign Minister had entrusted handling
of this question to Geheimrat Grundherr of the Foreign
Ministry.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg forcefully pointed out that the Foreign
Ministry could not possibly concern itself with carrying out this matter
without overburdening itself. He promised to keep the Foreign
Minister informed and to talk it over with him as soon as he [Rosenberg]
was well again. Hewel then expressed some concern as to
possible effects of the intended action upon the Foreign Minister's
Eussian policy. Reichsleiter Rosenberg explained the situation to
him. Such an action would lead not to hindrance but rather to a
perceptible easing, since with the present state of affairs and the
forcing back of the Finns, armed incidents might occur at any moment
at the new frontier with Norway. Such an incident could develop
into a serious conflict, perhaps involving England. Then
naturally an intervention by us in the intended manner [Evngreifen
imsererseits in der beabsicTitifften Weise] would be much more
difficult than before. Now it could be explained as a safeguard for
Russia in her actions against Finland and thereby meet with Russia's
complete understanding assuming, of course, that the Foreign Minister
has not already recognized Scandinavia as a Russian sphere of
influence. Since Hewel ruled out this assumption, complete agreement
was reached.
Hewel then asked again for as prompt information as possible for
the Foreign Minister on any measures that may be impending.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg promised this too. In passing Hewel also
mentioned the financial support once again. He mentioned that there
were a great many so-called "driblets of foreign exchange." [Devisenr
tropfe], and English pounds must gradually be disposed of, for already
people in Sweden no longer want to accept them. Reichsleiter
Rosenberg emphasized that the details of this would have to be taken
care of by the Reich Chancellery.
564
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 481
4475VE087913-1S
Special Protocol
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, December 22, 1939.
SPECIAL PKOTOCOL or DECEMBER 22, 1939, OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN
THE GERMAN AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES CONTCEKNTN-Q *
GERMAN-SWEDISH TRADE IN 1940
On the occasion of the signature today of the "Protocol of the Conversations
from December 11 to December 22, 1939, between the German
and Swedish Government Committees on Questions of Trade and
Payments between Germany and Sweden" x the following was also
agreed on -by the two Government Committees in consideration of the
present special circumstances :
I
Swedish Exports to Germany in 191>
1. In so far as relevant applications are submitted, the Hoyal
Swedish Government will permit export licenses to be issued for the
export of Swedish goods to the German Reich as a rule up to the
amounts which, according to the official Swedish export statistics of
1938, were exported to Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It is
agreed that in the cases in which important deviations are noted
between the official Swedish export statistics of 1988 and the corresponding
import statistics the situation will be reviewed.
2. It was stated on the Swedish side that in consideration of the
production and'supply situation of Sweden the quantities exported in
1938 could not be maintained in all categories, but that an increase was
possible in other categories.
a. In the case of the goods mentioned below, the following annual
quantities replace the quantities for 1938 :
aa. Iron ore, list Nos. 405-407 10,000,000 1
2>b. Charcoal pig iron, list No. 1330 20,000 1
cc. Tall oil, list No. 235 8,000 1
dd. Ferrosilicon, list Nos. 1333: 1 and 1334: 1 4,500 1
ee. Silicomanganese, list No. 1333 : 2 1,000 1
if. Tallow, list No. 250 600 1
Note re aa. :
Attention is called by Sweden to the fact that export in the
projected amount can be carried out only if a considerable portion,
about 2 to 3 million tons, is taken via Narvik.
6. In the case of the following goods Sweden will not limit exports:
aa. Lumber
#6. Cellulose
1 Not printed (4475/E087903-12).
DECEMBER 1939 565
c. For the export of coal tar from list 'No. 435, export licenses will
be issued at least for the amount which is obtained from German coaL
d. For the products of agriculture and fishing the temporary arrangement
in the annex 2 has been made for 1940.
e. A list of the goods which in consideration of her own supply situation
Sweden can no longer deliver in 1940, or can deliver only during
a transitional period,
8 has been transmitted, as well as a communication
concerning the further delivery of calfskins.
3. If there should be changes in the production and supply situation
of Sweden which bring about a change in the export situation, the
Government Committees will confer again.
4. The promise is made by Sweden that exports will be regulated in
such a way that no country which has broken off relations with Germany
will be treated better than Germany, on the basis of its former
share of the Swedish exports.
n
German Exports to Sweden in Wlfl
1. Everything will be done by Germany so that the following deliveries
will be made to Sweden in 1940, in so far as there are orders
from Sweden :
a. Coal up to 3,000,000 1
&. Coke up to 1,500,000 1
It has been pointed out by Germany that the delivery of these
amounts of coal and coke, which are a great deal more than the past
exports to Sweden, depend upon the railroad transport situation, and
that therefore Sweden's cooperation in the employment of railroad
cars, etc. is urgently needed. Sweden has promised to do everything
possible in this area.
Sweden is particularly interested in having coke delivered in the
winter months in larger quantities than one-twelfth of the prescribed
amount per month. Germany will do everything possible to comply
with this wish.
. Rolling mill products up to 300,000 t distributed as equally as
possible over the separate months.
The amounts falling to the separate production groups are to be
agreed upon by the experts with the participation of government representatives.
If these conferences of experts do not lead to any results
by the end of January 1940, then the Government Committees will
confer once more.
'Not printed (4475/E087919).
"Not printed (4475/E087930-n31) .
566 DOCUMENTS O1ST GERMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
d. Coke pig iron up to 75,000 t distributed as equally as possible
over the separate months. It was pointed out by the German side
that it will probably not be possible to deliver steel pig iron*
e. Potash up to 85,000 t
/. Glauber's salt up to 130,000 t
a. Table salt up to 100,000 1
7i. Calcined soda up to 30,000 t
i. Caustic soda up to 5,000 t
k. Chlorine, liquid, up to 14,000 1
1. Regarding further Swedish wishes for imports the German side
has transmitted a reply in the form of a minute.*
2. In the cases in which under the changed circumstances the
German exports to Sweden are no longer possible owing to raw materials
difficulties, the Swedish Government will sympathetically consider
whether the delivery of the necessary raw materials can be
permitted the Swedish purchaser in the amounts agreed upon between
purchaser and seller. The German Government will permit the
export to Sweden of the goods produced with the help of such
deliveries.
Ill
1. The assumption is made that the F. O. B. prices for the quantities
of German products specified under II 1, a to c and e to Jc and the
F. O. B. prices for the quantity of Swedish iron ore specified under 1 2
are to be kept at the level of the F. O. B. prices in force in 1939 before
September 1. At the same time it is not excluded that there may be
an agreed moderate increase in prices on both sides, in order that the
desire of the parties concerned to make deliveries may be maintained.
Details are to be clarified forthwith between the experts of both countries,
with the participation of government representatives. The
Government Committees will then confer once more.5
It is agreed that on the above basis there is to be a balance between
the F. O. B. value of the German deliveries designated above and the
F. O. B. value of the Swedish deliveries designated above. If the
F. O. B. value of the German deliveries does not reach the F. O. B.
value of the Swedish deliveries, or if it exceeds this value, which will
still be checked, a balance must be found.
2. If the amounts contemplated on both sides should not be delivered
in their entirety, the Government Committees will confer about
the resulting consequences.
IV
In order to facilitate an orderly German-Swedish exchange of goods
the Government Committees have pointed to the necessity of employ-
4 Not printed (4475/E087924-27). 1 On Jan. 12, 1940, a further Protocol was signed at Stockholm increasing the
values to be attached to various items exchanged (4475/E087933-36) .
DECEMBER 1939 567
ing ferry traffic more effectively and accelerating the circulation of
railroad cars by improving and relieving ferry traffic, rerouting
ferries, etc.
Experts of both traffic administrations have discussed these questions
and will continue their discussions immediately. The Government
Committees will follow the progress of these discussions.6
DR. WALTER RICHERT
On Feb. 22 the Defense Economy Staff of OKW notified the Operations Division
of tlie Naval Staff of OKM of the status of Swedish and Norwegian ore deliveries
to Germany. The report, which was an annex to the record of the Ftihrer Naval
Conference of Feb. 23 but was not included in the Brassey publication, was as
follows :
"A. Sweden: Iron ore deliveries to Germany for 1940 as specified by German-
Swedish agreement : 10,000,000 tons.
( Swedish authorities consider it necessary to ship 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 tons via
Narvik.)
However if arrangements could be made for storage during the winter months,
the following amounts could be shipped :
via Lulea up to : 6,000,000 tons
via Oxelosund at least : 3,000,000 tons
Thus the ore to be shipped via Narvik would not exceed : 1,000,000 tons.
However we cannot depend on shipment of this amount during 1940 for the
foUowing reasons :
1. Owing to unfavorable weather conditions shipments from Lnilea will begin
later than usual this year.
2. Accumulated stocks do not exceed normal figures.
3. The ore railroad Liulea-Narvik wiU have to carry the additional load of
supplies for Finland.
Swedish ore shipments to Germany since the beginning of the war have been
as follows :
September 590,000 tons
October 795,000 tons
November 873,000 tons
December ca. 661,000 tons (including 118,000 tons via Narvik)
January 490,000 tons (including 260,000 tons via Narvik)
B. Norway: Deliveries to be made to Germany in 1940 :
Iron- ore: 1,200,000 tons (ores poor in phosphorus, mainly via Kirkenes)
Deliveries since the beginning of the war :
September 80,000 tons
October 27,000 tons
November 21,000 tons
December 73,000 tons
January 40,000 tons
Copper (metal content) : 7,200 tons
to be extracted from ca. : 180,000 tons cupriferous pyrites
19,000 tons cupriferous calcined pyrites
20,000 tons copper ore
ZWIG ore: 6,500 tons
No limit on molybdenum concentrates. Output not more than : 750 tons
Deliveries to Germany in 1938 : 415 tons
Titanium ore: 40,000 tons
Sulphur: 5,500 tons (taking into consideration the sulphur content of the
cupriferous pyrites, the total sulphur deliveries are about 40,000 tons).
Iron alloys:
Ferrochrome : No limit on deliveries, ca. 6,000 tons
Ferro-silicon : ca. 13,000 tons
Sillcomanganese : ca. 5,OOO tons
At present shipments are progressing normally/'
568 DOCUME3SPTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 482
324/194235-37
Protocol Signed at Madrid* on December 2%, 1989
SECKET zu W. XXII/600.1
Not for publication.
At the negotiations which took place at Madrid,2 the delegations
appointed by the German and the Spanish Governments have established
the following :
The German delegation states that the German and Spanish Governments,
in the secret agreements of July 1937 and especially in the
protocols of July 12 and 15, 1937,3 have declared their desire by means
of the projected comprehensive settlement of their relations to develop
trade between the two countries in a manner that would be most
conducive to its maximum expansion. Guided by this viewpoint, the
delegations of the two Governments carried on negotiations on economic
and financial questions at Burgos from June 12 to July 5, 1939.4
These negotiations led to agreement in principle on the future normal
exchange of goods and payments, which is calculated to expand and
intensify the economic relations between the two countries for a long
time to come.
The contracting parties also declared in article 9 of the Treaty of
Friendship of March 81, 1939 5 that they would intensify the economic
relations between their countries as much as possible and they affirmed
their desire that Germany and Spain should supplement each other
and cooperate in economic matters in every way. The contracting
parties further declared in article 6 of the Treaty that in the event of
warlike complications with any third power they would avoid anything
that might be disadvantageous to the treaty partner or of advantage
to its opponent.
In consequence of the general development, it has not been possible
to complete the negotiations on the German-Spanish economic relations
in the manner envisaged in July 1939.
Likewise, the German delegation declares that as soon as the situation
permits the resumption of normal economic relations, the negotiations
to give them final form are to be continued and completed with
a view to achieving the objectives set forth in the protocols and the
afore-mentioned Treaty of Friendship.
In carrying into effect the decisions of the Inter-Ministerial Treaty
Commission as approved by the higher authorities, the Spanish deler
*W XXII/600 is the cover note of Dec. 29 (824/194168; not printed) with
which, the Protocol of Dec. 22 was transmitted.
2 See document No. 282.
See vol. m, documents Nos. 392, 394, 397.
4 See vol. m, document No. 809.
* See vol. m, document No. 773.
DECEMBER 1939 569
gation for its part emphasizes the keen desire and the firm intention
of the Spanish Government to give fuU support not only to the treaty
instruments referred to in the German declaration, but also to the
spirit of mutual trust and sincerity which animates them and which
dominated the negotiations, started during the past summer, which
-were referred to in the above-mentioned declaration. Although these
negotiations did not culminate in an agreement, they gave expression
nonetheless to the desires of the two countries with regard to their
economic and commercial relations, as well as to Spain's desire to meet
her commitments to which the declaration mentioned refers; their
realization has been prevented thus far by the deplorable international
situation.
Both Governments take cognizance of the above statements and
declare their agreement with them.
Done in duplicate in the German and Spanish languages at Madrid,
December 22, 1939.6
For the German Government : For the Spanish Government :
E. VON STOHKER JtrAiq- BEIGBEDEE
HELMTTTH: Wom/rHAT CASA EoJAS
*A more specific agreement laying down the basic principles for German-Spanish
economic relations was also signed on Dec. 22 (824/194238-44). A mixed
German-Spanish commission was to be set up with the power to authorize private
transactions between firms on either side. The commission was to be guided by
the principle that current trade would be in those goods in which each of the two
countries was especially interested. Both sides agreed that, even though the
present situation prevented a development of German-Spanish trade as envisaged
in June 1939, economic agreements with other countries and economic policies
in general must not prejudice a resumption of normal economic relations between
the two countries after the war. Both recognized that the volume of future
German-Spanish trade could not be calculated at present. The Spanish Government
stated also its willingness "to examine" certain German claims arising
from civil war contracts and to enter into negotiations abaut them ; but it also
pointed to Spain's great difficulties in settling her debts during the present period
of economic reconstruction. Finally, Spain emphasized her willingness to meet
German import wishes, though with the reservation that the goods in question
were not needed by Spain herself or had to be exported to other markets in view
of Spain's foreign exchange situation.
No. 483
22/13750
The State Secretary to the Legation mNorway
Telegram
TJBGENT BERUHT, December 23, 1939.
SECRET e. o. PoL VI 2667 g.
No. 542
For the Minister personally.
With reference to your telegraphic report No. 482 of December IT.1
Reichsamtsleiter Scheldt of the Aussenpolitisches Ami left last
'Document No. 466.
570
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
night at the instruction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for several days
in Oslo, in order to consult with Quisling, Hagelin, and their circle.
The purpose of the visit is observation, but not active participation in
Quisling's plans.
2 The Foreign Minister requests that you maintain
discreet contact with Scheldt and come to Berlin for instructions
shortly before or after the New TearJ
8 You will report in this matter
only to the Foreign Minister, myself, and Grundherr.
WEIZSAGKER
a See document No. 511.
8 See document No. 503.
No. 484
1370/357101-05
Memorandum "by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Moscow, December 23, 193&.
At 10 : 00 p. m. on December 22, 1939, a conversation took place
between Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg and the President of
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, M. Molotov, regarding
the status of the economic negotiations. The Ambassador
pointed out to M. Molotov that the negotiations were unfortunately
not taking the course expected. The difficulties that had arisen were
mainly attributable to the fact that the parties have so far nob been
able to reach an agreement regarding deliveries and compensatory
deliveries. Whereas we understood by the term "industrial deliveries,"
mentioned in the exchange of letters between Foreign Minister
von Ribbentrop and M. Molotov, principally products of our civilian
industry, the Soviets were demanding the adoption of an exorbitant
and purely military program, apparently disregarding entirely the
fact that we are at present at war with two of the strongest countries
in the world and therefore have corresponding requirements of our
own. For this reason the conversations with Herr Ritter and Herr
Schnurre had so far not led to any understanding. The German Government
deplored this all the more since it regarded these negotiations
as of much more than merely economic importance and held that an.
agreement on a sensible basis was in the interest of both countries.
Consequently, the German Government had instructed him to make
an appointment with M. Molotov for Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre,
since M. Molotov had conducted the correspondence with Herr von
Ribbentrop and was in any case more competent to interpret it than
was M. Mikoyan, who had not participated in the conversations of
September 28. The German Government therefore expected that M.
DECEMBER 1939 571
Molotov would assert Ms great authority and influence also in this
matter, in order to clarify the situation. For this reason he asked him
to receive Herr Bitter and Herr Schnurre tomorrow for a detailed
discussion in order that they might present to M. Molotov the German
viewpoint in all its details.
M. Molotov replied that he was informed about the difficulties that
had arisen in connection with the economic negotiations. On the question
of the interpretation of his exchange of letters with Foreign Minister
von Ribbentrop, he was obliged to state the following at the very
outset: By the term "industrial deliveries" they had by no means
meant only products of the German civilian industry. This expression
had been chosen at the time because the correspondence was tobe
published. The Soviet Government had never entertained a doubt,
however, that by the term "industrial deliveries" military orders were
also meant. He Molotov remembered distinctly that in the course
of the conversations on September 28 Herr von Ribbentrop had made
the remark that Germany would deliver everything to her friend, the
Soviet Union, that the latter desired of Germany. The Soviet Government
had noted this at the time with especial satisfaction. It did
not have the intention of requesting anything of Germany which went
beyond what was usual in trade between two friendly countries. Above
all, the Soviet Government had full understanding for the fact that
Germany was producing certain military articles which for reasons
of military secrecy she could not supply to other states, even if she
was very friendly with them. There could be no misunderstanding
on this score. As far as the war which Germany was now waging
was concerned, the Soviet Government naturally wished to take it fully
into consideration. On the other hand, however, it knew that Germany
had an industry capable of producing large amounts of war
material. Nevertheless the Soviet Government did not expect us to
grant all its wishes in the military field. Thus, for example, three
cruisers were mentioned in the Soviet lists, but the Soviet Government
would understand it if Germany explained that in the present situation
she could deliver only one of these. He also wished to state that
in such negotiations differences of opinion were unavoidable. Despite
all the interest the Soviet Government had in having its wishes fulfilled,
it had never expected that we would grant them 100 percent.
It would be the task of the negotiations to obtain an agreement in this
matter that satisfied the wishes of both sides. But there was another
side to the whole affair that was producing a very unfavorable reaction,
since it shed a peculiar light on the German attitude toward
the negotiations. He was thinking in this connection of the German
260090 54 42
572 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
prices, particularly in the field of aviation. These prices were so
exorbitant as actually to give the effect of a kind of demonstration.
They gave the impression that the whole agreement was intentionally
being allowed to fail. This would be a particularly inappropriate
and annoying form of refusal. It was customary in all such negotiations
for the parties concerned to make greater demands at the start;
he had the impression in the present case that both sides were guilty
of exaggeration. None the less, with good will and a sensible attitude
on both sides, a solution could be found. But the decisive thing
was that the German viewpoint, according to which the exchange of
letters between Herr von Ribbentrop and himself had not envisaged
deliveries of military equipment, was untenable. In this connection
he again had to point out that Herr von Ribbentrop had promised the
Soviet Government generous cooperation on the part of Germany,
precisely in the military field. This naturally did not preclude Germany's
being able with justification to refuse to supply the Soviet
Union with certain products, such as modern torpedoes and the like.
Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg stated in reply that Germany
did not refuse to make a certain portion of the deliveries, that
seemed reasonable to her, in military products. It was absurd, however,
for M. Mikoyan to demand a 120 percent fulfillment of the program,
and that exclusively in the form of military supplies, and to
state in addition "either everything or nothing." As far as prices
were concerned, the planes and related material represented an investment
of billions that had had to be spent for the construction and development
of the models in question, and it was only right and proper
that the Soviet Union should share proportionately in these costs.
M. Molotov replied that he could not share this view. The Soviet
Government had also spent many billions on the development of its
oil fields and its agricultural enterprises and it was only because of
this that it was in a position to supply Germany with correspondingly
large amounts of petroleum and grains. It did not occur to it, however,
to raise its grain and petroleum prices on this account. Our
impression that M. Mikoyan demanded "either everything or nothing"
was also not correct. They were not making any unjust demands
of us, and with good will on both sides, it would be possible to reach
an agreement. He was prepared accordingly to receive Herr Ritter
and Herr Schnurre in the Kremlin on December 23 at 5 : 00 p. m.,
in the presence of People's Commissar Mikoyan.
HTLGER
DECEMBER 1939 573
No. 485
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Ho. 440 of December 23 HELSINKI, December 24, 1939 2 : 25 p.m.
Beceived December 24 9 ; 30 p. m.
Pol. VI 2915.
The great interest which. Italy is taking in Finland's fate is attracting
attention here, although Finland participated in the sanctions at
the time and at one time \jsic\ showed sympathy for Fascism. Italy is
delivering planes and is supporting Finland in the warmest way on
the radio, and Italian journalists who have come here are ostentatiously
siding with Finland.
The difference between the German and the Italian positions causes
a good deal of comment.
BliTJOHER
No. 486
2997/687580
The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
WASHINGTON, December 24, 1939 8 : 58 p. m.
No. 814 of December 24 Received December 25 11 : 30 a. m.
Pol. IX 2547.
In his efforts to have the United States participate in a possible
mediation attempt, President Roosevelt has felt the need for closer
cooperation with the Pope.
For several weeks rumors have persisted here that President Boosevelt
would send a special American envoy to the Vatican, and the
name of Secretary of War Woodring was first mentioned in this connection.
In view of the aversion of large Protestant groups in America
to establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Roosevelt
had to await the proper moment for this plan, and thought that the
Christmas season would be the right time. In order to forestall criticism
by these groups, Roosevelt had his press spokesman state, simultaneously
with the announcement concerning Taylor's appointment
as his special envoy to the Vatican, that this should not be considered
a departure from the traditional American policy toward the Vatican,
and that the appointment did not signify the establishment of
full diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
574
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Myron C. Taylor is the 70-year-old, highly respected former president
of the biggest American steel concern, the United States of
America \_sid} Steel Corporation; he is a member of the Episcopal
Church, is closely connected with Quakers and is consequently not a
Catholic. Taylor is well known in Italy and has owned a villa in
Florence for many years. He will take over his post in a few weeks.
THOJISEK
No. 487
laTO/ssTosa-ioo
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Mimstry
Telegram
No. 1000 of December 24 [Moscow, December 24, 1939].
For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary von Weizsacker.
With reference to your telegram No. 1194 \ll%4f] of December 20.1
Conversations with Molotov make it possible to resume negotiations
with Mikoyan.
Molotov did not support various points of Mikoyan's position as
communicated in telegraphic report No. 968 of December 19.2 He does
not insist that German compensatory deliveries be of an exclusively
military nature. He admits that even between powers such as Germany
and the Soviet Union, where especially friendly relations exist,
there are reasons for military secrecy and consideration for the fact
of being at war.
Conversations with Molotov have produced two new viewpoints.
First, the statement that for the present the Soviet Union did not intend
to copy German airplanes. If at a later time after she had become
familiar with the planes she wished to copy one airplane type or
another, she would get in touch with us again for this purpose. In
this connection Molotov repeatedly declared that the Soviet Government
had found the over-all price of three hundred million reichsmarks
for the planes a particularly inappropriate and annoying form
of refusal. Second, the statement that the term "industrial" deliveries
in the Kibbentrop-Molotov exchange of letters of September
28 also included "military" deliveries. The word "industrial" had
been selected at the time only because the correspondence was to be
published and the intention of making "military" deliveries should
not be publicized.
The conversations with Molotov, too, were very sharp at times.
Even though they make it possible to resume negotiations, we can
1 Document No. 476.
'Document No. 474.
DECEMBER 1939 575
hardly expect the negotiations to make smooth and rapid progress**
The other side attaches decisive importance to the delivery of heavy
naval artillery and coastal artillery ; we did not refuse this in Berlin,
to be sure, but we did indicate that any statement as to time of delivery
was impossible. I shall make a special report on this point
shortly if the occasion demands.4
In a letter of Dec. 27 (137O/357106-07) to Ribbentrop, Ritter referred to this
telegram and to Hilger's memorandum (document No. 484), and concluded with
the following observation: "Negotiations here are not proceeding favorably.
Both in general and in detail the other side is not showing the generosity that
should result from the new political situation. Instead they are trying to get
all they think they can. I assume that in the next few days I shall be obliged
to report orally in Berlin about the whole situation." See document No. 499,
footnote 3.
4 See document No. 499, enclosure 1.
No. 488
ieft/82971-72
"
The Minister in Kwm&nia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BUCHAREST, December 25, 1939 11 : 45 p, m.
No. 1052 of December 25 Received December 26 6 : 00 a. m.
Pol. V 12419.
Foreign Minister Gafencu just summoned me to inform me that
former Polish President Moscicki had become very ill, so that
physicians urgently recommended his transfer to a Swiss sanatorium*
A cabinet meeting which took place the day before yesterday thought
that from humanitarian considerations it had to consent to his departure,
particularly as there were no juridical grounds for the internment
of this dying man, who had definitely renounced politics;
thereupon the decision had been adopted yesterday evening to permit
Moscicki to leave together with his wife and his daughter, and last
night arrangements had been made with Belgrade and Rome to permit
the transit of the sleeping car. The departure had taken place today;
I nevertheless strongly remonstrated with Gafencu, as he and the
former head of the Government had promised me to permit departure
only after consultation with us.1
Juridically this promise, already
given me by Calinescu, was (group garbled) outside the neutrality
question. At the time Argetoianu, too, had thought it appropriate
and tactful personally to inform us of the King's wish for MoscieM's
1 See documents Nos. 64 and 100.
576
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
departure.
2 It was beyond my understanding how one could disregard
that; the cabinet decision of December 23 was an affront. It
had evidently been intended to present us with a fait accompli*
Gafencu, who was deeply impressed, wanted to shift the question
to the sphere of humanitarianism (treatment of a seriously ill person).
From his remarks it was evident that persistent representations from
Swiss and American diplomatic quarters had influenced the Cabinet,
also, if the Rumanian Ambassador in Berlin had made a demarche
in the matter, we had not been able to show him legal grounds for
Moscicki's retention.
To my ironical question whether the same procedure would be
followed with regard to Beck and other members of the Government,
Gafencu said there could be no question of that.
When I suggested that Moscicki still be stopped at the border
Gafencu stated that this was no longer possible because of the time
element involved, as the entire Government and the King had left
Bucharest for the holidays, and the train would cross the border this
evening.
FABEICIUS
* See document No. 100, footnote 1.
No. 489
15821/241946-50
Memorandum "by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
SECRET. BERLIN, December 26, 1939,
Subject : Delivery of coal to Italy.
Our coal deliveries to Italy during 1939 did not reach the agreed
monthly quota of approximately 750,000 tons until July; they decreased
to about 670,000 tons in September and October and dropped
to 830,000 tons in November. The greater part went by sea; rail
shipments reached a maximum of 277,000 tons in the month of October,
and declined to 175,000 tons in November.
The alarming drop in November led to repeated urgent representations
by the Italians: by the Commercial Counselor of the Italian
Embassy to me in the middle of November ;
1 by Ambassador Attolico
to State Secretary von Weizsacker on November 23 ;
2 as well as to
Ambassador Hitter on November 27,
3 and to the Keich Foreign Minister
on December 4=.
4 Attolico on each occasion emphasized the de-
1 The record of this step was not found.
*The full memorandum is in the files but is not printed (1571/380219-20). " The full memorandum is in the files but is not printed (1848/421088-93). * Not found.
DECEMBER 1939 577
cisive political importance of the question, 'which, we allegedly did
not yet appreciate sufficiently. The following is from the memorandum
by State Secretary Weizsacker :
"All that the Italian Government wanted was to attain a state of
economic preparation for war which would preclude a repetition of
the experiences of August 25. Attolico maintained that the Germans
had obviously not yet made all the necessary efforts in transportation.
At the same time it seemed that we entirely overlooked the political
import of the problem."
The following is from the memorandum by Ambassador Kitter :
"Important Italian war industries had only a one- to two-week
coal supply. The situation thus was still the same as the 'tragic
moment5 in August. Unless her coal situation improved radically,
Italy would also find herself in the same situation on similar occasions
in the future. In the earlier discussions, which had envisaged
a period of several years, it had in fact been agreed that Italy must in
the meantime lay up a reserve of 2 million tons of coal annually.
Far from making this possible, the current imports did not even
suffice for the current requirements. . . . The Italian Ambassador
intends to propose in Rome that another conference of railway experts
from Doth countries be held. The experts of both sides, however,
would have to be headed by a political figure, otherwise not
much would be achieved."
At the conference with the Eeich Foreign Minister on December 4,
Attolico made similar statements: Regardless of maximum increase
in deliveries by sea, the rail deliveries had to be increased to 1 million
tons a month. The Reich Foreign Minister promised the Ambassador
that he would use his influence to this end and instructed me in the
presence of the Ambassador to do everything possible in order to
reach that goal.
The Foreign Ministry thereupon intensified the efforts which had
been under way in this direction since the middle of November. It
was a question of releasing the necessary number of coal cars for the
deliveries. The German -railroads up to that time had furnished
5,300 cars for the purpose; the Italians had promised 3,000 cars.
About 30,000 cars in all are necessary to attain the maximum capacity
aimed at; of these, approximately 20,000 must be provided by the
Germans and 10,000 by the Italians. The demand that Italy provide
10,000 cars had already been made by the Reich Foreign Minister in
the conversation with Attolico on December 4. Attolico was going
to make a strong recommendation to this end in Rome.
On December 5 Count Magistrati stated 5 that the head of the
Italian Coal Office, Nbbili, an engineer, was prepared to come here
* No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
578 DOCUMENTS GIST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
for the contemplated discussions. On December 8 I informed
that the discussions could begin here on December 13, but what they
required primarily was a transportation expert with the necessary
full powers, not a coal expert. We were prepared to do everything
possible on our part to reach the monthly figure of 1 million tons,
but the Italians would have to make available a minimum of 10,000
cars.
Magistrati promised that Italian representatives provided with the
necessary powers would be here on December 13. In the course of the
conversation he remarked incidentally but with emphasis that these
talks were to be of -a purely technical, not a political nature.
On December 11 Count Magistrati sent a memorandum 7
giving
the names of the Italian representatives for the talks on December 13
and stating that the Italians were prepared to furnish about 10,000
cars but had to request that in this case 5,000 Italian cars now used
for the transportation of food to Germany be replaced by German
ones.
In the meantime, the Reich Foreign Minister, through personal
conversations with Field Marshal Goring, had been able to obtain the
deferment of important economic interests at home in order to make
possible the release of the 20,000 coal cars necessary for the shipment
of 1 million tons a month to Italy.
This was reported by Ambassador Bitter at the opening of the
conference on December 13. Surprisingly, the Italian representative
Nobili thereupon declared that the program for delivery of 1 million
tons a month was to be set up only as a precautionary measure for
the contingency that the shipment of coal by sea should cease. He
had come here only to discuss a current railway program for about
500,000 tons a month. Ambassador Hitter replied that this must be
r mistake ; the Italian delegation would have to request new instructions.
Referring to the continued demarches of the Italian Ambassador
and the resulting personal intervention by the Reich Foreign
Minister, he reproached the Italian Commercial Attache severely for
the manner in which the matter was handled by the Italians.
Ambassador Mackensen was informed of the situation by telegram
on December 14 and was instructed to discuss the matter in Rome and
also inform Ambassador Attolico (attached telegram ]STo. 1025 8
).
Attolico then gave Herr von Mackensen the following explanation
in Rome: On the basis of his conversation with the Reich Foreign
Minister he had reported to Rome as the German view that Germany
was to make available 20,000 cars if Italy provided 10,000. After his
departure from Berlin, Ambassador Ritter had stated that if, on
The memorandum on this conversation is not printed (8331/E589813). * Not printed (5234/E311155-57).
"Not printed (1848/421101-02).
DECEMBER 1939 579
the basis of Magistrates memorandum of December 11 (withdrawal
of 5,000 food cars) , Italy actually provided only 5,000 cars, the German
offer would have to be reduced to 10,000 cars. Accordingly, since
only 15,000 cars in all could be counted upon, Xobili had been instructed
to discuss for the time being only a program of 500,000 tons a
month, this being the quantity that could then be transported. (Of.
attached telegram No. 1023 of December 18 from Rome.9
)
On December 16 Magistrati informed both State Secretary Weizsacker
10 and Ambassador Hitter 1X that the view of the Italian Government
in the matter of the coal deliveries would be presented by
Ambassador Attolico, who would presumably return here on December
18. The return of Attolico has been delayed without any further
communication having been received from the Italian Government.
Two programs were drawn up at the technical discussions with the
Italians on December 153
12 namely one for a monthly shipment of
00,000 tons, and another for a monthly shipment of 1 million tons,
under which the Germans and Italians were to furnish cars in the proportion
of 2 to 1, respectively. The 500,000-ton program is getting
under way.
Recommendation
In further discussions with Attolico it will be advisable to recall
to him his earlier declarations and his urgent political representations,
to state that Germany still agrees to the program of 1 million'
tons a month, and to make clear that the Italians are to blame if
only a smaller program is to be carried out now.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.
WlBHIi
M"NNoot mperimnotreadn(d1u8m48o/f42t1h1e04W-e0i5z)s.aeker Magistrati conversation has been found.
u The memorandum of the Kitter-Magistrati conversation is not printed
(1848/421103) .
"The memorandum of these discussions is not printed (5234/E311206-11).
No. 490
2997/587587-88
MeTTwrandwrn, 'by Ambassador DiecJehoff
BEKUUST, December 27, 1939.
zu Pol. IX 2547.1
I should like to make the following comment on the annexed telegram
No. 814: from "Washington :
1
I do not believe that the sending of a special envoy to the Vatican
indicates so much a desire on Roosevelt's part for close cooperation
*PoL IX 2547: Document No. 486.
580
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
with, the Pope in. the event of possible attempts to mediate for peace'
in my opinion it is, rather, a tactical move made with the elections in
mind. The President has always shown unusually great consideration
for the Catholic element in the United States (although, or perhaps
because, he has many adversaries particularly among the Catholics*
e. g., Father Coughlin,2
etc.) and he now emphasizes this tendency in
view of the coining election. The sending of Ambassador Kennedy
to the Pope's coronation in the spring of 1939 was a step in that
direction, and the appointment of Myron C. Taylor is a logical
second step toward the same goal. Naturally, even Roosevelt cannot
dare in the face of the preponderantly anti-Popish attitude of the
American people to establish regular diplomatic relations between
the American Government and the Vatican; to do this he would
moreover need the consent of Congress, which he cannot get. As a
result he confines himself to sending a special envoy for some time,
probably until the American elections are over.
Myron C. Taylor is well known to us ; as chairman of the refugee
conference at Evian in 1938 he made a very nasty speech against
Germany. He is very one-sidedly anti-German.
Submitted herewith to the Political Department.
I would propose that our Embassy at the Vatican, which probably
will have received a copy of telegram No. 814 from Washington, be
sent a commentary along these lines.8
DIECKHOIT
"Father Charles Edward Coughlin, whose radio addresses commanded a
large audience at this time.
'Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting: "Yes." The commentary wag
sent on Jan. 3, 1940. Copies were also sent to Rome and Madrid
(8128/E582026-27 ) .
No. 491
171&/39936O-61
TTie Foreign Minister to tTte Legation in Rumania
Telegram
No. 928 BEKTJOST, December 28, 1939 1 : 30 p. m.
zu Pol. V 12419.1
With reference to your telegram No. 1052 of December 25.1
I fully approve the line you have taken with Gafencu in the question
of former Polish President Moscicki's departure. I request you to
express emphatically to the Foreign Minister in my name also our
great surprise at the breach of the promise made to me, and to add
that it could not remain without consequences if a similar case contrary
to the promise given were to occur again.
RlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 488.
DECEMBER 1939 581
No. 492
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Uruguay
Telegram
No. 286 of December 28 BERUTBT, December 28, 1939 7 : 00 p. m.
zu R 32165
R S2196.1
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 195 of December 24 and 196
of December 26.1
For the Minister personally.
Please continue to convey by your manner that we regard the attitude
of the Uruguayan Government in the Grraf Spee incident as
unjustified and without foundation, but otherwise continue to handle
current matters with calm matter-of-factness. Further reply to the
Uruguayan answer of December 19 is not contemplated.
RlBBEOSTTROP
1 Neither printed (8521/E597454/1-3 and 8521/B597454/4^5), dispatched Dec.
24 and Dec. 26, respectively. In telegram No. 195, Langmann described a conversation
of Dec. 16 with Foreign Minister Guani, the decision to destroy the Graf
Spee, the events which followed, and his view that Uruguay had been unable
to resist British and French pressure. I/anginann also reported in this telegram
that on Dec. 22 Uruguay rejected the German Note of Protest of Dec. 17. (See
document No. 467.) The Uruguayan rejection, dated Dec. 19 and transmitted in
telegram No. 196, stated that since the Graf Spee had been treated in accordance
with the Hague Convention and the Uruguayan Neutrality Decree of Sept. 5,
1939, there were no grounds for the captain's complaint that his ship had not
been accorded her rights under international law. The Uruguayan Government
therefore rejected the German Minister's protest embodying this complaint.
No. 493
F19/024-O25
MeTnorancbum ~by the Foreign Minister
EM 64 BERUST, December 28, 1939.
COITVERSATICEN" BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN'
AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 28, 1939
1. The Foreign Minister informed the Italian Ambassador briefly
of the Pfitzner affair x and at the same time expressed his astonish-
1 On Dec. 23, Ciano had complained to Mackensen of a speech delivered to a
closed Party gathering by Josef Pfitzner, a Sudeten German and vice mayor
of Prague, in which the latter was reported to have spoken of a future German
empire embracing Trieste, the South Tirol, and Ixxmbardy. See The Oiano
Diaries, entries for Dec. 23 and 27, 1939, Jan. 3 and 5, 1940. Ciano's version of
this episode is supported by documents in the Foreign Ministry files : not printed
(1571/380254-55, 70-71, 73-74; 2281/480567-69; 1848/421110-13). A month earlier, on Nov. 26, Mackensen had reported (1571/380225-26) a
similar complaint hy Giano because the Provincial Governor [StatthaUer} at
Dresden, in a speech delivered in the presence of the Italian Consul General,
warned of "our friends who betray us," a reference which was taken to apply to
Italians, as more dangerous even than the enemies of Germany. See also
The Ciano Diaries, entry for Nov. 26, 1939.
582 DOOTMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ment that a matter which from the outset bore the stamp of falsehood
should have been taken so seriously by Ciano, and this at the
very
moment when the Führer was making the tremendous gesture vis-Stvis
Italy in the question of the South Tirol. The Foreign Minister
added that although the whole affair was in his opinion a pure'fabrication,
he had summoned Ambassador von Mackensen to Berlin to have
him now clear up the matter with the Duce and Count Ciano once
and for all.
2. On the question of coal deliveries Attolico expressed himself i&
the same sense as he had to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.2 The Foreign
Minister told him that he would use his influence in behalf of an
arrangement whereby Germany would provide 20,000 cars even if
Italy provided only 5,000, so that Italy might be supplied with
sufficient coal.8
3. In reply to Attolico's question concerning Ciano's speech,
4
the
Foreign Minister said that it contained some excellent formulations*
On reading the speech he had merely felt some apprehension that a
few points might be exploited by France and England for their purposes.
And that had actually occurred, particularly with respect to
the passages on the Berchtesgaden negotiations preceding the outbreak
of the war, on which the German and Italian views differed, and
from which England and France deduced proof of Germany's war
guilt. The second point which had given rise to apprehensions was
the mention of the target periods, 3 years for Italy and 5 years for
Germany, which the two countries needed to be prepared for war.
The Foreign Minister closed this subject with the remark that he did
not attach any further importance to the matter in itself.
4. With reference to Russia, the Foreign Minister told Attolico that
he was surprised at the extreme anti-Russian attitude of Italy, since
the Russian expansion did not, after all, threaten either Germany or
Italy. Ambassador Attolico explained this anti-Russian attitude by
referring to the vital needs of Fascist domestic policy.
R[IBBENTROP]
a Wiehl's record of Attolico's preliminary conversation on the same day is not
printed (1848/421114r-16). 3 It was subsequently agreed at an internal discussion on Jan. 8 (1848/421119-
20), that owing to the frost, the 1 : 2 ratio was the maximum which the Gterman
Railways could achieve for the present AttoUco was informed on Jan. 13 that a
daily quota of 560 cars would be provided even if the Italian quota did not
always reach 280 (6234/E311261-62). 4 See document No. 478.
DECEMBER 1039 583
No, 494
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Mimstry
Telegram
BTo. 1095 of December 29 BOMB, December 29, 19396 : 10 p. m.
Anfuso sent for me today and told me at Ciano's instruction that
the newly appointed Bussian Ambassador here had left Borne prior
to presenting his credentials, following anti-Bussian demonstrations
occasioned by the war with Finland, and had simply announced that
he was leaving, without giving any reason. As we knew, Italy had
never, not even in Ciano's recent speech, taken any official stand
agoainst the war with Finland. The demonstrations at the time had
occurred spontaneously, Now that a month had passed since the
departure of the Bussian Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador in
Moscow had yesterday been instructed to leave Moscow and to say
that he was going on vacation. This step, which was the minimum
that Italy had to do in view of the conduct of the Bussian Ambassador,
did not indicate any change in Italian policy vis-a-vis Bussia. The
Italian Ambassador had not been recalled; he remained Ambassador
to Moscow. Affairs there would be handled by the Charge d'Affaires,
as in the Bussian Embassy here,
Ciano had been anxious to inform us confidentially of'the instruction
to the Italian Ambassador, which might perhaps be interpreted
differently by the Bussians.1
PLESSEN
*A memorandum in the files of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union
(366/206711) records that on Jan. 7, 1940, Molotov told Ambassador Schulenburg
that the Bussian Ambassador had been called home "to report" because the
Rome demonstrations against Russia "could not be ignored." He said he did
not know why the Italian Ambassador had left Moscow ; the Soviet Government
had done nothing to occasion any change in its relations with Italy.
584 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 495
F19/528-529
The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia
Telegram
SECRET BERLIN, December 30,
EMNb.2,Ang.II
For decoding by the Minister himself.
With reference to my instruction No. 1 of December 30, 1939,
1 1
herewith assign to Minister von Killinger the following duties:
1. To ascertain all secret enemy organizations (Secret Service, etc.)
active in the Balkan countries, and to watch, and impede their
operation.
2. To watch the entire enemy press and propaganda.
3. To supervise, to assist, and to intensify the work of our own
press and propaganda.
In order to camouflage his activities he will work on the following
matters :
Transportation questions
Economic questions
Safety of transports of goods
The Polish refugee problem
Establishment of cultural institutions
Sports and matters relating to youth organizations
Shipping questions relative to German operations against merchant
shipping.
Please assist Minister von Killinger in every way possible in the
accomplishment of his duties.
ElBBENTTEOP
*Not printed (F19/531-32), In this instruction, Ribbentrop had defined Killinger's
duties as follows : "I have appointed Minister yon Killinger Inspector of
our Missions abroad, and charged him with the task of investigating on the spot
the situation of our diplomatic and consular Missions with respect to personnel,
organization, finances and administration. He is to submit to me a report in
writing about the material he gathers and his experiences, together with any
recommendations for changes." The instruction then requested the Missions to
make available to Killinger all material necessary for the performance of his
task and to assist him in every way.
DECEMBER 1939 5g5
No. 496
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 797 of December 30 TOKYO, December 31, 1939 12 : 20 p. m.
Received December 31 3 : 00 a. m.
Pol. VIII 10.
With, reference to our telegrams No.. 791 of December 29 and No.
777 of December 18.1
At the close of the year the Japanese administration is laboring
under very strong pressure in both foreign and domestic policy. The
three great problems of Japanese foreign policy, solution of the China
question, agreement with. America, and settlement with Russia, are unsolved.
Announcement of the opening of the Yangtze from Nanking
on did not bring about the desired change in the American attitude.
The American Ambassador presented new demands with the obvious
aim of independence and liberty of trade for China, at least Central
and South China. He is supposed principally to have demanded the
following : a gradual withdrawal of troops, with a maximum of eight
garrisons in Northern China, a guarantee of an open door and treaty
rights of foreign powers, together with dissolution of the monopolistic
Japanese Development Company. America's attitude brought
disappointment to the initially high hopes that were nourished by
the calculated optimism of the Government. In order to avoid pressure
from America (group garbled) idea of ending the China conflict
by concessions to Chiang Kai-shek is again being entertained in
some circles, possibly by entering into peace negotiations with him
while abandoning the Konoye declaration, and employing Wang
Ching-wei only as a mediator in the matter^ To be sure, the Army,
that is the China Army, is thus far still determined to form a new
central government under Wang Ching-wei, although the latter ("demands
5' apparently lacking) considerable independence and is still
struggling with serious personnel difficulties.
Negotiations with Russia remain confined to details (Manchuria
boundary demarcation, fisheries treaty) without touching the basic
questions of the Japanese-Russian settlement, particularly Russia's
relations to China. Trivial Russian counterdemands augment the
difficulties, such as payment of the remaining debt of 6 million yen
on the South Manchurian Railroad.
1 Neither found.
586
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Internally, the surprise revolt of 270 representatives in the Diet out
of a total of 466 has created a new situation.2 The revolt was supported
by all the small parties and numerous representatives of the
major parties, who came to the opening of the Diet from the election
districts with first hand impressions of the dangerous state of popular
sentiment. The popular sentiment is conditioned by the foreign trade
policy, the deterioration in the food and supply situation
resulting
from the war with China, specifically by the increase in the price of
rice and the failure of the Government in the distribution of essential
goods. The Cabinet decided, as reported, to remain in office despite
the action of the majority in the Diet, and is trying to split the opposition
through negotiations with the party leaders.
The party leaders are, however, hardly ready to oppose the action
of the members of their parliamentary groups, since in that case there
would be a danger of further splits in the parties. Resignation of the
Cabinet in the middle of January before the reconvening of the Diet
is therefore generally expected. The pro-Anglo-Saxon press also is
beginning to abandon the Cabinet, which it has thus far (1 group
garbled) despite all its failures. (2 groups garbled) Court circles,
which from their (1 group garbled) to preserve the Cabinet are obviously
shaken. According to recent information, Court circles are trying
to prepare a cabinet of national union with the participation of
the parties in the Diet in order to forestall any essential change of
course. General Ugaki, who is known there as the Foreign Minister
of the Konoye Cabinet, is being mentioned for Prime Minister. Since
the crisis in foreign policy and serious internal differences continue,
no workable union cabinet or even association with one of the European
power groups should be expected for the present. In the opinion
of Ambassadors Oshima and Shiratori, who are working hard for
the overthrow of the present Cabinet, two or three transition cabinets
are still necessary to bring about a fundamental change of course.
* On Dec. 26 a resolution was passed by representatives of the leading parties
calling upon the Cahinet to "take the proper steps regarding resignation." On
Jan. 9, 276 members of the Lower House signed a declaration of no confidence
in the Cabinet and on Jan. 14 General Abe's Cabinet resigned.
No. 497
330/152113-14
TJie Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 1 of January 2 BEIXJKADE, January 2, 1940 9 : 05 p. m.
Received January 3 3 : 30 a. m.
In today's conversation tlie Foreign Minister pointed out that
finally, after all difficulties had been overcome, the copper and
JANUARY 1940 687
lead deliveries under the Landfried Protocol x had now begun to get
under way, and he continued with the following remarks : "He was
happy to be able to assure me that in spite of all the intrigues, with
which I was of course familiar, the question of Yugoslav relations
with Germany was settled for the future, too, on the basis of good
neighborly relations and the closest economic cooperation. The Minister
President, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, and he
himself actually formed a solid front which also had the full approval
in the highest quarters. We could depend on it that everything would
be done to foil any efforts at interference and sabotage directed
against it, regardless of whether they were undertaken in the political
or the economic field. He also asked me to believe that all Yugoslav
efforts to pacify the Danube area and the Balkans and to promote
political cooperation between the countries in this area had always
been done with the idea of German-Yugoslav friendship." I believe
these statements indicate that the Anglo-French attempts at weakening
the Foreign Minister's position, which were mentioned in telegraphic
report No. 566 of December 16,
2 came to naught. The manner
in which Cincar-Markovich spoke was more definite and more selfconfident
than before.
HEEKEK
1 See document No. 117, footnote 4.
'Not printed (230/152109).
No. 498
103/111926-28
The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in the
Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 8 BEBUEK, January 2, 1940.
For Ambassador Hitter.
With reference to the private letter of December 27 x to the Foreign
Minister.
The Foreign Minister does not consider a personal letter to Molotov
advisable in the question mentioned by you, but sends you the following
information to be used orally in a suitable manner :
It is certainly an error on Molotov's part when he says that the
expression "industrial deliveries" was chosen in the Moscow negotiations
only because the correspondence was to be published. The question
whether and to what extent the German deliveries were to include
deliveries of a military nature was never discussed at all, at the time.
The letters were drafted by Schnurre and myself and even this first
1 See document No. 487, footnote 3.
588
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
German version contained in the passage involved here the same wording
as the final text, in which the German industrial deliveries were
placed opposite the Russian raw-material deliveries without being
defined more closely. NOT were any such specifications made during
the oral negotiations. At one point Stalin merely mentioned the delivery
of steel tubes as an example of supplies important to the Soviet
Union.
It is true that the Reich Foreign Minister stated in the negotiations
that a large-scale program for the exchange of commodities was desirable
and possible, and the letters were also edited to that effect. It
is obvious, on the other hand, that the Foreign Minister's statements
on this subject could not have meant that Germany would deliver without
limitations everything that the Soviet Union might desire from
her.
Perhaps Molotov is confusing this with another passage in the correspondence.
For the introductory sentence of the first German
draft stated that the Government of the Soviet Union was willing "to
give economic support to Germany in the present war." At the request
of Stalin, who pointed to the publication of the correspondence,
these words were then changed so as to make mention of the development
of economic relations and trade between Germany and the Soviet
Union.
GATJS
No. 499
F18/412-396
Mern&rand/Mm, "by Ambassador Bitter
TOP SECRET [Moscow,] January 1940.1
THE COSTFEBENCE I3ST THE KREMLIN OK DECEMBER 31, 1989
Present:
For Germany:
Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg,
Ambassador Bitter,
Minister Schnurre,
Counselor of Embassy Hilger ;
For the Soviet Union :
M. Stalin,
Chairman Molotov,
People's Commissars Mikoyan and
Tevossyan, and
Trade Representative Babarin
1
Tliis document is undated, but the second (more detailed) section follow
closely the text of a memorandum initialed Jan. 2, 1940, by Schnnrre
(1137/324471-78) .
1940 589
On December 29, 1939, People's Commissar Mikoyan announced in
a conversation concerning German requests for iron that the matter
would have to be discussed with M. Stalin. There were binding decisions
of the Soviet authorities concerned that pig iron and scrap iron
could not be exported. There could be no deviation from this except
by a decision of M. Stalin. At this time the other more important
points of negotiation that were still open could also be taken up.
The conversation with M. Stalin lasted a little over three hours.
It went into great detail. On the whole M. Stalin appeared not to
be in a very friendly mood. Quite incidentally, he expressed his low
evaluation of England and France. Although on individual points
he showed more understanding of German needs than the Soviet negotiators
had previously done, he steadfastly insisted on the Soviet
wishes brought forward by him, which, to be sure, are quite limited
compared to previous Soviet demands.
From a general political standpoint the most remarkable fact is that
for the first time he used the expression mutual assistance [gegenseitigen
Hilfeleistung] . In this connection he said that the Soviet Government
did not consider the treaty as an ordinary trade agreement,
but as one of mutual assistance. The Soviet Union was prepared to
help Germany by deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs, which
it could sell elsewhere at higher prices and for foreign currency. For
this it also expected Germany's help. The Soviet Union wanted to
learn from Germany, particularly in the field of military armament.
If German officials were at all concerned lest in this way other powers
might learn something about the condition of German armament,
such anxiety was not in keeping with existing relations between Germany
and the Soviet Union. Moreover, he thoroughly recognized the
necessity for keeping certain things secret.
Ambassador Hitter thereupon replied that such an anxiety had not
played any part in the German attitude. If the Reich Government
had not fulfilled all of the Soviet deelgation's wishes, this was due to
other reasons. For Germany also it was not merely a question of an
ordinary trade agreement. By the exchange of notes of September
28, 1939, the Soviet Government had promised its assistance through
deliveries of raw materials. Germany would compensate for these
deliveries in the manner promised. In this way Germany was also
helping the Soviet Union. Never before had experts in a foreign
country been permitted to see so much as the Soviet delegation in
Germany. Unforunately, the Soviet wishes were largely concentrated
in those industrial and military fields in which their fulfillment
was not possible at the time, or occasioned very great difficulties.
In ordinary circumstances it would have been easier. The Soviet
590
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Government must not forget that Germany was at war with two of the
strongest military powers.
The course of the conversation in its essential details is given bdow.
In accordance with the special reason for the meeting. Ambassador
Bitter set forth the German situation as regards iron. All the ship,
ments desired by the Soviet Union called for iron. Because of Germany's
own armament needs as well as the loss of some of her previous
sources of iron ore, it was a condition for the fulfillment of the Soviet
desires that Germany should promptly receive in return, in usable
form, the iron necessary for expediting the Soviet orders. He specified
the German desire for the delivery of 200,000 tons each of pig
iron and scrap iron, and a million and a half tons of iron ore of 55
percent average iron content. The desire for the delivery of 180,000
tons of chromium ore was related to this.
M. Stalin immediately spoke up regarding the iron question and
declared that the Soviet Union was unable to deliver such high-grade
ore. The Soviet Union did not have at its disposal sufficient quantities
for its own iron production, which at the present time was only
adapted to the use of high-content ores. He hoped however that the
development of Soviet extraction and concentration installations
would make possible the delivery of high-content iron ore the very
next year. Germany had ore concentration establishments in which
it prepared even 18 to 22 percent iron ore and then smelted it. Germany
could make all the more use of the ores of 35 to 42 percent iron
content offered by the Soviet Union. Thereby it also saved the expenses
connected with the preparation of German ores.
As regards scrap iron, it was doubtful whether the entire 200,000
Ions could be delivered. Nor could all the pig iron be delivered. The
Soviet Union would, however, do everything possible in regard to pig
iron and scrap iron. The prospect was held out that exact figures
would be quoted.
Of chromium ore the Soviet Union could deliver 100,000 tons in
the year 1940. The deposits were large and were being further developed.
In the absence of a railroad, the chromium ore was for the
time being delivered by truck. Within 10 months the railroad would
be ready. In 1941, then, the deliveries could presumably be increased.
In connection with the general preliminary explanations, M. Stalin
then began to speak about the Soviet wishes. Foremost were the desires
in the field of naval artillery. The Soviet Union was prepared
to restrict its wishes to the minimum. It wished to learn from Germany
and requested Germany's help in this field. This help was not
desired gratis, but was to be paid for. The details of the restricted
Soviet wishes in this field set forth by M. Stalin appear in enclosure L
JANTTABT 1940 591
M. Stalin then began to speak of the Soviet wishes in regard to
warships and welcomed the fact that Germany was prepared to deliver
the cruiser Luteow. If Germany declined to deliver other ships
in process of construction because she wanted to complete them herself,
he could not object to this stand.
He then turned to the Soviet wishes in the field of machine tools.
He pointed out that for the Soviet Government it was principally
a question of large-scale machines for the production of fl.nmmTmf.in-n
for heavy artillery. The Soviet Union was very urgently in need of
these machines and was very much dissatisfied with the previous
German replies. The Germans pointed out the particular difficulties
posed by the delivery of precisely these machines at present.
M. Stalin said that he would also keep the Soviet wishes for immediate
delivery in this field to a minimum. But he must insist on
these limited deliveries in the year 1940. The present status of the
Soviet requirements in the field of machine tools may be seen from
enclosure 2.
M. Stalin furthermore characterized the total price of the airplanes
as out of the question. It represented a multiplication of the actual
prices. If Germany did not wish to deliver the airplanes, he would
have preferred to have this openly stated.
M. Stalin further characterized the acquisition of the Lurgi or
Eenn process, which we had already sold to Japan, as important.
Besides, he expressed his amazement that Germany did not wish to
deliver the few periscopes, and that even in the case of storage batteries
for U-boats difficulties of delivery were brought up.
Ambassador Bitter characterized the information given by
M. Stalin concerning iron ore as a great disappointment. Although
it was true that Germany had made great progress in the last few
years in the dressing of low-grade iron ores, the capacity of these
plants was still restricted to her own production. What we needed
was the high-grade iron ore from Spain, North Africa, and overseas.
The iron ore offered was also undesirable for us because of the high
freight costs and because of its high content of silicic acid. M. Stalin,
however, stood by his decision that high-content iron ore could not be
delivered this year. To the question as to whether the statement
concerning higher-content iron ore could be considered as a concrete
prospect for the year 1941, M. Stalin replied that he had already
explained that.
Ambassador Bitter then went over the Soviet wishes mentioned by
M, Stalin one by one. He stated first of all that Germany had declared
herself ready to make deliveries of almost all the items mentioned
by M. Stalin and had merely declined to set specific time
592
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
limits. The Russians had set time limits which were in part incomprehensible
to experts. For artillery turrets for warships we rg.
quired three or four years. This caused skeptical amazement. In
the Soviet Union a gun turret could be produced in a year and a half
after the completion of the plans.
Ambassador Bitter promised that after his return to Berlin he
would look into the matter of whether, in view of the greatly reduced
Soviet demands, time limits could be set,
In regard to the airplanes, Ambassador Bitter pointed out that
we had offered not only airplanes of today and yesterday but even
of tomorrow, and that the Soviet delegation had always spoken of
purchasing a few planes as "models." The word "model" implied
the idea of wanting to copy the airplanes. Naturally we could not,
therefore, content ourselves with the value of individual planes, but
must request reimbursement for the licenses and compensation for the
fact that we placed our entire costly work of development and our
experience at the disposal of the Soviet Union. M. Stalin replied
that for the present the planes were being bought for testing purposes
only. The object was to become acquainted with the German types
and to learn from them. If it was decided to copy them, the Soviet
Government would approach us and pay for the right to use them
as models. People's Commissar Tevossyan returned to the matter
of the high-speed dive bombers allegedly on hand.
Ambassador Bitter continued, stating that Germany was prepared
to deliver installations for the Lurgi or Benn processes. But the
Soviet Government should make up its mind soon and conclude contracts,
for the production of such installations required time. He
went on to explain why the delivery of even a few periscopes caused
difficulties at present. Germany had already delivered such periscopes
to the Soviet Union in the year 1937. From this it was apparent
that we were not opposed to the delivery as such.
The next item brought up for discussion by Ambassador Bitter
was the delivery of non-ferrous metals and hardening metals. We
could not take from our own stockpiles the quantities required for
the completion of the Soviet orders. It was therefore essential that
these metals should be delivered by the Soviet Government, and on
time, i. e. before the commencement of the work. The simplest
method would be the establishment for this purpose of consignment
depots in Germany, from which the necessary amounts could be taken
from time to time as needed. M. Stalin objected to the method proposed.
He pointed out that the establishment of such consignment
depots in Germany would surely become known to England. This
might have repercussions on the Soviet chances of purchasing these
jA]sruAET 194,0 593
metals for Germany's account, too in the world market. It would
be more practical if Germany bought these metals directly from the
Soviet Union. Even now the Soviet Union was prepared to set aside
certain amounts from the Soviet stocks and deliver them to Germany.
Thus, for example, 1,500 tons of nickel could be delivered
immediately. Also, several hundred tons of tin could be delivered
on short notice. (On January 2 Mikoyan defined more exactly Stalin's
pledge to the effect that the Soviet Union would deliver 1,500 tons
of nickel, 450 tons of tin, and 5,000 tons of copper to Germany against
payment in reichsmarks through the clearing system.) As already
stated, the Soviet Union was also prepared to purchase such metals
for Germany in third countries. Ambassador Ritter called attention
to the necessity of keeping the two questions guaranteeing of the necessary
requirements for the Soviet orders and purchases for Germany's
own supplies separate from each other.
In this connection M. Stalin went more into detail concerning the
metal resources of the Soviet Union and the difficulties which at present
retarded the development of the individual deposits. These difficulties
were caused by the lack of machinery, especially dredges
and mining machinery, and the inadequate technical experience of
the Soviet experts. There were large deposits of nickel in the Soviet
Union, whose exploitation could in time bring the Soviet Union's
own production up to 20 or 30 thousand tons annually. The same
held true for iron ore and other metals. In Orenburg [Chkalov]
there was iron ore with a high nickel content. Delivery of German
coal to the Kola peninsula for phosphates, the hard metal Widia, etc.
If Germany furnished the necessary machines and installations,
enough could be produced in the Soviet Union to supply "two Germanies"
with these metals. Ambassador Bitter characterized this as
an interesting prospect for both sides and declared the willingness of
Germany to cooperate with the Soviet Union along this line. A program
for this cooperation could be set up as soon as the present treaty
was signed. Chairman Molotov agreed with the suggestion of Ambassador
Ritter that experts on both sides should then meet for that
purpose.
Ambassador Ritter then said that in preparing the text of the
treaty yesterday a new and very serious difference of opinion had
come up unexpectedly. It concerned the rate at which the German
shipments in compensation for the Soviet deliveries were to be made.
The wording and purport of the exchange of notes of September 28,
1939 were quite clear on this point. It spoke of ". . . raw materials
for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through delivery
of manufactured goods over a more extended period of time? The
594 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAK FOREIGN POLICY
present treaty was to run for one year. Even if we assumed that the
Soviet Union would, if possible, carry out its deliveries in a shorter
time, and the Soviet negotiators had on various occasions promised
this, we had previously without contradiction proceeded on the assumption
that "a more extended period" in any case was understood
to mean more than a year. That also necessarily followed from the
fact that in connection with the German compensatory deliveries it
was largely a question of newly manufactured articles, and that the
Soviet delegation wished to order articles which, as for example the
ship turrets, required a long time. In drawing up the text of the
treaty the Soviet negotiators had, however, insisted on the stipulation
that the balance of shipments and compensatory deliveries should
be drawn up quarterly, and in case of failure of one party to make
deliveries, the other could consequently limit its deliveries. It was
to be expected that the German deliveries would be considerably
behind the Soviet deliveries in the first and second quarters of the year
and probably also in the third and fourth. This was brought out right
in the exchange of notes of September 28, 1939. The new interpretation
of the Soviet negotiators would change the Agreement of
September 28, 1939, on a decisive point and was not acceptable to ua
M. Stalin upheld the interpretation of the Soviet negotiators to the
extent that the shipments and compensatory deliveries must be balanced
at the end of the year at least. The contingency should not
occur that at the end of the year the Soviet Union should have made
deliveries worth 500,000,000 RM and Germany merely 400,000,000 BM.
That would of course amount to a credit to Germany from the Soviet
Union. There had been no talk of credits. In that case it would
have been necessary also to discuss interest. The detailed discussion
on this point did not lead to any understanding. Ambassador Hitter
rejected the view of M. Stalin as unworkable in practice and contrary
to the Agreement of September 18 [J8], 1939. M. Stalin
thereupon proposed to come back to that point in a later discussion.
Ambassador Ritter in conclusion again brought up the undecided
question of the 50 percent reduction of railroad freight rates for
soybeans in connection with the payment of transit freight charges
through the clearing system. This question was settled during the
same night by an exchange of letters 2 on the basis of the German
point of view.
RlTTBR*
Not printed (3782/E041720-21). * Hitter wired from Moscow on Jan. 3 that after a full discussion with Stalin
on the points still open, he thought it necessary to return to Berlin for a few
days to reach some final decisions; he would leave Moscow the evening of
Jan. 3 and asked that appointments with the principal officials involved be
arranged for him (1138/324601-02).
JANTJARY 1940 595
[Enclosure 1]
PROGRAM OF SOVIET DESIRES TK THE FIELD OF NAVAL
ARTILLERT, DECEMBER 81, 1939
M. Stalin explained that in view of the difficulties in regard to
delivery alleged by the Germans, the Soviets were prepared to reduce
their desires in the field of naval artillery to a minimum.
1) In place of the previously requested fourteen 381 mm. or 15-inch
double turrets they would be satisfied with three double turrets of this
caliber which, according to his information, Germany could deliver
easily* German production was running smoothly.
2) Germany's production of triple ship turrets, caliber 280 mm. or
11-inch, was running just as well. The Soviet Union desired three of
these triple turrets.
3) The previously expressed desire for the delivery of twelve triple
ship turrets, caliber 149.1 mm. or 6-inch, was reduced to four triple
turrets of this caliber.
Time of delivery for items 1 to 3, within the year 1940. Ambassador
Hitter called attention to the impossibility of delivering within
this time limit, since the completion of the desired turrets required a
much longer time*
4) Germany had designs for triple turret installations, caliber 16-
inch or 400 mm. The Soviet Government requested that it be given
merely the drawings of these.
[Enclosure 2]
The previous desires of the Soviet Government in the field of machine
tools were :
I. On the principal list for war material, under subdivision 12,
machines for the production of artillery munitions to the value
of 54 million KM.
On the supplementary list of war material, machine
tools of the same type to the value of 6 million EM.
Total .... 60 million KM.
EL The Soviet Delegation has now reduced its requests substantially
and formulated them anew in the following manner:
1) It starts out with the previous list of war material accepted by
us at an earlier stage in the negotiations, which amounted to a total
596
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of 7 million EM. The items are marked in the war material list with an asterisk.4
2) In place of the previously reported desire to obtain machines
from the Hasse & Wrede firm and the Heller firm (Section I, items 5
and 7) (under 5, 527 pieces ; under 7, 96 pieces) , the Russians now expressed
a wish to receive a total of only 34 pieces during the year 1940
namely : Two sets of machine tools for Russian manufacture of 150
ipm. shells [as follows] :
1. Centering machine Hasse & Wrede 2 machines
2. Special, automatic, hard composition steel
planing machine Hasse & Wrede 8 machines
3. Machine for fuse threading Hasse & Wrede 4 machines
4. Automatic grinders Hasse & Wrede 6 machines
5. Thread milling machines for milling the
thread of the bore for the fuse Heller 4 machines
6. Machine for milling grooves Hasse & Wrede 2 machines
7. Machine for rolling grooves Hasse & Wrede 2 machines
8. Machine for making rotating bands
Hasse & Wrede 2 machines
9. Presses for hydraulic tests Hasse & Wrede 4 machines
34 machines
3) Moreover, in the main only the few items entered under II, TTT
?
IV, and V of the old war material list were retained for delivery in
the year 1940.
Items of the old war material list and the supplementary list not
mentioned under 1 and 3 are, to be sure, not canceled, but have been
postponed till later.
4 The list was that submitted by the Russians on NOT. 30 (see document No.
407). The list with asterisks opposite the items accepted by the Germans has
not been printed (1138/324742-97).
No. 500
B18/B003287-88
State Secretary Wetesdcker to Minister Sliicher
PERSONAL BERLIN, January 2, 1940.
DEAR HERR VON BLTJCHER : I still have to thank you for your letter
of December 18,
1 and should like in the first place to express the
hope that the new year will be less difficult for you than the last. We
have full understanding here of what it means for you now to have to
follow a new policy toward a country where you have cultivated such
friendly relations.
1 Document No. 471.
JANUARY 1940 597
You recently suggested
3 that it might be well for you to come here
to report in the first days of January* However, I have had to ask
that you postpone this idea for a while,
3 as we feared that a trip here
by you at the present moment might be given a political interpretation,
which you did not intend. There is no reason, however, why
you should not approach us again with this suggestion, and we for
our part will also keep the trip in mind.
It is clear that our situation, as it has developed in the course of
the last 6 months, does not permit us to appear to equivocate vis-ttvis
the Russians. An unexposed flank toward the east means a great
deal to us at the present time.
We have learned from your wife that so far her letters have not
reached you. I hope this situation has changed by now; if not, I
should of course be glad to lend my assistance, and shall take the
liberty of informing Frau von Bliicher of this once again.
I am keeping my fingers crossed for you.
Sincere greetings.
Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc., WEIZSACKER
*Not found.
1 According to a memorandum by Grnndlxerr of Dec. 30, 1939 (452/223392/2-93) ,
this was done by Grundherr on Dec. 28.
No. 501
im/857647
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 14 of January 3 BERLIN, January 3 6 : 53 p. m.
Received Moscow, January 4 12 : 50 a. m*
For the Ambassador.
We plan to send Herr Nikolaus Bost, a man born in Russia and
familiar with conditions there, who is personally very well known to
us, as a courier to Moscow for about 2 weeks. He is to prepare an
investigation of whether it is possible to bring- influence to bear on the
French Section of the Third International and whether Soviet information
files on French Communists could be inspected. Please treat
Host's mission, which is purely of an informative and preparatory
nature, in strict confidence and lend him every assistance within the
598 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAK FOREIGN POLICY
scope of the mission we have assigned him. Host will be instructed
to act in close liaison with you.
1 Marginal note : "Was discussed by the Ambassador with M. Potemkin, who
was asked whether Host could talk to the head of the French Section of the
Comintern. P. will study the question and let us know. To he filed. Y[QH]
TEippelskirch] January 9."
This document was found in the files of the German Embassy in Moscow, which
contain some additional material on this episode. There are some notes apparently
used by Ambassador Schulenburg in his conversation with Potemkin on
Jan. 9. According to these notes (1379/357648-50), the German Government
assumed that the Soviet Union was greatly interested "in freeing French domestic
policies from the repressive measures of the present War Government and
in restoring democratic liberties." Therefore, German-Soviet cooperation toward
these ends was being considered and the Soviets were requested to designate
someone with whom the German emissary Host could discuss further detaila
On Jan. 27, von Tippelskirch told Potemkin that Host had now arrived In
Moscow, and reminded him of Schulenburg's request that Rost be allowed to
talk to the head of tbe French section of the Comintern (1379/357652 ) . Potemkia
said he would submit the matter to Molotov. A memorandum by Tippelskireh
of Feb. 5 (1379/357653) quotes Potemkin as saying that he had reported on the
German request to Molotov who had listened without, however, expressing himself
on the subject. On Feb. 8, Tippelskirch recorded (1379/357654) having discussed
with Rost the possible effects on the latter's mission of the police raid
on the Soviet Trade Office in Paris which had just been reported on the radio;
it was agreed that the Soviets would probably observe even greater caution
now, and that it would be advisable not to press the matter too hard. Marginal
notes on this copy indicate that Potemkin was ill when Tippelskirch went to
see him on Feb. 10, and that he was still ill on Feb. 13. Finally, on Feb. 10,
Tippelskirch inquired once more at the Foreign Commissariat whether there
were any new developments with regard to the Rost mission.
According to a memorandum of the same day (1379/357655), Potemkin had
answered in the negative, saying that the Soviet Foreign Commissariat preferred
not to take any initiative in that matter but that it was up to Rost to da
on his own whatever he deemed necessary "in this affair which was of interest
to him." Tippelskirch's statement that Rost had already left Moscow was
received by Potemkin "with a little shrug."
No. 502
109/82979-86
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
SECRET BERLIN, January 3, 1940.
On January 2 a discussion, took place in Karinhall under the chairmanship
of the Field Marshal, in which I, as a representative of Ambassador
Hitter, who had been asked to attend, took part together
with Minister Clodius.
The other participants were :
From the staff of the Field Marshal : State Secretary Korner, State
Secretary Neumann, Major General Bodenschatz, Staatsrat
Wohlthat, and several adjutants; From the Economics Ministry: State Secretary Landfried, Under
State Secretary von Jagwitz, Under State Secretary Hanneken,
Ministerialrat Reinhardt ; From the High Command of the Wehrmacht: Lieutenant General
Thomas, Lieutenant Commander Koch;
JANUARY 1940 599
From the High Command of the Navy : Admiral Canaris ;
From the Sicherheitsdienst : GruppenFührer Heydrich and Brigadeftihrer
Johst;
From the Ministry of Communications : State Secretary Kleinmann ;
From the German Legation in Belgrade : Consul General Neuhausen ;
From the German Legation in Bucharest: Air Attache Colonel
Gerstenberg;
From the Air Ministry : Ministerialrat Muller.
The discussion was devoted to economic questions, especially Rumania
and the transportation problems in the Balkans. Some of the
problems also related to Sweden and Yugoslavia.
The Field Marshal opened the discussion with some general observations
:
Not only in the military sphere but in all others likewise we would
have to ward off the attacks of the enemy and go over to the offensive.
The propaganda field was the business of the Foreign Ministry and
would not be taken up for discussion. In the economic field, the important
subject of trade warfare at sea would likewise not be discussed
today. But the enemy was also trying by other means, in particular
by preemptive purchasing and even violent sabotage, to prevent us
from getting our supplies from foreign countries. These questions
would be the subject of discussion today, especially as they concerned
Kumania, where this type of enemy activity was especially prevalent.
The official defense was the business of the Foreign Ministry,
through representations by the Minister, by influencing the Rumanian
Government, by conducting appropriate negotiations with it. The
Minister was naturally handicapped by his official position; he also
obviously had his own views on these questions. He was not entirely
satisfied with the work of the trade delegation, and would not permit
matters to continue as they were.
Still more had to be done, however, in addition to this activity by
the Foreign Ministry. If the British were working against us with
all legal and illegal means, we would have to do the same. He had
obtained the Führer's permission for us to pass over to an active
counterattack in Rumania. Action would have to be taken with the
greatest determination. In so doing we must not shrink from using
the most extreme methods, such as were being applied by the British.
Keeping planes in readiness after major actions would also come in
for consideration. The particulars of the fight against sabotage
should be discussed later in a smaller group. To begin with, therefore,
the discussion was to be limited to the other kinds of action. Foreign
policy activities, which have just been termed the task of the Foreign
Ministry to be carried out by the Minister and the trade delegation,
would be left out of the discussion. However, in the economic field
the Foreign Ministry was merely an executive agency, while the Eco
600
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
nomics Ministry was the one to make the actual decisions. The way
in which economic matters were being handled did not please him. We ought not to haggle about the rate of exchange of the reichsmark*
the important thing was to increase the volume of raw material imports
and to assure their delivery. It did not seem to him that we had
been successful in this, in spite of the improved rate of exchange which
had been obtained. He now requested the Economics Ministry to
express an opinion in regard to these questions.
State Secretary Landfried declared that it would be advantageous
to make an agreement with Rumania similar to the one with Yugoslavia,
1 in which Yugoslav metals were delivered in exchange for German
arms and with the proviso that price fluctuations should affect
deliveries in both directions in the same way. Under State Secretary
von Jagwitz stressed the fact that as a result of the latest agreements
concluded by the trade delegation much more Rumanian raw material
could be bought than we were in a position to haul away for example,
130,000 tons of oil per month while at present, since the Danube was
blocked by ice, only approximately 30,000 tons could be transported.
An extension of the agreements was thus not urgent ; the important
thing was merely the assurance that they would be carried out.
Thereupon Minister Clodius gave a report on his latest negotiations
in Bucharest 2 as follows : The improvement of the treaty by obtaining
a binding commitment by the Rumanian Government to deliver 1%
million tons of oil and 1% million tons of grain without any definite
agreements regarding a guarantee of German payment, and even the
delivery of Rumanian oil on credit up to the value of 40 million RM;
increase of our purchasing opportunities by 50 million RM as a result
of an improvement in the rate of exchange ; measures of protection
against sabotage taken by the Rumanian Minister President after a
discussion with Minister Clodius ; military protection of the entire oil
region under a division commander as military chief, to whom the
police are also to be subordinated ; a definite promise by the Minister
President to fulfill the obligation to deliver oil, if necessary by compelling
the oil companies to sell, possibly even by resorting to
expropriation.
The Field Marshal was evidently satisfied with Minister Clodius'
statements. He said in this connection that he had not been correctly
informed; he was now convinced that Minister Clodius had
Acted correctly and properly in Bucharest. However, various things
1 See document No. 117, footnote 4.
Clodius* negotiations In Bucharest In December (the 7tn session of the Gov-
>ernment Committees) were concluded on Dec. 21 by a Protocol (903/292986-3000).
Also signed on Dec. 21 was a secret supplementary agreement (5556/E395476~77>
to the one classified confidential on payment for armament deliveries which
formed part of the complex of agreements signed on Sept. 29. 1939. See docujnent
No. 166.
JANTUART 1940 601
still had to be done now in order to be on the safe side. When Minister
Clodius during his report spoke of his conversations with the
Rumanian Minister President, the Master of the Royal Court, and
other Rumanian Ministers, the Field Marshal asked him twice whether
he had seen the Ministers personally and had personally spoken to the
Master of the Royal Court, to which Minister Clodius replied emphatically
in the affirmative.
MText the Field Marshal requested Colonel Gerstenberg to give his
opinion. The latter said that he had had occasion in Bucharest to
observe the activity of the government committee at four different
times. He had asked himself this question : Are these negotiations
sufficiently dependable to permit the German Wehrmacht to rely on
their being carried out punctiliously ? In view of the national characteristics
of the Rumanians, he had become convinced that in the event
of total war the oil supplies for the German "Wehrmacht were not assured
by these negotiations.
Then there ensued lengthy discussions of the transportation question
(navigation on the Danube, increase in the number of tankers,
capacity of the railroad, increase in the number of tank cars) in
which State Secretary Kleinmann and Under State Secretary Hanneken
took the floor ; there was also discussion of the enemy's acts of
sabotage and our defense against them, in regard to which Admiral
Canaris made some comments.
From these discussions there emerged the proposal to send to
Bucharest a special representative for economic and transportation
questions; his task would be to see that in the implementation of the
agreements between the Governments our imports of raw materials
from Rumania would be guaranteed through the conclusion of commercial
purchase contracts, the punctual performance of Rumanian
deliveries and German payments, and through providing for means
of transportation and the actual hauling away. To this I remarked
that in the Foreign Ministry, too, the necessity had already been discussed
of stationing a special representative for these extremely important
questions in Bucharest and perhaps also one in Berlin, under
whom would be placed the men from the various departments who are
now dealing with the question both in Berlin and in Bucharest. The
special representative in Bucharest would have to be attached to the
staff of the Legation. The Field Marshal did not contradict the
last statement and for his part remarked that the activity of Minister
Clodius as chief negotiator with the Rumanian Government ought not
to be encroached upon in any way by the special representative.
During the discussion in regard to the special representative the
Field Marshal handed me a folded note across the table, upon which
he had written the words : "Wohlthat to be assigned by the Foreign
602
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ministry?" I read the note and put it away. Wohlthat's name^
not mentioned in conversation. On the other hand, the Field Marshal
remarked that in discussions on Southeastern questions the Führer
had quite frequently spoken of the special qualifications of Viennese
personalities for dealing with such questions, and in that connection
had mentioned the name of Guido Schmidt, the former Austrian
Foreign Minister.
In conclusion the Field Marshal remarked that the appointment of
such a special representative seemed to him to be particularly urgent
and important. He asked me to lay the matter before the Reich
Foreign Minister immediately, and said he would welcome very much
the proposal indicated in the note.
This concluded the discussion of the Rumanian problem. There
was still some discussion of Sweden and Yugoslavia, and then the
Field Marshal dismissed the large group and retained only Admiral
Canaris and the two men from the Sicherheitsdienst along with
his own entourage for a smaller conference.
I was already aware from the reports of the Minister and the Air
Attache that the Air Attache, Colonel Gerstenberg, and Minister
Fabricius had had considerable differences of opinion for quite some
time, and likewise that Colonel Gerstenberg believed that something
more would have to be done to assure the execution of the trade agreements
and afford protection against enemy sabotage. Upon instructions
from the State Secretary I had a discussion about this with
Colonel Gerstenberg on December 26, at which time his strong bias
against the activities of Minister Fabricius had become apparent,
whereas Colonel Gerstenberg did not criticize Minister Clodius* activities
in any way on this [later] occasion, but on the contrary expressed
approval. My knowledge of this background as well as the course of
the discussion with the Field Marshal made me suspect that the reason
for his calling the conference and for the attitude he adopted at first
was to be found in the reports which he had received from Colonel
Gerstenberg.8
"In a supplementary memorandum of the same day (169/82977-78), Olodius
noted : "Before I had an opportunity in yesterday's session to explain the progress
of the negotiations, tbe Field Marshal repeatedly expressed the opinion that I
had been too severe and unyielding toward the Rumanian Government and had
thereby caused considerable ill will in Bucharest. When in reply to this I
explained that precisely in time of war a certain amount of severity was unavoidable
in negotiations in a foreign country in order to put through Germany's vital
demands, and that in Bucharest, too, I had not done anything more than use the
necessary pressure to obtain acceptance of our just demands, the Field Marshal
appeared to be satisfied. Nevertheless, he asked me once more whether the
Rumanians had been very much annoyed at the close of the negotiations. Not
until I answered him that this had by no means been the case, that in spite ot
the unavoidable political pressure our demands had been put through in a
thoroughly friendly manner, and that the leave taking between me and the lead
JANUART 1940 603
Several hours after the return from Karinhall State Secretary
Landfried called me by telephone and made the following statements:
He had turned over in his mind once more the result of the discussion
with regard to the suggested special commissioner and had also talked
the matter over with State Secretary Korner. He was of the opinion
that it would not be necessary to have a special representative here in
Berlin, since the departments concerned, and in particular the transportation
board established to deal with transportation questions,
could deal adequately with the problems arising here. As far as the
sending of a special representative to Bucharest was concerned, he
assumed that the Foreign Ministry would doubtless also wish to aim
at a complete solution, for it would surely have an unfortunate effect
if a special representative were sent to Bucharest in addition to the
Minister, I declined to express any opinion at all in the matter, since
I first had to lay the matter before the Foreign Minister.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with
instructions.
WlEHCL
Ing Rumanian statesmen had occurred in complete friendship, were the Field
Marshal's doubts in the matter entirely dissipated.
"From the above it is apparent that one of the Field Marshal's informants
must have laid particular stress on the alleged excessive severity during the
negotiations. But this can by no means have been Colonel Gerstenberg, whose
difference of opinion with Minister Fabricius is based on the very fact that he
thinks the Rumanians should be treated more severely than has been the case
heretofore."
No. 503
Memorandwni T>y the Minister to Norway
-,
1 January 3, 1940.
I vouch for the Norwegian Government's determination today to
remain neutral.
I believe I can vouch for my ability to give prompt notice if this
attitude should undergo any change.
The Norwegian Government's determination to remain neutral could
be undermined through assistance given in the Russo-Finnish conflict,
but it cannot be seriously impaired by any British proposals to Norway
that England be granted bases on the Norwegian coast. The
Norwegian Government would resist such a move with the support of
the Norwegian people.
Watchfulness is required, as stated above, with respect to assistance
given in the Russo-Finnish conflict. The King and the Foreign Mina
See document No. 483.
604
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ister have told me that they see no violation of neutrality in
permitting
material and humanitarian aid to Finland. The Foreign Minister
told me that he would keep watch on the private character of such aid.
The question is what Norway would do if England and France, without
officially intervening in the Russo-Finnish conflict and without
declaring war on Russia, should begin delivering arms and sending
volunteers. I believe that Norway would not obstruct the transit of
arms or of volunteers not organized in military units, taking the position
that Norwegian neutrality is not violated thereby. Under its
present policy the Norwegian Government will be careful to continue
keeping out of the Russo-Finnish conflict and to prevent England
from gaining a foothold in Norway. It wants to remain master in
its own house and considers strict neutrality as Norway's only effective
armament.2
The situation would naturally change if Russia were to undertake
measures against Norway or Sweden.
BKATJER
2 In a memorandum of a visit on Jan. 9 by S. Johannessen, Commercial Counselor
in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, WeizsUcker recorded the following:
"I tried to explain to M. Johannessen, as I have done with other visitors, our
urgent desire that Norway not become a theater of war. Norway's attitude
would begin to assume importance for us whenever, succumbing to British or
French influence, Norway began to grant our enemies facilities and concessions
which are incompatible with our interests/* (54/36492/2)
No. 504
F1/O203-O9
The Duce to the Fuhrer and Oha^ioellor *
[January 3, 1940] *
FTJHRER : Four months have passed since the exchange of letters between
us during the first part of September,8 four months during
which your attention has been completely absorbed by action and I
have considered it inopportune to disturb you.
But today, while there is a period of waiting, I consider it necessary
to submit to you an examination of the situation from my point
1 Translated from the Italian, two German translations (100/64889-98 and
F7/0537-0532 -Fl/0200-02) having been compared.
'This date appears on one of the German translations (F7/0537). In his
Diaries, Ciano noted that Mussolini had prepared the letter on Jan. 8, but subsequently
made a few changes in it and ordered it to be dispatched on Jan. 5.
The latter date appears on a photostat of the document from Italian official
sources. The source for the date Jan. 4, which is that given for the translation
of the document in Les lettres secretes 6chang6es par Hitler et Mu&*oUwi, ed.
by Andre* Franeois-Poncet (Paris, 1946), p. 47, is unknown to the editors.
WeizsUcker noted in a memorandum of Jan. 8 (1848/421118) that Attolico had
that morning requested an audience with Hitler to present Mussolini's letter to
him. See also document No. 583.
*See document No. 1.
JANTJAKY 1940 605
of view and speak to you about the problems of the moment with that
absolute sincerity and loyalty which have been and are the very conditions
of our personal and political relations.
Ciano's speech. I shall begin with that speech, which has been the
only political declaration of the Fascist Government since September.4
It has come to my knowledge that some parts of this speech did not
please certain German circles. I need not tell you that it represents
my thoughts from the first to the last word, and I believe that it was
absolutely necessary to explain to the Italian people the origin of
events and the reasons for our present attitude. The revelation of
some details of the truth, such as the fact that both of us desired a
rather long period of peace, did not do any harm to the German cause.
You know that Count Ciano has been and is still one of the most convinced
champions of Italo-German friendship, and for this very
reason it was his duty to enlighten Italians and foreigners. That
there have been more or less ridiculous speculations apropos of Ciano's
speech is unimportant. Whatever he might have said, the same thing
would have happened.
Tour d*hori&on. I now wish to tell you about Italy's relations with
the other European states. I shall begin \yith the State which is contained
within the city of Borne. I can inform you that the recent
exchange of visits between the King and the Pope has been of a
predominantly domestic, not international, significance. The conversations
have been brief and general, without anything definitive
or anything in the nature of proposals; nor could it have been
otherwise.
You will not be surprised if I tell you that the German-Russian
agreement has had painful repercussions in Spain. The Civil War is
too recent. The earth which covers the dead yours and ours and the
Spanish is still fresh. Bolshevism, is a memory that obsesses Spain
and the Spaniards ; with their passionate and fanatical logic they do
not understand the tactical necessities of politics. It is clear that
what Germany and Italy have lost during the last few months in Spain
has been won by the French and the British.
The relations of Italy with the French and the British are correct
but cool. We are supplying both with goods of various kinds, some of
which may indirectly aid the war effort, but all deliveries of a typically
military nature have been prohibited. The existence of these commercial
relations permits us to acquire those raw materials without which
we cannot complete our military preparations and which therefore
ultimately benefit Germany as well. The rumors of political conversations
are false. Between us and the British there was a period of
4 See documents No. 478, footnote 1, and No. 493.
606
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
strong tension in connection with the blockade, and although the procedures
of the British have been modified for the better, things are
far from normal and from that complete freedom for our shipping
which we intend to ensure for ourselves. Neither in Paris nor in
London does anyone have any illusions about seeing the phenomenon
of 1914r-15 repeated in 1940 or 1941. Feeling 5 in Italy is still strongly
anti-British, in spite of the propaganda to which I shall revert later*
The Balkans. We have never intended, and do not now intend, to
form that bloc which became "suspect" from the moment that it ^as
sponsored by the big democracies.6 I regard peace in the Danubian
basin as of fundamental interest to Germany.
Russia. Although Count Ciano's speech made no mention of Finland,
the Russian Ambassador in Home did not present his credentials
and departed.
7 Wehave recalled our Ambassador from Moscow.
[Relations between Home and Moscow are bad. We shall do nothing
to aggravate them, but the attitude of the Russians is a matter of
indifference to us.
Finland. Fascist Italy is favorably disposed toward this brave little
nation, in spite of the sanctions which the Government voted for at
Geneva but which the better part of the Finnish people did not accept*
There has been talk of immense aid given by Italy to Finland. That
is a matter of 25 fighter planes ordered before the war and nothing
else. Thousands of volunteers have presented themselves individually
at the Finnish Legation in Rome and at the Consulates, but the offers
have to date been declined by the Finns.
Motives of Anglo-French propaganda. Through the Catholics and
the remnants of the old parties, through radio broadcasts, which we
cannot effectively interfere with and which are freely listened to, and
through personal relations, the British, more than the French, are conducting
intensive propaganda. As regards the responsibility for the
war, no Italian believes in the innocence of Great Britain. As regards
the war aims of the big democracies no Italian takes seriously the
words liberty, justice, right, morality, etc., which are pronounced by
the heads of those democracies.
But British propaganda is emphasizing two facts, namely, the
Russo-German agreements, which in practice mark the end of the
Anti-Comintern Pact, and the treatment which is said to have been
meted out in Poland to the genuinely Polish population. On this
point the German counterpropaganda seems late and weak. A people
1 The Italian text here uses the German word Btimmung. 9 See documents Nos. 145, 176, 266, 296, 329, 354, 359, 362, and 372.
7 See document No. 494.
Finland participated in sanctions applied against Italy under art. 16 of the
League of Nations Covenant in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute of 1935.
JANUARY 1940 607
which has been ignominiously betrayed by its miserable politico-military
governing class but which as you yourself chivalrously recognized
in your Danzig speech 9 fought courageously, deserves a treatment
which does not give occasion for hostile speculations. It is my
conviction that the creation of a modest, disarmed Poland which is
exclusively Polish, liberated from the Jews for whom I fully approve
your project of gathering them all in a large ghetto in Lublin can no
longer constitute any threat to the Greater Reich. If this were done,
it would be an element of great importance which would deprive the
big democracies of any justification for continuing the war and would
liquidate the ridiculous Polish Eepublic created by the French and
British at Angers.10 Unless you are irrevocably resolved to prosecute
the war to a finish, I believe that the creation of a Polish state under
the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and
constitute a condition sufficient for the peace.
You might as in fact your radio broadcasts to the French do every
day reaffirm that you do not have any war aims in the West and
thereby, before the world, place the responsibility for the continuation
of the conflict on the French and the British, and in any event refrain,
as you have done hitherto, from taking the initiative on the Western
front.
I am profoundly convinced that Great Britain and France will never
succeed in making your Germany, assisted by Italy, capitulate, but it
is not certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British
to their knees or even divide them. To believe that is to delude oneself.
The United States would not permit a total defeat of the
democracies. Empires crumble for lack of internal equilibrium,
whereas blows from the outside may consolidate them. As you have
said, it is possible to foresee an outcome of the war with both sides
losing.
11 Now that you have secured your eastern frontiers and created
the Greater Reich of 90 million inhabitants, is it worth while to risk
all including the regime and sacrifice the flower of German generations
in order to hasten the fall of a fruit which must of necessity fall
and be harvested by us, who represent the new forces of Europe ? The
big democracies carry within themselves the seeds of their decadence.
* The text of Hitler's speech at Danzig, Sept. 19, 1939, is printed in Monatshefte
fur Auswartige Politik, Sept-Oct. 1939, pp. 929-944. An English translation
appeared in the New York Times for Sept. 20.
10 On Sept 30, 1939, the establishment of a Polish "Government in Exile" in
France was announced.
tt Presumably a reference to Hitler's speech of Oct. 6, 1939 (see Editors' Note,
p. 227) when he said : "Mr. Churchill may be convinced that Great Britain will
win. I do not doubt for a single moment that Germany will be victorious. Destiny
will decide who is right. One thing only is certain. In the course of world
history, there have never been two victors, but very often only losers. This seems
to me to have been the case in the last war,"
608
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Agreements with Russia. No one knows better than I, who have
now had 40 years of political experience, that politics even revolutionary
politics has its tactical exigencies, I recognized the Soviets
in 1924; in 1934 I concluded with them a treaty of commerce and
friendship.
12 So I realize that since von Ribbentrop's efforts toward
nonintervention by the French and the British were not realized, you
have avoided a second front. Without striking a blow, Russia has,
in Poland and the Baltic, profited from the war.
But I, a born revolutionist who has not modified his way of thinking,
tell you that you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of
your Revolution to the tactical exigencies of a certain political moment*
I feel that you cannot abandon the anti-Semitic and anti-
Bolshevist banner which you have been flying for 20 years and for
which so many of your comrades have died; you cannot renounce
your gospel, in which the German people have blindly believed. It is
my definite duty to add that a further step in your relations with
Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where the
anti-Bolshevik unanimity, especially among the Fascist masses, is
absolute, solid as rock, and indivisible.
Permit me to believe that this will not happen. The solution of
your Lebensraum problem is in Russia and nowhere else ; in Russia,
which has the immense area of 21 million square kilometers and 9
inhabitants per square kilometer. Russia is alien to Europe. In. spite
of her extent and her population, Russia is not a power but a weakness.
The mass of her population is Slavic and Asiatic. In olden times the
element of cohesion was furnished by the people of the Baltic; today,
by the Jews; that explains everything. Germany's task is this: to
defend Europe from Asia. That is not only Spengler's thesis. Until
4 months ago Russia was world enemy number one ; she cannot have
become, and is not, friend number one. This has profoundly disturbed
the Fascists in Italy and perhaps also many National Socialists
in Germany.
The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have
kept faith with our two Revolutions. It will then be the turn of the
big democracies, which cannot survive the cancer which is gnawing
at them and which manifests itself in the demographic, political, and
moral fields-
The situation of Italy. I am accelerating the tempo of military
preparations. Italy cannot and does not wish to become involved in
a long war ; her intervention should come at the most profitable and
decisive moment. In East Africa Italy is containing considerable
French forces at Jibuti and in the adjacent British colonies. The
"On Sept. 2, 1933, a Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Neutrality
was signed at Home, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxviu, p. 319,
JANUARY 1940 609
15 divisions in North Africa (8 regular army, 4 Black Shirt, and 3
Libyan divisions) are containing 80,000 British, Egyptians, and In*
dians and 250,000 French. In the Alps our troop dispositions have
been retarded but not reduced by the snow, and the troops confront
from 10 to 15 French divisions.
Fascist Italy intends at this time to constitute your reserve :
from the political cmd diplomatic point of view^ in case you should
desire to reach a political and diplomatic solution ;
from the economic point of view, aiding you to the greatest possible
extent in everything which may strengthen your resistance to the
blockade ;
from the military point of view^ when the aid will be not a burden
but a relief to you. And this question should be studied by the
military.
I believe that the nonintervention of Italy has been and is much
more useful to Germany than intervention, which in the war against
Poland would have been entirely superfluous.
I desire the German people to be convinced that the attitude of
Italy is within, not outside, the framework of the Pact of Alliance.
There are also other things that I might say, but this letter is already,
contrary to my custom, deplorably long. I ask you to read it
with the thought in mind that it takes the place of a conversation between
us, which I should have liked to have.
Accept my ever-friendly greetings and my best wishes for your
future and that of Germany.
MTTSSOUENI
No, 505
1982/44026&-76
Memora/nd/umn by an Official of the Embassy in Italy
x
BOMB, January 3, 1940.
OBSERVATIONS ON GERMAN-ITALIAN RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING
OP 1940
I. In retrospect
The year 1935 is of particular significance in Carman-Italian relations,
since it brought the basic change in the relationship of the
two countries. As late as the spring of 1935, when the Stresa conference
convened, the Italians were among the prime agitators against
Germany.2
1 This document Is from the papers of Ambassador Mackensen. No copy has
been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry, and it is not known whether
one was sent to Berlin or not.
9 See Documents on International Affairs, 19S5, vol. if pp. 80-93.
610
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
This changed when Italy embarked on the Ethiopian campaign and
the majority of the other nations attempted to counter Italy's action
by means of the sanctions.8 Germany did not participate in the
sanctions.
Over and above such "negative" aid we gave "positive" assistance
to the Italians by the fact that we occupied the Ehineland during the
Ethiopian war (spring 1936) and thereby diverted, as it were, the
attention of the world from Italy to ourselves.
In May 1936 the Empire was proclaimed and shortly thereafter it
was recognized by us on the occasion of Count Ciano's trip to Berlin
and Berchtesgaden.*
In November 1936 Mussolini made his well-known Milan speech,
which initiated the new era in Italy's relations with Yugoslavia (pact
with Yugoslavia, March 1937) and in which the word "Axis'* occurred
for the first time.5
The Duce's trip to Berlin followed in the fall of 1937.6
Consequently, the new German-Italian friendship was created not
by the spontaneous inner urge of two countries which are similar
in nature or which originally pursued the same objectives, but ad hoc,
on rational grounds as the result of necessities confronting both of
them. This situation is not changed by the similarity in the character
of Fascism and National Socialism. Even after 19B3 the Germans
did not want to hear anything about Italy or about closer relations
with the "two-faced Italians \Katzlmacher
JANUARY 1940 611
Another necessary condition was that Germany not outdo Italy in
the Balkans.
Then came the Austrian Anschluss (March 1938 ).
8 This was the
first serious jolt which the Axis experienced, but it survived it unweakened.
At that time Mussolini extricated himself brilliantly from
the predicament and made the best of it. During his visit to Italy
(May 1938) , the Führer renounced all claim to South Tirol once and
for all.9
Mussolini's role at Munich, in the fall of 1938 is common knowledge.
10 He is doubtless one of those primarily to be credited for averting
war at that time. The fate of the Sudeten area, contrary to that
of Austria, did not particularly concern Mussolini. Germany's right
to the Sudeten area was really recognized in the whole world.
Matters were different with regard to the establishment of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shortly thereafter (spring
1939 ).** Just a few months earlier Mussolini had stated in an open
letter to Lord Runciman that Italy supported the German claim to
the Sudeten area, since only Germans were to be incorporated into the
Reich; it would be a different matter if non-German areas should
also be claimed.13 Moreover, for Italy the establishment of the Protectorate
signified a further step by Germany toward the southeast
and this was not agreeable to Italy. The decision to annex Albania
(April 1939)
13 is said to have involved the consideration that the
Italian people should not gain the impression that the Axis partner
was getting everything and Italy nothing. Otherwise, however, th.e
Italians were indifferent to the fate of Czechoslovakia, for which no
particular sympathy was felt here.
Finally, the Polish war broke out (September 1939) . It is common
knowledge that this did not fit into Mussolini's plans at all and that
he was of the opinion that our claims in Poland could be satisfied in
a peaceful way ; the same applies to the fact that Mussolini was convinced,
in contrast to the German Government, that England and
France would fight. Mussolini did not leave us any doubt as to his
views.
Our treaty with Russia (September 1939 )
14 at first elicited the
admiration of the Italian Government for the successful diplomatic
coup and also otherwise met with its approval because of the hopedfor
effect on England and France. This soon changed, however,,
when the consequences made themselves felt : Re-entry of the Russians
* See vol. i.
MSSeeee vvooll.s.i,ndaoncdumrev.nts Nos. 758-762.
11 M SSeeee vvooll.. inv,, ddooccuummeenntt NNoo.. 244868..
13 See vol. vi, documents Nos. 150, 158, 166, 170, 171, and 172.
"Document No. 157.
612
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
into Europe, danger of an advance in the Balkans, and finally the
war with Finland (November 1939). No one could express more
plainly than all circles here sympathy for Finland and loathing for
Russia and everything Soviet.
II. General attitude vis-a-vis Germany
The broad mass of the Italian people, and this applies to all
classes,
never liked us. The German character with its frequently ponderous
thoroughness is foreign to the superficial Italian. That has always
been the case and is probably true today to an increased degree.
There are few Italians who seek personal association in German
circles. In general the Italians prefer to be among themselves.
Associations with foreigners are fostered primarily by so-called
society, and then mostly with the British and the French. To a great
extent, to be sure, this involves persons who do not have any political
importance in Italy today. Nevertheless, they influence the attitude
of a large sector of the Italian people. Count Ciano moves a great
deal in this so-called society. He never seeks to enter into personal
relations in German circles.
The antipathy toward Germans which has always existed is coupled
at present with the widespread aversion to National Socialism and
especially to our policy vis-a-vis the Catholic Church. Italy is a
strictly Catholic country. How great the influence of the Church is
here and what great value the Italians attach to good relations with
the Vatican was evident, among other things, during the recent
exchange of visits between the Pope and the Bang.
Large sectors of the Italian people fear that they might be dra^vn
into the war by us. They disapprove of German policy, which in
their opinion is responsible for the war.
Even Italian Government circles lack understanding for our policy
vis-St-vis Russia.
Many circles mistrust Germany and believe that we will sooner or
later assert claims for Italian territory after all.
All this does not alter the fact that Mussolini, and with him Count
Ciano, adheres to Axis policy as a matter of honest conviction.
III. Prospects
If the question is asked as to what the course of German-Italian
relations should be in the future, in my opinion the following must be
noted :
1. The Axis is not popular with the Italian people ; its fate depends
on Mussolini. Mussolini is guided in his policy by very sober considerations,
which are concerned only with Italy's advantage.
2. Mussolini is convinced that there is at present no other way for
Italy than to go together with Germany.
JANUARY 1940 613
3. There is no need to fear that Mussolini will join the ranks of
our enemies.
4. The question whether Mussolini intends to enter the war actively
on our side cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." Prior
to the outbreak of the war, Mussolini left us not the least doubt about
what he could and would do. His conduct was unequivocally honest.
The alliance with us was concluded on the assumption that nothing
.should happen during the next 3 or 4 years. In spite of different
opinions which one sometimes hears, I think Mussolini never intended
&t the outbreak of the war to take part in it at once. He is unhappy,
however, that he was also unable to do so because of Italy's inadequate
military preparations. At present he is doing all he can to be armed
"by next spring so that he can make his decisions freely. He wants
to be able to participate in the spring if this appears to him to be
the correct thing. It is impossible to foresee whether it will seem
correct to him. If at the given time Mussolini thinks he can achieve
his aims by peaceful means he will not take military measures.
No. 506
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST tTRGENT HELSINKI, January 4, 1940 9 : 05 p. m*
SECRET Received January 5 2 : 00 a. m.
ISo. 7 of January 4
The Foreign Minister sent for me and had a conversation with me
which lasted an hour.
M. Tanner began by saying that Germany had previously always
had friendly relations with Finland. For some time, however, he had
had the impression from the German radio and the German press
that Germany was downright hostile to Finland. He wished to know
what attitude Germany took toward the Russo-Finnish. conflict.
I replied that Germany had a nonaggression pact with Russia, but
not with Finland. Apart from that, Germany had no share in the
conflict.
M. Tanner then proceeded to speak about the Russo-Finnish war
and the sacrifices which it is demanding. He stated that in view of
the numerical superiority of the Russians, Finland could not forego
the help which was being offered from all sides,
I remarked at this point that if Finland accepted help from Germany's
enemies, it would depend upon the nature of this help whether
Germany would be forced to re-examine her relations with Finland.
M. Tanner then asked whether I could not tell him what kinds of
assistance Germany would consider unobjectionable. I declined to
614
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
answer this question. Tanner [did not] 1 (group garbled) insist, but
remarked that the matter involved the delivery of war material, financial
assistance, and the sending of volunteers.
I left him in no doubt that Germany would in each individual case
of foreign aid carefully investigate to what extent German military
or political interests would be affected.
Tanner remarked in reply that Finland had no interest in providing
a battlefield for the Great Powers.
Tanner then went on to speak about the devastations caused by the
Kusso-Finnish war, which also complicated deliveries of important
products from Finland to Germany, and he asked me whether I
believed that Russia was prepared to enter into new negotiations with
Finland. I replied that it was not within my authority to give an
answer. If he wanted to know my personal opinion, it was that Enssia,
which had not yet committed her main forces, would hardly
depart from her previously negative stand. Tanner said that it would
perhaps be easier for Russia now than three months later, for Eussia
would then still be in her initial positions.
Tanner then asked : "Can the German Government give us any advice?"
I told him that there was no occasion for German mediation.
Tanner then withdrew the question, but after a discussion of
other subjects returned to it by submitting it to me in an unofficial
form, with the request that it be transmitted to the German
Government.
My impression is that this is an attempt by the Finnish Government
to isolate the Russo-Finnish conflict and bring about a settlement
through an understanding before yielding to offers of assistance from
the League of Nations Powers.
Tanner requested strictly confidential treatment.
Please wire instructions.
BtfXTGHER
1 "Did not" is taken from the copy sent to Moscow; see document No. 513,
footnote 1.
No. 507
1821/416.743
Memorandum ~by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, January 4, 1940,
e. o. W V 29.
In connection with preliminary conversations concerning the extension
of the German-Finnish economic agreements, the Finns inquired
whether there was any possibility that Germany might permit the
JANUARY 1940 615
transit of war material destined for Finland. I stated that we could
not permit such, transit in the future.
VAN SCHERPENBERG
No. 508
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal Goring *
PERSONAL BEKUN, January 4, 1940.
MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl reported to
me on the conference on various economic questions in the Balkans
which you held in Karinhall on January 2.2 In the interest of smooth
further treatment of these questions I am very much interested in
informing you of my opinion on several points which were discussed
or touched upon at the conference,
1. To begin with, a personal request: In your introductory remarks
before the group of representatives from various agencies you expressed
your dissatisfaction with the activity of the German trade
delegation in Bucharest headed by Minister Clodius, and also let fall
a general remark about Minister Fabricius which was apparently
interpreted as a criticism of his activity by the members of this large
group. Should you ever again believe on the basis of your observations
and information that you have reason for raising objections
against officials of the Foreign Service, I should be grateful to you if
you would inform me of this directly and clear it up with me.
In addition I must stress emphatically that I consider your criticism
to be in substance unfounded. Minister Fabricius has always carried
out the duties of his office, which particularly in the last few months
have often been especially difficult and delicate, with the proper political
tact, energy, and skill.
In my opinion Minister Clodius, too, has conducted the negotiations
in Bucharest exceedingly well and with the greatest success
imaginable, so that I have expressed my special appreciation to him.
In the further course of the discussion, after Herr Clodius had
described the course of the negotiations in detail, you recognized this
yourself and remarked that you had not been correctly informed. I
am very grateful to you for this frank statement, but consider it direct
proof of how justified my request is that you clear up directly with
me any cases which on the basis of reports coming to you seem to give
reason for complaints relating to the activity of my officials. In this
1 Marginal note : "File in a secret place. E[rich] K[ordt] January 6."
* See document No. 502.
616
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
connection, I should like to remind you of the case we recently discussed
regarding a complaint about the activity of Ambassador Bitter.
The justice of my request, by the way, is also confirmed by a curious
sequel to your conference. The representative of another Ministry
who took part in the discussion, informed Ministerialdirektor Wiehl
a few hours later that in his opinion the Foreign Ministry would be
likely to decide on a "complete solution," [Totalldswrig'] with respect
to sending a special representative to Bucharest, since it would not
work to have a special representative operating in Bucharest alongside
the Minister. In other words, he requested or suggested the
recall of Minister Fabricius. You will surely understand that this
method of handling an important personnel matter is not agreeable
to me.
2. As far as assigning a special representative for economic and
transportation questions to Bucharest is concerned, I, too, consider
this important and urgent. Ministerialdirektor Wiehl pointed out
at the time of the conference that the special representative should be
located within the German Legation; it follows that a man like
Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat, whose capabilities I value very highly,
would be a person with too high a rank for this position. I therefore
intend to send Minister Clodius, who is acquainted with these things
in the minutest detail down to the present moment, to Bucharest in
order to take over himself for the time being the duties of special
representative in the Legation there. I shall assign to him Party
Comrade Neubacher, whom you know and who has been familiar with
the economic problems of Southeastern Europe for years ; he will later
take over Clodius' duties. I believe that in this way the centralized
administration of the German-Rumanian economic agreements, which
you and I both consider necessary, will be assured and that you will
also be satisfied with this solution from the point of view of the Four
Year Plan.
3, At the conference you also brought up for discussion the subject
of defense against enemy sabotage in the Balkans. In so far as this
involves "legal" measures of protection at points of production, they
can of course be carried out only by the foreign governments themselves
which are concerned. In order to induce these governments to
do this effectively, constant political influence and diplomatic pressure
will be necessary. But I am entirely of your opinion that it is
time to go beyond "legal" measures and to combat sabotage actively
by all effective means at our command. For a long time already I
have had the activity of the British in the Balkans under surveillance
by my agents, with the result that even today we have rather extensive
knowledge of these intrigues and of those who organize them. Furthermore,
some time ago I got in touch with the Gestapo and the
JANUARY 1940 617
Intelligence Department of the OKW and discussed with both of them
the further action to be taken in this field. As soon as any definite
active measures in this regard on the part of Germany prove to be
necessary, it is clear that their execution will have a very strong effect
on foreign policy. Consequently, I must attach considerable importance
to my retaining control over such measures at all times. Therefore
several weeks ago, with the consent of the Führer, I gave Minister
Killinger the task of going to the Balkan countries,
3
ostensibly as an
inspector of our Legations; there he was to contact our diplomatic
missions, my personal agents, and the local German counterintelligence
people from the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht, obtain an exact impression
of the situation and the necessities arising therefrom, and keep
me currently informed on these things. I shall at all times appreciate
being informed of your wishes in this regard which may result from
your own observations. I shall of course likewise see that you are kept
currently informed about all these matters.4
I remain, as ever, with best regards and Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc.5
8 See document No. 495.
* Another letter from Ribbentrop to Goring, dated Jan. 25, 1940 (2117/460970-
71), indicated that the letter which is printed here was answered by Goring on
Jan. 19. Referring to Goring's reply, Ribbentrop expressed satisfaction that
his measures directed at ensuring and increasing oil deliveries from Rumania
had met with GQring's approval. He also welcomed Goring's suggestion that
the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, be used in some capacity.
Ribbentrop finally expressed satisfaction with cooperation between the Foreign
Ministry and the economic departments as organized under the Economic Policy
Committee in April 1938. Goring's letter has not been found.
* The copy printed is unsigned.
No. 509
2131/4fl6476-7a
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
SECRET HOME, January 4, 1940.
9870
Subject: Italian deliveries of war material to England and France.
With reference to your instructionW2824 g of December 4, 1939.1
I refer to the reports previously submitted in the above-mentioned
matter by the German Consulates in the industrial areas of Northern
Italy. The situation has remained the same. The rumors concerning
Italian deliveries of war material to our enemies persist. The
Foreign Minister here and other offices which have been asked openly
"Not printed (2131/466469-70) : A request for the Embassy's views on information
Clodius had received from Gafencu in Bucharest on Nov. 29, 1939,
regarding reported large-scale arms deliveries by Italy to France.
618
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
or covertly continue to deny any war material deliveries to England
and France.
An attempt has been made to trace each individual rumor to its
source, but so far no evidence of actual deliveries of war material in
the strict sense could be produced.
The rumors in question refer primarily to the delivery of airplanes
and airplane engines to France. It might be correct that agents of
France were and still are in contact with the Italian airplane industry.
The informants insist that orders were placed for the delivery of
training planes and light engines.
I do not believe that orders have been placed with the Fiat firm
in Turin for the delivery of tanks, but truck deliveries are probably
being made to France.
Thus the orders placed of late by England and France for the most
part seem to involve not war material in the strict sense but equipment
for the enemy armies. Among others the reports concerning deliveries
of military fabrics, blankets, and boots can be considered correct.
The representatives of French and British machine factories in
Italy, who have so far been occupied with the sale of foreign machine
tools in Italy, are striving at present to purchase machines in Italy
for export to France.
The Innocenti firm in Milan is said to be delivering to France
scaffolding, corrugated sheet metal, and sections for the construction
of airplane hangars.
England and France are striving to obtain in Italy additional hemp,
mercury, and sulphur, as well as skins and hides, and appear to be
getting considerable quantities.
Since the Italian military authorities pay poorly and belatedly, the
Italian armament concerns are very much interested in exports abroad
with much more favorable conditions of payment.
The French and British Governments have interested the Italian
Government in the deliveries by promising at the same time the delivery
of raw materials and semifinished products. Thus the Italian
trucks are to be paid for in part with deliveries of scrap iron.
A local informant has now, however, made the following report:
"France has let it be known during the negotiations now in progress
concerning Italian deliveries that she will hereafter no longer be able
to commit herself to repay by deliveries of raw materials, but that she
will pay in gold bullion. Thus new difficulties arise for Italy in obtaining
raw materials, since it is becoming increasing difficult to purchase
them even with gold and to transport them to Italy."
Italian firms in Trieste and Fiume are endeavoring to obtain meat
and fats in Yugoslavia through clearing payments and to send them
on to France in return for free currency.
JANTJARY 1940 619
In summary, it can probably be said that negotiations of considerable
scope are doubtless being carried on by England and France
with Italian firms concerning the purchase of war material in a broad
sense and that Italian Government authorities and the Italian concerns
involved are by no means unfavorably predisposed toward these wishes.
The Italian rearmament now in progress, however, will probably not
permit any extensive deliveries of war material in a strict sense, and
politically, too, the Government here seems to prefer to make war
material exports to neutral countries like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania,
and the Northern countries rather than to England and France.
In order to conceal its own rearmament, the Italian Government is
probably not interested in refuting the exaggerated rumors about
exports of war material.
v.
No. 510
B21/B005327-28
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States
Telegram
URGENT BKRTjy, January 5, 1940.
No. 16 of January 5
For the Charge d'Affaires personally; strictly confidential.
The President of the German Bed Cross, the Duke of Coburg, is
going via Japan to the United States of America, where he will spend
altogether about 4 to 6 weeks. Purpose of the trip : friendly conversations
with leaders of the American Red Cross and social contact
with leading American personalities. The Duke will be accompanied
by Captain von Grolman and an attendant. He will presumably arrive
in San Francisco at the beginning of March.
Although the Duke has no official mission, we nevertheless attach
the greatest value to having his tour of the United States go smoothly
and bring satisfactory results. The Embassy and Consulates are to
lend the Duke assistance in every way. Counselor of Legation Dr.
Tannenberg will be placed at the Duke's disposal for the entire length
of his stay in the United States and must stand by to advise and assist
him from the moment he arrives in San Francisco.
Please work out program suggestions for either a longer or a shorter
tour and telegraph them here by January 13 at the latest. You are
*A typed note appears at the head of the document: "By oral instruction of
the Foreign Minister."
260090 54
620 DOCUMENTS OBT GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
requested to treat the plan as confidential for the time being and to
discuss it discreetly only with the Consulates concerned.2
2 On Feb. 20, Thomsen was instructed to take special care that public opinion
in the United States did not misinterpret the Duke's mission, in particular that
the press did not represent it as having political significance (B21/B005393) A
further telegram of Feb. 28 (B21/B005411-12) stated that the American Am
bassador in Japan, it was assumed on instructions of the State Department had
advised against the visit on the ground that in view of anti-German feeling in
the United States undesirable demonstrations might occur. Berlin had decided,
however, that Ooburg should proceed and he had sailed from Yokohama y an Official of the AussenpolitiscJies Amt*
BERLIN, January 5, 1940.
TRAVEL REPORT OF EEICHSAMTSLEITER SCHEIDT ON His Tfcip TO NORWAY
AND His STAY THERE FROM DECEMBER 24, 1939, TO JANUARY 2, 1940
In consequence of the discussions which, took place here in Berlin in
mid-December on the Norwegian question, I left as directed on the
morning of December 22 for Norway, where I was to gather information
about the situation and maintain contact with [former]
Minister Quisling, and be available if needed to advise him in Ms
propaganda work.2 The trip to Norway went without any difficulties
worth mentioning ; only that the route via Sassnitz-Tralleborg is not
advisable these days, since the ferry at Sassnitz sails most irregularly
and only by daylight. I was told the reason for this was the danger
of mines along the Swedish coast. In the roadstead of Tralleborg
harbor lies a remarkable number of ships, yet none over about 4000
tons, all freighters, including several under 1000 tons and of all Scandinavian
nationalities. Altogether I counted 20 freighters (steam)
in the roadsteads. Except for four small minelayers and a tender no
Swedish naval vessels were to be seen. On the return voyage the picture
was substantially different. During the holidays all had left but
four small freighters, and these were not in the roadsteads, but on a
westerly course under protection of the shore,
In Malmo I visited the German Consul, Dr. Kirchhof. I asked him
how he judged the situation in his consular district or the rest of
Sweden as he knew it. From his utterances I perceived that anxiety
1 This document is in custody of the German Military Documents Section,
Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, 17. S. Army, flic
250--d-18-42/3. a See document No. 483.
1940 621
about the Finnish conflict is extremely acute among the Swedes. The
military were unanimous in the view that extension of the Russo-
Finnish conflict to Norway and Sweden is unavoidable. The Swedes
already have troops in the Aland Islands and it is expected that the
Russians will attempt to occupy the Alands. Even in Sk&ne, they
are extremely nervous and are working hard at building up coastal
defenses. Still stronger is the fear and anxiety in the eastern provinces,
Sodermanland and farther north. Public opinion is fully prepared
by intensive pro-Finnish propaganda to come soon to the active
aid of the Finns. Volunteer formations for Finland are already
assembling in Sweden. According to one report not verified by me,
some volunteer units are already fighting in Finland, Sweden is
fully determined to stand with arms in hand against Russian occupation
of the Aland Islands. According to Consul Kirchhof, many
political elements in Sweden are ventilating the question of whether
a German guarantee of Swedish frontiers could be achieved. The
Swedes expect no active help from England.
Immediately after I arrived in Oslo I got in touch with Norwegian
elements I know well. There, too, it was true that the Finnish conflict
had excited public opinion to a truly disconcerting degree. Contrary
to the calm nature of the Scandinavians as I have known them
at other times, their emotions are aroused. Although I was already
prepared by Minister Quisling's descriptions of the prevailing mood
in Scandinavia, the high degree of excitement disconcerted me. The
active participation of Norway in the Finnish conflict is promoted
by placards and in show window displays. Meetings for aid to Finland
are taking place in the streets. The Norwegian press is completely
dominated by the Finnish conflict. It is noteworthy and
disquieting that the question of active Allied aid for Finland is not
nearly as much in view as the constant reproach that Germany has
left Finland, always friendly to her, in the lurch facing Russia. This
one-sided attitude regarding Germany closely resembles the British
line, as does the least possible mention of the Allied states in this
connection. Two Norwegian publicists known previously to be extremely
pro-German, M. Jakobsen in the newspaper Ragrnarple and
Viktor Mogens in his weekly Utenriks Chronik, have dropped their
previously pro-German course and are writing in an extremely anti-
German way. In their accounts they have taken over completely
the terminology of the Western Powers relating to Central European
questions. Both papers now speak of Jewish "persecutions," of aggression
against Czechia and Poland, etc. My information in Oslo
on this point indicates clearly that both publicists receive even more
money from England than from Germany. Under pressure of public
622
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
opinion and the drop in subscriptions, which, occurred spontaneously
after Germany concluded the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, both
have been captured by England. I have had a chance to speak personally
several times in Oslo with Viktor Mogens, and from the very
beginning I have had a poor impression of him. He has no political
weight and in his weekly Utenriks CJvronik, without any political
conceptions of his own, he expresses a certain point of view, yet
offers no supporting argumentation. Since the Norwegian is greatly
influenced by any powerful experience, is not allowed to dig very
deep into political problems, and is naive toward any at all comply
cated motives of a political nature, he is all the more interested in
this rather superficial style of treating foreign policy questions since
he is glad to find his own political views stated in print. This, characteristic
of the man in the street in Norway is known to the "Western
Powers and is exploited by them. Through a skilfully managed press
policy Germany, too, could enjoy equal success in Norway. It will,
h.owever, be extremely hard to carry on propaganda work for Germany
in Norway unless the German press is strictly restrained in
handling Russo-German relations. The wide display of extremely
good relations between Germany and Bolshevist Kussia on Stalin's
birthday, the extremely favorable judgment of the person of this
Bolshevist statesman, gave the British very easy arguments with
which to work on the Norwegian public. For successful press policy
in Norway, I should regard as indispensable the halting of such
outspoken demonstrations of sympathy for Bolshevist Russia as have
been seen over and over again since the Non-Aggression Pact. If
.as could easily be done the Norwegian press each day printed a German
quotation from before the pact with Russia and right next to
it one from after the pact, no further commentary would be needed
to completely convince Scandinavian public opinion of the unreliability
of German policy, all the more so because nothing is done by
Germany comparable in effectiveness to the propaganda of the enemy
coalition.
When I began the trip I received orders to -report to the German
Minister in Oslo, but without telling him anything about my assignment.
I could not miss discovering that even before my arrival in
Oslo the Minister was aware that I was to work with Minister
Quisling and also that M. Quisling's confidential agent, M. Hagelin,
had just come to Norway from Germany. The Minister for Ms part
had orders from State Secretary von Weizsacker to maintain incon-
.spicuous contact with me. Since from the beginning M. Quisling
has always emphasized that his contact with Germany as well as the
proposals he made here [in Berlin] must remain absolutely secret and
that he would deal in these matters exclusively with Reichsleiter
JANUAKY 1940 623
Rosenberg and me, this disclosure to the German Minister in Oslo
caused him extraordinary consternation. Minister Quisling pointed
out that the wider the circle of people knowing his plans, the harder
it would be to keep them secret. I can certainly understand his
wishes in this matter, for as a former Norwegian Minister of War
his own neck is at stake with his policy. He saw reason for the
presence of some people at the conversation between the Filhrer and
himself, and in addition that the Foreign Minister had to be included
in the total circle of those informed. On the other hand, his
experiences with the German Mission in Oslo had made it seem advisable
not to inform the Legation. That some other men in the
German Foreign Ministry, along with the Minister in Oslo, are informed
of his plans has disturbed him. He has naturally learned
this through bis agent, M. William Hagelin. I calmed Minister
Quisling, as I could do in. good conscience after I got to know Herr
Brauer, the German Minister in Oslo, and became convinced that he
had made no use of what he knew, not even with the men of his
Legation. Since the German Minister had been informed, I spoke
openly with him on everything and gained the impression that Herr
Brauer has known the direction of the intended development. It is
too bad that fox* the present Herr Brauer evidently is directed to
carry on with the staff of his predecessor. I regard Herr von Neuhaus
as unsuited to be, during the present extremely difficult situation in
Norway, the regular adviser to the newly-arrived German Minister
in Norway. Herr von Neuhaus certainly enjoys no reputation for
great intelligence. All the Norwegians regard him as a "very nice*r
and affable man, but beyond that he is not feared by Norwegians
known to be pro-British. This blunt characterization has come to
me several times from Norwegians.
My talks with Norwegians have resulted in all seeing the extremely
great danger that Norway will be drawn into the whole conflict
of Germany and the Western Powers. Obviously, they emphasize
to me as to all Germans that they are determined to remain absolutely
neutral. Anyone knowing the character of the Norwegian
people knows, however, that little value should be attached to these
assurances. The German Legation in Oslo and its members naturally
will be acquainted only with this view and the Legation will be unable
to gain knowledge of any other utterances of influential men in the
Government. I should therefore like to warn against taking the Legation's
reports as absolutely correct. This is not the fault of the
Legation, which certainly does its best, but Germany lacks in Norway
an organization comparable to the British Secret Service. I am
convinced that Germany is well informed on the true opinions of the
man in the street and on much of the background of high policy in
624
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
England, France, America, etc. I am not convinced that in the
Wilhelmstrasse the measures planned by the Norwegian Government
or the public opinion of Norway are taken into account in
handling
the Scandinavian question.
On the way to Oslo, I had already gathered from German press
accounts that Minister of War Monsen planned to resign; this displeased
me, for I knew him to be incompetent and rejected by the
whole officer corps. Monsen would be easy game in Norway, for anyone
fighting him would have universal sympathy. I therefore warned
Quisling against proceeding too strongly against Monsen, for in the
circumstances this might be [too] successful. On arrival in Oslo, I
heard that at the King's desire Colonel Ljundberg had become Minister
of War and that the press inferred that he had "no political ties."
I asked M. Quisling to make an investigation of Ljundberg's person.
Quisling's friends among the officers of the 1st Infantry Regiment in
Frederikshavn [sie\ which Ljundberg commanded until he was named
War Minister, testified unanimously that he is outspokenly pro-
British. For a long time he was aide to the King of Norway, an
acknowledged friend of England. Mme. Ljundberg was for a long
time lady-in-waiting to the Queen, who was herself English. So far
the new Minister of War has taken no special steps. The call-up of
reserves into the Norwegian Army has not been increased, and there
are about 25,000 men under arms, of whom three-fourths are in Finnmark
(against this reliable report from Norwegian officer circles is to
be set the information received by the German Naval Attache in Norway
that about 40,000 men have been called up and of these 30,000 are
in Finland) \_sic] . Quisling considers these figures known to the Naval
Attache as incorrect. It is noteworthy that at the urging of the new
Minister of War an air route Northern England-West Coast of
Norway-Stockholm previously banned, is now permitted. It might
be superfluous to point out that such an airline, with its middle base
on an island (Sm01a?), is not civilian in origin. It might also be
noted that the entire personnel of the Norwegian Navy was denied
Christinas leave, the reason given being that Germany intended to
carry out fleet actions on the Norwegian coast. This information
comes from England, and this also is admitted.
The German Naval Attache tells further that the international
Association of Combat Veterans [Frontkampfer] plans a meeting soon
in Oslo. Some German veterans who lived in Norway formerly were
members of this international association. Because of the Ossietzky
scandal 3 and the lasting unfriendly attitude of the Norwegian Gov-
* In 1935, Carl von Ossietzky, a German pacifist imprisoned by the German
Government, was awarded the Nobel peace prize by a committee named by the
Norwegian Storting, whereupon Hitler forbade Germans to accept such awards.
JANUARY 1940 625
eminent, Germany has as a gesture ordered her nationals out of the
Norwegian branch of this international association. Now the Norwegians
can reach common decisions with England which are beyond
Germany's control. Had the German veterans remained in the association,
then Germany would have reasonable expectation of being
represented in its leadership and could have prevented making basic
decisions without Germany's knowledge. In this connection, the German
Naval Attache expressed misgivings that under this camouflage
it would be not at all hard for the British to bring several hundred
combat soldiers unobtrusively to Oslo. Clearly all sorts of plans can
be carried out in this way, all the more so when one knows how exposed
Oslo is to this sort of thing.
I spoke with the senior captain of the Norwegian-American Line,
the master of the passenger vessel St&vangerfjord. Captain Irgens
told me that from the beginning of the war until about 3 weeks ago,
he had crossed to North America from Oslo or Bergen several times.
When I asked if the British had not searched him, he said he had
gone through the blockade unseen by the British every time except one,
when they detained him and took him to Kirkwall where his ship
was inspected for a whole week. When I asked him to tell more about
his experience, it transpired that before the detention by the British
a German plane had circled his ship and afterwards flown over several
times on the way to Earkwall. Knowing that Irgens is pro-British,
I cannot avoid the impression that the British are purposely letting
S. S. Stawamgerfjord through since they are informed anyhow by the
smooth functioning of their intelligence services as to the ship's
passengers and cargo. The report that a German plane had circled
Sta/vangerfjord while British warships were near in my opinion
led the British to demonstrate impartiality by taking her to KirkwalL
I do not believe at all that in the circumstances the British thought
it worthwhile to search such a well-known Norwegian ocean liner,
since this would be displeasing to the passengers, owners, and public
as well. My experience with a few other seamen was that they are
most skeptical about the German conduct of the naval and air war and
its results. Norwegian maritime circles consider it in general
extremely doubtful that airplane attacks can be effective against
ships under way. In this connection someone told the story of a convoy
which included among other ships a large whaler, chartered by
England and flying the British flag. Over a dozen German planes
bombed the floating factory, all missing the target. The entire convoy
reached England unscathed and without loss of time. Whether or
not this story is true does not seem to me to matter, the important
thing is that British propaganda is succeeding in Norwegian mari
g26 DOCUMENTS GIST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
time circles. I have the same impression about the Norwegian Government.
The present Government is evidently following the saa&
course as the Czech and Polish. The British Government leads the
Norwegian Government to believe that it is winning the war and is
more than a match for the Germans. At the same time, the British
promise to protect Norway's neutrality and independence. German
Army communiques are received with the greatest caution.
In a conversation with M. Odal, editor in chief of the anti-Marxist
and hitherto quite pro-German newspaper, Nationen, I was told under
the seal of deepest secrecy that the bane of Norwegian politics was
M. Hambro, President of the Storting, chairman of its committee on
foreign policy, and Norwegian representative in Geneva. This Jew
is always spinning threads for England. When I asked Odal if he
v knew how far M. Hambro had gone in his conversations with the
Geneva Powers during its last session, Odal, who is well informed,
told me that in a secret session of the Storting there had been great astonishment,
even horror \Entsetzen\ at the concessions which Hambro
had made in the name of the Norwegian Government at Geneva to the
enemy coalition. There he gave Norway's assent in all questions
concerning sanctions and permission for troop transit to Finland.
Thereupon a special emissary of the Norwegian Government was sent
after M. Hambro to recall all these concessions in the name and
authority of the Norwegian Government. I do not believe M. Odal's
account in all respects. By and large, however, the description may
conform to the actual facts. I believe, however, that Odal's information
to me was a calculated indiscretion. It would be just like M.
Hambro and the British to neutralize such concessions by calculated
indiscretions to other states, right until they thought it time to
intervene.
Quisling has meanwhile prepared his propaganda work. He has
undertaken various dealings with newspaper proprietors whose papers
he buys out if occasion arises. To camouflage his German sources of
funds he has begun a great money-raising drive for Nasjonal Samlrng.
Besides that, he is now selecting from his shock troops a suitable
number of reliable men who can be considered for a possible surprise
action. To carry out all these prepared plans he urgently needs the
funds he has asked Germany for. In the last few days through
Minister for Social Affairs St0stad, M, Hagelin has come in touch with
[Trygve] Lie, the Minister of Supply, about Norwegian import licenses.
After getting these licenses, he expects to return to Germany
to conduct further negotiations.* From Hagelin's conversations with
4 Hagelin represented the Norwegian Government in negotiations for the purchase
of German antiaircraft equipment.
JANUARY 1940 627
Sfyfetad and other official personages while in Oslo, one gathers that
they fully intend to increase imports from Germany; this only partly
meets Hagelin's wishes. He and Quisling hope that final permission
to provide German funds will be given very soon, and they will then
immediately begin their work in Norway. Quisling has meanwhile
received another message from Colonel Sundlo at Narvik Sundlo
regimental commander there, states in this message that on his own
initiative he has made all preparations at Narvik and now only waits
Quisling's order to attack. I have asked Quisling to restrain Sundlo,
for any action by him will be called for only if and when the German
authorities consider the moment for surprise opportune. Similarly,
Quisling has been asked by a rather large number of officers at Trondheim
to come there to discuss with them the political situation. One
day before I left Oslo, Quisling went to Trondheim. In my view,
the younger officer corps and 'the younger staff officers of the Norwegian
Army are the only ones completely clear about the situation.
After seeing the reports of Finnish successes they realize that the reason
for the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact is not any German
fear of Russia, and as soldiers they also see that Germany's strong
military position in this war and the economic strength bolstering that
position are possible only through avoiding a two-front war. In
addition, they also realize that Germany's battle with England must
end in destruction of England's importance on the continent if Germany
wants to avoid a two-front war in the future. Similarly, in the
Norwegian Army it is feared, as mentioned above, that the Norwegian
Government, just as Czechia and Poland, will some day be sacrificed
to the British siren songs. If one now reckons with the known respect
for Quisling which exists in the Norwegian officer corps and far beyond
that, he can understand why the Norwegian officers always wish
to learn Quisling's position on political events and incline to him and
his advice. It is to be hoped that Quisling will extend further his
relations with the officer corps, and he will be able to do this all the
better the sooner German means for decisive propaganda are available.
An hour before I left Oslo, I had tea with a few Norwegians I
know who told me that they had jtist heard of border incidents between
Soviet and Norwegian troops at the Finnish-Norwegian frontier.
To get the evidence for this was not possible in the time
remaining.
628
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 512
The Ambassador in, Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 21 of January 6 ANKARA, January 6, 1940 5 : 05 p. m.
Keceived January 6 8 : 50 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. '8 of January 4 (W Hie 41)
*
1. I reached the following agreement with the Minister of Commerce
today :
In return for the delivery of papers for the goods in customs
storage 2 in accordance with your instructions, Turkish products with
a total value of 5 million Turkish pounds will he exported, distributed
as follows :
tobacco 2.6 (two point six) million
raisins 400,000 (four hundred thousand)
figs 100,000 (one hundred thousand)
hazelnuts 1 (one) million
cotton seed 100,000 (one hundred thousand)
olive oil 300,OOQ (three hundred thousand)
oil cake 100,000 (one hundred thousand)
sesame 100,000 (one hundred thousand)
industrial figs 300,000 (three hundred thousand)
Thus in accordance with your wishes better terms for important
goods hare been obtained.
I have instructed the banks to deliver the papers. Please inform
the suppliers accordingly.
2. The data you have requested concerning German shipments on
the basis of old contracts will follow as soon as possible. With reference
to the new orders for pharmaceutical products the Minister remarked
that in view of sufficient offers and possible imports from
England, France, America, and Switzerland he is ready to dispense
with German deliveries, but that German industry would thereby be
displaced from the local market from now on. German representatives
here confirm the existence of this danger and urge that the quantities
requested by the Turks, which are negligible as such, be released.
I request that the chemicals for X-ray treatments, which are urgently
needed in the earthquake area,
3 be released at any rate.
3. Your dilatory treatment of the proposals made here has seriously
affected the favorable atmosphere laboriously created for future large-
1 Not printed ( 8493/E59693a-34) .
9 The German decision to stop deliveries to Turkey until a general settlement
had been agreed upon (see document No. 330) had been supplemented by German
refusal to release goods already in Turkish customs (telegram No. 559 of Dec.
14, 1939, from Papen : 4531/E144254r-55 ) . * On Dec. 27, 1939, a severe earthquake had occurred in eastern central Anatolia.
JANUARY 1940 629
scale negotiations and has created the impression that we intend to
exert pressure on the Turks by withholding German deliveries, even
for the very small amount of 2 million Turkish pounds. The delay
in coming to an agreement is being utilized by the British to sabotage
German efforts at normalizing economic relations as well as the political
relations connected therewith, and to remove goods from the market.
I request therefore in the interest of as speedy a settlement on
point 2 as possible that the list of goods desired by the Turks, which
will be sent within the next few days, be examined very quickly and
accepted, if possible without change, and that my proposal for Turk*
ish return deliveries be approved as given below:
hides 270,000 (two hundred seventy thousand)
olive oil 500,000 (five hundred thousand)
mohair 700,000 (seven hundred thousand)
valex 300,000 fthree hundred thousand)
opium 60,000 (sixty thousand)
hemp 100,000 (one hundred thousand)
emery 20,000 (twenty thousand)
licorice root 50,000 (fifty thousand)
Because of excessive prices owing to considerable Italian and Rumanian
purchases, cotton is practically out of the question for us*
PAPEN
No. 513
TTie Ambassador in the Soviet Union to tJie Foreign Mimi&t telegram of Jan. 4 (document No. 506) and asked the Embassy to
present its views on that, too, without informing the Soviet Government of
Bliicher's report.
630 DOCUMENTS O3ST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
doubt of the ultimate victory of the Red Army in this fight It is
merely a question of time, the approximate length of which it is
impossible to predict.
The situation came about owing to the fact that the Soviet Government
was not sufficiently prepared for such a war, since it had expected
Finland, just as the Baltic countries, to yield finally to its demands. A misjudging of the situation on the part of the Finnish Government
caused the Soviet Government to feel obliged to use force in order to
avoid a loss of prestige after it had laid down a definite minimum program
in Molotov's speech before the Supreme Soviet on October SI *
The war against Finland was from the very beginning unpopular
with the population of the Soviet Union. The fear of war, which
has always been strong among the masses here and which had temporarily
been diminished by the conclusion of the Non-Aggression
Pact with Germany, has been given a new impetus by the Finnish
conflict. This sentiment is strengthened by the absence of victories
at the Finnish front, increasing supply difficulties, reports about imminent
price increases, and the large number of Red soldiers with
frozen limbs who are crowding the provincial hospitals.
I see confirmation of the existing difficulties in a statement by
Molotov, with whom I had a conversation yesterday during the conference
session 8 and who spoke in connection with the Finnish conflict
about a serious situation, the strength of the Finnish fortifications
and the unfavorable effects of the severe cold.
When I asked how the Soviet Government regarded the possibility
of support by third states, especially Sweden and Norway, Molotov
said that the Soviet Government was aware of the danger that would
arise if England and France should use Sweden and Norway for
their own ends and had therefore warned the two Governments on
January 5 and 6 through appropriate notes. In these notes the Soviet
Government had reproached Sweden and Norway for tolerating
hostile actions directed against the Soviet Union and incompatible
with the neutrality of these two countries and had pointed to the
possibility that complications might arise. The Norwegian Government
had answered at once, protested its determination to maintain
strict neutrality, and laid the blame for certain happenings in
Norway on private groups as well as the opposition press. No official
written reply from Sweden had yet been presented, but in accepting
the note Gunther had already given a similar tentative answer
by word of mouth.
a See Editors' Note, p. 368.
* See document No. 520.
1940 631
Moreover, the Soviet Government expected that Germany would
use her influence with Sweden in a suitable manner.
When I remarked that the Finns could not in the nature of things
expect ultimate victory and would therefore probably be ready to
enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government, Molotov did not,
interestingly enough, make an entirely negative reply but answered
with the words that it was "late, very late" for this and that it would
have been better for the Finns to accept the Soviet demands in the
first place.
Settlement of the Soviet-Finnish conflict would in my opinion foil
British intentions, afford the Soviet Union considerable relief, and
if it came about with our help would mean a great gain in prestige
for Germany apart from other advantages, for instance undisturbed
deliveries of ore from Sweden. However, to begin with, the following
questions, still completely open at present, arise in this connection :
1. Does the prestige of the Soviet Union permit taking up negotiations
at all in these circumstances ?
2. What conditions will she set in this event ?
There is no doubt in my mind that, if such a possibility does exist
or should arise, the person of Tanner, who is here considered the "evil
spirit" of the past negotiations, will disappear from the scene,
No. 514
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister
BERLUST, January 8, 1940,
MT DEAR HEKR vox BJBBENTROP: With reference to our lengthy
conversation of December 30, I am sending you the enclosed condensed
study of my operations office ]JPuhrungsamt~\ on the military
and the military-political problems of the Southeast and the Near
East from the viewpoint of military strategy.
If you or your oflice should want information on additional military
details, I would be very glad either to give it to you myself or
to have it supplied to you by the chief of the Wehrmacht operations
office with the help of maps.
Heil Hitler!
Tours, etc. KKITEL.
632
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure]
No. 22004/40 g. K. Chefs. L (I) BERLIN, January 6, 1940.
Wehrmachtfiihrungsamt
Abteilung Landesverteidigung
POLICT AND THE WAR EFFORT IN THE EAST
1. It is in the interest of the German war effort
a) that the strategically favorable starting position (war on one
front), brought about through political means and through, arms,
should not be impaired by the necessity to commit forces in the Southeast;
b) that the Southeast, being an important source of supplies, should
remain neutral, at least as long as in the economic field it gives us
what we must have;
c) not to draw Italy into the war through military action in the
Southeast, thereby causing conflict of interests between Italy and
Russia which would be a serious threat to our relations with Italy;
d) to use every means to contain the Army in Syria in at least its
present strength and to make all possible trouble for the British in
India, as well as in the Arabian countries, without making necessary
any substantial German assistance.
2. Purpose and possible employment of the Army in Syria.
a) To safeguard the line of communications from the Mediterranean
to India (the Suez of the Air) .
) To scotch any Arabian tendencies to revolt.
c)) Commitment against a Russian attack in the direction of Western
Asia.
d\ Establishment of a Balkan front at the side of Turkey in case
a favorable opportunity should develop during the war.
3. Possible Russian operations German interests.
a) An operation against India is ruled out by the distances and
terrain conditions with which the Russians would have to contend.
On the other hand it would require relatively little to foment a rebellious
movement of the mountain tribes at the Indian border, possibly
.also in Afghanistan. This would create a trouble spot threatening
to England, hinder the departure of English troops for Europe, ana
is therefore desirable in Germany's interest.
&) An occupation of Bessarabia would be relatively easy for the
.Russians. The Rumanians have withdrawn their troops behind the
Prut and will scarcely offer any resistance. The outcome of such a
Russian move would be an unrest in the Balkans which we do not at
all desire. If Russia were to encroach upon the Balkans beyond
IBessarabia by military and political treaties or even by a direct attack,
in order to come closer to her old goal, the Straits, then Russo-Italian
conflicts would become unavoidable.
c) An operation into the Near East from the Trans-Caucasus region,
would bring in the Syrian Army as well as additional Anglo-French
forces. The Russians might base this on the following political
objectives :
JAJSTTJARY 1940 633
I. The Soviet Union seeks to deal a decisive blow to England's
power by a thrust toward Mosul-Bagdad-Basra which would cut
off communications to India.
II. She seeks to acquire the Iraqui oil fields near Mosul for
their economic value.
III. She wants to regain the territories southwest of Batum
which were ceded by the Treaty of Kars, in 1921.
Attainment of objectives I and II would also eliminate the threat
of air attack from Western Asia on Soviet Russia's principal oil
region around Baku (50 percent of Russia's oil) .
We have no reliable reports on strength, distribution, and the combat
value of the Hussian forces in the Caucasus. Nor have we any
information on Russia's operational intentions and plans.
German studies have shown that any objective beyond reconquest
of the region west of Baku would require very large Russian forces;
supplying them would be extremely difficult with the existing railroad
and highway system. The eastern wing of an attack in the direction
of Mosul-Bagdad would have to advance through Iran. It would
meet the opposition of parts of the Turkish and Iranian armies, the
forces stationed in Iraq, which would be certainly reinforced, as well
as Weygand's Syrian Army.
It is questionable whether the Russian armed forces would in their
present state believe themselves capable of an operation toward the
Near East. From the German standpoint, however, it is highly desirable
to divert the Russian forces in this direction and thus probably
away from the Balkans. As far as we can see at present, this
would not affect Italian interests. Considering the special significance
of a strike in that direction in the war against England, we
would be justified in supporting at least indirectly any such operation.
JODL
No. 515
18.60/422903
TTie Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT STOCKHOLM, January 9, 1940 9 : 25 p. m,
No. 16 of January 9 Received January 10 12 : 45 a. m.
Pol. VI 85.
"With reference to your No. 14 of January 6.1
The Foreign Minister asked me today to see him in order that he
might better define his recent statements (telegraphic report No. 2 of
January 2 regarding the desire for absolute neutrality)*
2 The
1 Not printed (1860/422879). 3 Not printed (205/141987).
634
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Swedish Government had declined the League of Nations invitation
to participate in a relief action for Finland as irreconcilable with
neutrality. Sweden was prepared energetically, und, if
necessary
by force of arms, to repel any attempts of the Western Powers to
establish bases in Sweden or to transport British and French troops
through Swedish territory. This also held for British and French
military supplies of all kinds. Transit permits would be granted,
however, for war material that was the property of the Finnish Government.
When I pointed to the dangers that might be involved in
implementing this intention, Giinther replied that practically no war
material for Finland had been shipped in transit so far. The Foreign
Minister urged me to treat his statement regarding Sweden's
refusal to the League of Nations as confidential and not to make use
of it in the press.
WIED
No. 516
84&a/E5i9-7'005-06
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to tJie Embassy
in Turkey
Telegram
No. 16 of January 9 BERLIN*, January 9, 1940 10 : 08 p. m.
Received January 10 2 : 30 p. nou
With reference to our telegram No. 15 of January 8.1
Be points 2 and 3 of your telegram No. 21 of January 6.2
The two million transaction is also approved. The list of Turkish
return deliveries is accepted. We are still expecting the Turkish list
of goods desired. We are even ready in this connection to permit
new transactions to the extent desired by the Turks (25%) , especially
as regards pharmaceutical products and other chemicals. Orders
for chemicals for X-ray treatments can be placed at once, independently
of other agreements.
By consenting to the two million transaction we merely wish, to
give the Embassy the chance it desires for obtaining in this manner,
through further transactions, the chromium ore supplies needed by
us. For your strictly confidential information: The German war
economy is not interested in the greatest possible volume of trade with
the greatest possible number of countries, but in the wisest possible
distribution of German exports, the volume of which is limited by
*Not printed (8493/E597007). This telegram gave Foreign Ministry assent
to the agreement summarized in point 1 of document No. 512.
3 Document No. 512.
JANUARY 1940 635
the conditions prevailing with regard to raw materials, capacity, and
transportation. In this respect those countries are of primary importance
which can supply us with goods that are essential for conduct
of the war. In the final analysis, therefore, we are interested
in trade with Turkey during the war from an economic standpoint
only if Turkey makes concessions in the chromium ore question.
No. 517
2121/462387-88
Memorandum* 1>y an Official of the Economic PoUlcy Department
SECIOST BERUN, January 9, 1940.
CHROMIUM ORES
(Oral information given by Dr. Hoffmann, specialist of the Reich
Office for Iron and Steel)
1. Mobilization requirement 12,000 tons of ore per month (with an
average content of 40 percent Cr2O3 ) .
2. Available supplies are sufficient for 13 months.
3. To cover our further requirements the following is available to
us:
from Greece a maximum of ...... 12, 000 tons per year
from Yugoslavia a maximum of ... 12, 000 " " "
from Bulgaria approximately ..... 8, 000 " " "
32,000
" " "
If this quantity is received by the end of 1940, we shall have a supply
for an additional two to three months. To this will possibly be added
another 100,000 tons from Russia, which would assure our supply for
another 8 to 9 months x and perhaps (that is, in case the British permit
transport by sea) the 35,000 tons of chromium ore which the Norwegian
ferro-chrome works Bjolvefossen purchased in Turkey for
the purpose of sending on the ferro-chrome obtained therefrom to
Germany.
4. Dr. Hoffmann received enthusiastically my communication concerning
the possibility of obtaining 40,000 tons of chromium ores
from Turkey (Hungarian proposal : 40,000 tons of Turkish chromium
ore in return for permission to export 200,000 time fuses from the
Hungarian optical works to England). He sees two possibilities:
either this refers to the output of a mine in the vicinity of the Sea of
1 Unsigned marginal note : "altogether for 2 years !"
26009O 54-46
636
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Marmara (on the Asiatic side) which belongs to a certain Paluka* 2
up to now the latter has been our main supplier of Turkish chromium
ores and is for the time being still placing his output at our disposalso
far, however, he has tried in vain to obtain the Turkish export
permit. Or else this refers to ore which England secured for herself
in Turkey; in this case it might be assumed that the Hungarian proposal
originated in response to a British suggestion.
MOEAHT
3 In a memorandum of Jan. 10 (2121/462386), Morabt recorded that information
had been received that the Hungarian oft'er actually did refer to the output
of this particular mine near the Sea of Marmara. Meanwhile OKW had been
asked to give its views on the Hungarian proposal (8483/E596879-80) in a memorandum of Jan. 11 (2121/462383-84), Wiehl noted that Keitel had expressed
the desire to refer the matter to Hitler. Wiehl recommended that the
Foreign Ministry support the proposed arrangement, provided the OKW agreed
but documents indicating what action was taken have not .been found,
*
No. 518
F18/090-0'8a
Memorandum* T>y the Foreign Minister
KM 1 BERLIN-, January 10, 1940.
I received the Italian Ambassador at 12 : 00 today. I told Ambassador
Attolico that Herr von Steengracht had communicated to
me his [Attolico's] readiness to make more detailed comments on the
Duce's letter x and asked him whether he had something to say on
specific points. Ambassador Attolico said no, but that he would be
glad to place himself at our disposal for any questions. I told him
that I had so far discussed the Duce's letter with the Führer only
very briefly ; the Führer wished to think over the separate points very
carefully and form a clear view of the general situation; then he
would presumably communicate to the Duce in writing his opinion
on the various subjects discussed. This answer would, to be sure,
probably take some time ;
2 Ambassador Attolico showed full understanding
for this.
Then I asked Ambassador Attolico a number of questions on the
points dealt with in the Duce's letter :
1. Oiano^s speech. I asked Signor Attolico which German circles
the Duce had in mind when he said that some parts of Ciano's speech
had not met with approval. Signor Attolico replied that the impression
generally prevailed that the speech had not been received
1 Document No. 504.
2 In his memoirs Weizsiacker stated that lie composed a memorandum about
Mussolini's letter (Eriwnerungen, p. 274). No copy of this memorandum has
been found in the Foreign Ministry files.
JANUARY 1940 637
very enthusiastically. I told him that I had answered his question
at the time to the effect that some of the points of this speech were
excellent but that there were one or two points which, I feared, might
be misused by our enemies.3 I had in mind the mention of a divergence
of opinion in the conversations at Fuschl and Berchtesg4aden,
4
the disclosure of which might create the impression in the world of
a German will to war. And certain quarters had actually taken this
passage as proof of Germany's war guilt. Attolico replied that the
Duce did not attach great significance to such calculations. I closed
the discussion of this point with the remark that of course everyone
in Germany firmly believed that Ciano was a convinced champion of
Italo-German friendship and would remain so.
2. I then asked Signor Attolico what was meant by the Italian war
preparations which upon completion would "ultimately benefit Germany
as well." Signor Attolico replied that the more Italy armed,
the more this would prove to Germany's advantage.
3. The Balkans. I confirmed to Signor Attolico that the maintenance
of peace in the Balkans must be of basic interest to both Germany
and Italy today.
4. Russia. I expressed iny astonishment to Signor Attolico concerning
the sharp anti-Bolshevist tone of the Duce's letter. Some
time ago Mussolini himself had recommended bringing about an
easing of German-Russian relations,
5 and that was exactly what
Germany had done no more, no less. Moreover, we were engaged in
lively trade with the Soviet Union. From a military standpoint the
Soviet Union was not to be considered excessively strong. Neither
German nor Italian interests could be seriously threatened by the
Soviet Union. I had therefore believed that the Duce would have
greatly welcomed an easing of Russo-German relations ; for an easing;
relieved Germany and consequently also the Axis. At any rate the
situation would be considerably less favorable if the Soviet Union
had allied herself with England and France. Moreover, the Führer
and the Duce had always agreed on the fact that England and France
were the principal enemies of the Axis. Therefore, why this animosity
toward Russia ?
Ambassador Attolico pointed out that the Communist papers in
Moscow had spoken of Italy's standing aside in the present conflict
in order to make common cause with Germany at the moment of
* See document No. 493.
4 This refers to the passage in Ciano's speech (Monatshefte filr Auswartige
Politik, January 1940, p. 45) where he spoke of his conversations with Hitler and
Ribbentrop when lie visited Germany on Aug. 11, 12, and 13, 1939. See vol. vn,
documents Nos. 43 and 47.
5 See vol. vi, document No. 211.
638
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
victory. This slander had aroused the greatest indignation. Fi,
nally, the Soviet Union's attack on Finland had shown the danger
from Russia which might some day threaten the Balkans, too. There,
however, Italian interests were involved to a very large extent
Otherwise, Ambassador Attolico had little to say in reply to my arguments
about German-Russian relations.
In the Finnish question I explained that England had maneuvered
Finland into a senseless situation. I knew that Stalin had not wanted
the conflict with Finland either. Moreover, I did not believe in a
Russian policy of expansion, but only in limited revisionism, which
was primarily directed against the post-war treaties forced upon
Russia. I also expressed surprise that the Duce should really believe
the Fuhrer would pursue a Bolshevist policy. For my own information,
in case the Fuhrer should ask, I would be grateful to him
for enlightening me on whether the Duce thought it possible that
Germany would open her gates wide to Bolshevism and recall the
Jewish emigrants. Italian anti-Semitism had, after all, only been
the result of National Socialist anti-Semitism.
Ambassador Attolico explained that of course the Duce assumed
no such thing.
5. General situation. I explained to Ambassador Attolico that the
Duce's letter appeared to me to contain primarily the advice to refrain
from unleashing a real war with England and France. The
Duce was of the opinion that "the creation of a Polish state under
the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war
and constitute a condition sufficient for the peace." That meant, however,
that Germany could conclude peace with the Western Powers
on this basis. This opinion, however, seemed to me to conflict to a
certain extent with the fact that the Fuhrer had offered such a peace
to the Western Powers in October, but they had scornfully rejected
it. The most varied statements by British and French statesmen,
the most recent of which was yesterday's speech by Chamberlain,
constantly demanded the elimination of the "tyrant," that is, of the
Fuhrer, and consequently of the German people. I asked Ambassador
Attolico whether the Duce perhaps had information to the
effect that the Western democracies abandoned these views. Ambassador
Attolico replied that he had not been present at the drafting
of the letter and therefore could not add anything on this point. At
any rate, however, the Duce had not had any conversations about
it with the British and the French, and he also did not believe that
the Duce had any other definite information. We finally agreed on
the fact that in the Duce's personal opinion a peace could be brought
about gradually 'on the proposed basis. Signor Attolico formulated
JA2STUARY 1940 639
this to the effect that logic told the Duce that such a development was
thinkable.
I told Signor Attolico that I would at any time welcome a peace
on the basis outlined by the Duce, but that I strongly doubted whether
England would be ready for it. England's attitude manifested the
will to annihilate, decimate, and destroy the German people. We
could counter this only with the same will to annihilate. We were
determined to beat England and bring her to her knees. If, however,
the Duce had other information, despite all the statements made by
Western statesmen, and despite all attempts to decimate Germany,
such as those being scientifically prepared by the Toynbee Committee
in Balliol College at Oxford, I would be greatly interested in
learning it. Signor Attolico replied that he did not believe that such
positive information was available. I concluded this point of our
conversation with the statement that as long as England did not
clearly express her desire for peace, Germany's determination to
annihilate her enemy was unshakable.
6. England and France. No one in Germany believed that it would
be possible to separate England and France ; nevertheless, it appeared
to me that propaganda in this direction would be injurious to the
enemy and we would therefore continue it.
Attolico then explained the passage in the Duce's letter, "it is not
certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British to their
knees," to the effect that the Duce did not doubt the strength and
striking power of the German Army. On the contrary, he was of
the opinion that Germany had great possibilities of victory. He
believed, however, that such military victories, even if we should conquer
Paris, would not force Britain to her knees. Therefore, it appeared
more advantageous to the Duce to seek a solution other than
a.purely military one.
7. With reference to the passage in the Duce's letter that the conditions
for British and French nonparticipation had not materialized,
1 explained that I had told Count Ciano earlier that such nonintervention
could not be predicted automatically, but that I had thought
it entirely feasible in certain circumstances.
8. I then asked what was meant by the "catastrophic repercussions"
that would result from a further step along the road of our relations
with Moscow. Ambassador Attolico explained that this referred to
conclusion of a Eusso-German alliance as had been mentioned in the
press a number of times. I told Signor Attolico that no such alliance
existed and that neither the Soviet Union nor Germany had considered
such an alliance. Germany had only one alliance, namely that
with Italy.
640 DOCUMENTS O1ST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
9. Italy*s situation. I asked Signer Attolico what was meant by
the statement that Italy could not and would not permit herself to be
drawn into a long war and that her intervention would have to come
at the most useful and decisive moment.
Ambassador Attolico explained that in case the war lasted five
years Italy could not enter it as early as the first, second, or third year
I refrained from replying to that.
10. When I asked what was meant by the statement that Italy -WB&
our reserve in the political and diplomatic field, Attolico replied that
the Duce was completely at Germany's disposal in case she desired a
solution by diplomatic and political means.
I thanked Ambassador Attolico for his additional information. I
requested that he consider my statements and in general the entire
conversation as private and my statements as purely personal. I had
been primarily interested in preparing myself for possible questioning
by the Führer and had therefore welcomed it very much that Signor
Attolico had made himself available for further explanations. The
G-erman answer was, of course, entirely in the hands of the Führer.
Ambassador Attolico stated that he understood this very well.
No. 519
I37W35.767S
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
STRICTLY QOKFiDEK'TiAL BERLIN, January 10, 1940.
Received January 15<
WV27IH.
For your information.
With reference to our instruction No. 1039 of Dec. 10, 1939.1
The dementi issued some time ago concerning the transit of war
material from Italy to Finland via Germany was based on the fact
that no transit permit for such material had been issued during the
time in question, and according to the legal regulations in force transit
could take place only on the basis of such a transit permit. Together
with the denial all customs offices had again been given very emphatic
instructions to the effect that no war material of any kind for Finland
might cross the German frontiers. On the basis of this instruction it
then developed that several carloads of war material from third countries
for Finland had actually gotten into Germany owing to an oversight
on the part of the customs offices involved ; as a matter of fact
there were 8 carloads of war material from Hungary and 11 carloads
with planes and plane ammunition from. Italy. It was still possible
1 Document No. 4S5.
JANUARY 1940 641
to stop the 8 Hungarian cars. Of the 11 Italian carloads, 2 had left
Germany even before the outbreak of hostilities between Finland and
Eussia and 3 more during the first days of December, before the
dementi became known. Thus 3 carloads of plane ammunition were
inadvertently permitted to leave Germany for Finland after November
30, but no planes or other war material. So far the dementi has
also been essentially substantiated by the various inquiries made. All
the shipments detained here were returned to the senders. Suitable
measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of carelessness on the
part of the customs offices such as was evidently responsible for the
occurrences mentioned above.
By order:
WiEHIi
No. 520
im/324528-ai
Memorandum, l>y cm Official of the Embassy m the Soviet Union
Moscow, January 10, 1940.
In his conversation with M. Molotov on January 75 1940, the Ambassador
reverted to the conference on the present economic negotiations
which took place on December 31, 1939 in the Kremlin in
Stalin's presence.
1
The Ambassador explained that the conference with M. Stalin
had unfortunately had to be broken off suddenly because of the late
hour, and that another important point had therefore remained unsettled
on which he, the Ambassador, should have liked to say a few
more words at the time. It concerned the statement in the exchange
of letters between Ribbentrop and Molotov according to which the
Soviet Union would supply Germany with raw materials for which
Germany was to pay with industrial deliveries over a more extended
period of time. Since it had not been possible to reach an agreement
on the term "more extended period of time" in the conference of
December 31, he wished to go back to the origin of the exchange of
letters mentioned and briefly sketch the historical development. Its
beginning had to be sought in the German-Polish war, as a result of
which the Soviet Union obtained possession of the Western Ukraine
and Western White Russia after the German. Wehrmacht had overcome
Polish resistance. Thus Germany had rendered valuable service
to the Soviet Union in the expansion of her territories. The
negotiations between Foreign Minister von Kibbentrop and M. Molotov
had then been carried on in this atmosphere and on this realistic
basis. The Soviet Union had recognized that Germany needed the
a See document No. 499.
642 DOCUMENTS ON GERMA3ST FOREIGN POLICY
speedy delivery of certain Soviet raw materials to carry on the war.
Germany did not by any means wish to get these raw materials far
nothing, and wished to give proper compensation for them. Because
of the entire nature of the German deliveries these could not, however,
be made as quickly as the delivery of the readily available
Soviet raw materials. With this in mind the stipulation was made
that compensation for the Soviet raw-material deliveries would be
made over an extended period of time. If M. Mikoyan now took
the stand that the Soviet Union never promised Germany any credit,
then this was literally correct but did not accord with the facts insofar
as Germany by the advance service she rendered in the course
of the campaign against Poland had done the Soviet Union a favor
which doubtless justified some compensation.
This, however, was merely the theoretical side of the question; the
practical side was much simpler. The fact of the matter was that
Germany had declared that compensation for the Soviet deliveries,
which were to be completed by the end of 1940, could not be made
faster than over a period of 15 months, i. e., approximately by April
1, 1941. The Ambassador was even of the opinion that the Soviet
Government should grant Germany a still more extended period of
time, in other words about 18 months, which would be even more in
conformity with the spirit and intention of the letters. Nevertheless
Germany was prepared to make compensation for the Soviet rawmaterial
deliveries after 15 months, but with the best will in the
world was not in a position to do so by the end of 1940. He asked
M. Molotov to take these considerations into account and to give appropriate
instructions to M. Mikoyan so that the latter recognized the
justice of the German stand.
M. Molotov, who had listened very attentively, replied as follows :
As far as the historical side of the matter was concerned, there had
really never been any talk of a Soviet credit to Germany. And it
would have been strange if the Soviet Union, which had just received
a credit of 200 million from Germany, would now grant Germany
credit on her part. The Soviet Government fully recognized that the
manufacture of German products took a longer period of time. Therefore
it was fully prepared to begin its deliveries at once, but with the
condition that the account had to be balanced by the end of 1940. At
present it was primarily a question of finding a practical solution, for
the Soviet Union was interested in knowing concretely what German
products she could be sure of getting and exactly when. This was
necessary from the standpoint of economic planning and especially
with regard to Soviet armament. The Soviet Government did not
intend to make impossible demands on Germany. The Soviet Union
had already withdrawn her first proposal concerning a quarterly settlement
of the deliveries on both sides and had agreed to having these
JANUARY 1940 643
settlements made every half year. The Soviet Government was convinced
that a large number of products that were important for the
Soviet Union were available in Germany and could be delivered at
once. Thus the German Government had only to give permission for
delivery of a cruiser in order to create at once a large balance in the
payments account in Germany's favor. If Germany should decide
upon delivery of both cruisers, the sum in question would increase
even more. Also the delivery of several sample planes would immediately
bring a substantial amount to Germany's credit. Consequently
Molotov did not consider the Soviet demand any insurmountable obstacle
in the way of reaching a mutual understanding. He was convinced
that Herr Ritter and M. Mikoyan would come to an agreement
concerning the methods following Herr Hitter's return from Germany
and would find a practical means for a mutual understanding. -A necessary
condition for this was for the Soviet Government to learn what
the actual German deliveries consisted in and when they would be
made. For the Soviet Union these were not theoretical problems but
very concrete ones. The large raw-material deliveries to Germany
meant for the Soviet Union a curtailment of her own economic interests
and necessitated considerable limitations on domestic consumption.
The fact that the Soviet Government had declared itself willing
to make such sacrifices proved that it, too, attributed a definite political
significance to the economic agreement with Germany. It was indispensable,
however, for the Soviet Government to know what it could
expect in the way of war material from Germany in the near future.
The conference closed with the Ambassador's request to Molotov
that he submit the matter once more to M. Stalin.
HlLGER
No. 521
124/122602-04
Ambassador ScJiuleriburg to State Secretary Weizsacker
Moscow, January 10, 194.
DEAR HERE VON WEIZSAOKER: During the past few days I had a
lengthy conversation first with M. Molotov and then with M.
Potemkin. During my talk with M. Molotov the conversation turned
to the departure of the British and French Ambassadors; it was noted
in this connection that their departure coincided with the summoning
of Italian Ambassador Rosso to Rome and was used by the anti-
German press, as was to be expected, to put an unfavorable interpretation
on all of this. M. Molotov emphasized that the attitude of the
Italian Government vis-a-vis the Soviet Union had been very unfriendly,
for which Moscow could see no particular reason.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
When I spoke with M. Potemkin today, he reverted to the matter
of his own accord. He said that the Soviet Government had just
received a report from its Embassy in Rome to the effect that Count
Ciano's favorite paper had come out with a very abusive article directly
aimed at the person of Stalin. M. Potemkin asked whether I
had any idea why Count Ciano should behave in this manner. It
certainly appeared as though he wished to do the work of the British
and the French. At the same time the Soviet Government knew
that Signor Mussolini thought quite differently and had always been
interested in having correct relations with the Soviet Union. The
conduct of Count Ciano and the Italian authorities had considerably
complicated the position of the new Soviet Ambassador in Eome.
During the conversation M. Potemkin mentioned that Italian students
had clamored for half an hour directly outside the windows of the
Soviet Embassy ; all efforts at calling the police by telephone had been
in vain. M. Potemkin hinted that the Soviet Union would not look
unfavorably upon our using our influence in Rome toward moderation.
In general I remained noncommittal and merely said that Eome and
Moscow would probably soon find a way of eliminating this very
disagreeable friction.
In my opinion it would be up to the Soviet Government, which, was
the first to recall its Ambassador, to be the first to send him back.
Doubtless it is in the interest of all of us to have correct relations reestablished
between Rome and Moscow. I am unable to judge whether
we can do anything in this direction.
In my conversation with Molotov the discussion on Finland was
the most interesting. I have already telegraphed what is most important.
1 I should like to add that we had assumed M. Molotov
would energetically reject any possibility of negotiations with the
Ryti Government from the very start, as he had once told me. We
were surprised that he did not do so. His answer, "late, very late,"
is difficult to evaluate. It is obvious that M. Molotov's statements
and attitude certainly reflect M. Stalin's opinion and that, on the other
hand, M. Molotov cannot say anything definite in such important
matters without having spoken with M. Stalin. I am curious to see
whether M. Molotov will revert to this matter in his next conversation
with me.
I should like to add that according to all our observations the food
situation, which is worse than it has been for a long time, letters with
unfavorable news from the Finnish front, and the lack or inadequacy
of support given the families of the soldiers are creating unmistakable
dissatisfaction among the population.
With most cordial greetings and Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc. F. W. SOHOTENBOTG
1 See document No. 513.
JANTJAKY 1940 645
No. 522
The Ambassador in Belgvwm to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 7 of January 10 BRUSSELS, January 11, 1940 2 : 35 a. m.
Received January 11 8 : 05 a. m.
Last night, for the first time since the holidays, I had an opportunity
for another long political talk with the Foreign Minister. M.
Spaak complained first of all about an article in the Angriff of January
6, which, referring to an article in the Gazette of January 5, had
sharply attacked Belgium for her unneutral trade agreement. The
statements in the G-a&ette had been purely hypothetical and did not
warrant attacks of this order.
Proceeding from this episode, M. Spaak declared that he was afraid
Germany failed to realize the Belgian people's unity in backing the
neutrality policy of the King and the Government and the fact that
this policy had steadily gained followers since the outbreak of the
war. Except for a few cranks there was no one in Belgium who
would advocate any other policy. This had also been evident when
the Chamber and the Senate voted on the budget of the Foreign Ministry,
and likewise in the voting at the convention of the Socialist
Party. I used the opportunity to remonstrate to the Foreign Minister
once more about the sins of the Belgian press and to insist again on.
neutrality of thought.
In connection with the deliberations of the Chamber our conversation
turned to the Foreign Minister's declaration on the relationship
between Belgium and Holland.1 M. Spaak remarked that he thought
the notion of a German attack on Holland was absurd. At the out-
*Spaafc had made a statement on foreign policy in the Chamber on Dec.
19, 1939. Concerning Belgian relations with the Netherlands he had said : "For
my part, I have no hesitation in saying that from the military as well as the
economic and moral point of view, an independent and neutral Holland is of
vital importance to Belgium. I do not think it necessary to labour so obvious
a truth.
"I am even more anxious than I was what has happened makes it necessary
that there should be nothing mechanical about Belgian foreign policy. I want
to be quite free to form a judgment in the light of all the facts. For that
reason, I think it would be unwise to decide now what attitude we shall have
to adopt if the situation in Holland changes. But I should like to make it clear
that it would be madness to suppose such an event would leave us indifferent.
"As far as I am concerned and I am sure I am speaking for the whole Government
I am deeply conscious of the ties between Belgium and the
Netherlands."
For text of the speech, see Annales Parlementaires de Belgique: Chambre He*
Reprteentants, Dec. 19, 1939, pp. 153-195; for translation, see Belgium: The
Official Account of What Happened 19S9-19W (London, 1941), pp. 80-84. Biilow-
Schwante had sent on Dec. 20 a lengthy report on the Spaak statement
(2823/548960-63).
646 DOCUME3STTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
break of the war both. Holland and Belgium had received solemn
assurances that their neutrality would be respected ; he had faith, in
the word which had been given. If in his speech he had, nevertheless,
taken up the question of what Belgium would do if Holland should be
attacked -from one side or another, he had done so only because he had
been forced to by the report of the Chamber Committee. In view of
the general expectation that large-scale fighting would break out somewhere
next spring, it was quite natural that the Belgian public was
speculating on where these battles would occur. Belgium would be
directly affected only by an attack against her own border or against
that of her northern neighbor. In the former event, the situation
was clear : Belgium would then fight no matter from what side she
was attacked.
As regards the latter case, the Belgian public had been wondering
what position the Government would take. Here he would have to
say that any occupation of Holland, whether by England or by Germany,
would create a situation for Belgium that would call for new
decisions. With the German Army in Holland, Belgium would not
be able with her small Army to defend her several hundred kilometers
of border from Arlon to Antwerp ; besides, occupation of the Scheldt
estuary would make it impossible to maintain the flow of supplies for
the country. Furthermore, if Holland were to be attacked in spite
of the solemn assurances given her, it would be impossible to convince
the Belgian people that they in turn would not suffer invasion sooner
or later. If it were England, on the other hand, which occupied Holland,
the situation, would be equally difficult, and any other attempt
to keep the country out of the war would probably also be foredoomed
to failure.
Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that the point of his statements
had been merely to indicate that any attack on Holland would
create a new situation that would require reexamination. He had
rejected the idea of an automatic reaction. The Belgian Government
would accordingly keep its hands free for that contingency. In the
circumstances obtaining at the outbreak of the war, Belgium, in pursuance
of her policy of independence, had declared her neutrality,
and she would continue to observe the strictest neutrality as long as
these circumstances prevailed. There were no grounds for doubting
that ; the Government was as firm in its resolve to pursue its neutrality
policy as it had been at the start of the war, when Franco-British
inclinations to inarch through Belgium undoubtedly failed to materialize
because, among other factors, there was a firm determination
to defend the country against any attack.
BULOW
JAJSTUAET 1940 647
No. 523
2790/547590^-91
Memorandum, by an Official of the Cuitwrcxl Policy Department
T, January 11, 1940.
zu Kult B 64r-ll 6/UL1
THE N. V. HOI*LANDSCHE BmTENLAND-BANK, THE HAGUE 2
I. Now that the provinces of Weichselgau and Warthegau have at
last become integral parts of the Reich,3 the conditions which made it
necessary at one time to set Tip such a camouflaged corporation as the
KT. V. Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank of The Hague have ceased to
exist.
II. Liquidation of the credits which we extended in the former
Poland through the N. V. Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank must absolutely
be handled in a manner that will stand up under the scrutiny
of the Netherlands authorities.
III. Due consideration must also be given to the Dutch members of
the board of directors, some of whom are very prominent persons.
IV. Following the liquidation of the credits, it would be advisable
to retain the valuable framework of the Buitenland-Bank for future
Germanization projects of the Reich. which might need camouflage.
A reduction of the capital stock to about 1 million Dutch guilders
would on the other hand appear desirable.
The Buitenland-Bank also administers for the Cautio 4 the international
commitments of the Tobis,
5 and also renders valuable
services to the Reich-Kredit-Gesellschaft A. G. in the financing of
exports and imports.
1 Not printed (2790/547593-96),
a The Hollandsche Buitenland-Bank, founded in 1925 with assistance of the
Reich and Prussian Governments, had been engaged in financing and refinancing
enterprises of German nationalist interest among German minorities principally
in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The financial structure engaged in
this type of activity was headed by the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G. m. b. EL
(formerly the Ossa Vermittlungs- und Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H.), a government-
controlled agency, over which the Foreign Ministry exercised supervision
through Kult B, and which at this time went under the cover name of Exzelsior
A. G. Activities of this organization in Austria have been mentioned in vol. i,
documents Nos. 170 and 175, its activities in Poland in vol. v, document No. 85,
and in Denmark in vol. v, document No. 462.
*The Weichselgau and Warthegau (German descriptions of areas in the four
western provinces of Poland) were declared to be incorporated into the Reich
by a decree of- Oct. 8, 1939, to be effective Nov. 1, 1939 (ReicJisgesetzUatt, 1939,
pt i, p. 2042).
* The Cautio Treuhandgesellschaft m. b. H., a financial holding company.
B A German and an international film concern. The international concern
had headquarters in Amsterdam.
648 DOCUMENTS COST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Submitted to the official in charge. Senior Counselor Schwager*
with the request for an opinion.
7 '
a Schwager, who had formerly been in charge of these matters as head of Kult
B, now exercised supervision over them as officer in charge of budget and
financial questions in the Personnel and Administrative Department.
7 Marginal notes :
"Re I. The H[ollandsche] B [uitenland-] B[ank] is used also for other credits,
e. g., in Rumania. ^
"Re II. Yes !
"Re III. Yes!
"Re IV. I strongly recommend that the attention of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl
and Ambassador Ritter he called to other administrative possiUUties of the
H. B. B., on the basis of a detailed memorandum on the H. B. B. in the files of Knit B prepared by us about 2 or 3 years ago. [Not printed, 2790/547621-26],
"I disagree with the Exzelsior, whose interests are one-sided, and am convinced
that very good use could be made of the H. B. B., in one way or another
during the war. Schwager."
On Jan. 28, the Minister in the Netherlands was asked to state his opinion on
proposals for liquidating or reducing the scale of the Hollandsche Buitenland-
Bank (2168/471060-61). Count Zech replied on Feb. 14, that the Bank had
proved extremely useful and that he was opposed to liquidating the bank or
reducing substantially the scale of its operations (2168/471062-63). Grosskopf,
in a memorandum of Mar. 7, noted that the Exzelsior A. G. and the Finance
Ministry were in agreement with the position that the Bank should be continued
on its current scale to the end of the war (2790/547584).
No. 524
100/64908r-10
Memorandum, ~by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat,
, January 11, 1940.
Upon presenting the attached memorandum, the Italian Ambassador
told me, with reference to yesterday's question by the Foreign Minister
x as to what evidence the Duce had of a possible change of mind
by the enemy, that the Duce's opinion was founded less on concrete
facts than on the logic of the situation. If Germany allowed Poland
to be restored in some form or other, she would deprive her enemies
of that very reason for the war on which they have focused the
attention of their own public. This would logically lead to a peace
movement.
Moreover, if Germany abstained from taking the offensive on. the
Western front, the only result of such a situation would likewise be
peace, for the Allies themselves certainly would not attack in the
West.
Attolico then asked me whether any German reaction to the Duce's
letter was yet discernible. I replied that the German reaction had
been made evident in the talk that he hud had with the Foreign Min-
1 See document No. 518.
JA3STTTARY 1940 649
ister yesterday, from, which he could gather at any rate that Germany
was studying the Duce's letter very closely.
2
SCHMIDT
[Enclosure]
PARIS, December 20, [1939],
FROM ATTOUCCO
There continues to be agitation in parliamentary circles for a reorganization
of the Cabinet, the main objective of which, in the minds
of many deputies, would be Daladier's resignation as Foreign Minister
and the formation of a ministry to coordinate the armed forces.
Mandel, as the heir to Clemenceau's tradition, would have to be placed
at the head of the latter ministry. There is an overabundance of candidates
for the Foreign Ministry, including de Monzie, who, however,
would gladly take the Ministry of the Interior if he were not appointed
Foreign Minister. I have been assured, however, that de
Monzie recently had a talk with Halifax and discussed with him his
views on foreign affairs, which received the approval of the British
Minister.
Another candidate for the Foreign portfolio is M. Chautemps. The
decision may be made in the first days of January.
But the chief issue debated at this moment is really whether the
serious internal incidents caused by the military inactivity may be
more severe or less severe than those which might be provoked by an
attempt to shake off this inactivity. This, too, is reported to have
been discussed at the Anglo-French meeting in Paris the day before
yesterday. The problem is, however, complex and difficult because
it involves not only military factors but more particularly political
and social factors, the appraisal of which varies with the general viewpoints
of the two countries and the special viewpoints of their political
officials. In reality, England feels that the burden of this siege
warfare rests more heavily on her and would like her ally to bear a
greater share of it. On the other hand, it is said here that in the
British Government itself the ideas of absolute intransigence are beginning
to change a little. There is no doubt that the anxieties increase
in the same measure as the intentions or the opportunities of
conducting a real and regular war of infantry diminish.
It is possible that just as the two opposing sides, as the result of a
chain of fateful mistakes, found themselves in an intolerable political
situation from which the only logical way out sooner or later had to be
war, so it might also come to pass that if it should suit neither side to
take the initiative in large-scale operations, peace will sooner or later
appear as the only logical way out of an intolerable military situation.
3 See document No. 504.
650 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
No. 525
446-7/E087442-43
Memorandwm, *by an Official of the A.ussenpolitische$ Ajrnt
January 11, 1940.
On Monday, January 8, I spoke at the Fiirstenhof [hotel] to the
German Naval Attache to Oslo, Lieutenant Commander Schreiber
who told me of a visit he had paid Geheimrat von Gnindherr in the
Foreign Ministry. I asked Commander Schreiber whether he had
spoken to Herr von Grundherr on the question of possible British
intervention in Norway. Commander Schreiber affirmed this, and
said that Geheimrat von Grundherr regarded it as a fairy tale. Commander
Schreiber then asked Herr von Grundherr if he thought an
unhindered supply of Swedish ore vital to Germany and her war effort,
and he said yes. Then Commander Schreiber asked further what
Herr von Grundherr himself would do if he were an Englishman and
knew that delivery of the ore was vital to the German war effort
Herr von Grundherr then had to admit it was altogether probable
that the British would overlook nothing to disturb ore deliveries to
Germany from Narvik.
I myself visited Herr von Grundherr on the evening of January 9.
To me also he stressed that he did not believe England would intervene
in Norway in any way whatever. Moreover, he was quite certain that
in any case the Norwegian Government would maintain its neutrality.
He said expressly that recently the Norwegian Government has been
extraordinarily courageous in the neutrality question. I had the impression
that my objection to this view made no lasting impression
on him.
Regarding the Finnish affair, it is interesting to note that Herr von
Grundherr told me that he considered German conduct toward Eussia
as neither wise nor correct and thought any yielding to Russia ominous
for further developments in northern Scandinavia. That this
view contradicts those of the Foreign Ministry was left unsaid, but
could clearly be inferred.
SCHEIDT
No. 526
124/122&54r-55
Minister BlucTier to State Secretary Wei&sdcTcer
KDDO, January 11, 1940.
DEAR BARON- WEIZSACEJER : I wish to thank you most cordially
for your kind letter of January 2.1 Thank you, too, for your kindness
1 Document No. 500.
JANUARY 1940 651
to my wife and your offer to arrange for forwarding her letters.
They are now coming through regularly, so that I do not need to
trouble you.
Permit me now to add a few remarks with the brutal frankness
excusable only in a private letter.
My old friend Hedin wrote me a few days ago : "Finnish resistance
may in certain circumstances change the entire world situation.'*
This is correct according to my impressions here.
What Soviet Eussia amounts to was heretofore a big question mark.
For the past six weeks Finland has now been the guinea pig on which,
the excellence of the Red Army and the appeal of Bolshevism have
been tested by experiment.
The result is unequivocal.
In spite of a tremendous superiority in men and materiel, the
Bed Army has suffered one defeat after another, lost thousands of
prisoners and hundreds of guns, tanks, and planes, and has made no
decisive gain in territory.
Kuusinen's government has not found support anywhere in Finland.
Even the workers have entirely rejected it.
In view of this experience the ideas on Bolshevist Eussia must be
thoroughly revised. All of us started with the wrong premises
when we assumed that Eussia was a first-rate military factor and that
Bolshevism and its Comintern exerted a strong influence on the laboring
masses of other countries. Actually, the Eed Army has such
shortcomings that it cannot even dispose of a small country and the
Comintern does not even gain ground in a population that is more than
40 percent socialist.
What Eussia amounts to economically cannot be ascertained, to be
sure, on the basis of the Finnish experiment that Herr Eitter must
establish; at any rate, however, the experience gained in Finland
shows that Eussia has not for some time past constituted a threat to
the great power, Germany, and that Germany already had a safe
flank in the East and did not need to make any sacrifices for it.
In these circumstances it might now be possible to adopt an entirely
different tone toward the gentlemen in the Kremlin from that
of August and September.
In addition there is the fact that Eussia's alignment with the
Western Powers is at present out of the question, now that Eussia
has seriously compromised herself in these countries through the
Finnish adventure and has revealed her military and political
weakness.
I would therefore assume that our position vis-li-vis Moscow is
strong enough today so that we can without difficulty put a stop to
this calamitous excursion into the ]NTorth.
260090 54 47
652 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
I hope you will not mind if I send a copy of this letter to Herr von
Grundherr.
With a Heil Hitler, a kiss of the Baroness's hand, and my best regards
to you, I remain
Yours, etc. BLUOHER
NQ. 527
124/122483r-S8
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsacker
SECRET ROME, January 11, 1940.
MT DEAR FRIEND : Professor Hermanin von Beichenfeld, the curator
of the art treasures at the Palazzo Venezia, where he also has his
office and so is constantly in the same building as the Duce a person
who is known to you as the man who, after the big banquet at the
Palazzo Venezia on the occasion of the Führer's visit, conducted the
Führer, the Duce, and our immediate circle through the collections of
the Palazzo Venezia, and a person who has for years been closely
associated with the Embassy and with me personally urgently requested
a few days ago that my colleague, Reichert, a personal
friend of his, come to see him in order that he might tell Reichert
his views as set forth in the enclosed memorandum.
In this conversation, as you will see, he expressed certain grave
anxieties, which, I must add, we hear from many quarters and especially
from the none-too-numerous Italian friends of ours who stand
squarely by the Axis. We are giving the greatest attention here to
these anxieties, which we fully share. Our counterpropaganda, which
was launched pursuant to the instructions given me personally by
the Reich Foreign Minister early last December in Berlin and in
line with the conditions stated by him at that time, will take effect
only gradually. We anticipate a certain measure of success, although
we must also bear in mind that for a great number of reasons the
other side probably will have the advantage over us for some time
yet.
I would not have considered forwarding the enclosed memorandum
to Berlin especially since it is unlikely to contain anything new to
you if it were not that I supposed, I might even say felt certain,
that what Hermanin had to say to Reichert came directly from the
Duce, who, I know, has confidential relations with Hermanin and
has used him as go-between on a number of occasions in the past.
The cautious Hermanin would never have entered into such political
talks without the approval of the Duce, and least of all would he have
JANUARY 1940 653
urged a member of the Embassy staff to visit him for such a purpose.
This gives special weight to the matter, for it indicates that the unmistakable
advantage -which the propaganda of the Western Powers
has here is causing serious concern also to the Duce. As I pointed
out in my oral report in Berlin, the Duce attaches particular importance
to popular sentiment, more so perhaps than one would expect
in an authoritarian regime. It is quite certain and this, too, I made
clear in Berlin that in his final decision he will never allow himself
to be governed by such popular sentiment; but there is no question
that at the critical moment, when he presses the button, he would,
if possible like to have the people solidly behind him and resolved
to follow him of their own free will. Considering this, it is natural
that he should feel some concern about the present status of the
propaganda war of the two sides on Italian territory. Just as I did
in Berlin, so I should like to emphasize now once more that the whole
question is of no vital importance for his decision, because when the
time comes he will, as he has always done in the past, find the right
phrase to make his people fall in behind him. Still we must do
everything to ease his task in that field also*
What I have in mind in this connection is not so much the question
of our relations with the Church, broached by Hermanin, or the question
of the Graf Spee (regarding the latter, incidentally, there is
already an interchange of ideas going on between the Naval Attach^
and the Naval High Command, although this has produced nothing
fruitful for us to date) what the Duce is most of all concerned about
is the question of our relations with Eussia. It has been brought out
in both my written and oral reports that the Duce practically alone
in Italy, I should say has a full understanding for the events in
Moscow following in the train of the visits there by the Reich Foreign
Minister. I need to call to mind only his statement to me that
this regulation of German-Russian relations was an "absolute necessity"
for us; but I recall also that he followed it up by raising a
warning finger against any intensification or further development of
our relations with Russia.1 Considering the psychology of the Italian
people, it is after all impossible for him, in a country where the
memory of our common battle in Spain is still so vivid and the Anti-
Comintern idea is perhaps more deeply rooted than among us, to
make the broad masses understand in this case the broad masses
extend far into government circles that what has happened does not
signify any change in the course of German policy.
1 See documents Nos. 205 and 410.
654
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Concerning the question as to what we can do in this field, I should
like first of all to say negatively that we must at all events avoid any.
thing of the sort that happened in the case of the Stalin
leaflet, for
instance, (cf. telegraphic report No. 1078 of December 27, 1939)
2 and
more recently with the Joy and Work brochures sent us for distribution
here (cl Instruction of December 28, 1939 Inf. 4202).
8
I should furthermore like to urge very strongly that if it is at all
possible all releases concerning our relations with Kussia, and not
least of all pictorial representations, always be reviewed in the light
of how they will affect the Italians. Finally, I should be grateful if
I could have ample material suitable for use in publicity especially
for word-of-mouth propaganda so as to promote understanding for
our Russian policy.
In conclusion I should like to call your attention to the fact that
Hermanin, who mentioned the Russian question to Reichert twice,
stated at the end that "according to his firm conviction" (i. e. a conviction
probably based on statements by the Duce) Italy could not
remain a passive observer if Russia should ever become an aggressor
against Rumania or, what is more, Hungary.
I should be extremely grateful to you, my dear friend, if you would
give this letter your special attention and consider whether and in
what measure my suggestions can be acted upon,
4
With cordial greeting and Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc. MACKENSEN
P. S. On the subject of propaganda, the secret report of the Military
Attach^ (g. Kdos No. 2 of January 5, Annex 1, a copy of which
was submitted to the Foreign Ministry) 6 is also of interest; it states
the arguments of "one of the oldest Fascists" (this refers to Giunta,
whom you know about) .
* Not printed (8336/E58987S-74) .
* Not found.
4 On Jan. 18 Weizsacker replied that Berlin was keenly aware of the propaganda
difficulties in Home and had studied Mackensen's suggestions. He then
went on as follows: "As regards our Russian policy, the development it has
taken since September 1, 1939, is rather inevitable IstiemlicTi gwanpslaufiffe], and
I am afraid it will remain a vulnerable point of attack for the propaganda of the
opposing forces in Rome.
"By the way, anticipating your agreement, I passed on your recommendations
of January 11 to Herr von Ribbentrop and the offices in the Ministry which are
primarily concerned with them.
"Finally, I find the unqualified statement important according to which Italy
would not remain passive if Russia should attack Rumania. That is a question
which we also discussed during your last sojourn in Berlin, This new version
seems to be rather unequivocal. At the moment, however, we have no sure
indications that it will be the Balkans' 'turn' next" (2281/480329-30). 8 Not found.
JANUARY 1940 655
[Enclosure]
KOME, January 9, 1940.
MEMORANDUM
Upon his telephoned request, I today visited Professor Hermanin
at the Palazzo Venezia. He explained that his urgent request for me
to visit him was prompted by the desire to inform me, privately and
as friend to friend, of the following:
He was watching with deep concern how the French and British
propaganda was increasing and having more success in Italy with
every passing day. Of German propaganda, on the other hand, there
was practically nothing to be seen. Very cleverly, as the Embassy
must be aware, capital was made of Germany's close relations with
the Soviet Union, whose action against Finland had enormously intensified
Italy's dislike for the Soviet Union. There were many
Italians who would gladly join in fighting on the side of the opponents
of the Bolsheviks, us they had done in the Spanish campaign. He
knew of some who had already done so. In view of this outlook of
the Italians, one could imagine the effect of the slogan, very cleverly
exploited by the enemy propaganda, that Germany was on the side
of the Bolsheviks and let them help her. The force of that argument
was further increased by our bad relations with the Church; Catholic
Italy was likening these to the Bolshevist atheistic movement and thus
furnishing the enemy propaganda with an extremely effective device
to foment hate. He, Hermanin, as the good friend of Germany that
we knew him to be, could not urge us insistently enough to launch
as active a propaganda campaign here as possible, with all available
means, so as to avert the loss of valuable ground. It was lucky for
us that the Italians had a fundamental dislike for the British individually
and, above all, politically. This, in his opinion, was the
point which our propaganda should seize upon.
Hermanin then turned the conversation to the events that followed
the "unfortunate" naval engagement in the bay of Montevideo.
He had been told yesterday by someone connected with the Italian
Navy that on leaving the port, the pocket battleship Graf Spee was
confronted only by the two small British cruisers which it had effectively
shelled before, and a small gunboat. It was a matter of regret
to him that Germany had not issued an authentic communique on
the last days of the Graf Spee; such a communique would surely have
afforded sufficient material to quash such allegations which, unless
counteracted, would create a very unfortunate impression here.
656
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Professor Hermanin then touched once more on the subject of
Russia's action. He only hoped that Germany was in a position to
check this advance if it should turn toward the Balkans. Should
Russia resort to aggression against Rumania or especially Hungary
he was firmly convinced that Italy could not remain passive. The
result would be a spread of the conflagration in Europe, which certainly
could not be desired by Germany.
[Respectfully submitted through the Counselor of Embassy to the
Ambassador-
No. 528
141/126450-52
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II
JANUARY 12, 1940.
The Belgian Counselor of Embassy, Vicomte Berryer, handed me
today the attached note verbale containing a protest against two
separate cases of German airplanes flying over Belgian territory on
January 10, and requesting that appropriate measures be taken to
prevent the recurrence of such incidents. In his oral statements accompanying
the presentation of the note, Vicomte Berryer stressed
that the note gave very specific data as to place, time, and aircraft
type, so that there could be no question of a mistake on the part of the
Belgian authorities.
I confined myself to saying that we must reserve our reply in tnis
matter until the results of the investigation by the competent German
authorities regarding the representations of the Embassy were
available.
In this connection Vicomte Berryer also mentioned briefly the German
Luftwaffe plane which had made an emergency landing near
Mechelen-sur-Meuse, remarking that this airplane, too, had flown over
Belgian sovereign territory.
1 I referred him to the DNB report that
the airplane in question had lost its direction by mistake.
*A German courier plane had made a forced landing in Belgian territory
near Mechelen-sur-Meuse on January 10. Two German Luftwaffe officers,
Major Keinberger and Major Hoenmanns, were aboard the plane. Major
Reinberger had in his possession some confidential documents which he attempted
to burn. The documents were preliminary instructions for use of German
troops in an invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands planned to begin on
Jan. 17, but subsequently postponed. (See the OKW directives of Jan. 11
and Jan. 15, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxrv, document No. 072-0,
exhibit GB-109, pp. 294-96.) Translations and photographs of portions of
the documents may be found in the Belgian Foreign Ministry's publication,
Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened, 19S9-1940, pp. 85-91, and in
the work of the military aide to King Leopold, General R. F. O. van Overstraeten,
Albert I-L
JANUARY 1940 657
Vicomte Berryer then stated, emphasizing that this was not an
official communication, that the German side had admitted during the
German-Belgian trade negotiations that German airplanes flew over
Belgium on photographic missions. At any rate the German negotiations
had countered the Belgian statement that no railroad cars
were available with the assertion that this was not true ; on the contrary,
photographs had disclosed the presence of 300 railroad cars
standing idle on tracks in southern Belgium. In replying to this
statement by the Belgian Counselor of Embassy I confined myself to
the remark that I had the impression that there must be some misunderstanding
here.
VON EUSTTEOSN
[Enclosure]
Note Verbale From the Belgian Embassy 2
P. 5272 BERLIN, January 12, 1940.
No. 473 Pol. H 148.
The Belgian Embassy has the honor to call once more to the attention
of the Reich Government that new cases of flights over Belgian
territory were recorded in great detail by the competent Belgian
authorities on January 10.
A German Heinkel 111 plane was spotted
at 10 : 36 a. m. near Houffalize
at 10 : 40 a. m. near St. Hubert
at 10 : 43 a. m. near Jemelle
at 10 : 45 a. m. near Dinant
at 10 : 51 a. m. again near Jemelle
at 10 : 59 a. m. near Namur
at 11 : 11 a. m. near Laroche
at 11 : 15 a. m. near Fauvillers.
On the same day a detailed report was made regarding a German
Junkers 88 plane above Fauvillers at 1 : 07 p. m. This plane then
took the following direction r Laroche, Marche, Huy, where it passed
at 1:27 p. m., and then Aywaille, Verviers, Vise, where it passed
at 1 : 44 p. m.
The Belgian Embassy has been instructed to address to the Reich
Government its renewed protest against these violations of the neutrality
of Belgian territory and a request that appropriate measures
be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
2 The original of this document was in French.
658
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 529
141/126454.
The Foreign Minister to tJie Embassy m B
Telegram
MOST URGENT BERLIN^ January 12, 1940 *
No. 11 RAM 13.
With reference to your telegraphic report No. 12 of January 12.2
Please wire immediately detailed report on the particulars of the
conversation between Wenninger and Reinberger, as well as an exact
account of the circumstances attending the destruction of the courier
baggage.
RlBBENTROP
1 The Embassy copy of this telegram (2845/551208) shows it to have been sent
at 9 : 12 p. m. Berlin time and received at 9 : 10 p. m. Brussels time on Jan. 12
2 In telegram No. 12 of Jan. 32, 1 : 25 p. m., Lt. Gen. Wenninger, Air Attach4 in
Brussels, reported to the High Command of the Luftwaffe, Attach^ Group:
"Reinberger reports that the courier baggage was burned down to insignificant
fragments. The conduct of both officers following the landing was unobjectionable."
(141/126453)
No. 530
1860/422921-22
Memorandiim "by the State Secretary
*
St.S. No. 4A BERLIN, January 12, 1940.
Pol. YI 133.
The Swedish Minister, who had spent several days in Stockholm,
called on me today and began the conversation with the remark that he
came without specific instructions. He wanted to give me the assurance
once more, however, on the basis of the impressions he had gained
in Stockholm, that his Government was maintaining its neutrality
and had not in any way complied with the League of Nations resolution
regarding assistance to Finland nor would it do so in the future.
Sweden had informed the League of Nations of this, too. Everything
that Sweden did for Finland was done of her own accord, without any
cooperation with foreign powers, and was not of an official nature.
M. Hichert attached particular importance to this remark since on
his last visit 2 I had shown him telegrams to the Secretary General of
the League of Nations from London and Paris from which other conclusions
could have been drawn.
1 Richert's report on this conversation is printed in HandUnffar rorande Sveriffes
poUtiJc under andra varldsTcrigct: Forspelet till det tystca angreppet pd DanmarTe
och Norge den 9 April 1940, a collection of documents published by the Swedish
Foreign Ministry (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 2&-30.
a On Jan. 4 (1860/422882-83) .
JAOTTARY 1940 659
Today I called M. Richert's attention to an article in the Temps of
January 10 which quite plainly demands that Scandinavia be drawn
into the general theater of war. M. Richert knew this article and
also the polemics in the German press opposing this thesis. He
strictly adhered to his assertion, however, that Swedish cooperation
with third powers in favor of Finland was out of the question.
The Minister then explained that the Swedish Parliament at present
agreed with this policy of the Government. However, M. Richert continued,
patriotic excitement in Sweden continued to run very high. If
at some later time the Russian weight should crush Finland and the
Russian Army approach Sweden, it was uncertain whether the national
exuberance might not push Sweden into the war against Russia.
It was clear to the Minister that this would entail great danger for
Sweden. From there he went on to speak of the joint interest of Germany
and Scandinavia in seeing that peace was preserved in Sweden
and Norway, and in that connection privately inquired whether Germany
could not after all render the tremendous service and win the
prestige of effecting a settlement between Russia and Finland before
matters went to extremes.
In answer to M. Richert's last remark, I only confirmed the German
interest in preserving Scandinavian neutrality and pointed to the fact
that the Kuusinen Government had been recognized by Russia. As
he knew, the Russian Government had stated that it could not negotiate
with two Finnish governments. Thus I did not see that there was
any room for negotiations.
WEIZSACKER
No. 531
141/126458
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BRUSSELS, January 13, 1940 & : 40 a. m.
No. 13 [15~\ of January 13 Received January 13 7 : 35 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 11 of January 12.
1
1. Major Reinberger informed General Wenninger on January
12 that he destroyed the courier baggage by burning, leaving only a
few fragments, the size of the palm of his hand.
Reinberger further reported that he had ascertained by inspection
that the major portion of the remnant that was not burned was of no
importance.
He was unable to identify the remaining pieces.
1 Document No. 529.
660 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAK FOREIGN POLICY
2. According to Major Reinberger's report the destruction of the
courier baggage toot place as follows :
a. After an emergency landing, Beinberger took the courier pouches
behind some bushes in order to burn them out of sight of approaching
Belgian soldiers, whose attention Major Hoenmanns engaged in order
to gain time. It was possible to burn a considerable portion of the
material before the light of the fire attracted the attention of the
soldiers. When the fire was forcibly extinguished, there remained the
fragments described under 1.
o. After being taken to military quarters near the landing site
Keinberger tried to complete the destruction of the remaining pieces!
which were lying on a table, by throwing them into the stove. A Belgian
officer managed to pull the remnants from the stove without their
apparently having sustained much damage from burning. Reinberger
has not seen the remnants mentioned under [paragraph] 1 again since
that moment.
3. The conversation of the Lieutenant General with Majors Reinberger
and EE[oenmanns] took place in the presence of the Military
Attache and the assistant to the Air Attache, with no Belgian witnesses
present ; it was taken for granted that the conversation was being overheard
with listening devices. Consequently, the content of the courier
mail could not be discussed in detail.
4. The Military Attache has made arrangements for a watch on
any military measures that might be touched off by this incident.
5. General Wenninger will arrive in Berlin early on January IS to
report in person to the Air Ministry.2
2 In the Jodl diary introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals
as document No. 1811-PS, but not included in the published collection, there
Is the following entry on the conference -which Wenninger had at 11 : 00 a, m. on
Jan. 13 with Goring, Bodenschatz, and Jeschonnek: "Report on a conversation
of Luftwaffe Attach^ with the two fliers who made the forced landing. Result:
Despatch case burnt for certain."
No. 532
141/126459
The Ambassador in Belgiwrn, to tJie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST UBGENT BRUSSELS, January 13, 1940 12 : 45 p. m*
No. 16 of January 18 Received January 13 5 : 45 p. m,
With reference to our telegram No. 15 of January 13.1
1- Following yesterday's reception of the Defense Minister 2 and
the Chief of the General Staff by the King, the Foreign Minister made
the following announcement :
s
1 Document No. 531.
* Lt. Gen. Henri Denis.
* The quoted portion of the telegram is in French.
JANUARY 1940 661
"In accordance with decisions previously adopted by the Government,
certain protective measures have been taken today.
"These measures constitute nothing more than the carrying into effect
of the defense plan envisaged from the first days of mobilization."
Although the announcement seeks to create the impression that the
defense measures involved were prepared long in advance, it may
nevertheless be assumed that the measures were taken as a result of
alarming reports received by the Belgian General Staff in recent days.
2. Since the night of January 12, troop movements have been in
progress. So far it has not been possible to ascertain particulars as
to direction and strength.
3. The Military Attache requests that the Army High Command
be notified at once.
BULOW
No. 533
8712/EOS5718
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in JBumania
T, January 13, 1940,
WlMg.
Making sure of our imports from Rumania is of special importance
in time of war and demands extraordinary measures. In order to
deal with these problems in a responsible way an economics office under
a "special representative for economic questions" is being set up in
the Bucharest Legation and he is accountable directly to the Minister.
I am charging the Chairman of the German Government Committee
for Rumania, Minister Clodius, with setting up this office. To be
head of the office Herr Neubacher, Mayor of Vienna, is going on leave
of absence from his official duties in Vienna, and is being assigned to
the Legation in Bucharest as special representative for economic questions.
Both men are leaving immediately for Bucharest.
It is the task of the special representative to see that every means
is used to ensure that all possibilities available to us under existing
governmental agreements for acquiring important raw materials and
food are fully exploited ; this will involve initiating at the right time
and in the appropriate way the effecting and following througih of
the necessary purchase contracts, ensuring the required transport
facilities, and counteracting attempts at sabotage by the enemy powers.
RIBBENTKO*
662
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 534
141/126466
Memorandum J>y the Director of tJie Political Department
BERLIN, January 13,
The Belgian Ambassador told me today that he wants to call on tie
State Secretary in the question of the continued instances of flights
of German aircraft over Belgian territory. In particular he criticized
that we had left former complaints unanswered, which places him in
a difficult position toward his Government.
Also Counselor of Embassy Count Berryer has spoken to me
repeatedly about these flights over Belgian territory, which he says
had continued up to the last few days.
The Luftwaffe Operations Staff has been requested to give us a
plausible explanation for Belgian consumption [plausible Darstellwng
fur den G-ebraucJi der Belgier].
Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.
No. 535
173/84143
Minute by the Director of tTie Economic Policy Department
CONFIDENTIAL BEELiif, January 13, 1940.
Geheimrat Kreuter, the manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit,
told me the following from a conversation with the Dutch Director-
General Hirschfeld last week :
The Netherlands Government has sent former Netherlands Minister
President Colijn to Home for an unofficial discussion of the situation
with the Italian Government. Colijn was to explain that Holland
"was greatly concerned about the existing regime in the event that
property in Germany should become further undermined." The
Netherlands Government was for that reason greatly interested in an
early peace; it expected little from any initiative of its own in this
direction, but was at all times prepared to support an Italian initiative.
When Colijn's trip was announced, Mussolini had replied that he
was prepared to receive him, but not to discuss peace possibilities -with
him. Ciano would be available for further conversations.
Herr Kreuter had been promised by the Dutch that he would be informed
about the result of the conversations in Home after the return
of M. Colijn.
1
WXBHL
*In a memorandum of Jan. 28 (173/84181-83), Wiehl noted further information
which had been received from Dutch sources about the visit of the former
Netherlands Minister President to Home in order to explore peace possibilities.
Colijn was reported to have considered his visit to have been without
results. Count Ciano's account of the visit appears in The Ciano Diaries, entry
for Jan. 9, 1940.
JANTJAKT 1940 663
No. 536
ITS/84153
Minute "by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, January 13, 1940.
Geheimrat Kreuter, the manager of the Dutch Tredefina-Kredit,
told me the following from a conversation -with the Netherlands Foreign
Minister, Kleffens, last week :
The Foreign Minister had mentioned that the ships with Swedish
ore for Germany were still reaching the port of Rotterdam without
trouble. This was facilitated by a friendly shadowing of these ships
in Dutch waters by the Netherlands Navy.
In this connection, the Foreign Minister referred to the contracts
for the delivery of arms from Germany to Holland (Dornier planes,
antiaircraft guns) . Holland was aware that these arms were ready
for delivery, but that delivery seemed to have been delayed. Holland
was urgently in need of these arms and hoped that these old contracts
would still be honored although she understood that new contracts
were out of the question because of Germany's own arms requirements.
Wnsm
No. 537
Nuremberg document No. 021-C
Exhibit GB-194
ExtractFrom War Diary of the Naval Staff i
[Extract!
CHEFSACHE JANUARY 13, 1940.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
By Officer Only
SITUATION DISCUSSION WITH THE CHIEF OF NAVAI*
2. "Study North" received from the OKW. This gives a rough
preliminary survey of the possibilities of German operations in the
northern area. The Führer has ordered a Working Committee to be
formed to revise the study; it is to be headed by a Luftwaffe General
who will at the same time be entrusted with the execution of any
eventual operation. The Chief of Staff of the Working Committee
1 The German text of this extract (less the final paragraph) Is printed In
Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxiv, pp. 181-185. The German text
of the entire extract is printed in Walther Hubatsch, Die cteutsche
von JDanemark und Worwegen, 1940, pp.
664
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
will be a naval officer and the Chief of Operations Branch an army
officer,
2
The study commences with the premise that should England establish
herself in the Norwegian area it would create an intolerable situation
for Germany in her military strategy, and that probably the only
way to prevent this would be for Germany to anticipate a British
move and occupy Norway first. Anti-German feeling is growing in
the Scandinavian countries as the situation becomes tenser owing to the
Busso-Finnish conflict, and this would be in favor of England if she
were to take action in Norway. Resistance on the part of the Norwegians
can hardly be expected. According to OKWs study, the possibility
of such a development becomes the more probable because the
Storting, contrary to constitutional practice, was not dissolved on
January 11 and the Jewish pro-British Minister President [$&],
Hambro, remains at the head of the present Norwegian Government
In the opinion of the OKW, it is also possible that a German offensive
in the West will be used by England as a pretext for occupying
Norway.
The OKWs study was initiated by a report made to the Führer on
December 12, 1939, by the Commander in Chief, Navy, in which the
latter, as the result of his conversation with M. Qu[isling] on December
11, drew attention to the great threat which the establishment oi
the British in the Scandinavian area would imply to German strategy,
and explained the opportunities for German operations which the possible
development of internal political conditions in Norway might
afford. (See memorandum of conversation between the Commander
in Chief, Navy, and Quisling, and the report to the Führer in War
Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.3
)
The Chief, Naval Staff, is still firmly convinced that England mtends
to occupy Norway in tlie near future in order to cut off completely
all exports from the Norwegian-Swedish area to Germany, and
to hinder German warfare on the ocean and in the North Sea; in so
doing she will be able to count on Norway's tacit consent or at least
that of the Government and the majority of the population because of
the Norwegians' anti-German attitude. This opinion is confirmed by
*The Jodl diary (entries for Jan. 23, 24, and Feb. 5) records that at Hitler'*
order these arrangements were canceled and "Study North" was instead assigned
to a staff under direct OKW control. On Jan. 27, Keitel notified the Army,
Navy, and Luftwaffe that the Ftihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
had assigned responsibility to him for "Study N[orth]," to be known in
future as "Weser Exercise" [Weserubung\ . Plans were to be prepared by a
special staff under Keitel's direction. Trial of tlie Major War Criminal*, vol
xxxiv, document No. 063-C, exhibit GR-87, pp. 269-270. An English translation
appears in Nazi Conspiracy ana Aggression, vol. vi, p. 88S. ' See document No. 443 and footnote 2.
JAJSHJARY 1940 665
special intelligence which has reached the Chief, Naval Staff. In the
view of the Chief, Naval Staff, the exercise of very strong British
pressure on Sweden could be expected as a further result of such an
occupation, with the aim of choking off the flow of all merchant traffic
to Germany, and, if possible, of forcing Sweden into the war on
the side of the Western Powers. The Chief, Naval Staff, sees a most
serious threat to Germany in such a development, since the occupation
of Norway by England would have a decisive effect on the war against
Germany.
In partial opposition to the opinion of the Chief, Naval Staff, the
Operations Division of Naval Staff does not believe that an imminent
British occupation of Norway is probable. Apart from the fact that
it is in any case doubtful whether England is at present capable of
such a display of force, in the opinion of the Operations Division,
Naval Staff, such an operation would involve great risk and great
difficulties for England. The occupation of Norway would bring
England into strong and extremely undesirable opposition to Russia,
and, further, would immediately call forth severe countermeasures on
Germany's side. The establishing of British forces in Norwegian
bases would directly result in the immediate extension of the German
operational base to Denmark and, if necessary, to Sweden, and German
sea and air forces would thus constitute an effective threat to
any British activities in the south Norwegian area.
Any British military pressure exerted on Sweden from Norway
could be rendered ineffective by immediate German action against
Sweden since the effects of German warfare could be made felt to a
much greater degree and much more quickly than would be the ease
with British operations undertaken from the Norwegian area.
In the opinion of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, it must be
regarded as very improbable that England could release such strong
forces at home as would be necessary for the occupation of Norway
in order to counter effectively the grave threat from Germany.
The Operations Division, Naval Staff, considers, however, that an
occupation of Norway by Germany, if no British action is to be
feared, would be a dangerous undertaking both from the strategic
and economic point of view. After German seizure of Norway, the
neutral Norwegian territorial waters would no longer be safe, and
with Germany's at present still small naval strength, the maintenance
of German ore imports especially vital during the winter months
from the Norwegian area, and of the important sea routes to Base
North and to and from overseas could no longer be guaranteed.
While in complete agreement with this opinion, the Chief, Naval
Staff, is also convinced that the most favorable solution is definitely
666
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the maintenance of the status quo, which, while Norway preserves
the strictest neutrality, permits Germany's important wartime sea
traffic to use Norwegian territorial waters in safety without the fear
that Great Britain will make any serious attempt to disrupt these
sea communications.
The development of the political situation in Norway and also the
situation of the war as a whole cannot be predicted. It is therefore
necessary, on principle, to include an occupation of Norway in the
operational preparations for general war strategy, and where the
Navy, which would play a decisive part, is concerned, to get all preliminary
work underway which would be necessary for the fulfillment
of any demands which may be made on the Naval Staff, possibly at
short notice. This preliminary work will be summarized in Study
North.
No. 538
141/126467
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJKGENT BRUSSELS, January 14, 1940 1 : 50 p. m,
No. 22 of January 14 Eeceived January 15 12 : 10 a, m.
Also for the War Ministry.
With reference to our telegram No. 20 of January 13.1
The Belgian Defense Ministry tonight ordered phase D, that is,
the next to the last mobilization step. Moreover, portions of age
classes 20 and 21 were called in tonight. "Details will be reported by
the Military Attache. The new military measures seem to have been
occasioned by the lively activity of German fliers over Belgian territory,
reports of German troop movements at the Belgian and Dutch
frontiers, as well as the content of the partly unburned courier mail
found on the German Air Force officer. This morning's Belgian
papers point in a calm tone to the great seriousness of the situation.
The population is very anxious because a German invasion of Holland
and Belgium is believed to be imminent.2
BULOW
a This telegram reported that members of the Belgian armed forces were
being recalled from leave (141/126463) .
2 The Embassy reported further in telegram No. 27 of Jan. 15, 6 : 15 p. m.
(141/126478), that Belgian popular feeling was becoming calmer. This trend
was assisted by the moderate tone taken by the press. Official circles remained
alert and mistrustful, but so far there seemed to be no inclination to deviate
from the policy of neutrality or to seek aid from England or Prance.
JTA2STUARY 1940 667
No. 539
ITS/84145
TJie Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT THE HAGUE, January 14, 1940 8 : 52 p. nu
No. 35 of January 14 Received January IS 12 : 10 a. m.
For Pol. I M.
All leaves canceled in Holland ; thus far alarm has not been issued.
No troop movements from North Holland ascertained up to 6 p. m.
Increased telephone traffic at 2 p. m. I have posted watchers for any
troop movements. Weather : thawing, heavy fog, no visibility. Team
P. with S. are leaving Monday forenoon. KOH.1
ZECH
1 These initials are believed to stand for Kriegsorganisation Holland, a unit
of the Abwehr. A notation by the coding office of the Foreign Ministry indicates
that 4 copies were to be sent to Lt. Col. Pieckenbrock, who was head of Abwehr TL
No. 540
141/126471-72
Memorandum l>y an Official of Political Division I
BEKLHT, January 14, 1940.
Pursuant to the instructions received from, the Foreign Minister
I have taken the following steps :
1. Since Admiral Canaris was en route and could not be reached,
and his deputy, Captain Burkner, could also not be reached, I contacted
the General Staff of the Luftwaffe directly.
2. When I learned that the Chief of the General Staff, General
Jeschonnek, had been summoned to Field Marshal Goring to make
a report, I contacted General Jeschonnek directly.
3. At 12: 55 p. m. General Jeschonnek told me the following:
a. There has been no substantial intensification of reconnaissance
activity over Belgian territory in the past days.
Probably no more than one or two planes had been over the
area during the day.
7). It was true that after the long period of bad weather there
had been a small increase in flights in the fine weather of the
past days, and this probably had also attracted attention.
c. In view of the political considerations indicated to him,
General Jeschonnek would issue orders that the flights be cut as
drastically as was in any way consistent with the military requirements.
26009
668 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
4. Subsequently, I informed Admiral Canaris about the conversation
with General Jeschonnek. Admiral Canaris in turn will inform
General Keitel.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with
instructions.
V. D.
No. 541
141/126473-76
Memorandum by the State Secretary
SECRET BERiuTN, January 15, 1940
St.S. No. 47
After the Belgian Ambassador had asked on Saturday a to be received
by me I received him at noon today.2
Count Davignon started immediately to talk of the numerous occasions
when our planes were guilty of flying over Belgian territory
recently. He hoped for a plausible explanation on my part, especially
as our answer to the Belgian complaints of the more distant
past was also still lacking. I promised an early reply to the Belgian
complaints of the months of November and December to the Ambassador.
Our investigations were always most thorough and would,
therefore, frequently take some time. We desired to really clarify
the subject in every case and did not consciously delay our explanation.
On the contrary, we were prepared to acknowledge a frontier
violation, if it was confirmed also by our side, and would not hesitate
to express our regrets.
After we had concluded this subject within a few minutes, I told
the Ambassador that I, on my part, would possibly have asked him
to come in today if he had not, as it happened, requested it himself.
I had had submitted to me a series of reports of the foreign press
on Belgium this very morning, which showed a shocking state of
excitement and of a military activity which was directed one-sidedly
against Germany.
The Ambassador frankly admitted this. This was the third phase
in the military preparedness of Belgium. The fourth and last phase,
however, was not yet reached. It might be that Belgium would have
been better off if she had completely mobilized earlier, just as Holland
and Switzerland had done. For it was true that the present measure
must give us the impression of a special alarm,
1 Jan. 13.
'Davignon's account of this interview appears in his Berlin 1936-1940:
souvenirs d'une mission, pp. 199-200.
JANUARY 1940 669
After this I asked the Ambassador to give me the reasons which
impelled his Government to take such steps*
The best means to produce a crisis are conditions of excitement as
created by Brussels. It was the right and the duty of every neutral
country to prepare its defense, but not to strengthen this defense onesidedly
against one of the belligerent parties.
Then Davignon came into rhe open with the reasons which in
Brussels had caused fear of a German invasion* First he spoke of
his own information. He would, however, be very cautious in forwarding
this to Brussels and would weigh it carefully :
a. Everybody in Berlin speaks in the open street of the German
invasion of Belgium and Holland. I answered this point by saying
that Brussels should not, after all, rely upon gossip in the street.
6. The Embassy continuously received anonymous letters dealing
with the planned invasion. Davignon himself did not put any decisive
emphasis on these.
c. His colleagues of the diplomatic corps were already paying him
visits of condolence. Davignon pretends at least that he reprimanded
the visitors.
d. The flying over Belgian territory during the last few days had
also taken him Davignon aback.
I replied to this by saying that such individual instances never
permitted such far-reaching conclusions, even if they were true. The
Ambassador denied my objection that English and French planes
were certainly also seen at the Belgian frontier and had crossed it in
flight. The French and English had been very cautious recently.
e. Davignon told me confidentially that a member of the German
economic delegation had told a member of the Belgian delegation that
our aerial photographs proved that 300 unused and empty freight
cars were standing in a Belgian village (X) . I told Davignon with
regard to this story that it certainly would not be in keeping with the
facts. At best it was just a bluff in order to cause the Belgian delegation
to put more freight cars at disposal.
After these experiences of the Belgian Embassy itself, Davignon
presented the following as the presumable reasons for his Government's
worries :
/. Alleged German troop movements next to the Belgian frontiers.
He conceded that the Embassy knew comparatively little of them.
I told Davignon he should inquire how things looked at the French-
Belgian frontier, whether there were not great numbers of French and
English troops massed there. The danger point would be right there,
but Brussels did not seem to react against it.
Davignon asserted then that a spontaneous French invasion of Belgium
was absolutely out of the question. France's most urgent desire
670
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
would be that we enter Belgium, for this would waken the Fren h
population from its lethargy. But France by herself would never
take the first step toward Belgium. France's entire policy consisted
in the hope of support from America. But America's sympath
would be gone once and for all and turned to the opposite if France
sought to violate Belgium's territory.
#. Davignon replied to my doubts thereof that the reports about
the German intention to attack France through Belgium came from
every quarter. This kind of thing was reported from Italy. It
seemed likely that Germany did not have anything against Belgium
except the very fact that its geographical position invited an invasion
1
Then Davignon returned a second time to the warnings which came
from Italy.
3
h. Davignon finally mentioned that it was perhaps also known to
me that a German plane had made an emergency landing near Mechelen
recently. There was presumably some alarming material in this
plane. I conceded quite incidentally that I had learned of the fact
of such an emergency landing from the press.
I then steered the conversation back to the point that the Belgian
Government was in my opinion being frightened by unfounded
reports and was being pushed into a very one-sided action. I considered
this very objectionable. I could not recognize any particular
cause for the Belgian alarm.
Davignon left after this last remark.
WEIZSACEER
1 See documents Nos. 553 and 557.
No. 542
C82/241951-&a
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram.
No. 88 of January 15 ROME, January 16, 1940 1 : 00 a. m.
Received January 16 1 : 45 a. m.
With reference to our telegram N"o. 87 of January 15.1
The following is a translation of the pro memoria referred to in
No. 87:
"1. The report 2 in Berlin concerning the sale to France by Italy
of airplane engines manufactured by the Isotta Fraschini firm stems
1 Not printed (8331/E589814r-15). In this Mackensen summarized the pro
memoria, which had just been handed to him by Ciano, and reported that it had
been drafted by Ciano and revised by the Duce himself.
a On instructions from the Foreign Ministry (2131/466588-89), Mackensen had
handed to Ciano on Jan. 11 a memorandum (2131/466592) containing details of
the report which had reached Berlin.
JANUARY 1940 671
from the conclusion of a contract for the delivery of engine parts
which the Italian plant is making for the account of the Gnome et
Khone company. These connections between Italian firms and the
Gnome et Rhone company go back to 1937, and since then it has
happened several times that Italian firms have turned to Manfred
Weiss in Budapest for the production of engine parts.
"2. Although Italy has in the past rejected the numerous and urgent
requests for materials for direct war use, winch her industries received
from France and Great Britain, and for reasons of her military security
also intends to do so in the future, it must be pointed out that
Italy must build up her own armaments to a maximum as soon as
possible. She had allowed for a long period (until 1942) to carry
out this plan, and during that whole period she would have to try to
accept the greatest possible number of orders from countries with
free currencies, and to offer war material in order to secure for her
own rearmament approximately twice the amount of the raw materials
used in the goods delivered to other countries, since the prices amount
on an average to 3 times the value of the raw materials used in such
war orders. The outbreak of the war did not diminish, but rather
increased, Italy's obligation and necessity to accelerate her own
rearmament. This being the case, Italy cannot escape the necessity
of intensifying her exports, among which, for obvious reasons in the
circumstances, war materials are the most important item,
"It is clear that without these exports Italy would not be able to
speed the execution of the program which has become even more
urgent owing to the fact that in the circumstances it might be necessary
to use the armaments much earlier than 1942. In carrying this
military program into effect, Italy increases her own war potential
and makes an extremely important contribution to Germany's
strength.
"3. The German Government is well aware that the Franco-British
naval blockade is being very strictly enforced, and that it would
doubtless become even stricter if Italian industry should persistently
refuse to consider any wishes of the Allies.
"It should be added that, apart from the above-mentioned necessity
of procuring the necessary currency for our purchases in other
countries, the sources of the most important raw materials lacking
in Italy are controlled by France and England, and that these countries
can easily cut off our supplies at any moment if the economic
and commercial relations between Italy and the two Allied countries
should enter the phase of open conflict. If that should occur, our
armaments program would suffer new and unpredictable delays or
even be halted altogether.
"4. On the basis of this necessity, Italy contemplates limiting her
military deliveries to France and England by so restricting and
staggering them as to preclude any really noticeable change in the
ratio of strength between the belligerent countries, and to help Italy
in case of a rupture. At the same time, we shall not neglect to keep
the Reich Government informed in detail about the receipt and acceptance
of all orders, thereby providing the German Government
with useful information on the armament situation of the countries
at war with the Reich
672
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
"5. It is stressed that the existence of the above-mentioned commercial
relations with France and Great Britain does not in any wav
influence or change the known policy of the Fascist Government as
agreed upon with the Eeich Government and in accordance with tie
Berlin pact of alliance and the existing agreements. No negotiations
of a political character have been initiated or are intended
between Italy, France, and Great Britain. The commercial relations
are the result of direct contacts between the Italian industry and
individual foreign firms ; none of them has been developed through
diplomatic or any other official channels."
No. 543
1138/^24569-70
Mentora/ndum "by Ambassador Hitter
BERIJCNT, January 16, 1940.
The Foreign Minister made the following communication to me
on January 15 concerning his conference with the Führer on January
13 :
x
*The basis for this conversation was evidently a memorandum of Jan. 10
by Hitter setting forth for Ribbentrop the points requiring decision by Hitler
(1138/324580-84). Attached to this memorandum were the following tables:
A. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET DELIVEBIES AND OTHER SERVICES IN 1940
I. Deliveries and services on*the basis ofthe new economic program,
a. Deliveries:
1. Food Industry
(grain, legumes, tobacco, intestines and
stomachs) approx. RM 126, 000t 000
2. Industry
petroleum products
" "
116,000,000
textile raw materials (cotton, flax)
" "
96,000,000
3. Ores
(crude iron, scrap iron, iron ore, manganese
ore, chromium ore)
" "
60, 000, 000
4. Precious and nonferrous metals
(platinum, copper, nickel, tin)
" "20, 000, 000
5. Other industrial raw materials
(phosphates, asbestos, sulphur)
" "13, 000, 000
6. Forest products
"
43,000,000
7. Miscellaneous products
(tobaccos, chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, etc) .
" "
16, 000, 000
" "
490, 000, 000
fe. Part of clearing balance
madeup of Soviet raw-material purchases in
third countries on behalf of Germany . approx. RM 30, 000, 000(?)
c. Transit freight (soy beans, etc.)
" "
70, 000, 000(?)
II. Delivery of goods on the basis of the credit agreement
of August 19, 1939 " "
90,000,000
III. Deliveries to the Protectorate " "
50,000,000
Total RM 730,000,000
JANUARY 1940 73
It was difficult for the Führer to make a positive decision on some
of the points given below. He had decided to do so, however, in
view of the over-all situation and in order to bring the negotiations
to a conclusion. I was authorized to transmit to M. Stalin a statement
to this effect by order of the Führer.
The Foreign Minister further instructed me to explain to M.
Molotov that the latter's recollections of the Foreign Minister's
statements on military deliveries were erroneous.
The following are the details of the Fuhrer's decision :
1. Six 381 mm turrets can be delivered by the following dates:
March 1, 1941; June 1, 1941; September 1, 1941; December 1, 1941:
March 1, 1942 ; and June 1, 1942.
2. The 203 mm guns for the cruiser Lufeow can be delivered in a
similar manner as the other accessories, parallel with the completion
of the Ltit&ow.2
3. Of the periscopes and storage batteries requested by M. Stalin,
only one of each is to be delivered immediately. The remainder ojf
the articles requested by M. Stalin is to be delivered in 1941. In case
I cannot get M. Stalin to agree to this, I am to telegraph to Berlin
for a possible new decision.
4. With reference to the planes, according to M. Stalin's statements
the total demand will no longer be insisted upon. It is to be explained
that in case the Soviet Government wishes to copy certain types, it
will pay "suitable" license fees.
5. Of the 34 machine tools especially requested by M. Stalin, one
complete set is to be delivered in 1940, the second one in 1941.
HITTER
Footnote (1) Continued
B. ESTIMATE OF GERMAN ARMAMENT DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING
1940 AND THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1941
I. Delivery of goods on the basis of the new economic program.
Industrial deliveries agreed upon:
steel tubing, locomotives, turbines, mining equipment;
equipment for the naphtha and chemical industry, for
steel wire factories and electric power plants; freighters
and special ships; metals and coal RM 250, 000, 000
II. Delivery of goods on the basis of the credit agreement of
August 19, 1939 90, 000, 000
III. Delivery of goods from the Protectorate 50, 000, 000
Total RM 390, 000, 000
The following insertion was made between Items II and III of list A:
'III. Delivery of goods on the basis of the German-Soviet Trade and Payments
Agreement . . . approx. RM 15,000,000"
and the total changed to read RM 745,000,000.
In list B, the 90,000,000 was changed in pencil to 60,000,000, which was in
turn changed to 75,000,000, and the total was changed to read 375,000,000. The
figure 15,000,000 was also inserted into the list, with a. cross-reference to the
change in list A, but the total figure was allowed to stand as 375,000,000.
a "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945," JBrassey's Navwl Annual,
1048, p. 79, includes the following paragraph at Jan. 26, 1940: "8. Political
questions. The Führer desires to delay as long as possible giving plans of
the Bismarck class as well as the hull of the Lutzow to Russia, since he hopes
to avoid this altogether if the war develops favorably.**
674
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 544
141/126480-81
The Ambassador in Belgivan to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT BRUSSELS, January 17, 1940 6 : 40 a. m.
No. 32 of January 16 Received January 17 10: 30 a. m.
Foreign Minister Spaak requested me to see him tonight and spoke
in an earliest but studiously friendly manner in order, as he expressed
himself, to try to restore the basis of mutual trust between our countries
which had been shaken in the past days. State Secretary
Freiherr von Weizsacker had asked Vicomte Davignon about the
meaning of the military measures taken in Belgium over the weekend.
1 He wanted to give me the same answer which Davignon was
going to deliver. The military measures were taken mainly for two
reasons :
1. The military authorities had had reports that German troops
during the last week had been brought up directly to the frontier as
their jumping-off position and that units stationed further back had
been moved forward.
2. According to the statement of the military authorities the plane
which made an emergency landing on January 10 had put into Belgian
hands a document of the most extraordinary and serious nature, which
contained the clear proof of an intention to attack. It was not just
an operations plan, but an attack order worked out in every detail,
in which only the (group garbled) time remained to be inserted.
The two reasons given above had compelled the Belgian Government
to take, for its part, the military measures deemed necessary.
That was the truth of the matter; all other reports were mere
speculations.
When I asked whether it was not conceivable to him that the Belgian
Government had fallen a victim to the war of nerves, the Foreign Minister
replied that he, too, had for a time played with the notion of such
an attempt on the part of Germany, especially in view of the whole
idea of a complete attack order dropping down from the sky. But he
had asked himself, for what purpose 3 The purpose could only have
been to make the Belgian Government lose all composure, so that it
would on its own initiative call the French and British into the country
for the joint defense against a German attack. He could assure me
solemnly and most earnestly, however, that the Belgian Government
would never commit the folly of calling the Allies into the country.
Belgium's policy was that of independence and neutrality toward
every one. Calling upon one belligerent party for help was inconsistent
with the policy pursued so far and would inevitably result in
what it was intended to avoid, namely, war in one's own country.
1 See document No. 541.
JANUARY 1940 675
The Foreign Minister concluded by saying that he hoped that his
words, which were meant sincerely, would serve to restore confidence
in the relations between the two countries.
I should like to add to the Foreign Minister's statements that a
representative of the Court, who is very close to the Bang, emphatically
told me yesterday that the King, who is himself of German extraction
and whose pro-German sentiment is known, would never permit the
Belgian Government to depart from the clear line of a neutral policy.
He would uphold this policy even in the most critical hour and not
let himself be influenced by either side. He was firmly resolved to
pursue to the end even to the bitter end this policy of neutrality,
which he himself had initiated. If Belgium therefore should be
drawn into the war, this would happen only through her violation,
for which she herself had given no cause.
BTJIXTW
No. 545
75/52172
The Deputy Director of tTie Economic Policy Department
to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET BUDAPEST, January 17, 1940 6 : 00 p. m.
No. 43 of January 16 Received January 17 9 : 45 p. m.
I. The agreements were signed today.1 Together with economic
agreements, very secret protocols regarding cooperation in matters
of war economy were signed. As authorized by the Reich Foreign
Minister, I told Count Csaky at my farewell visit that the German
Government recognized that Hungary had tried, in the development
of economic relations since the beginning of the war, to do everything
in her power to take Germany's vital interests into consideration.
This also applied in particular to the granting of the latest German
requests in the exchange rate question. Csaky thanked me for this
communication and asked me to tell the Reich Foreign Minister that
in accordance with the promise he had given to the Führer and again
recently to the Foreign Minister in the Führer's headquarters,
Hungary would also in the future aid Germany economically with
all her resources.
II. Following up Ms recent statement 2 that according to his in-
1 The agreements signed were the 16th Confidential Protocol (8502/^3597167-
235) and a secret record of conversations on military questions (8502/E597236-
45) . Copies of papers to which the record referred had previously been forwarded
to the Foreign Ministry by Clodius under a report from Budapest of Dec. 15,
1939 (5571/E399670-81).
*On Dec. 15, 1939, Clodius had reported a conversation with Csaky in the
course of which the latter had launched forth into various speculations about
future political developments in Southeast Europe (73/52131-32).
676
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
formation Russia would not undertake anything against Rumania but
would rather turn against Turkey, Csaky informed me that from ttte
latest reports of the Hungarian Minister in Moscow he now had lite
distinct impression that the Russians had changed their intentions and
were seriously considering action against Rumania. PotemHn had
recently sought to find out in detail from the Hungarian Minister what
Hungary's attitude would be if Russia took action against Rumania.
The Minister had received the distinct impression that these were not
theoretical considerations.
III. Count Csaky gave the following confidential figures regarding
Hungarian rearmament : Since the beginning of 1938 an additional 2
billion pengo had been expended for armament. The last installment
of 450 million pengo had just been made available to the Army. Of
this amount, 170 million pengo were earmarked for orders in Germany
and 150 million pengo for orders in Italy. The Hungarian Government
was particularly grateful that Germany, in spite of the war,
had already made possible at least in part the placing of these orders
and hoped that before very long she would also take on deliveries
which were not yet filled at the present time ; these were of decisive
importance in increasing the Hungarian war potential and to have
them carried out should therefore be of political interest to Germany
also.
CLQDIUS
No. 546
8142/E582203
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 34: of January 17 TOKTO, January 17, 19407 : 00 p. m.
Received January 17 7 : 00 p. m.
PoL IX 101.
With reference to my telegram No. 29 of January 15.*
The Ybnai Cabinet was formed yesterday. The list of Ministers
has been transmitted by the Deutsche Nachrichteribiiro. There is no
assurance that the new men will be able to overcome the difficult internal
economic problems which brought the fall of the previous cabinet.
Although Yonai failed in his efforts to commit the major parties
to the policy of the new Government by summoning their leaders into
1 Not printed (174/136221-22) . The telegram reported the fall of the Abe
Cabinet on Jan. 14 and stated that both Prince Konoye and Army leaders bad
refused to form a new cabinet because, in view of the serious domestic and
international problems pending, they anticipated a series of transition cabinets,
It recalled that the new Prime Minister, Admiral Yonai, had been Navy Minister
in the Hiranuma Cabinet of 1938-1939 when the Navy opposed the extension
of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance with Germany.
JANUARY 1940 677
the Cabinet, nevertheless the assignment to party men of the now particularly
important post of Finance Minister as well as the equally
important Ministry of Agriculture means a broadening of participation
in the Government by the parties, which have hitherto been
limited to the Ministry of Railways and Transport.
The strong influence of the anti-reform high finance and Court
circles on the new Cabinet is unmistakable and is already the subject
of increasing criticism in the press. Particularly worthy of note with
respect to the new Cabinet is the very considerable reserve of the
Army, which is being explained by its concern to concentrate all its
energies on disposing of the China enterprise. That parts of the
Army disapprove this attitude is evident from the very fact that it
required a personal appeal of the Emperor to insure support for the
Cabinet by the Army.
The foreign situation and the known attitude of Foreign Minister
Arita 2 indicate that a continuation of the present foreign policy, in
particular of efforts for an agreement with America, is to be expected.
All the leading personalities of the new Cabinet have spoken in their
first press interviews in favor of the early formation of a new Chinese
government under Wang Ching-wei.
The new Cabinet, despite the proclaimed opposition of the Social
Mass Party and splinter groups in the Diet, will probably encounter
no very great difficulties, since the major parties have promised their
support for the present. Same text to Shanghai, Hsinking.
OTT
* Arita had been Foreign Minister in the Hlranuma Cabinet, October 1938-
August 1939, and was identified with the opposition to a military alliance with
Germany.
No. 547
B18/B003331
TTie State Secretary to tTie Minister in Finland
Telegram
SECRET BEKLTNT, January 17, 194XX
No. 25 zu Pol. VI 4A g I.1
For the Minister.
With reference to your No. 7 of January 4=.
2
In case M. Tanner should again mention the subject to you, please
tell him that you transmitted his unofficial inquiry to the German Government,
The latter, however, was of the opinion that there were
at the moment no prospects of putting an end to the conflict.*
WBIZSACKER
1 Pol. VI 44 g I : Not found.
3 Document No. 506.
* Typewritten marginal note : "This telegram is based on instructions giren me
oraUy this morning (January 16) by the Foreign Minister/*
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 548
171/184396
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Schulenburg
BERLIN, January 17, 1940.
Received January 22.
DEAR COUNT ScirurjENBrrRG : I owe you thanks for several letters.
With reference to the subject of Russo-Italian relations which you
discussed on January 10 1 I must confirm your doubts as to whether
anything can be done in Rome to correct the language used there with
reference to Moscow. At the moment anti-Bolshevism is the trump
in Rome.
Your information was very interesting for the question of possible
mediation between Russia and Finland. Ambassador Ritter will inform
you in the next few days, however, that we do not believe that
we can undertake such mediation at the present time. I do not, however,
wish to discourage you thereby from making further reports
when you obtain new material.
With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler I
Yours, etc. WEIZBACEER
a Document No. 521.
No. 549
174/136228-29
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Draft Telegram 1
SECRET BEKLI:N, January 1940.
zu Pol. VIII 86 g geh.
87 g*
Drafting Officer : Counselor Knoll.
With reference to your No. 101 of January l7.8
On January 13 the Embassy in Tokyo sent the following telegram:
I spoke to the Italian Ambassador today regarding the report from
a reliable informant in the Foreign Ministry to the effect that he liad
1 The telegram was not sent, as is explained in the following minute which
appears in the margin: "Minute of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat The
Foreign Minister requests that the telegram not be sent, since he intends to take
up the matter personally. Berlin, Jan. 30, 1940, Kordt." Ribbentrop did so in
his conversation with Mussolini and Ciano in Home on Mar. 11; see document
No. 669.
a The two file numbers presumably refer to the Tokyo telegram of Jan. 15
quoted in the draft, and to the cited telegram from Rome to which this was
Intended to be a reply.
'Not printed (174/136227). Mackensen reported that the Japanese Ambassador
in Rome had told him that Italian Ambassador Auriti in Tokyo had, on
Instructions from his Government, advised the Japanese Foreign Minister to oe
"reserved and cautious" in Japan's relations with Russia,
JANUAKT 1940 679
spoken to the Japanese Foreign Minister about Italy's objections to
a political rapprochement with Russia and about her interest in a
friendly understanding with America. The Ambassador did not
deny having made the demarche but tried in a lengthy statement to
justify the action of Italy by her desire for an understanding between
America and Japan in the interest of world peace and her deep anxiety
over a Russian penetration of the Balkan region. I pointed out
in no uncertain terms that Japan's choice between America and Russia
in the final analysis meant a choice between England and Germany and
that the influence exerted by the Ambassador was very regrettable
in view of the Axis policy.
End of the telegraphic report from Tokyo.
I ask you to call on Ciano and, referring to Auriti's conversation
with the Japanese Foreign Minister, state the following :
As our Ambassador in Tokyo has already explained to Auriti, we
are of the opinion that it is injurious to German interests to exert
influence on Japan in order to bring about an understanding with
America and at the same time warn against a rapprochement with
Russia. N'or can we understand what interest Italian foreign policy
has in influencing Japan toward such an orientation of her policy,
which in practice amounts to orienting the policy of that country
toward the Western democracies, and thereby promoting the antagonism
already existing between Japan and Russia with all the political
developments which might result therefrom in the future. Italy
as well as Germany must after all, with a view to a speedy termination
of the war, be interested in eliminating as far as possible all friction
between the nations not involved in the war.
We therefore request that the impression created in Japan by
Auriti's conversation which, moreover, cannot have given the Japanese
Government a good impression of the political cooperation between
the two Axis Powers be corrected in a suitable manner.
I request a telegraphic report.
WEIZSACKJEE
No- 550
486/231723-26
Memorandum l>y the State Secretary
St.S. No. 50 BEIULIN-, January 17, 1940.
Bishop Berggrav, Norway's leading Protestant clergyman, called
on me today, as he wishes to make no mistakes in his projected meetings
with Protestant clergy here or cause them any embarrassment,1
1 Twardowski had noted in a memorandum of Dec. 1$, 1939 (3023/599153-54)
that Bishop Berggrav had proposed to Bishop Heckel, head of the Foreign
Department of the German Evangelical Church, that representatives of the
Northern churches meet in Denmark with representatives of the German Evangelical
Church and in Norway with those of the Anglican Church to discuss
"what Christians can do right now to prepare a constructive peace plan." To
680
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
We agreed that there would be no objections if Bishop Berggrav
and the Archbishop of Upsala, who apparently is also in Berlin, were
brought together by Bishop Heckel with the local Protestant circles,
with a view to keeping intact their long-standing relations. However,
there must be no political discussions nor any attempt to interfere
in domestic German church questions on that occasion. The meeting
should be kept on a social and religious plane.
Bishop Berggrav, whom I have known from the time of my sojourn
in Norway, then told me of a meeting he had had with four representatives
of the High Church * and an important French Protestant
minister. The meeting took place in Holland. Political as well as
ecclesiastical topics were discussed on that occasion. The British
churchmen left Bishop Berggrav their views on the peace problem in
writing, whereas the French minister did not commit himself to a
written statement. Berggrav left with me the English text, which, is
annexed hereto.8
Berggrav, who spent 2 weeks in England at the end of the year,
gave me an account of the views prevailing in England, which largely
correspond with Minister Aschmann's report Pr. 79 of January 13
from The Hague.4 The gist is this : The French war aims are not
taken seriously in England, bxrt the British Government, on the other
hand, is weak. It is also too weak to take any peace initiative. Such
an initiative could only come from the Führer, as the only outstanding
personality, and it would specifically have to go beyond his constructive
ideas of October 6 of last year, by holding out to the world
the prospect of a "federated Europe." Such conceptions would destroy
the British will to war and prepare the ground for ending the
conflict, which is not likely to be brought to an end through military
operations.
Bishop Berggrav formed this opinion from a lengthy conversation
with Lord Halifax, whom he described as the dominant figure at
present in the British Cabinet.
further this plan Bishop Berggrav had already visited the Archbishop of
Canterbury. Since Bishop Berggrav was regarded by the Legation in Oslo as
of "great significance for us," Twardowski recommended that Germany's refusal
should take a courteous form, and it was decided to accept Bishop Heckel's
offer to write a personal letter to Bishop Berggrav after the first of the year. An attached draft for such a letter (3023/599155-57) was approved by Weizs&
eker, and Woermann recorded that the letter was actually sent. * "High Church" in English in the original. An unsigned and undated memorandum, in English, of two typewritten pages.
It called for Christian reconciliation of the warring nations, and stated a belief
that "it would be right to enter negotiation if the following points were secured:
(a) that the Czech and Slovak and the Polish peoples be recognized as independent
and sovereign and that practical guarantees for this he forthcoming;
the nature of such guarantees cannot be defined in advance, because
they may greatly depend upon the condition existing at the time. (6) That the
definitive peace be negotiated in a Congress including at least the European
nations, the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles being full partners in the '
(486/231725-26) 4 Not found.
JANUARY 1940 681
No. 551
141/126482-S*
Memorandum 'by the State Secretary
SECRET BERUONT, January 17, 1940.
St.S. No. 58
The Belgian Ambassador yesterday had again asked for an appointment
with me without indicating the subject matter. I received him
this noon.1 Davignon came right out with the reason for his visit*
He had been told by me the day before yesterday 2 that Germany was
surprised about the feeling of alarm and the military measures in Belgium
which were directed against Germany. I had told him that I
was at a loss to understand such an attitude, which I considered unwarranted
and harmful. He had reported this to Brussels. His
Government now deemed it essential as a token of its good faith to
answer the German doubts regarding the justification of its actions.
The answer was simple. The Ambassador had already spoken to me
the day before yesterday about certain documents which had been
found in a German plane that had landed near Mechelen. These documents
conveyed the definite impression of German aggressive intentions
against Belgium.
When I assumed an expression of surprise at this and repeated my
remark of the day before yesterday that I knew of this story only
through the press and that Davignon apparently had nothing in hand
himself either, the Ambassador said that he did not, of course, have
the documents here. He repeated, however, that these documents,
which had come into the possession of his Government in such an unusual
manner, had created the impression with Ms Government and
the King, who surely were serious people and certainly did not exaggerate,
that an offensive was planned. Davignon added that he did
not know whether these documents spoke of a definite date of attack.
In the meantime, to be sure, the excitement in Belgium had somewhat
subsided. However, his Government continued to consider the
matter as serious. That was the reason why it had sent him to the
Foreign Ministry.
In order to put his visit in the proper focus, Davignon then went
on to say, however, that his Government did not on the other hand
intend to dramatize matters, and today's visit was not to be construed
as a demarche. He was not making any protest or asking any questions.
He would be especially happy, however, if I could give him any
additional reassuring information, because his own policy, which had
always been in accord with the King's from the very beginning, was
1 Davignon's account of this interview appears in his BerUnt 19Se~19J$: souvenirs
d'ttne mission, pp. 204r-05.
"See document No. 541.
682
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
justified only if everything remained peaceful between Belgium and
Germany.
In conclusion, I told Davignon that the only information which he
seemed to have about these documents from the airplane was a short
telegram, while I myself knew nothing at all about it; thus both of na
were lacking an adequate basis for discussing the matter. Now as
heretofore, I saw Belgium's harmful and unilateral military measures
being justified on grounds which I could not recognize.3
Davignon then turned to a more general topic and stated that the
Belgian policy of independence was completely unchanged in spite of
the increase in military security measures. His Government had not
followed any foreign inspiration. Nor had his Government made a
fuss about the airplane affair abroad ; it would not approach or make
an agreement with any of the belligerent countries until an invasion
by one or the other side had created an accomplished fact. If, however,
such an eventuality should materialize as a result of German or
French action, his Government would, of course, make an appeal to
the other side. (Davignon implied an appeal under the agreements
of 1937,
4 but did not explicitly refer to them.)
WEIZSAOKER
*On Jan. 19, Erich Kordt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat sent to
Weizsacker the following memorandum :
"The Foreign Minister requests you to talk to the Netherlands Minister in the
same way as you did to the Belgian Ambassador and to express to him our
astonishment at the steps which have been taken which we consider to be objectionable.
The reasons advanced for them in the press cannot be accepted by
Germany." ( 173/84169)
See document No. 555.
4 See vol. vf document No. 475.
No. 552
124/122356
Memorandum T>y tJie State Secretary
, January 18, 1940,
Excerpt from a letter written by hand to Minister Bliicher at
Helsinki :
... In the meantime you will have seen that your gentle lint for
mediation, which reached us, was not followed.1 You will be interested
to know that this decision was made by the highest authority
[massgeb&ndster Stelle]. Without doubt it must be interpreted and
understood in the light of the over-all situation.
Moreover we are at present getting many indications from other
countries, too, that we are in a unique position for mediation. We
1 See documents Nos. 506 and 547.
JANTTJABY 1940 683
are also answering these, at present, along the same lines as in the
instructions telegraphed to you.
Many thanks for your letter of January 11, which I just received.2
I wonder whether the weight of the Russian state will not after all
succeed in smothering Finnish opposition in the spring?
WEIZSACKER
* Document No. 526.
No. 553
100/64885-S7
State Secretary Wei&sacJcer to Ambassador Mackensen*
BEKLIK, January 18, 1940.
DEAR FRIEND : As far as I know, Herr von Bibbentrop advised you
in good time of certain occurrences (Rome-Brussels) 2 and the Duce
letter.3 It was thus unnecessary for me to mix in this myself, but
I thought it very important that the texts in question were shown
or sent to you. My personal opinion about the letter is that while
in the nature of things it is inspired by Italy's interests, it must liTcewise
be viewed as cownsel from a friend. If it is disregarded the
warning party obtains freedom of action which he may use as he
sees fit. However, I do not wish to anticipate the official reply, not
even in this entirely private letter. Besides, we have occasion every
day to view the situation in a new light.
It is still unclear to me what objectives Italy has set for herself
in the Balkans in the event of a conflagration there. A hint can be
1 This letter is in Weizsacker*s handwriting. 3 In his diaries Oiano recorded that on Dec. 26, 1939, Mussolini asked Mm to
inform the Dutch and Belgian diplomatic representatives in Rome that he had
intelligence from good sources indicating that invasion of the Netherlands and
Belgium was imminent. On Jan. 2, 1940, Ciano says he conveyed the warning
to the Belgian Ambassador (The Ciano Diaries, entries for Dec. 26, 1939 and
Jan. 2, 1940) . Two messages from the Belgian Ambassador in Borne to Brussels,
reporting this warning, were then intercepted and deciphered by the Germans,
according to an account by Weizsaeker in his memoirs. Mackensen, upon being
informed, had expressed disbelief in the contents of the intercepts (Weizs&cker,
Erinnerungen, p. 275). Documents on this incident have not been found in the
files of the Foreign Ministry. * See document No. 504. A copy of Mussolini's letter was sent to Mackensen
from Bibbentrop's office on Jan. 15 (100/64899). Mackensen had already been
informed in a general way of the contents of the letter on Jan. 11 by Ciano, and
had telegraphed that same day to the Foreign Ministry: "I believe it would
be extremely desirable at this very moment if a personal meeting of the Heidi
Foreign Minister with the Duce could be arranged for the transmittal of the
FUhrer's reply. A visit to Borne would surely be greatly appreciated here, if
only to return Ciano's two visits to Salzburg and Berlin" (1848/421121). Bibbentrop
delivered Hitler's reply to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See documents; Nos,
663 and 665.
260090 54 i
684
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
found in your letter of January 11.* Would it be possible to find out
more? 6
Cordial greetings, also to your wife,
Yours, etc., WEIZSACKER
4 Document No. 527.
* On Feb. 7, Mackensen submitted a political report, "Tendencies of Italian
Balkan policy", in which it was argued that although Italy did not intend to
participate in all Balkan affairs and saw no occasion to form a Balkan bloc at
that time, she could not tolerate Soviet entry into the area south of the
Carpathians ; Italy did not regard Bessarahia as part of the Balkan T>roblem
(2281/481285-86).
No. 554
The Minister in Finland to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT HELSINKI, January 19, 1940 5 : 00 p. m.
SECRET Received January 19 7 : 30 p. m.
No. 38 of January 19
With reference to your telegram No. 25.x
In the course of a conversation I informed the Finnish Foreign
Minister today that the German Government was of the opinion tliat
there were at present no prospects for putting an end to the conflict
M. Tanner was unable to hide his disappointment.
It was possible to gather from his further remarks that diplomats
of third powers, accredited in Moscow, had suggested to the Finnish
Government that it try to enter into conversations with Moscow via,
Berlin. It is likely that M. Tanner now has the impression that the
obstacles exist more in Berlin than in Moscow.
M. Tanner told me that the Eyti Government was formed to facilitate
a peaceful settlement. The Government remains ready to
discuss matters.
If the Russians should desire to continue the war, their task would
not become easier even after the end of winter. They would have
to fight for every foot of ground among the lakes and swamps of
Finland.
After this conversation I must assume that if contact is established
between Helsinki and Moscow, it will not be undertaken via Berlin.
* Document No. 547.
JANUARY 1940 685
No. 555
8
Memorarwkem ~by the State Secretary
SECRET BEBUCtf? January 19, 1940,
St.S.No.73
During today's visit of the Netherlands Minister, I adverted to the
rumors circulating about complications between Germany and Holland,
and asked the Minister to tell me what measures his Government
had taken and what had been the occasion for these measures. I was=
aware, for instance, that leaves in the Dutch Army had been ordered
canceled*
M. de With admitted the cancellation of leaves but asserted that no
other military preparations of any kind had been made. Dutch feel*
ing was very calm indeed. The reaction had been much less in Holland
than in Belgium. However, he would admit, said the Minister,
that he, too, had become a little nervous by the numerous reports
that had come to him in the past week.
I replied that I was unable to discern any special reason for such
alarm. A neutral country had the right and also the duty to make
preparations for the defense of its territory, but it could in no way
justify directing these measures against one side, as had been the case
in Belgium, for example.
M. de With agreed with me fully, but declared that his country hadl
made equal defense preparations in all directions and particularly
at the coast against British attacks. No matter from what direction
an attack should come, the country would defend itself and do so*
with all vigor.
I did not ask the Minister in the course of the conversation about
the nature of the rumors and warnings that he or his Government had
received. Nor did M. de With drop any hints in this regard.
WEIZSAOKER
No. 556
1822/41650-7-11
The Minister in Estonia to tJie Foreign Mimstry
No. 301 TAUUCNX, January 19, 1940.
Received January 25.
Subject : The Russo-Finnish conflict.
During a social function at the Legation the day before yesterday
I had an opportunity for a long confidential conversation with the*
686
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Commander in Chief, General Laidoner. The General, who, as is
known, also wields a certain influence outside military circles in
Estonia, especially in questions of foreign policy, expressed himself
very frankly concerning the observations which he had made during
his visit to Moscow in the middle of December. According to his
statements he met with Stalin four or five times and had several very
long conversations with him in which, understandably enough, the
Russo-Finnish conflict played a considerable role.
The General explained that he had on the whole gained the impression
from Stalin's statements that the latter was not actually striving
to incorporate Finland into the territory of the Soviet Union. Bather
he evidently intended, as in the case of the Baltic countries, to content
himself with obtaining certain strategic spots and clarifying
Soviet-Finnish relations to the end that Finland could not align herself
with the enemies of the Soviet Union. He evidently considered
this solution adequate and more advantageous for the over-all interests
of the Union than incorporation.
With reference to certain reports known also to the Foreign
Ministry according to which the Soviet Russian military commander
for the Leningrad district had brought on the conflict arbitrarily
and really contrary to the wishes of the Moscow central authority,
the General stated that in so far as he knew this was not correct.
He thought it was true, however, that Zhdanov, the Party Secretary
for the Leningrad district, had striven in his reporting to induce the
Moscow central authority to sharpen the conflict; this had then led
to the outbreak of hostilities. To his knowledge Zhdanov had disappeared
from the scene some time ago ; it was possible that lie had
fallen into disfavor because of the turn events had taken and had
been withdrawn from his post. The Soviet Government had in fact
obviously misjudged the situation regarding Finland and the prospects
for the Soviet offensive at the begining of December, and it
was possible that Kuusinen's reports on internal conditions in Finland
might have played a certain role in this.
Nevertheless it was clear that now, once she had started, the Soviet
Union had to continue her campaign if only for prestige reasons;
she would not permit herself to be diverted by the setbacks which the
Russian troops had suffered at the hands of the Finns. In their
extreme sentimental leaning toward the Scandinavian-British orientation,
the Finns had to a considerable extent lost sight of actual realities
and for their part, too, underestimated the Russians. At first it had
been believed that the latter were not actually in earnest; this turned
out to be an illusion. It now seemed that Finland was placing great
hopes in the Geneva resolution of the League of Nations,1 the declara-
1 See Editors' Note, p. 480.
JANTJART 194=0 687
tions of sympathy by many countries, prominent among them England
and France, and the occasional support in the form of gifts, volunteers,
etc. ; these, too, would turn out to be illusory. Finland would
not receive any really effective aid in the form of troops from other
countries in spite of all the declarations of sympathy; on the contrary,
she would be left to her own devices, as had been the lot of
Poland. Finland was merely another example of how for all practical
purposes the hardly comprehensible nimbus which still enveloped
England in spite of all past experience continued to delude
some countries even now.
As for putting an end to the conflict, the General believed that an
amicable agreement between the parties was altogether possible even
now. Finland herself had indicated that she was ready to negotiate.
To be sure. Foreign Minister Tanner had simultaneously made the
mistake of again offending the exceptionally sensitive and resentful
Soviet Russians by polemic statements, so that it was doubtful
whether any accord could ever be reached involving this man, who
was particularly disliked by the Soviet [Russians. Nor would the
Soviet Union, in his opinion, be disinclined to reach a compromise
agreement with Finland, though perhaps not precisely at the present
moment, when the Red Army had just suffered setbacks for which
Soviet Russia's prestige required compensation. He thought the
psychological moment might come very soon, however, The General
did not consider Kuusinen's government any real obstacle, for
he believed that Stalin would abandon Kuusinen without hesitation
if he thought this conducive to a solution appearing acceptable to the
Russians, since Kuusinen was merely a pawn to Stalin, not a real
power factor.
One incident which the General told about his Moscow visit might
also be mentioned : At one of the dinners in Moscow, some of which
took a very long time and during which in Russian fashion many
speeches were made, Stalin had said to the General at a late hour that
he would now drink a toast that would astonish some of the guests and
might not meet the approval of all. Then Stalin had risen and had
raised his glass "to the independence and national People's Government
of Finland."
Of the General's further statements during the conversation one
other remark on the causes of the war is of interest. The General
stated that during his visit to Warsaw in March 1939 he had had the
unmistakable impresssion that Beck and several of the men close to
him had fully realized the imminent danger to Poland and had been
inclined to accept the Führer's offers. The great majority of the
Poles, however, had been practically out of their minds and bereft of
reason because of the British guarantee. The feeling that nothingcould
happen to them now had been so overwhelming that Beck had
(}88
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
no longer been able to put through his real intentions at all. The
General had heard that Beck had even been told by one of the
leading
military men, probably General Kaprecinski, that he would risk
physical annihilation if he continued his trend toward reconciliation.
No. 557
Memorandwrn, ~by the State Secretary
SECRET BBKLENT, January 22, 1940.
St.S. No. 83
The Italian Ambassador today showed me a Le Temps article which
dealt with the forced landing of a German plane near Mechelen 1 and
was designed to prove that German military orders taken from this
plane were the cause of the recent alarm in Belgium. Attolico
handed me the article with the remark that apparently this was an
important incident that I had not mentioned to him during his visit
last week.
Since I did not wish to pursue this theme, I told Attolico that this
story had certainly been current in the foreign press for some time,
but that I should like to ask him whether he. for Ms part could not
give me the real reason why the Belgians had been so alarmed a
week ago.
2
Our conversation then turned elsewhere, so that I was not able to
determine whether or to what extent Attolico was aware of the Italian
role in this whole business.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
* See documents Nos. 528, 529, 531, 538, 541, 544, and 551.
a See document No, 553, footnote 2.
No. 558
2931/&6T006-07
Minute Tzy the Head of Political Division VIII
BBKLIK, January 22, 1940.
Pol. VIII 118.
The Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Ting, called on me today
in order to inquire about Count Ciano's telegram to Wang Ching-wei.
1
He asked particularly whether the Italians had informed us of this
*On Jan. 8, the Abe Cabinet announced its intention to sponsor a new
Chinese regime under Wang's leadership. Ciano had acknowledged this development
with a telegram of congratulations to Wang.
JANUAKY 1940 689
telegram. I said they had not. Ting asked whether the German
Government intended to take an attitude toward Wang similar to that
of Count Ciano. I replied that we had as yet reached no decision
in this matter ; for the present the new government had not yet been
formed and, to judge from reports that had come in, it could not
even be said with certainty that it would be formed in the near future.
Ting replied that for him the amazing thing about Ciano's attitude
was that he had sent his telegram of congratulations to Wang at a
time when it was entirely clear that the Abe government, which in its
death-struggle had proclaimed its support of Wang, would have to
resign, and it was not at all sure that its successor would take the
same attitude toward Wang.
I asked Ting whether he knew anything about a recent change in
Wang's relations with Chungking.2 He said that Chiang Kai-shek
was still opposed to Wang. I asked him about Wang's collaborators
mentioned in Chungking telegram No. 6 of January 18,
3 namely Ku
Meng-yu, Cheng Kung-po, and Tsung-wu. Ting said that Ku
Meng-yu was not a follower of Wang. On the contrary, after he
had long been inactive for reasons of health he had gone to Chungking
in order to demonstrate that he was on the side of Chungking.
It was possible that Wang had asked him to induce Chungking to
accept his peace terms. Wang himself must have known beforehand
that he would have no success in this. It had long been known that
Cheng Kung-po did not support Wang's purposes. It was interesting,
to be sure, if it were true, that Kao Tsung-wu had deserted Wang;.
He had originally conducted peace talks with Japan, with Chiang's
consent. Later he had gone over entirely to Wang. It had already
been remarked that Kao had not appeared as Foreign Minister on
the list of ministers that Wang had recently issued. Ting had not
yet heard of Kao's defection, however.
Ting then said that he thought that the proclamation of the new
Wang Ching-wei government would aggravate Japanese-American
relations still more. By way of provoking comment I interjected
that Roosevelt had long since abandoned the principle of China's inviolability
and was now concerned only with the preservation of
American interests. If Wang gave him assurances concerning these,
the United States would undertake nothing against his government.
Ting said the American Government was now primarily concerned to
put across rearmament on as large a scale as possible. For this purpose
it was making use of the anti-Japanese sentiment. And this
* In a telegram of Jan. 17 (8137/E582163) , the German Consulate in Shanghai
nad reported alleged negotiations between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek
for fusion and for peace with Japan. The Frencn and British Ambassadors
were said to he active as mediators.
Not printed (8137/E582164).
690
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
sentiment would be wasted if the State Department tolerated in
silence the setting up of Wang Ching-wei.
In reply to a question from me Ting stated that the British Ambassador
had made no attempt of any kind during his last visit in
Chungking to influence the Chinese Government to adopt an unfriendly
attitude toward Germany.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Deputy
Director and Director of the Political Department.
KKOU,
No. 559
486/231748
TTie Minister in Eire to the Foreign Mvwstry
Telegram
TJKGENT DTTBUOT, January 23, 1940.
SECRET Received January 23 12 noon.
No. 40 of January 22
Various representatives of British peace movements have lately
tried to approach the Legation through the intermediary of distinguished
Irishmen, in particular through a certain Northern Irishman,
Craig,
1 of Belfast, who has a German wife the office of a
central organization of the British peace movements alleged to have
been founded recently by Lord Tavistock,2 to which the Bishop
[Arc7tbishop~\ 3 of York and G. Lansbury * are also said to belong.
They want to find out in particular whether something could be
stated about our intentions regarding the ultimate political future of
Poland, and secondly also Bohemia, which would be calculated to
encourage the peace movement in England. They also want the
Foreign Ministry to be informed. Our practice of maintaining complete
reserve and calling attention to the well-known official German
statements obviously causes disappointment. I should like to mention
in this connection, that in a talk with De Valera at Christmas, he
told me, stressing that this was only his personal opinion, that an
early settlement on Poland, which the Allies could accept without too
great a loss of prestige, possibly combined with concessions on Bohemia,
might perhaps help Chamberlain's fundamental desire for
1 The German text, which had been garbled at this point, has "Grefe," but
references to this telegram in other documents, Dublin telegrams No. 119 of
Mar. 1, 1940 (91/100164-65) and No. 137 of Mar. 8, 1940 (91/100170), indicate
that Craig is the name intended.
2 Hastings William Sackville Russell, Marquess of Tavistock, since 1940 Dufce
of Bedford.
* Most Rev. William Temple.
*Rt. Hon. George I^ansbury, Labor M. P. for Bow and Bromley.
JAKUAKT 1940 691
peace which, he thought was sincere prevail against Churchill and
the other obstinate war supporters in the British Cabinet. In that
instance, too, I strictly adhered to the directives of your telegraphic
instruction No. 185 of October 24, 1939,
5 and avoided any discussion.
I want to add that around Christmas time the Foreign Office here,
evidently on the basis of reports from the Irish High Commissioner
in London, showed increasing optimism about British peace tendencies,
which were noticeable also among several members of the British
Cabinet. Fear seems to have arisen lately that Russia's weakness evidenced
by the Finnish conflict has stimulated the inclination to carry
on the war against Germany.
'This telegraphic instruction (91/100088), in explaining the German official
attitude toward discussions of peace at that time, stated that the only German
peace terms were those announced in Hitler's Reichstag speech of Oct. 6, 1939, and
directed that any discussion of the subject should be in accordance with the official
published pronouncement, i. e. t that in DNB, but that such discussion should not
be initiated.
No. 560
5570/E399251-52
Th& Foreign Mwdstry to the Legation in Yugoslavia
SECRET BERLIN, January 23, 1940.
zu W 180 g*
Through a letter to the Air Ministry, a copy of which is enclosed,
3
the Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe has given
instructions that arms deliveries for Yugoslavia and the related transactions
to pay for them shall be handled in Yugoslavia by Consul
General Neuhausen.
This instruction by the Field Marshal, as I would like to point out
so that misunderstandings may be avoided, merely aims at clarifying
how the activities of the Air Attache in Belgrade and Consul General
Neuhausen are to be delimited in the handling of aircraft transactions.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the Legation in the handling of
arms deliveries is thereby not affected,
3 particularly in so far as this
should require negotiations with the Yugoslav Government going
beyond the purely commercial sphere. In so far as Consul General
Neuhausen acts within this sphere of jurisdiction of the Legation,
he does so, as heretofore, under the responsibility and control of the
Minister. Please inform Consul General Neuhausen of this.4
By order:
1W180 g : Not printed (5570/399245 ) .
* Not printed (5570/E399247). * Marginal note : "Goes without saying. Ribbentrop]"
4
Copies of this instruction were sent to the Air Ministry, the High Command
of the Wehrmacht, and the Economics Ministry.
692
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 561
8081/61S18&-S4
Minister Brewer to Senior Counselor Grundherr
OSLO, January 23, 1940.
DEAB GKUKDHERR : I am sending you enclosed :
1. A further report on the transactions of the Storting with special
reference to the defense question ;
1
2. A confidential memorandum regarding Minister Quisling's
standing in the Norwegian Army.2
In connection with the memorandum, I feel obliged to inform you
confidentially that Reichsamtsleiter Scheldt on his various visits to
Oslo always maintains very close contact with former Ortsgruppenleiter
Kern, with whose career you are familiar, just as you are aware
of the reasons for his recall exactly 2 years ago. I fear that the accomplishment
of Herr Scheldt's mission here will be rendered difficult
or even jeopardized by these very close relations with Kern. The interest
which certain elements, e. g.. Consul General Ringnes, take in
Kern is still very great.
3 Only a few days ago there was an article
in the local press to the effect that Kern was an officially accredited
court interpreter and that this fact deserved greater attention on the
part of the Norwegians. Certain signs indicate that Bdngnes is responsible
for these articles against Kern. So Kern is under a certain
surveillance not by the police, to be sure, but privately, and it is quite
possible that Herr Scheidt might be subjected to such surveillance;
that, I believe, would not be in our interest. I am writing this to you
as a personal letter, because I am under instruction to deal in this
matter only with the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary, and you.
With cordial regards and Heil Hitler !
Tours, B[EAUBR]
1 Not found.
'Not printed (3081/613185-86). The memorandum, dated Jan. 23 but unsigned,
suggested that Quisling's influence in the Norwegian Army had been
exaggerated. * Ellef Ringnes, a Norwegian national and former Consul General for Austria
in Oslo, wrote Hitler a letter dated Apr. 7T 1937, deploring the activities of
Gtinther Kern, Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in Oslo. Ringnes, who identified
himself as founder of the Norwegian-German-Austrian Association in Norway and
Party Member No. 59 of the National Socialist Party of Norway, assured Hitler
that his letter was not directed against the NSDAP but that on the contrary lie
and those whom he represented had the greatest admiration and sympathy for
the Third Belch and its political ideas (3010/58800&-04).
JANUARY 1940 693
No. 562
$1/100144
The Consulate General at Genoa to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 7 of January 24 GENOA, January 24, 1940 2 : 50 p. m,
Eeceived January 24 6 : 55 p, m.
The delegate of the Irish increment, John McCarthy, who has
arrived from New York, asked today whether the German Government
was prepared to take to Ireland John Russell, the Chief of Staff
of the Irish movement, who is still in New York without the knowledge
of the American Government. If so, he would arrive here from
New York aboard anew direct steamship line under an assumed
name and would be identified here by McCarthy. The inquiry is
being made since direct traffic between America and Ireland has been
stopped and the route via London is impossible because of the danger
of arrest. McCarthy, who is leaving for Naples by steamer today, "requests
an answer by the time of his return from there on Saturday,
January 27.1
Also for Political and Information Departments.
1 See document No. 606.
No, 563
2431/6-14131-32
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Mimatry
Telegram
No. 39 of January 24 BRUSSELS, January 24, 19406: 20 p. m.
Beceived January 26 1 : 10 a. m.
PoL H 335.
The newly-appointed American Ambassador Cudahy called on me
yesterday. From the long conversation the following is worthy of
note:
1. The Ambassador stated at the outset that he had particularly
good relations with President Roosevelt and was a friend of his of
long standing. However, he was not entirely in agreement with, the
President's current policies. He would have found it more desirable
for America to take a completely objective and neutral attitude and
maintain greater reserve in European affairs. t
2. The Ambassador then discussed the situation of Belgium, and
stated that Belgium's fate was being followed in the United States
694
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
with the greatest interest. Violation of Belgian neutrality
arouse profound indignation in America, no matter how good the arguments
the aggressor thought he could muster for this action, and the
feeling would be the same from whichever side the aggression occurred.
England and France were fully aware of this fact, and he
presumed that this was also true of Germany. In response to my
remark that I could not believe that the United States of America
would somehow allow herself to be drawn into a war again, the
Ambassador replied it would be a mistake to think that America
would keep out of the European conflict under all circumstances. A
violation of Belgian neutrality must by no means be undertaken
lightly in view of possible developments in the United States of
America. Public opinion could change very suddenly and set off
.surprising reactions.
The sense of the Ambassador's statements was that he anticipated
America's entry into the war in the event of the violation of Belgium's
neutrality by Germany, although this was not stated
explicitly.
BtiLOW
No. 564
385/242540-41
The Charge d''Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT SOFIA, January 24, 1940 11 : 40 p. nu
No. 32 of January 24 Received January 25 3 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 46 of January 22.1
I brought the questions raised in your instruction to the attention,
of the Minister President today when I congratulated him on the exchange
of declarations, reaffirming peace, with the Yugoslav Foreign
Minister on the occasion of the anniversary of the treaty of friendship.
2 Menemencioglu reported on behalf of London that England
was prepared to purchase Bulgarian tobacco, but without any political
condition (two groups missing). Kiosseivanov took cognizance.
1 Not printed (585/242536). In this telegram, Woermann asked Richthofen
to verify certain reports received in Berlin, according to which Menemencioglu
during his visit to Sofia, Jan. 12-13, had told the Bulgarians that they would
receive financial support from Britain if they changed their political course.
Menemencioglu was also said to have asked "that Bulgaria give an assurance of
neutrality in the event of Turkey's entry into the war, as well as in the event
of an attack on one of the neighboring Balkan states hy a great power, and that
she put off her territorial demands for the duration of the war ; in return he
is said to have promised Turkish support for Bulgarian wishes after the end
of the war."
a On Jan. 24, 1937, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had signed a pact of perpetual
friendship (Documents on International Affairs, 1937, pp. 401-405.)
JA3STTJARY 1940 695
The Turk then tried, as reported in telegram No. 17 of January 15,
8 to
arouse fear of Germany and Russia, and proposed a formula of strict
neutrality, that is, one that would bind Bulgaria in any eventuality.
Forewarned by EendelPs advance notice that the Turkish Secretary
General was going to confer with Halifax and Hugessen on the previously
discussed plan, the Minister President rejected the proposal. In
the second conversation Menemencioglu then did not make any more
demands of this kind, emphasizing instead that the Turkish Govern*
ment had no intention at all of hitching Bulgaria to a neutral Balkan
bloc. Agreement was then reached on the neutrality formula and
communique,* which we know. Nothing whatever had been said about
putting off the Bulgarian revisionist demands and linking this with
later Turkish support for them. For his part, however, he had again
set forth the well-known Bulgarian revisionist demands.
The general impression the Minister President gained from the conversations
is that the visit was doubtless made under strong British
pressure and for the purpose of neutralizing Bulgaria more securely,
but that Turkey's desire to strengthen the peace in Southeastern
Europe had also played a part. To affirm this, Menemencioglu had
assured him that Turkey would oppose any passage of foreign troops
through Bulgaria or even Greece. Despite all his distrust of Turkey's
ulterior motives, he had therefore felt that he would not be
justified in rejecting a reaffirmation of the common determination to
maintain neutrality in the sense of the communique, if only to keep
the Turks whom he, Kiosseivanov, did not yet regard as (1 group
garbled) lost from being driven entirely into the enemy camp*
Germany could rest asssured that, as in the past, Bulgaria would not
enter into any commitment without a previous understanding with
Germany.
Not printed ( 585/242534-35) .
4 The communique reaffirmed the ties established by the Turkish-Bulgarian
Friendship Treaty of 1925 and stated the identity of views of the two countries..
No. 565
22/13780-81
The Minister iffi Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET OSLO, January 24, 1940 11 : 4:1 p. m*.
No. 77 of January 24 Received January 25 4 : 00 a. m.
With reference to our telegram No. 73 of January 23.1
*Not printed (22/1377&-T9). In this telegram BrJiuer described the bad reception
which Churchill's speech of Jan. 20 had had in Norway and cited other
evidence indicating that a reaction against England in Norwegian governmental
circles had set in. Churchill's speech is printed in The War Speeches of the-
Rt. Hon. Winston 8. Churchill, vol. I, pp. 185-138.
(J96
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
During a call I paid Foreign Minister Kolit today for another
purpose, I brought the conversation around to Winston Churchill's
radio address the day before yesterday. In a conversational tone, the
Foreign Minister quit calmly and frankly expressed his views in
regard to the address and British policy in general, and I repeat them
here with the request that they be treated as confidential.
It was incomprehensible, said Koht, that one of the ranking members
of the Cabinet should have delivered such an address which
would drive the neutral countries into opposition to British policy
even if they were in sympathy with England. The speech was provocative
and silly. The Norwegian press had, in fact, made a reply
to it which left nothing to be desired as regards bluntness. He had
known Churchill for 30 years and considered him, a demagogue and
a windbag (sic ! ) . True enough, he had written some very good books,
but every time he ventured into practical politics, he got on the wrong
track. He, Koht, had at the time been very much astonished that
Churchill had been taken into the Cabinet just at so difficult a period
and had been given a position of such importance in the British Government
which called for the greatest tact and the deepest wisdom.
This could be explained on the ground of the lack of realism of
Chamberlain, who "means well, but is a bungler" ["am gruter Menseh,
aber em scfdechter Musikant"']. It was his softness which probably
also accounted for the fact that such slips as Churchill's address could
occur. The man in the British Cabinet whose thinking was straight
and solid, according to the Foreign Minister, was Lord Halifax; his
speech, delivered on the same day, followed a line entirely different
from that of Churchill, a fact that threw an unfavorable light on teamwork
in the British Cabinet.2 The Foreign Minister believed he could
discern peace feelers in Halifax's speech as also in Chamberlain's
last address,
8 and felt that these two speeches probably were more
indicative of the views prevailing in the British Cabinet than was the
speech of Churchill. The mistake in Halifax's speech, the Foreign
Minister said, was that it again contained attacks on National
Socialism; for one could not expect peace, which England assuredly
wanted, if at the same time one attacked like that the enemy's Government,
on which, after all, the will to peace also depended.
BRATJER
* This speech, delivered at Leeds, is printed in Speeches on Foreign Pottoy
~by Viscount HaMfa, pp. 345-357.
'Presumably a reference to the Mansion House speech of Jan. 9; the text
is printed in the Timw (London) , Jan. 10, 1940.
JAOTTABT 1940 697
No. 566
22/137&2r-84j
The Minister in Norway to the Foreign. Ministry
Telegram
No- 78 of January 24 Osix>, January 24, 1940 11 : 40 p. m,
Received January 25 4: 40 a. m.
During my call on Foreign Minister Koht today, I -was approached
by him on the subject of the notes which the Norwegian Legation had
delivered to the Foreign Ministry between January 11 and 15 regarding
the sinking of the two British ships, the Thomas Walton and the
Deptford, and the Greek steamer Garawfalia.
The Foreign Minister informed me confidentially of the following
regarding the background of these notes : After the sinking of the
above-named British ships, the British Government, around the turn
of the year, had made very forceful representations with the Norwegian
Government. The British Government had protested that the
Norwegian Government permitted Germany without protest to undertake
naval operations in Norwegian territorial waters. Should such
incidents be repeated, England would be compelled to act in the same
mariner, that is, to operate with her naval forces in Norwegian territorial
waters. The Norwegian Government had replied to hi? in the
sharpest manner conceivable, stating that the evidence collected so far
had not in any way produced proof of German naval operations in.
Norwegian territorial waters; that the Norwegian Government, on
establishing the facts, would request an explanation from the German
Government ; but that a violation of Norwegian territorial waters
by one belligerent power did not give the other the right to do the
same. The Norwegian reply closed with the statement that any use
of force within the boundaries of Norwegian sovereignty would be
countered with force by Norway to the limit of her powers.
The Foreign Minister explained to me in this connection that in
the light of her experience with Germany to date, Norway was firmly
convinced that Germany was prepared in every way to respect Norway's
integrity as well as her territorial waters, and that if for some
reason violations of Norwegian territorial waters by Germany should
occur, Germany would admit it and give the satisfaction customary in
such cases under international law. As regards the three ships mentioned,
Norway's position would be very greatly eased if Gennany
were to send some sort of reply as quickly as possible and if the Norwegian
Government were permitted to publish that reply. The Norwegian
Government was not at all concerned with the nature of the
reply, just so it was satisfactory to the extent that Norway could point
out that the three incidents had been brought to a conclusion tmob
698
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
jectionable under international law, that ISTorway's reaction had been
correct and Germany's reply equally correct. The report on the Norwegian
investigation had been submitted to the Reich Foreign Minis*
try together with the notes of the Norwegian Government referred
to above*
In this context, the Foreign Minister also cited the threats against
Norway published by the Daily Telegraph^ from Paris (Pertinax) , fo
consequence of the German naval operations along the Norwegian
coast. He stressed the importance of a German reply for the reason
that it would also enable him to counter these fantastic rumors and
threats with even greater effectiveness.
The Foreign Minister added confidentially that in the case of the
Deptford the ship had unquestionably been sunk within Norwegian
territorial waters, but the sinking of the Thomas Walton and the
Graraufalia had occurred on the borderline of Norwegian territorial
waters, possibly just outside. In none of the three instances had it
been possible to obtain positive proof of torpedoing, although one witness
or another claimed to have seen a torpedo.
The Foreign Minister took the occasion to express his thanks for
the support we had given him by replying, prior to the debate in the
Storting, to the Norwegian ixotes protesting flights over Norwegian
territory.
1
Since I consider our reply to the Norwegian note as an important
instrument in Norway's defense against [England, which is naturally
keeping a very close watch over our naval operations and our shipping
along the Norwegian coast and is only waiting for some opportunity
to interfere, I request that our reply be expedited as much as possible.
BBATJER
1 In reply to an Inquiry from the Legation in Oslo, Woermann telegraphed on
Jan. 15 that a reply to a note of the Norwegian Legation of Oct. 19, 1939, had
been drafted in December but was not delivered since the Norwegians had not
raised the question again. On Jan. 15 the reply was transmitted to the Norwegian
Legation, with the additional remark that the German planes involved
had been strictly enjoined not to fly over Norwegian waters (22/13766).
No. 567
State Secretary Wei&saoker to Ambassador Ott
, January 24, 1940.
DEAR HERR OTT ; Within the next few days Herr Stahmer will go to
Japan, accompanying the Duke of Coburg.1 I do not like to pass up
this good opportunity to get a letter to you.
*Heinrich Stahmer, who was in charge of Far Eastern questions in the
IMenststelle Bibbentrop, accompanied the Duke of Coburg, President of the
German Red Cross, on a good will mission to Japan and the United States.
260090 54-50
JANUARY 1940 699
Actually I have nothing really new to tell you, since you are doubtless
well posted. The obstacles which were placed in your path by
your former Italian colleague, Auriti, now no longer exist. We complained
in Rome, and Auriti is on the way out.2 Our relations with
Italy are naturally somewhat burdened by our closer ties with Russia.
They make a good deal of their anti-Bolshevism in 'Borne, but they
sometimes forget that it was precisely Home that had advised us
repeatedly to normalize our relations with Moscow. The situation
could become critical if, contrary to our desires, the Balkans should
be drawn into the theater of war and a conflagration should break
out there. Then Italy would really find her interests in conflict. At
present the lines of force brought to bear by the Great Powers in the
Balkans seem to be sufficiently balanced to preserve the peace there.
If Russia remains quiet with respect to Rumania, there would seem to
be no danger to the existing peace.
For the rest, it is so cold here that one is reminded of conditions in
former wars when the soldiers went into winter quarters. In a certain*
sense, this may also be said of diplomacy at the present time.
The new Japanese Ambassador to Berlin is less impulsive than his.
predecessor and probably also somewhat more cautious in his reports.
He gave me the advice for Herr Stahmer that the latter should not
give too much emphasis in Japan to his old friendship* with Oshima
a piece of advice that is probably well meant.
Cordial greetings from our house to yours,
WEIZSACXJSK:
* See document No. 649.
No. 568
30T6/ 612949
An Official of Political Division I to the Legation in Norway
Telegram
URGENT BERunsr, January 25 [1940] 5 : 40 a. nu
TOF SECRET Received Oslo, January 25 6:30 a. m.
No. 67 of January 24
Also for Kirkenes.
For the Chief of Mission or his deputy personally.
Special security handling. Decode personally.
The Navy has advised us for your strictly confidential information :
The motor tanker AltimarTc^ returning from the Atlantic, is expected
in Norwegian waters beginning the 25th. The ship is considered
as being on official Government service and flies the official
Reich ensign. The ship has orders not to display any deceptive markings
in territorial waters. She has no armament. She is probably
700
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
carrying a large number of captured crew members from ships sunk
by the pocket battleship ffraf Spee. AltmarTc is under orders to pass
through Norwegian territorial waters without stopping.
Please notify Kristiansand through reliable channels. The other
regular Consulates have been notified.
No. 569
The Ghwrge d?Affaires in the United, States to the Foreign Mwdstiy
Telegram
No. 89 of January 25 WASBONCKTON, January 25, 1940 1 : 34 p. m.
Received January 26 12 : 25 a. m.
For the State Secretary personally.
I have learned that a German-American, von Hausberger, and a
German citizen, Walter, both of New York, are alleged to be planning
acts of sabotage against the American armament industry by direction
of the German Abwehr ; von Hausberger is supposed to have
detonators hidden in his dwelling.
In full agreement with the two representatives of the Wehrmacht,
who identify themselves with this report on all points, I should like
to make the following comments :
In accordance with the political directives given me I regard it
as my foremost duty to use every effort to remove any causes of conflict
which might drive the United States into breaking off relations
or entering the war.
As I already stated at length in telegram No. 382 of September
18, 1939,
1
alleged German acts of sabotage in the United States were
a decisive contributory factor to America's entry into the World War.
As a result of the trials of the alleged German spy ring recently conducted
with greatest publicity in New York, Panama, and New
Orleans; of the sensational decisions in the sabotage trial;
2 of the
recent statements of the former agent von Rintelen ;
8 and of the
measures inaugurated since the outbreak of the war by the [Federal]
Bureau of Investigation in order to preclude a repetition of sabotage
acts, the entire American public is so sensitive on this point that
discovery of attempted sabotage or of any sort of agent or espionage
activity directed from Germany will certainly entail the severest
consequences.
1 Document No. 88.
2 See document No. 88, footnote 1.
*
Capt. Franz von Rintelen had been interviewed in Ixmdon and Ms statements
about German undercover activity in the first World War were reported in t&e
New fork Times of Jan. 3.
JAKUART 1940 701
There is no doubt but that in its present mood the American people
would in such an eventuality go along with decisive measures by the
American Government.
Since our foreign policy aims at keeping America out of the war
under all circumstances, it is my opinion that all such attempts must
be prohibited.
There is no surer way of driving America into the war than by
resorting again to a course of action which drove America into the
ranks of our enemies once before in the World War and, incidentally,
did not in the least impede the war industries of the United States.
As a precautionary measure I have therefore had the above-mentioned
alleged agents ordered in an appropriate manner to desist
immediately from all activity until further notice. I request telegraphic
instructions as to whether the agents named, as well as any
others not known here, can be definitely relieved of their missions.
I should like to add that both individuals, whose relations with
official German agencies are well known, are unfitted in every respect
to act as agents of the Abwehr.
The wife of Hausberger, moreover, has been employed at the Consulate
General in New York.*
* In a telegram of Jan. 27 (B21/B005348) , WeizsScker replied that Thomson's
attitude and the steps he had taken were "entirely approved." He added that
neither of the men was in the service of the Abwehr. A. note on this document
states : "Based on conversation with Admiral Canaris."
Other documents in the Foreign Ministry files, however, reveal that on Jan.
24 an Abwehr agent left Buenos Aires with instructions to report to Fritz von
Hausberger at Weehawken, New Jersey *'for instruction in our specialty."
Abwehr messages to arrange this mission were sent by the Foreign Ministry
to the Embassy in Argentina. One of these stated that another agent, who
had left Buenos Aires for New York in December with instructions to gather
intelligence on American aircraft factories and arms shipments to the Allies,
was not to make his presence known to the German diplomatic representation
in the United States. (1709/398707, 398710-11; 4481/E097624-26, E097632-37,
B0976S9),
On Feb. 29, Thomson reported (1725/401170) that another agent, one Baron
Konstantin von Maydell, a Baltic German of Estonian citizenship^ had appeared
at the Embassy and represented himself as having arrived in the United States
on Dec. 16, 1939, on a sabotage mission for the Abwehr. Weiasacker replied on
Mar. 12 (1725/401171) that Maydell did have connections with the Abwehr, that
he had no specific mission, but was merely instructed to be available in the
United States in the event of war. In view of his inept behavior he would be
recalled.
No. 570
170/84720
TJie Minister in Mewico to the Foreign Mimstry
Telegram
No. 23 of January 25 MEXICO Cirr, January 25, 1040 6 : 45 p. nu
Received January 26 8 : 55 a. co-
Last November I was solicited by groups of Guatemalan emigrants
for German financial support for the purpose of occupying British
702
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Honduras. I have now been approached by the Mexican ex-General
Fhilemore with a similar request. He recently accompanied President
Cardenas on a tour of the southwestern [>'] provinces up to the border
of British Honduras, and then visited the British colony on M&
own to recruit followers. General Philemore claims that the project
has the sympathetic interest of the President and that he would for
that reason be able to obtain the weapons he needs for his thousand
or so newly enlisted volunteers in Mexico. Philemore asked for financial
aid in the amount of $30,000 to meet his payroll for 3 months.
The possibility of establishing a naval base in some hidden*cove along
the coast of British Honduras was hinted at. The immediate objective
is the establishment of the Free State of Belize.
A plebiscite regarding division between Guatemala and Mexico
would follow. I have of course aroused no hope in him, as to the fulfillment
of his wish, but I believe I should submit it.1
BUDT*
a telegram of Mar. 8, Woermann replied that Berlin regarded British
Honduras as a matter more of concern to Guatemala than to Mexico, and moreover
that Philemore's plans seemed to have too little hope of success to justify
financial support at present. However, Woermann instructed Rftdt to maintain,
contact with Philemore through an intermediary (176/84721) .
No. 571
2.2/1378&-9O
TTie Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT OSLO, January 25, 1940 8 : 00 p. m.
No. 81 of January 25 Received January 26 12 : 25 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 63 of January 24 1 and my
telegram No. 78 of January 24.2
The questions asked in the above telegraphic instruction have for
the most part been answered by my telegraphic report No. 78 of
yesterday* The Swedish and Danish reports of British action against
German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, cited in the instructions,
are accordingly incorrect in important aspects, although,.
as shown by Koht's statements, certain indications would point in
that direction.
As shown in my above-mentioned telegraphic report, England has
made no attempt to press Norway to take any action against our
a Not printed (3077/612988). Instructions to sound out the Norwegian Government
as to the truth of reports of British pressure on Norway to cut off
German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters without revealing that these
reports reached Germany through the Swedish Foreign Minister and the Danish
Minister to Berlin.
a Document No. 566.
JANUARY 1940 703
ishipping in Norwegian territorial waters which would be in violation
of her neutrality (that would have been emphatically rejected by
Norway) , but she did protest to the Norwegian Government with re*
^gard to the sinking of the British steamer Deptford in Norwegian
territorial waters and threatened that if this should happen again she,
too, would carry naval warfare into Norwegian territorial waters, an
action which in the circumstances could of course be directed only
against German shipping ui Norwegian territorial waters.
I am convinced that Koht's statements regarding the Norwegian
Government's reply to the British step are true. And, with the
omission of a few points, they were repeated in the speech which
Foreign Minister Koht delivered before the Storting on January 19.
Norway's reply demonstrates her will to take action with the means
at her disposal against any British measure to interfere with shipping
in her territorial waters. At the same time, we must realize that in
the event force is used, Norway's power naturally would be insufficient
for effective defense. For that reason Norway has with remarkable
consistency taken a stand of strict neutrality, attempting thereby
to establish a defense against any foreign intervention. As things
stand today, Norway could be successful in this* Since there have as
yet been no overt violations of neutrality by any of the belligerents,
England is very unlikely to be the first country to take the politically
weighty decision to violate openly the neutrality of a small country.
Nevertheless, we must of course proceed on the assumption that
England is aware of the importance for our war economy of our
shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, especially of our ore transports,
and is seeking means of stopping it. But as long as the Norwegians
have the will, born of their instinct of self-preservation, to
resist any violation of their neutrality, England will be hard put to
find an effectual means of stopping that traffic. Lately, a strikingly
large number of mines have been fished up in the Varanger Fjord,
as well as at many other places along the coast of Norway. Apparently
they are floating mines, however, since it is unlikely, in view of
British shipping traffic along the Norwegian coast, that England
would lay mines in the vicinity of Norwegian territorial waters in
order to interfere with shipping since these mines might also cause
damage to her own shipping. I shall continue to give my fullest
attention to this question. In the present circumstances our policy
must be to watch and support the will to be neutral. In this war,
Norway has had more reason for complaint about England than about
us. As a result of the blockade warfare waged by England, her brazen
demands in the trade agreement negotiations, and after the Churchill
address, a correct conduct on our part will bring England increasingly
into discredit. It would, moreover, help to put a neutral belt around
704
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Norway and to some extent afford protection for the expansion of
our shipping traffic. By the same token, we are also interested in
seeing Norway's neutrality respected by Russia. Any spreading of
the Russo-Finnish conflict to northern Norway would so upset the
balance resulting from Norway's neutrality that we, too, would then
have to expect reactions on our coastal shipping, quite apart from
the fact that Narvik especially, which is regarded here as the objective
of any Russian action against northern Norway, is, along with
Kirtenes, particularly important for our ore shipments.
I repeat my request made in telegraphic report No. 78 that the
Norwegian notes be answered as soon and correctly as possible. In
this connection, please refer to my telegraphic report No. 82 of January
25,
3 sent in response to a different instruction.4
BRAUEB
Not printed (22/13792).
* Telegram No. 66 of Jan. 24, not printed (8388/E591797).
No- 572
824/194154)
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Spain,
Telegram
SECRET BERLIN-, January 25, 1940.
No. 110 "W320g.
Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor Sabath.
With reference to your No. 276 of January 22.1
The Foreign Minister is in accord with your position and requests
that you continue pressing energetically for the delivery of the
promised 2000 tons of lead and that you make a serious protest if
it should develop that Spain, on the basis of the modus vivendi just
arrived at, is shipping strategic materials to France in excess of the
quantities shipped before the war. If the Anglo-Spanish economic
negotiations should also lead to an agreement which gives England
a considerably better position than she had before the war, similar
action ought to be taken.
WEBHL
*Not printed (136/74022-23). In this telegram Stohrer reported that, havfcig
been informed of a new Spanish-French agreement according to which Spain
would deliver to France large amounts of lead in excess of prewar deliveries,
he had made a protest to the Spanish Foreign Minister.
JAKUAKT 1Q40 705
No. 573
3118/641580-81
The Charge ffAffaires in tJie United States to the Foreign Zfimzstry
Telegram
No. 95 of January 25 WASHENTGTOK, January 25, 1940.
Received January 26 8 : 55 a. IEL
As of tomorrow trade relations between the United States of
America and Japan will no longer be governed by treaty*
1 The
efforts of the Japanese Government until the very last days to create
at least a temporary basis for trade relations by means of an exchange
of notes failed because of the unyielding attitude of the American
Government, which believes that it has the upper hand and intends
to hold the absence of a treaty, including the possibility of sanctions
in individual cases, over Japan's head as a sword of Damocles. Thus
within the American Government those circles were able to prevail
which pursue the aim, as did formerly Secretary of State Stimson and
now Under Secretary of State Welles and Ambassador Grew, of
re-establishing the open-door policy in China and of at least obtaining
sufficient Japanese guarantees for the security and free exercise of
American rights in China. An important factor contributing to this
decision was the circumstance that the Japanese made no concessions
of any kind during the 6 months since notice of intention to terminate
the treaty was given and thereby exhausted American patience. With
this decision of the American Government, however, it may well be
that all measures aimed at an embargo or other reprisals against Japan
will lose their force. I do not believe that Senator Pittman and others
with proposals in that direction will be successful in Congress. In
this connection it should be taken into consideration that Japanese
exports to this country (especially silk) are extremely vital to American
economic interests. The Japanese-Russian economic negotiations,
too, should dictate a certain caution to the United States, although
satisfaction is felt here in the belief that Japanese trade with Russia
offers relatively few exchange possibilities and will for years not be
able to replace the American market. Finally, a similar restraining
influence is exerted by the general political consideration of not
introducing any disturbances into the Pacific area, especially now
during the war ; this is of particular interest to Great Britain, which
is bringing influence to bear on the United States of America to this
1 On July 26, 1939, the United States had given Japan the required 6 months
notice of its intention to terminate the 1911 treaty governing trade relations
between the two countries.
706
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
effect. It is realized that the bow must not be drawn too tight. la the
present state of their relations the two Governments will not make
any de facto changes in current trade, i.e., they will neither introduce
discriminatory measures with reference to tariff treatment nor interfere
with the activities of each other's commercial agents, who have
now lost their legal status. Likewise the United States of America
will continue to accord Japan tariff preferences which are not based
mpon the reciprocal trade agreement. Only renewed serious interference
on the part of Japan with American interests in East Asia
would cause this to be changed.
THOMSEN"
No. 574
444T/B0866I96-98
Memorandum ~by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union'1
SECRET Moscow, January 25, 194&
The Soviet-Finnish conflict is for various reasons viewed with
mixed feelings on the German side. The reason for this is that this
conflict entails disadvantages as well as advantages for Germany, and
that the significance of each must be carefully weighed against the
other ; it is not so easy to say whether the drawbacks or the advantages
predominate.
To begin with the drawbacks, it should be noted that Germany
is being made to bear the blame for having made possible the conflict
between the Soviet Union and Finland. This causes resentment
against Germany, which is consciously fostered by our enemies. Another
factor is that the fighting in Finland, the war situation and the
inevitable consequences of the conflict cut deeply into the trade between
Germany and Finland, and also impair Russia's economic productivity
to Germany's detriment. The latter has only been intimated
as yet, to be sure, but a number of observations would indicate that the
Soviet Union's general capability is very extensively engaged by the
Soviet-Finnish conflict, which cannot fail to have its effect eventually
upon the deliveries to Germany. Furthermore there is no mistaking
that the shortcomings of the Ued Army, brought out by the fighting
in Finland, together with several severe setbacks at the front and the
duration of the war, whose end cannot be predicted today, have caused
the Soviet Union to lose prestige before the eyes of the whole world
a fact to which Germany cannot be indifferent in view of her ties with
1 Marginal note : "Original given to the Ambassador. T[ippelskirch]."
JANUARY 1940 707
the Soviet Union* Finally, there is no telling whether the Soviet-
Finnish conflict might not of necessity or through the conscious efforts
of England and France so develop as to draw Sweden and Norway
into tihe struggle and later involve the Soviet Union in a war
with England and France. That would eliminate Russia from the
picture as a supplier and a rear guard [Ruokendechungr] for Germany.
The foregoing drawbacks, to which surely more could be added,
must be contrasted with a like number of advantages, which should
not be underrated.
The substantial difficulties of the campaign in Finland, of which
the Soviet Government is becoming increasingly aware, are a wholesome
damper for the well-known Soviet conceit and overestimation of
their own victories. After the promenade into Poland, where the
German Army had done most of the work, and after the highly successful
action in the Baltic States, there was a tendency to be very
casual about the Finnish campaign. The great difficulties and the
reverses incurred, in particular as regard the Kuusinen government,
will serve as a warning for the Soviet Union and the Comintern, and
will also desirably weaken the ideas of world revolution. Besides, the
diminished prestige of the Red Army will inevitably entail a weakening
of the post-war position of the Soviet Union. As we know, it is
generally imputed to the Soviet Union that, with her army intact, she
plans to set herself up as arbiter after the end of the European war.
In the light of the events of the past months there is scant likelihood
that she can carry this plan into effect on the contemplated scale. Furthermore,
the military difficulties and the political disappointment of
the Soviet Government in Finland will have the general effect of imposing
greater caution with respect to its political aspirations. At any
event, it is to be expected that the designs which the Government may
be entertaining with regard to Bessarabia will at least be put off for a
long time. This would suit our policy, which, in view of our economic
and political interests, is oriented toward maintaining peace in the
Balkans* The increased restraint on the part of the Soviet Union
vis-it-vis Japan is a similar situation. Finally, it must not be overlooked
that the recent events are forcing the Soviet Union more and
more to the side of Germany. The new friendly relations between
Germany and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union's participation in
the partition of Poland, and the Soviet attack on Finland have had
a definite effect on the policy of the other countries toward the Soviet
Union. In consequence, ties with Germany are at present of great
importance for the Soviet Union.
VON TDETELSKIROB:
708
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 575
12,4/122018-151
Memorandum of the Embassy in tTie Soviet Union
2ran>EN"TiAij Moscow, January 25,
Subject: Conversation of Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg
with Molotov regarding Finland, on January 25, 1940.
The Ambassador informed M. Molotov that he had been instructed
by his Government to come to Berlin within the next few days, and
that he was bound to be asked, among other things, some questions
regarding the Soviet-Finnish conflict, in connection with certain economic
difficulties. He would therefore be grateful to M. Molotov if
he would give him his views on the Soviet Government's estimate of
how the matter would develop, that is, whether the conflict would be
prolonged for a long time or whether one could expect it to be terminated
in the foreseeable future.
M. Molotov replied that the time when the conflict would terminate
obviously could not be predicted to the day, but it was certain that
it would not drag on much longer. The Soviet Government had not
wished for this conflict and had done everything to avoid it. As far
as the economic difficulties affecting Germany were concerned, they
would just have to be accepted for a time, especially since it certainly
would not be for long. It was a fact that the British and French press
revealed a very hostile attitude of these countries toward the Soviet
Union. They were trying to influence Sweden and Norway hi that
direction, too, although England and France could not fail to realize
that the Soviet Union had no intention of changing her relations with
Sweden and Norway. The Soviet Union had no demands of any kind
to make on Sweden and Norway. As regards Finland, the matter
under discussion would reach its logical conclusion in the not too distant
future. Finland's situation, which was entirely of her own making,
was extremely difficult and would eventually lead to its inevitable
consequences. The Soviet Government demanded from. Finland only
that she satisfy its earlier demands. Of course, the situation had
changed since the outbreak of actual fighting and the shedding of
blood. The original demands of the Soviet Government had been extremely
modest. It had not demanded any influence of any kind on
Finland's Government and had been concerned only with the protection
of Leningrad. Since then, however, the hostile attitude of the
Finnish Government toward the Soviet Union had shown itself to the
full. The fortifications found in Finland had been an eye-opener for
the Soviet Government as to the intentions of the Finnish Goverjix
This memorandum was received and circulated in the Foreign Ministry
JA3STJARY 1940 709
ment. The uses to which. England could have put a Finland hostile to
the Soviet Union had become clear. The territorial wishes of the
.Soviet Government as to Finland were stated, to be sure, in the plan
agreed upon with the People's Government; 'but the Soviet Government
could never tolerate a hostile Finnish Government close to Leningrad
and the Murmansk railroad. An understanding with the Tanner-
Ryti Government and with Mannerheim was entirely out of the
question.
At the Ambassador's remark that he would probably be asked in
JBerlin whether an understanding might perhaps be possible if so
respected a figure as Svinhufvud assumed the leadership of the Finnish
Government, Molotov replied that Svinhufvud obviously stood
for about the same things as did the present Government. On the
other hand, however, the declaration of the People's Government did
provide that it could be expanded and supplemented.
Molotov answered with a definite affirmative the Ambassador's question
whether such expansion and supplementation was to be construed
.as meaning that a democratic Finnish Government might come about.
Then Molotov stressed repeatedly that although the Soviet Government
had no intention of infringing upon the independence of the
future Finnish Government, it could by no means permit a hostile government
to control territories close to Leningrad and the Murmansk
railroad, the destruction of which was being openly propagated by
the French press.
No. 576
124/l22eQS-10
Unsigned Memorandum From tTie Embassy in the Soviet
Moscow, January 25,
Subject : Conversation of Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg
with Molotov on January 25, 1940, concerning the situation in
the Balkans and the Near East.
With reference to his impending visit to Berlin, the Ambassador
told M. Molotov that he would like to hear from him what the Soviet
Government thought about the present situation in Southeastern
Europe and in Turkey. The Ambassador described to M. Molotov
the excitement and political activity which had been noticed recently
in the Balkans, and also mentioned the Ciano-Cs&ky meeting 2 and
1 This memorandum was Initialed by Weizsacker on CFeb.] 12.
3 The Foreign Ministers of Italy and Hungary met In Venice on Jan. 6 and 7.
According to a telegram from the German Minister in Budapest, sent on Jan. 11
(1571/380279-82), Csaky had told him that he had assured Clano that Hnngaryv
while upholding her demands for territorial revisions, would not start an attacx
against Rumania. A brief summary of the Venice conversations was given by
Ciano to Mackensen and was reported in a Borne telegram of Jan. 11
(2031/444707).
710
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the visit to Sofia of the Secretary General of the Turkish
Ministry.
3 One had the impression of a wild confusion of conflict^
rumors, with fear of the Soviet Union clearly standing out in the foreground.
The rumors even went so far as to suspect the Soviet Union
of the darkest intentions and to conjure up in particular the Soviet
threat to Rumania. On the other hand, there was talk ahout Weygand's
Army in Syria, of the threat to the Caucasus and of Anglo-
French plans to destroy Baku and thus strike at the vital nerve of the
Soviet Union.
M. Molotov replied that in conformity with German wishes the
Soviet Union had indirectly encouraged the rise of such rumors by not
issuing any denial. The Soviet Government intended to maintain
a calm attitude of waiting also in the future, holding that it was all a
matter of much ado about nothing. The press was full of the wildest
rumors, but in reality there was less going on than these rumors
suggested.
As far as the Balkans were concerned, German relations with Italy
were closer than those of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Germany
should be better informed than the Soviet Union about Italy's intentions
in the Balkans. Italy unquestionably was trying to form her
own groupings in the Balkans. Turkey also would not be disinclined
to take part in this, and they were working on Bulgaria with
intensity ; there was an impression however, that Italy had made no
headway and that up to now nothing serious had happened in. the
Balkans.
As for the alleged "dark intentions'9 of the Soviet Union it would
not even be worth the trouble to issue denials of these fantasies.
Germany was very well acquainted with the attitude of the Soviet
Union in the Rumanian question. The Soviet Union would stand on
her rights, but the Rumanian question was in no way acute at the
present.
The Ambassador then pointed out that the moves in the Balkans
and the attitude of Italy and Hungary apparently were dictated
largely by fear of the Soviet Union. The short stretch of common
boundary between the Soviet Union and Hungary was enough to
keep Hungary in a state of great anxiety ; in the case of Italy there
was the fear of Soviet Russian competition in the Balkans. This fear
had recently received new fuel from the Soviet Union's friendly attitude
toward Bulgaria. This presumably was responsible for the
stronger tone adopted by the Italian press toward the Soviet Union.
M. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union on her part had done
nothing to justify the anxieties mentioned. With respect to Italy
in particular, the Soviet Union had not taken any steps that could
3 Jan. 12-13, 1940; see document No. 564.
JANUARY 1940 711
arouse Italy's apprehensions. He also concurred in the Ambassador's
view that Italy did not desire a Balkan bloc but that Turkey
did. The idea of a Balkan bloc appeared hopeless however* With
reference to the relations of the Soviet Union to Turkey, Molotov
stated that there were no concrete signs of an improvement^ but
neither had the relations deteriorated.
No. 577
54Q/24O584
The Consul at Lourengo Marques to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
LiOtJBE^go MABQUES, January 26, 1940 % : 01 p, m*
No. 30 of January 26 Received January 26 5 : 00 p. nu
For Pol. X.
With reference to my telegram No. 7 of January 6.1
Denk 2 reported that his wife has carried out in Capetown the instruction
to have a personal conversation with Malan, who promised
to work in this sense*
Denk is convinced that Malan informed Hertzog,3 thereby favorably
influencing contents of speech of opposition leader.
Denk will shortly return from here to Germany.
TROMPKE
* Not found.
8 Hans Denk had been sent to South Africa by the Foreign Minister to establish
contact with the nationalist opposition there. Additional details on his mission,
including his wife's conference with !Dr. Malan on Jan. 16, are given in a
report of Consul General Karlowa of the Dienststelle Kibbentrop for the Foreign
Minister, dated Mar. 29 (116/66170-74).
3 Gen. J. B. M. Hertzog, former Prime Minister, at this time a leader of the
opposition, had introduced a motion in the South African House of Assembly
declaring that the war with Germany should be ended. The motion was debated
in the Assembly from Jan. 24 to 27 and defeated.
No. 578
4&e/231752
Memorandum "by the State Secretary
SECRET BBBZJOST, January 26, 1940.
St. S. No. 91
Attolico gave me today in strict confidence the following information
taken from a report of January 11 from the Italian Ambassador
in Paris: In Ms reports from Syria Weygand is trying to promote
direct action against Russia, using Rumania as a theater of war. "Ffi^
motivation is obvious : to shake or overthrow the Bolshevik system in
Russia and at the same time strike a vital blow against Germany in
the Rumanian oil fields.
712
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
According to the Italian report from Paris, Weygand's proposals,
have found the approval of MM. de Monzie x and Sarraut * and of Gen
eral Georges.
3 The other members of the Cabinet, General Gameliiu.
and the entire British Cabinet, will have nothing to do with the plaZ
however.
Attolico told me that he was not authorized to give us this information
and requested that it be treated with the greatest discretion.
1 Anatole de Monzie, Minister of Pjablic Works.
3 Albert Sarraut, Minister of Interior, leading member of the Kadical Socialist
Party.
3 General Georges, Commander of French Forces in the Northeastern Theater
of Operations.
No. 579
Memorandum* 7>y the Director of the Political Department
-, January 26, 1940.
During a social function today the Soviet Ambassador "privately""
and in a lively manner unusual in him asked me a whole series of
questions which indicated in general that he has received little information
from his Government:
1. The Ambassador asked the meaning of the well-known article kt
the Nach/tausgdbe of January 13, according to which the Soviet Union
was seeking an outlet to the North Atlantic. His question did not
give any indication of his attitude. I told him that this involved a
slip-up [lntgleis^mg] on the part of a journalist. We had also indicated
as much to other agencies that had asked us about it,
2. M. Shkvartsev asked directly about our relations with Italy. I
told him that our relations were excellent. The Axis continued to
exist as heretofore. We hoped very much that no difficulties would
arise between the Soviet Union and Italy. The Ambassador spoke
with animositv toward Italy.
3. The Ambassador raised the question of the anti-Soviet reports
broadcast by the Vatican Kadio. I told him that some of these were
directed against the Soviet Union and Germany. We were making
representations to the Vatican on account of these broadcasts. Th&
Ambassador asked whether we expected any success from these representations
to the Vatican, which he designated as a dead man.
4. The Ambassador asked, very generally, what news we had from
England. I seized upon ChurchilPs speech 1 and England's wish expressed
therein that the neutrals enter the war. The Ambassador's
reply was rather inconclusive but visibly anti-British.
WOEBMAH&
1 See document No. 565.
JANUARY 1940
No. 580
Minister Zeoh to State Secretary Wei&s&c&er
THE HAGUE, January 27, 1940.
DEARWEIZSACKER : Through personal relationships I might have the
opportunity to establish certain lines leading to the Duke of Windsor^
As of course you know, W. is a member of the British military mission
with the French Army Command. He does not, however, feel
entirely satisfied with this position and seeks a field of activity ia
which he would not have merely a representative character and which
would permit him a more active role. In order to attain this objective
he was recently in London. There, however, he achieved nothing and
is supposed to be most disgruntled over it. He has expressed himself in
especially uncomplimentary terms about Chamberlain, whom he
particularly dislikes and who, as he thinks, is responsible for his being
frozen out. Also there seems to be something like the beginning of a
Fronde forming around W. which for the moment of course still has
nothing to say, but which at some time under favorable circumstances
might acquire a certain significance. I do not know whether you are
interested in the doings and activities of W. I recall, however, having
formerly heard from English friends that iW. had had especially
good connections with the Eeich Foreign Minister inLondon. I might
perhaps have the opportunity to hear something from the group
around Windsor and also- incidentally to get something through
to him. Thus, when he was just recently in London, I had explained
to him through an intermediary why it is completely Utopian
for England to attempt to effect a change of regime in Germany, and
the statements of my intermediary are believed to have made a certain
impression on him, more in any case than those pitched in the contrary
tone, which he got at the same time from the group around
Chamberlain.
So, if you would care to have me cultivate this connection please
write me a line. I would, however, be extremely grateful to you if
as little as possible could be said about the matter, since I would not
want to compromise my intermediaries in any way.1
With best greetings and Heil Hitler !
Tours, etc. ZBCH:
1 Marginal note: "State Secretary: Please discuss with me. RCibbentrop]."
714
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 581
1848/421123-24
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET ROME, January 28, 1940 1 : 10 p. m.
No. 213 of January 27 Received January 28 1 : 35 p. m.
The Italian Government, as was to be expected, has from the very
first day designated the coal question as one of the most important
points in the negotiations. The Italians want us to include in the
program, for 1940 the delivery of 12 million tons from Greater Germany,
including Polish Upper Silesia. Asking that it be treated
confidentially, Ambassador Giannini repeated the statement that following
the most recent political developments, and particularly after
the recent speech of the Secretary General of the Fascist Party1 which,
had occasioned considerable annoyance in England and France, the
Italian Government was anticipating the imminent closing of the
sea route for coal shipments from Holland to Italy. The program
for 1940 therefore had to be based on the assumption that all coal
shipments would be shipped by land. According to computations
made here by traffic experts, it appears that with 10,000 cars made
available by Germany and 5,000 cars by Italy, even assuming an optimum
of 15 days for a round trip, at most 500,000 tons could be transported
monthly. The Italian Government would see to it that the
Italian state railways would make available every car that could
possibly be spared. In view of the great shortage of cars, it could not
guarantee at present that more than 5,000 cars would be released.
However, since the Germans had declared in Berlin that Germany
could furnish 20,000 cars if Italy produced 10,000, it must surely be
possible to release this number regardless of the number of cars
offered by Italy. In a vital issue such as this, where it was a question
of ensuring the entire further economic and military collaboration
between Germany and Italy, the question of wrangling for reciprocal
concessions could surely play no part.
Since the fixing of a ratio between the two figures really cannot be
justified in view of the special relations obtaining between Germany
and Italy, I turned away from that argument and said I was afraid
that, quite apart from the ratio, Germany was not in a position today
to promise more than 10,000. The Italians thereupon urged a new
study of the matter.
1 On Jan. 17, Ettore Mutt reported that at a recent conference with Fascist
leaders in Central Italy, he had reaffirmed the uncompromising attitude of
Fascism toward Democracy, Bolshevism, and the "bourgeois" outlook and called
for an intensification of Fascist imperial, racial, and autarkic principles.
January 1940 715
Please send telegraphic instructions as to whether 12 million tons
can be promised as far as quantity is concerned, and what may be
stated regarding the possibility of exclusive land transportation and
availability of cars independent of any increase over 5,000 in the
number of cars furnished by Italy. The matter is doubtless of very
grave importance for the Duce and particularly those circles which
desire to adhere to a common policy with Germany in all circumstances.
But it would be dangerous to allow political considerations
to prompt promises now which we are technically unable to keep.
Particularly after the bad experience that Italy had in the past year
even before the war with our performance in meeting the coal quotas
established by the agreement of February 13, 1939,
2 it will be absolutely
essential to keep the promises made by us at this time. In case the
deliveries requested by Italy cannot be made because of the production
and transportation situation, it will still be possible, even if only a
smaller quantity can be promised, to reach a satisfactory agreement
not harmful to important political interests, provided that for this
smaller quantity I can make absolutely binding promises, 100 percent
certain of performance, as to delivery and land transportation.
CLODIUS
MACKENSEN
2See vol. IV, document No. 451.
No. 582
103/111978-79
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 196 of January 28 Moscow, January 28, 19409 : 13 p. m.
Received January 29 12 : 45 a. m.
Citing numerous examples, the Russians are complaining about
the increasing difficulty of placing orders in Germany. This applies
to orders under the Credit Agreement as well as to orders within the
framework of the future treaty. They mentioned products of the
aviation industry, ships, coal, drilling machinery, steel tubes, boilers,
compressors, and numerous other items. Many German firms did
not reply at all, others mentioned delivery dates years hence, which
practically precluded any negotiations. The difficulties originated in
official quarters and private firms. Even now the tempo of placing
Russian orders is lagging considerably behind the tempo of Russian
deliveries. The Russians urgently request that the situation be remedied
and a more positive attitude adopted toward Russian wishes with
reference to orders. They have presented a memorandum * with de-
1 Not found.
260090
716
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tailed information, which will be transmitted with the next courier
for your scrutiny.
The origin of the Russian complaint was our demand that the
business contracts concerning delivery be prepared even now in such
a manner that they would, if possible, take effect within a month
after the government agreement was concluded [provided that?] the
delivery dates mentioned by us are adhered to. The understandings
reported in your telegram No. 183 of January 24,
2 were contested by
the Russians. Please investigate this and wire the result.2
The Russian attitude is creating a difficult situation for negotiations
here, since the suspicion is constantly growing that we are unwilling
and not in a position to make deliveries in the amounts agreed upon.
The conclusion of the agreement and delivery of the Russian raw
materials will depend on the Russian orders being disposed of
promptly and German deliveries being made according to agreement
The delegation considers it necessary that the official agencies and
industries concerned be imbued with an entirely clear and uniform
attitude on the Russian transactions. First of all, it will have to be
certain that Russian orders falling under the Credit Agreement can
be placed. Second, it is necessary once more to instruct the industrial
groups involved in the Russian transactions to negotiate even now
about items which are the subject of the future treaty. An exception
should be made in the case of war material that is to be kept secret
and that will be released only on the basis of a new treaty. The negotiations
about items in the new treaty will in almost all cases require
so much time that the delivery contracts will be concluded after
the government agreement. If these contracts should be concluded
earlier, tfcey will be credited under the new treaty. We have called
the attention of the Russians to the necessity of promptly informing
the Reich Economics Ministry of their wishes with regard to orders
and negotiations with German firms, so that official influence may be
exerted on the German firms at the very beginning of the business
negotiations. In this connection it must be assured that the stipulated
volume and delivery dates of the deliveries promised the Russians
under the credit agreement and in the present negotiations are not
jeopardized by other demands.
3 Not found.
JANUARY 1940 717
No. 583
Memorandum by the State Secretary
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, January 29, 1940.
St.S. No. 97 St.S. No. 134 g. K&*
The Italian Ambassador today again alluded in my office to the
letter of January 8, the reply to which they had now been awaiting
for 3 weeks.2
I observed that the Führer obviously wished to gain a clearer picture
regarding the many specific questions brought up in the letter, as well
as regarding the general situation, so as to have a basis for his reply.
Attolico seemed to assume that this might easily result in a mere
statement of ready-made and prepared decisions by the Führer, while
he had hoped for a written exchange of views between the Führer
and the Duce.
Attolico answered in the negative when I asked him whether he
had been instructed by Rome to remind us of the letter; he expected
instructions in the near future, however.
The following interpretation by Attolico of the gist of the letter
represents his own ideas : The Duce must have arrived at the conviction
that since the active emergence of the Russians on the political
scene in the fall of 1939, a clarification of the true positions of the-
European powers and a re-alignment had become evident. The Anti-
Comintern idea had gained considerable ground. If there were nowar
between Germany and the Western Powers, Germany would
undoubtedly be in their camp, just as, conversely, the realization was
growing in the British Cabinet that not Germany but Bolshevism
was enemy No. L Here was the latent basis for an understanding:
between us and our opponents. This understanding need not cause
a split between us and Moscow. It meant for us an automatic assurance
against Bolshevism, but one which did not commit us to anything*.
WEIZSACKEE
'This is the number under which this document is entered in the Secret
Begister.
1 See document No. 504, footnote 2.
718
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 584
F18/425-413
Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation m the Soviet Union l
TOP SECRET Moscow, January 30, 1940.
THE SECOND CONFERENCE IN THE KJREMU:N ON JANTJART 29, 1940,
FROM 9 : 30 p. M. TO 12 MIDNIGHT
Present :
For Germany : Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg
Ambassador Bitter 2
Minister Schnurre
Counselor of Embassy Hilger
For the Soviet Union : M. Stalin
Chairman Molotov
People's Commissar Mikoyan
People's Commissar Tevossyan
Trade Representative Babarin
Immediately after his return to Moscow Ambassador Ritter informed
People's Commissar Mikoyan that he would like to present
the answers to Stalin's questions of December 31, 1939, to M. Molotov
or M. Stalin.3 This discussion was only held after eight days of
waiting, since the Russians stated that Stalin was physically unable to
arrange it. The reason for this physical impossibility was apparently
a severe cold, from which Stalin had not yet quite recovered at
the meeting yesterday. At the beginning Molotov apologized once
more for this delay.
Ambassador Ritter presented the answers to the items of the Stalin
program (ship turrets, airplanes, two sets of machine tools for 15 cm.
ammunition, periscopes, submarine storage batteries) as they had
been decided upon in Berlin. The release of the patents on widia and
titanite for sale to the Soviet Union was also announced by Ambassador
Ritter. The German Government had thereby made a very great
effort and a quite special gesture. This had only been possible by
promising delivery at the expense of its own armament program. We
had done this since these wishes had been represented to us by
1 Marginal note: "Shown to the Fuehrer. Hew[el]. February 10, 1940."
a On Jan. 31 two telegrams by Hitter were dispatched to the Foreign Ministry,
No. 214 of Jan. 30 (103/111988-89) and No. 219 of Jan. 31 (103/111992), summarizing
various aspects of the discussion described more fully in the memorandum
printed here. Points on which the telegrams are more explicit or which
indicate Hitter's reactions and recommendations are noted in footnotes below.
'See document No. 499, enclosure 1.
JANUARY 1940
M. Stalin as particularly important. But we had the hope that our
wishes, which were still pending, would now also be taken into consideration.
Ambassador Eitter first named the imports desired by
Germany that were still pending oil cakes, oil seed, legumes, flax,
hemp, phosphates and then went on to the still unsettled cardinal
point of interpretation of the letter of September 28, 1939, according
to which the German compensatory deliveries are to extend over a
more extended period of time than is contemplated for the Soviet
deliveries of raw materials.
Here Stalin, who hitherto had not been sitting at the conference
table but in an armchair in the corner, joined in* To begin with, he
thanked the Germans for the important and positive work which they
had in the meantime carried out. In connection with a remark by
Molotov that the time limits for the deliveries of the gun turn&s were
really quite long, Stalin then began to speak of the delivery of gun
turrets of 28 and 38.1 cm.
He would like to ask us two questions :
(1) Assuming that there were ships in process of construction on
which 30 cm. turrets were intended to be used, was it then possible
to use 28 cm. turrets ? The keels for such ships had been laid and he
wished to have the 28 cm. turrets for them. According to his information,
these turrets had been built in Germany for a long time;
the plans were at hand. If it took that long to complete the job,
he requested that the plans be sold to the Soviet Union*
In regard to the delivery of the 28 cm. turrets, Ambassador Eitter
explained further that the delivery could be made 5 months earlier,
if the Soviet Union wanted the turrets the way we had previously built
them. We ourselves would now build them somewhat differently.
M. Stalin remarked that the Soviet Union, to be sure, did not consider
the 28 cm. gun an ideal gun, but recognized its offensive power. Morer
over, it had not been known that we had in the meantime discontinued
its manufacture.
(2) He then came to his second question. Again assuming that
there were ships under construction capable of mounting 30 cm. guns,
with three triple turrets of this caliber, could three double turrets of
38 cm. caliber be built in instead of the three 30 cm. triple turrets?
How was the weight distribution and the offensive power? Now we
would understand why the Soviet Government was in such a hurry
for the delivery of the gun turrets. M. Stalin requested that this
information be kept secret. Ambassador Eitter replied that he was
not in a position to answer these technical questions, but that the
German Navy had already stated previously that it was prepared
720
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to give technical advice. Only the Soviet Government could mate
the decision as to which tiirrets should be ordered.4
M. Stalin then went into detail concerning the question of the terms
of the treaty and the time limit for the German deliveries. Two
treaties should be concluded. One treaty for a year, in which we
stated what we could deliver during this year. In return the Soviet
Union would deliver to us what we principally needed : grain, naphtha,
apatite, iron ore, and nonferrous metals. Then a second treaty
should be concluded simultaneously for the second year. In this
treaty should be incorporated what the Germans could deliver within
the next year, and the Soviet deliveries were to be fixed accordingly.
The Soviet Government desired no deliveries that were difficult for
Germany to make ; it would not insist on such deliveries and not extort
anything. According to the clearing system, however, the balance
would have to be drawn up. If we did not desire this settlement, then
It would be a question of credits, and we ought to say so candidly.
But there had been no mention of any credit in the letter of September
28.
Ambassador Hitter stated that he would assent to the proposed
method of concluding two treaties, if in so doing the wording and
intent of the letter of September 28, 1939, were observed. This letter
contemplated a departure from the clearing system. The German
deliveries in compensation for the Soviet raw materials should take
place over a more extended period of time. This idea must be brought
out clearly, otherwise there would be nothing remaining of the "exchange
of letters of September 28. Moreover, it was not a question
of credit but only of a delayed transfer operation, since the purchase
price in reichsmarks would be promptly paid by Germany, The
exchange of letters of September 28 could only be understood in the
light of the political situation at that time. The Reich Foreign
Minister had requested the Soviet Government to give Germany economic
assistance in this war. The letter of September 28 was to b"e
thfe basis for this economic aid an aid which consisted of the immediate
and prior deliveries of raw materials from Russia, for which
the German compensatory deliveries were to be made over a more
extended period of time.
In the subsequent discussion M. Stalin did not adhere to this viewpoint.
At times he became quite agitated and excused himself for
* In telegram No. 219, Ritter reported that "during the discussion of the delivery
of gun turrets for ships Stalin, requesting that the matter be kept secret,
broached the question of the intended use of the turrets. His statements indicated
that several, in any event two, large ships were already under construction,
for which 30 cm. gun turrets were originally planned/' but that the Soviet Government
now wished to use three 38 cm. (double) turrets on one, and three 28
JANUARY 1940 721
this later. The Soviet Union rendered a very great service to Germany
by selling her raw materials in exchange for reichsmarks. Nor had
there been any question in the exchange of letters of September 28
of selling to Germany noiiferrous metals, of which the Soviet Union
itself did not have a sufficient amount. Nevertheless, it had done so.
The Soviet Union had made enemies by rendering this assistance.
But neither England nor France would induce the Soviet Union to
deviate from this attitude. All this was certainly a great help to
Germany. After Stalin had reread the wording of the letter, he was
of the opinion that, in regard to machines which we experienced difficulties
in delivering within twelve months, we could give notice to that
effect. The delivery could then be made in 15 months.
Ambassador Ritter stated he was ready to make an attempt on the
basis proposed by M. Stalin. According to this principle we would
attempt to set up two lists, one for the first treaty year, with a designation
of those items which would require 15 months for delivery, and a
second list of deliveries which could be made in the second treaty year.5
Then Ambassador Hitter again brought up the question of the prior
deliveries of the nonferrous and hardening metals necessitated by the
Soviet orders. We would have to take care that simultaneously with
the placing of the Soviet orders the required amounts of nonferrous
and hardening metals were at hand in Germany. These were copper,
tin, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, wolfram, etc. The discussion did not
lead to any satisfactory conclusion for us. Stalin declined categorically
to undertake any further concrete obligations for the delivery
of these metals except such as he had already undertaken in connection
with the delivery of copper, nickel, and tin. The Soviet Union would
do all that it possibly could without fixing quantities. It would relinquish
a part of what it bought for itself. N"ow, for example, a
whole shipload of wolfram was being held in Hong Kong by the
British. If it was released to them, they would also supply us generously
from it. The Soviet Union would resell to us half of what
it purchased. NOT did the Soviet Union wish to exercise any control
over the use of the metals delivered by it. Germany could use these
metals in any way it desired, for its own use or for Soviet deliveries*
In any case the delivery obligations undertaken by Germany must be
absolute and independent of the question of metals. It would not do
for each firm to demand now that the necessary metals be placed at
its disposal in advance. In that case these orders would have to be
canceled.
"In telegram No. 214, Hitter characterized Stalin's remarks on "deliveries
over a more extended period" as "evasions" tAusjl&chten}. Bitter also expressed
fear that the proposal for two treaties would reduce the total amount for 1940,
but said he had agreed in principle to take this way out in order to pzwent a
complete deadlock [Festfahren] in the negotiations.
722
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ambassador Bitter characterized this arrangement as unsatisfactory.
He called attention to the great difficulties that would thereby
arise for carrying out the treaty to be concluded, since these metals
were not available in Germany in the required amounts. M. Stalin
again replied that these orders must then be canceled. If we maintained
these conditions the treaty would not be concluded.6
Finally Chairman Molotov and People's Commissar Mikoyan again
called attention as had already been done repeatedly by other Soviet
sources to the difficulties that had been raised by the Germans in
connection with the fulfillment of the Credit Agreement of August 19,
1939,7 People's Commissar Mifcoyan urgently requested remedial
measures in order to bring about a settlement of the mutual deliveries,
since otherwise it would be necessary to proceed according to the
sanction provisions of this treaty.
SCHSTTJRRE
6 In telegram No. 214, Bitter described Stalin's position on advance delivery
of nonferrotis and hard metals as "really unsatisfactory" Irichtig unbefrtedigende]
and contrary to earlier Soviet statements about providing additional
metals beyond the copper, nickel, and tin already promised. Hitter said that
he would try to achieve an improvement on this point later, but did not think
it should be allowed to cause the breakdown of treaty negotiation, in view of
the "absolute necessity of obtaining the other indispensable raw materials such
as platinum, chromium ore, petroleum, etc."
7 See vol. vii, document No. 131.
No. 585
2845/551224-25
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium
Telegram
No. 4.8 of [January] 31 [JANTTABY] 31, [1940].
For the Ambassador or his representative personally. Special security
handling. To be decoded personally. Top secret. Exclusively
for the Ambassador himself.
With reference to your telegram No. 32 of January IT.1
You are requested to call on the Belgian Foreign Minister, without
giving this step, the appearance of a formal demarche and to tell him
the following :
1. You reported at the time (group garbled) the information
which M. Spaak gave you on January 17 explaining the measures
taken by Belgium during the preceding days.
2. You were thereupon instructed to tell M. Spaak (group garbled)
that the information of the Belgian military authorities to the effect
that German troops had in the course of the preceding week taken
up jump-off positions directly at the German-Belgian frontier and
1 Document No. 544.
JANUARY 1940 723
that troops from further back had been moved forward was incorrect
and hence must have been based on false reports.
3. As for M. Spaak's statement that a military document had fallen
into Belgian hands in a German plane that made an emergency landing
on January 10, nothing was known or could be ascertained in Berlin
as to the nature of, or the circumstances surrounding, this document,
4. Apart from this, however, you are authorized to call M. Spaak's
attention to the following absolutely positive facts: Since the beginning
of October a drastic regrouping of the Belgian Army and
of the Dutch Army as well has occurred to the end that the disposition
of this Army is directed exclusively against Germany. Pursuant
to your instructions you called M. Spaak's attention to this fact relating
to the Belgian Army as early as October 20 (cf. your telegram
No. 293 ),
2 without either then or later receiving from him any explanation
of this. It is of particularly grave significance that the
that .a strong Franco-British offensive Army, composed in the main
of motorized units, was being assembled at the Franco-Belgian frontier
; the Belgian-French frontier had been virtually denuded of any
Belgian troops and the concentration of the Army was carried through
facing Germany exclusively. It is quite natural that in view of these
threatening assembly movements in France, Belgium, and Holland,
it was necessary for Germany progressively to take all the precautionary
measures made necessary by them.
R[IBBENTROP]
8 Not printed. (14V127314).
No. 586
1T79/406445-46
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate
to the Foreign Ministry
TOP SECRET PRAGUE, January 31, 1940.
No. D. Pol. 2.g 81-63 g Ks. (67 g Us).
Subject : The political situation in the Protectorate.
With reference to my report D Pol 2g of January 29J1
I approached the Reich Protector today on the subject of the political
situation in the Protectorate, asking him for guidance as to what
information I could pass on to the Foreign Ministry. Baron Neurath
told me that Minister Feierabend and M. STecas had been under
suspicion for some time. They were not accxised of participation in
the secret military organization which had been discovered, but of
1 Not printed (1779/406443-44). This report stated that President mcha had
formally removed from office Minister of Agriculture Ladislav Feierabend and
the Head of the Price Control Office, Jaromir Necas; hotn men had fled the
country to escape arrest in connection with the discovery of a secret uzecn
military organization.
724
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
having known of its existence and kept silent about it. There had
been no intention of taking any serious measures against the two.
Apparently they got wind of the fact that the statements of the
arrested members of the organization brought out increasing evidence
against them, and so they fled, Necas first, and Feierabend after him.
Minister Feierabend's flight strongly suggested that he had been
more deeply involved than was believed at first. An investigation was
now under way to find out whether, in his capacity of Minister of
Agriculture, he had diverted Government funds to the secret
organization.
As regards the filling of the vacant posts in the Protectorate Government
or of reorganizing the latter, the Reich Protector stated that
it was actually unimportant whether Feierabend or some other Czech
occupied a post in the Government. It was impossible in any case
to find candidates for the Cabinet posts who were entirely unobjectionable
and could be depended upon. Filling posts in the Government
was the business of the Czechs, and they had to submit their proposals.
True enough, the Vlaika group and also the Czech Fascists were eager
to get into the Government, but the information he had received on
these candidates so far was of a rather dubious nature. They were
persons of bad reputation and some even had records of convictions
for common crimes.
The Reich Protector then touched upon the wave of arrests that
was sweeping the Protectorate. The nervousness of the Czechs was
increasing and there was a widening rift between Germans and Czechs.
However, it was necessary to rule with a firm hand, the Reich Protector
emphasized, for the Czechs were thick-skulled and treacherous. The
Reich Protector was of the opinion that everything would remain quiet
because our strong military and political position discouraged anyserious
resistance on the part of the Czechs.
No. 587
141/126495-06
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET BRUSSELS, February 1, 1940 9 : 20 p. nu
No. 56 of February 1 Received February 2 i: 30 a. m.
The Rexist leader Degrelle wants to publish an afternoon paper
without political affiliation, under the name of Journal de Bruxelle*,
in addition to the Pays Reel. The main line is to be the defense of
Belgium's neutrality. Through his liaison at the Embassy Degrelle
has asked for support. The plan deserves consideration, especially
FEBRUARY 1940 725
from the standpoint that we have an interest in having neutrality
violations by our enemies and possible anti-neutrality efforts on the
part of certain Belgian groups systematically denounced by a Belgian
daily. The Pays Reel is less suited for that purpose because as the
organ of the oppositional Rexist movement as shown by the recent
search of the houses of a number of Resists it is under the same
threat as the Flemish nationalist and the Communist press, which were
prohibited some time ago. Outwardly, therefore, the Journal de
Bruxelles is to have no connection with Degrelle and the Rexist movement.
This affords greater possibilities for defending the German
viewpoint and promoting German propaganda. In view of Degrelle's
exceptional ability as a journalist and propagandist, the new paper
has prospects of becoming a success.
The initial request for a subsidy in the form of 10,000 subscriptions
for one year was disapproved by me because of foreign currency considerations
and in order to avoid long-term commitments, but I would
recommend a subsidy through 10,000 subscriptions for 3 months,
payable in monthly installments. Degrelle has agreed. The funds
required would be 12,600 RM per month, in foreign currency. However,
continuation of support must be envisaged past the first 3 months
because the paper would not be able to exist otherwise. The amount
could then be made dependent on the success and the attitude of the
paper. Please wire decision.1
1 In telegram No. 82 of Feb. 21 (141/126503) , the Ambassador again requested
a decision on this proposal.
No. 588
141/12649-7-9S
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign, Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTBGENT BRUSSELS, February 1, 1940 11 : 35 p. m.
No. 58 of February 1 * Received February 2 6 : 15 a. m.
With reference to telegram No. 48 of January 31.2
I called on Foreign Minister Spaak today to give notice of my forthcoming
short trip to Berlin and in so doing presented in forceful
language the substance of the telegraphic instruction referred to
above. M. Spaak replied on point 2: He would immediately communicate
to the proper authorities the statement about the falseness
of the report regarding German troop movements but could not himself
take any stand in regard to this matter.
1 Marginal note: "Not circulated in the office of the State Secretary- AH
copies given to tne Secretariat of the Minister."
* Document No. 685.
726
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
On point 3: The statement that nothing was known in Berlin
regarding the nature of the military documents that had fallen into
Belgian hands and nothing could be found out about them either
filled him with the greatest astonishment. He would pass on this
information also and reserve to himself the right of giving or showing me particulars on my return.
On point 4 : The Belgian Army occupied all the frontiers at the
beginning of the Polish campaign, but with the increasing deployment
of the Germans in the West, it effected appropriate regroupings.
England and France would have to respect Belgian neutrality, since
otherwise the reason for their going to war the protection of the
small states would logically collapse and hope of help from North
and South America vanish. An invasion of Belgium might mean
losing the war for the Western Powers and therefore, he believed,
need not be feared. On the other hand, the Western Powers would
like Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality. They would thereby
acquire almost a million more fighting men, have a theater of war in
a third country, and perhaps win America over to their cause.
Belgium was standing between the fronts of the belligerents. She
had no cause even today to regret her policy of independence embarked
upon in 1936, and was still hopeful that she would be able to
keep out of the war. The King together with a loyal Army and
Government, backed by the united Belgian people, would carry on the
policy of neutrality to the bitter end if necessary. The Belgian Army,
by the very nature of its training, was not an attacking force, but had
always been a defensive force only.
In conclusion, M. Spaak declared with marked emphasis that there
was no contact whatsoever between the Belgian Army Command and
the French and British General Staffs, and that he could assure me
that the content of the military documents would not be divulged to
the Allies.
BULOW
No. 589
F7/0520-0518
Memorandum "by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN-, February 1, 1940.
Subject : Coal deliveries to Italy.
A conference was held today at the Ministry of Economics, presided
over by State Secretary Landfried, on the subject of telegram No. 213
from Minister Clodius in Rome.1 The following persons participated :
1 Document No. 581.
FEBRUARY 1940 727
Foreign Ministry Minister Eisenlohr and I ;
Ministry of Economics State Secretary Landfried, Under State Secretary Hanneken,
and a number others;
Ministry of Transportation State Secretary Kleinmann,
Ministerialdirektor Leibhardt,
and Ministerialdirektor
Triebe ;
Reich Coal Commissioner Wagner; OKW 3 representatives from the Chief
of the Field Railways
I explained that for reasons of foreign policy known to all we must
do our utmost to deliver to the Italians by land the 1 million tons of
coal a month which they need to build up their striking capacity. Although
we recognize the present difficulties of Germany's internal
coal situation, it should nevertheless be possible to increase the deliveries
from 377,000 tons in January to 500,000 tons in February,
which could be done by having Germany provide 150-200 additional
railway cars a day. Once the cold spell has passed and the coal
situation inside Germany has improved, an effort must be made gradually
to increase the monthly deliveries to 750,000 tons by assigning an
increasing number of German railway cars. Even though such an
undertaking does not suffice to reach the objective of 1 million tons,
it would probably still be possible to come to some agreement which
would also take due account of the political interests.
The subsequent discussion brought out that all the offices represented
consider the solution I proposed impracticable even after due
consideration of the requirements of foreign policy. It was acknowledged
that the quantity of 1 million tons of coal a month for Italy
could be extracted from the German mines without difficulty, but
within the foreseeable future it will be impossible to transport it to
Italy by the available transport facilities. In consequence of the
coal shortage brought on by the extreme cold, it was pointed out, partial
shut-downs in the armament industry are causing production to
lag behind the program by an average of 30 percent; the requirements
of the civilian population are being met only at a bare minimum
; and the reserves needed for the Heichsbahn and industry are
nearly exhausted. This situation has arisen in spite of the most
drastic restrictions on passenger trains and an embargo on shipment
of even the most essential products, such as raw materials for industry,
food for the population, and fertilizers for agriculture. If in spite of
this situation approximately 250,000 tons of coal were shipped to
Italy in January by German cars, this was made possible only by the
imposition of the greatest sacrifices and restrictions. Therefore, any
increase of shipments to Italy is entirely out of the question as long
as the extreme cold persists. After the cold has passed, the most that
728
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
can be promised is the shipment of a total of 500,000 tons a month.
For then our own armament plants must first be placed in a position
to utilize their full capacity, the stocks of the Reichsbahn and the
industrial plants must be brought up to a level absolutely essential
for the prosecution of the war, and the supply of the civilian population
for the next winter must be assured in a manner that will positively
preclude the recurrence of the present experiences.
I pointed out that the objective of our foreign policy could not be
attained with promises within these limits, and brought up for discussion
a variety of possibilities for increasing the supply. The other
offices maintained their position, however, and stated that the various
arguments advanced in its support are so weighty that they can be
set aside only by order of a higher authority. They requested that
in case the Foreign Minister should discuss the matter with the Field
Marshal or present it to the Führer, the Ministers of Economics and
of Transportation also be given an opportunity to justify their stands.
The only thing that I was able to accomplish was to have the commitments
made positive, that is, subject only to circumstances beyond
our control (e. g., floods, destruction of communications or production
plants by enemy action), and that the general promise can be added
-that we will do everything in our power to increase the quantity to
more than 500,000 tons a month as soon as the domestic situation in
Oermany permits.
To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary
with- the request that the appended draft of a telegraphic reply
for Minister Clodius be approved.2
WlBHL
a Presumably the draft of document No. 592.
No. 590
1671/3941576-82
Memorandum* ~by the Head of Political Division VIII
SECRET BERUDST, February 1, 1940.
Pol. VHI 230 g.
Subject : The policy of Japanese Ambassador Kurusu.
Ambassador Kurusu invited me to tea on January 31 and took the
occasion to inform me in a systematic way of his, as he called it,
private conception of German-Japanese relations. Although lie has
surely communicated at least portions of what he told me to other
gentlemen of the Foreign Ministry, I should like to summarize his
views as follows, because the Ambassador indicated that he was interested
in having my superiors confidentially informed of his statements.
FEBRUARY 1940 729
1. The conversation started with a question about the further
conduct of the war by Germany, which I said I was not in a position
to answer. The Ambassador thereupon stated : As German Foreign
Minister he too would have concluded ths !Nbn-Aggression Pact with
Russia. He considered Germany's present situation excellent. He
was not certain, to be sure, how much we could obtain in the way of
deliveries from Russia. He was inclined to be somewhat sceptical on
this point. But we were sure of Rumania, and she was very useful
to us. He knew the Rumanians and he knew from his own conversations
and those of his colleagues with Rumanian statesmen that Rumania
was very far from giving heed to British promptings. The
Rumanians knew very well that their future depended on close ties
with Germany. Even Rumanians who were not close to Germany
politically had told him : "There is simply no gainsaying the basic
fact that Germany is our largest and most important customer. The
British now want to make emergency purchases from us, but after
their victory they would again leave us in the lurch; whether we
like it or not, we must stick to Germany." As long as the door to the
southeast was open, however, the British blockade could not force
us to our knees. This the British already knew. If we entertained
friendly relations with the other neutral states also and developed
our economic ties, England would see no possibility of continuing the
war successfully.
What he feared most was a German invasion of Belgium and
Holland. He believed that such an operation was not necessary.
Holland and Belgium could not long sustain economically the present
state of mobilization. If these conditions continued, then these two
neutral countries would be the first to collapse in this war. For this
reason Belgium and Holland had approached Roosevelt through
former American Ambassador Davies, in order to get him to intervene
as leader of the neutrals. Roosevelt considered that the time
for this was not yet ripe, but sooner or later he would have to abandon
his reserve. If the story were true that we are nourishing the fears
of Holland and Belgium concerning a German attack in order to
force these countries to take steps in the direction of peace mediation,
then he would be very glad. He would deeply regret it, however, if
we really contemplated an attack on these two countries, because we
would thereby lose the sympathies of all neutral countries and because
this would mean a long war. He did not believe that the United
States would intervene in the war against Germany; he did not
assume they would do so even in case we attacked Holland and
Belgium. But he expected nothing for us from such an attack even
in case of a complete military victory. He said that even if we really
starved England out from the Belgian coast and forced her to make
peace, the United States would interfere in the peace negotiations and
730
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
deprive us of the fruits of victory. He certainly realized that we
had to show England our strength at some time or other, but for this
our air force and our navy were adequate. He considered that an
attack by ground forces would weaken Germany and would not help
to force a peace. This was also the lesson of the World War.
2. He was saying this not only as a sincere friend of Germany but
also in the interest of Japan. Japan must under all circumstances
desire Germany's victory. It was clear that if Germany should be
defeated Japan would be the next victim. They now realized in
Japan that the European war was not to Japan's advantage. At the
beginning they had believed in Japan that the European war would
permit Japan to settle the East Asiatic problems by herself. This
had been an error. Japan could not do this alone. She saw herself
deprived of Germany's help by the European war, just as Germany
saw herself deprived of Japanese help by the East Asiatic conflict.
Just as earlier we had quite properly advised cessation of the China
conflict because we had thought it weakened Japan to no avail, so he
thought that Japan deplored the European war today because it was
a burden upon Germany. Therefore Japan's interest today lay in an
early cessation of the European war ; he considered this entirely possible,
with the attainment of 70 to 80 percent of the German war aims,
if we did not attack Belgium and Holland.
As a matter of fact, on the following day Foreign Minister Arita
clearly indicated this Japanese interest in his speech in Parliament.1
3. The Ambassador then continued : "I believe in the necessity of a
strong German-Japanese friendship, and would like to support it
with all the powers at my command. In this I am looking far beyond
the present war ; I am looking, let us say, at the next 25 years. I do
not desire any brilliant successes. I want to work at this task in my
time, and my successors should continue to work at it." With regard
to Russia, the Ambassador recalled the words of Count Goto :
2 "Germany,
Russia, and Japan are a three-horse team, but the Russian horse
must walk in the middle so that it cannot break loose and start a
disturbance." He said that this three-horse team was a goal of the
future. He considered this combination the best imaginable. Perhaps
they would wait for an evolution in Russia. In Japan there was still
strong antipathy to the Communists. From the standpoint of Japan,
Russia was like gold that lay concealed in a sheath of dirt, so that one
could not take hold of it. Regarding Italy, the Ambassador said:
"Italy is just as much interested in the victory of Germany as is Japan.
Italy has, indeed, only become a factor through the Axis. Who would
1 DNB report : 8136/E582125-31. a Count SMmpei Goto, Japanese Foreign Minister in 1918, became an advocate
of Japanese-Russian friendship in the years following the war. He had studied in
Germany and was the founder of the German-Japanese Society.
FEBRUARY 1940 731
respect Italy if she stood alone ? Italy could not be successful either in
Japan or elsewhere in the world if she did not go along with Germany
and certainly not if she went against Germany."
4. In his previous statements the Ambassador had indicated at one
point that in our war we needed the mediation of a third party,
just as Japan did in hers. I asked whom he was thinking of as mediator
in the Japanese-Chinese war. The Ambassador first answered
evasively and then said, "Of Germany, if she has ended her war by
then." He mentioned (Wang Ching-wei, but did not seem to think
much of him, and rather stressed the fact that Japan could hold out for
a long time yet in the present war. Only as long as it lasted she was
not in a position to collaborate with Germany. The Ambassador did
not evince any interest at all in a possible recognition of Wang
Ching-wei by Germany.
5. In connection with the often recurring main theme of his statements,
the interest in an early European peace, the Ambassador said
incidentally that if he could be useful in any way at all, through his
connections in the neutral countries, particularly in the United States,
he gladly offered his services. Moreover, his colleague, Amau, in
Kome, would be still better qualified, he said, because of the greater
freedom of movement that was possible from a neutral country. The
Ambassador realizes that the time for this has not yet come.
6. The Ambassador is obviously thinking of Japanese assistance
in the settlement of the European war and thereafter German assistance
in the settlement of the East Asiatic war. His statements had the
character of confidential declarations, such as Japanese diplomats
and statesmen like to make. He concluded laughingly : "Naturally,
if you march into Holland and Belgium my whole beautiful political
scheme will collapse. Then, of course, nothing can be done."
7. During the conversation it was announced that the Duke of
Coburg and Herr Stahmer were leaving that evening.3 Apropos of
this, the Ambassador said: "I hope that Herr Stahmer will not
associate himself too strongly with the Oshima-Shiratori group.
Since he is on especially friendly terms with these gentlemen this
would be natural. But, after all, he is traveling with the Duke, who
will be received in an entirely official capacity, and so he will come
in direct contact with the Foreign Ministry. He ought not enter via
the group mentioned, through the back door, so to speak. You know
how it is in Japan. It was simply not desired that policy should be
made by this group. Among many people, the jubilation over the
collapse of the German-Japanese alliance negotiations was directed
not against Germany, but primarily against this group. I stand between
this group and the Anglophiles, as does Arita, too. That is
8 See document No. 567, footnote 1.
260090 54 &2
732
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
why I was sent here. We also desire the closest collaboration
Germany. But you know how it is in Japan when one wishes to
work only with a special group. One jeopardizes one's plans thereby."
The Ambassador asked me to call Herr Stahmer's attention to this
fact. But since Herr Stahmer had just announced his intention of
paying the Ambassador a farewell visit, I asked the Ambassador
himself to give him, an appropriate hint.*
4 In a handwritten note Knoll records that the memorandum had been shown
to Bibfoentrop. A copy was dispatched by courier to the German Embassy in
Tokyo on Feb. 15, 1940 (1671/394583).
No. 591
FI8/072-82
Memorandum l>y an Official of the Foreign Ministers Personal Staff
BERLIN, February 2, 1940.
CONVERSATION* or THE FTJHCRER WITH COUNT MAGISTRATI ON THB
OCCASION o* THE LATTER'S FAKEWELL VISIT * ON FEBRUARY 2, 1940,
FROM 12 : 00 TO 12 : 45 P. M.
Present : State Minister Meissner, Senior Counselor HeweL
Count Magistrati handed the Führer a picture of his deceased wife
who, as Count Magistrati told the Fuhrer, had always had very special
esteem for the Führer. A short talk followed regarding the illness
of the deceased Countess. Then they spoke about the weather, and
the Führer said that, oddly enough, the unusually cold weather had
resulted in an amazingly good condition of health in the Army. Besides,
the epidemic of grippe that recurred every year had not made
its appearance so far.
Count Magistrati then spoke of a commission he had from Ms
Ambassador, who had been instructed by his Foreign Minister to
inquire whether and when a reply to the Duce's letter 2 was to be
expected from the Führer. The Führer answered that the weather
was also to blame for the delay in the reply for he wanted to make it
a very detailed one and the weather did not permit him to make any
predictions as to possible decisions.
He did not believe that at present there was any possibility at all
of composing differences with England and France. He had come
into possession of an extraordinarily revealing document 3 in the
Far East, which he would also divulge to the Duce. This document
exposed England's cynical intentions regarding the authoritarian
1 Magistrati had recently been appointed Minister to Bulgaria, * Document No. 504.
'Not found.
FEBRUARY 1940 733
states. There was no doubt that England was firmly resolved to
destroy one of the two states, in the hope of then also weakening the
other or creating the conditions for destroying it, too. The situation,
moreover, was such that he would refuse today to agree to any
spurious compromise, the result of which would only be that in a few
years time new disputes would arise. The Führer discoursed at length
on Germany's superiority over the Western Democracies, particularly
with respect to military and economic preparedness.
He reverted once more to the strange attitude of the British, who in
their dreams were still living in the Victorian era, when all they had
to do was send out cruisers to restore order in the world. England
had long since ceased to be the foremost nation in the world, which
she still thought she was. This belief no longer had any foundation
in fact. America was a more important factor now, even in the
economic and financial fields. Japan, too, did not have to put up with
anything from England any longer, nor could England compete with
Russia. Germany considered herself today to be a stronger power than
England. The same was true with respect to France, which was torn
with envy at the thought that she was no longer the foremost power
in the Mediterranean. Magistrati was doubtless familiar with the
Führer's ideas and his proposals, which England had rejected with
boundless stupidity. Actually he regarded a German-British-Italian-
Japanese bloc as an entirely practical possibility, and thought that
such a bloc would have been a blessing for the world. But the whole
mentality of England was such that she could not share her fancied
world supremacy with others, and so this struggle had to be fought
out to victory.
Our struggle against England was only just beginning. Whatever
had happened so far was insignificant, and the British would be
dumfounded when the big effort really began. He felt unbounded
confidence. Regarding the fighting strength of the nations, the
Führer said that he did not like to disparage his enemies, but the
French were decidedly not the French of 1914; this had been noticeable
in all combat engagements. Aside from two bombardments of
isolated pillboxes, no single military action of a serious nature had
occurred in 5 months. Indeed, no Frenchman had shown himself as
yet before the Siegfried Line. We had practically no losses on the
Western Front; indeed, our fatal casualties there were far below
normal traffic accidents.
The Führer then spoke of the British guarantee offers. Magistrati
agreed that the British guarantees had fallen into very bad repute;
this was evident, for example, in the case of Rumania, which had
readily acceded to Germany's and Italy's wishes despite British wooing.
The Führer corroborated these conclusions and elaborated upon
734
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
them with a detailed account concerning Poland. He described once
more his offers to Poland and expressed the conviction that Poland
would, indeed, have made a satisfactory settlement of some sort with
Germany if she had not been goaded on by England. This settlement
would have been possible even as late as September 8, when the Polish.
Government, meeting in Lublin, expressed its desire to enter into
negotiations with Germany. At that time, however, the British Ambassador
had raved like a madman and promised them everything
under the sun. This performance is said to have been accompanied
by the most glowing reports of attacks by the French and British
on the Western Front, of advances, battles, capture of villages, battles
at the Siegfried Line, and the like, which we had laughed over at the
time, for actually nothing more had happened than that the French
had occupied some French villages in their outpost area against no
opposition. England was utterly callous \_eiskalt\ in sacrificing others
and this action of the British Ambassador was designed only to goad
the Poles on to a last desperate resistance for England's benefit. For
it was perfectly clear to him that the British had been firmly convinced
that Germany would not dispatch Poland in such short order. They
had hoped to drag the war on into the winter, and the fact is that
nothing can be done with a modern army in winter. The Führer
went into a lengthy discourse regarding the effect of a hard winter on
modern mechanized warfare, describing the influence of the cold
upon motorized troops and expressing the conviction that war had to
come to a standstill when the temperature dropped below 10 degrees
below freezing [ 10 C.] He pointed to parallels in history, remarking
that Napoleon would not have been overthrown if the Russian
winter had not destroyed his army.
The conversation then turned to the political questions of the
Balkans, and Magistrati remarked that these problems were naturally
of great interest to him, since his new post would take him there.
The Führer said that it would be best for the Balkans to remain
completely still. He had been glad, therefore, that Italy had invited
Cs&ky,
4 for if Hungary should seek now to carry into execution her
revisionist demands, she might touch off the spark that would set the
whole Balkan peninsula aflame. This would cause chaos on a scale
impossible to imagine. And Rumania, too, would do well to remain
quiet, for once the fire broke out, not only would the Balkan powers
destroy each other, but it would then probably also be impossible to
keep Russia, Turkey, and also non-Balkan powers from intervening
there. Answering Magistrati's question as to whether Russia did
not constitute a threat to the Balkans, the Fuhrer said he did not
4 See document No. 576, footnote 2.
FEBRUARY 1940 735
think so. The difficult fighting in Finland would undoubtedly hold
Russia back. At present, naturally, Russia could do nothing in Finland,
for at 40 degrees below freezing [40 C.] no nation including
Germany could mount an attack. He could not understand why
Russia had started the war there at the beginning of the winter, of
all times. He assumed that Stalin had been misinformed, especially
by Finnish Emigres, such as Kuusinen, etc., who, just like the German
Emigres in England, did not know their homeland at all. Just as the
German emigres in England had drilled it into the British that
Germany would collapse a week after a British declaration of war,
the Finnish Emigres in Russia had dished out similar nonsense. At
Magistrati's question as to what the spring would bring, the Fuhrer
said he believed that Finland would have to give up by next spring
or summer. To be sure, he felt sorry for the Finns, but they had
shown a lack of gratitude toward Germany, too, the country to which
they owed their freedom. He quoted Bismarck's dictum : "The only
things more ungrateful than human beings are nations," and applied
this also to the Baltic states. Russia could not back down. She had
been called so many names by the Western Democracies that she had
to go through with the war if only for the sake of her prestige. He
was convinced that the Kremlin had never thought of war, since,
everything considered, the Russian demands on Finland were justified.
In point of fact, it was impossible for Russia in the long run
and this was again demonstrated by this winter to exist without free
access to the sea. This pressure had always been evident in Russia,
and if Finland had given Russia those few islands and had agreed to
a border revision in the vicinity of Leningrad, everything would have
gone off peaceably. But here again, France, and particularly England,
working partly through Sweden, had egged the Finns on to
such an extent and led this small country to hope for so much assistance
that, against all reason, it stood up against the Russian demands.
At the time when there was still prospect of a British-French-Russian
coalition, Russia had been the most powerful empire, the greatest
military power, the most gigantic economic factor ; but today, when
Germany had intervened and effected a normal reconciliation with
Russia, Russia was the most criminal, uncivilized, weakest, and militarily
the most laughable country. The Fuhrer here interpolated
some observations on German-Russian relations and the logic of the
alliance, which he justified chiefly on economic grounds. The British
designs in the case of Finland, too, were unspeakably base. The
British would never ship anything at all to the Finns, and the fate
of the Finns was a matter of complete indifference to them. If the
Finnish Ministers had not made their stupid speeches, everything
would have developed quietly and Germany would have been able
736
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to mediate between Russia and Finland, as he would have been, very
glad to do. The Russian Army, moreover, was not so ridiculous as
the Western Powers tried to make it out. We Germans knew the
Russian Army. Everything considered, it was a powerful instrument,,
with tremendous manpower reserves and economic resources.
To be sure, he doubted that Russia could fight successfully against
Japan, if only because of the transport difficulties, and we Germans
were certainly not afraid of the Russian Army; but in battles in the
North or South, Russia would be a very substantial military factor.
Our main concern at that time had been not to have this great power
against us. Magistrati noted that it had been a bad move on the part
of the Russians to install an international communistic government
right at the start of the conflict with Finland, instead of negotiating
with the new Finnish Government and thus documenting before the
world her purely national aims. With respect to this, too, the Fuhrer
emphasized that the Russians really had not seriously believed in a
war, for otherwise they would have prepared for it better. They
would have concentrated the Siberian divisions and the ski troops,
which they also had. To be sure, even so they would have been unable
to win the war at a temperature of 40 degrees [ 40 C.]. Then he
referred again to the sensitiveness of a modern army, with its trucks,
in periods of great cold. In response to a question of Magistrati
he estimated that May or June would be the earliest date when Russia
could again take the offensive. Not before then was it possible to
wage offensive warfare, and besides, the long day would then favor
the attacker, for the attacker's best ally was the day, while the defender's
was the night.
The Fuhrer then terminated the conversation, wishing Magistrati
success in his new post.
SEWEL
No. 592
18481/421133-84
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
SECRET BERLIN, February 3, 1940*
No. 104 of February 3 zu W 497 g*
1
For Clodius.
Repeated discussions and thorough examination with the officers
concerned produced the following result :
2
1 W4Q7g: Not found.
a See document No. 589.
FEBRUARY 1940 737
The delivery of 12,000,000 tons in 1940 would involve no difficulties
so far as production is concerned. We also wish to adhere to our aim
to ship this quantity by the land route, but have little hope that this
objective for 1940 can be attained even by dint of the greatest effort*
Because of the unusual and persistent cold and the resultant worsening
of the German domestic coal situation, even the January shipments,
totaling 377,000 tons, made one-third in Italian, and two-thirds
in German cars, were possible only by virtue of the greatest sacrifices
and retrenchments.
Since it is difficult in present circumstances to tell future possibilities,
and we wish, on the other hand, in accordance with the position
taken there, and shared by us, to undertake only commitments which
are capable of fulfillment, it will be possible to make only the following
promises at present :
(a) For the duration of the freezing temperatures, at least the
quantity shipped in January ;
( 5 ) When the freezing weather ends, at least 500,000 tons per month
if 5,000 Italian cars are made available ;
(c) These promises will positively be kept even in the event that the
line via Basel should be unavailable. Subject, however, to forces
beyond our control such as, for example, disruption of production or
transport through floods or enemy action;
(d) We shall, for our part, do everything to increase shipments
over and above this unconditional promise as soon as the situation
in any way permits, and do this irrespective of whether or not the
number of Italian cars will be increased above 5,000.
* For your information only: The Italian Government cannot be
given any details regarding the German coal situation in the vital
industries and armament plants, or in supplies for home consumption
and for the railroads and factories. We believe, however, that it is
kept sufficiently well informed by the reports of the Italian Embassy
to view the situation understandingly and appreciate the significance
of our performance and promises, and we therefore assume that it
will be possible, with the above authorization, to reach an agreement
that will also take into account political interests.
RIHBENTBOP
738
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 593
1848/421130-32
The State Secretary to the Embassy m Italy
Telegram
SECKET BEBUCNT, February 3, 1940.
No. 109 zuW248g.
W249g.
W258g.
W327g.
W401g.
With reference to No. 87 * and No. 88 2 of January 15, No. 97 3 of
January 16, No. 140 4 of January 18, and No. 200 5 of January 26.
We cannot depart from the basic view that just as Germany is
doing her utmost and sacrificing a great deal in order to maintain her
trade with Italy and especially her coal exports at the highest level
possible, without regard for the fact that all her capacities are directed
toward the war effort, it is equally the duty of Italy to support
us economically and not to lend assistance to our enemies. If the
Italian Government believes that without trade with the enemy powers
it cannot supply its own country with raw materials and food and
complete its rearmament, at least we ought to be able to expect that
such trade does not by reason of its extent and the type of goods exported
contribute to the military strengthening of our enemies so as
to modify the ratio of strength to our disadvantage. We must leave
it to the Italian Government to determine in each instance how to
avoid this danger and how on the other hand to give due consideration
to Italy's vital necessities. We could not in fairness be expected to
acquiesce in deliveries of important war materials by Italy to the
enemy powers. We would be glad, however, if the Italian Government
would keep us currently informed about the requests addressed
to it or Italian industry by the enemy powers, and about the nature
and extent of the deliveries, because such information can indeed be
useful to us in estimating the state of the enemy's armaments, and
because such friendly frankness is best adapted to prevent disharmony
or misunderstandings.
1 Not printed ( 8331/E589814-15 ) .
'Document No. 542.
'-Not printed (8331/E589816) .
*Not printed (1571/380287). In this telegram Mackensen summarized statements
by the Italian Minister of Transport regarding the situation created by the
British blockade ; Host Venturi maintained that it was in Italy's interest "to
dance like an acrobat and keep her balance toward both sides as long as
possible."
5 Not printed (8337/E589S79) .
FEBRUARY 1940 739
Furthermore we expect that Italy will do her utmost, just as we
are doing, to deliver goods important to German-Italian trade, and
that as regards the blockade in the Mediterranean, especially the removal
of German passengers from Italian ships, search and seizure
of mail, inspection of Italian ships in Italian ports by British consular
authorities, and the examination of the books of Italian importers
by British agents, she will be unremitting in offering resistance
and be more forceful than in the past, and that she will lend us effective
assistance in the transit trade*
WEIZSACKER
No. 594
F18I/43O-426
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
TJRGENT BERLIN-, February 3, 1940.
SECRET W 511 g. Rs. H.
No. 251 of February 3
For Hitter.
With reference to your No. 214 of January 80 1 and to our No.
238 of February 2.2
The Russian attitude on the question of the settlement about deliveries
corresponds so little to the wording and spirit of the September
agreements that I do not like to assent to it without having
exhausted every means. I am assuming here that their proposal for
drawing up two treaties actually would result in a serious loss of
Russian deliveries for us in the year 1940, and that there is hope of
essential improvement of this situation through measures undertaken
by me personally. On this assumption I request you to convey
orally to M. Stalin a personal communication from me, worded approximately
as follows, which, in case he so desires, may also be left
with him in writing :
"From the reports of the progress of our economic negotiations in
Moscow I understand that on a number of questions a satisfactory
solution has not yet been found. Of particular importance is the
1 See document No. 584, footnote 2.
*Not printed (103/111990). A telegram by Wiehl notifying Hitter that Ribbentrop
was considering a personal message to Stalin and wished him to refrain
meanwhile from any final commitment on the proposal for two separate
treaties. Hitter's reply, telegram No. 256, dispatched at 9 : 40 p. m., Feb. 3
(34/23674), seems to have crossed the telegram printed here; it requested that
no further decisions be made until the result was seen of the attempt then
being made to reach an acceptable accord based on Stalin's proposal.
740
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
question regarding the period of time within which the Russian shipments
shall be paid for by German deliveries in return. The original
Russian request was to the effect that the deliveries of both sides
would have to balance on June 30 and December 81, 1940 ; while ^e
proceeded on the assumption that the balancing by means of German
deliveries could take even more than a year according to the time
necessary for their completion.
"In the last interview which M. Stalin granted Ambassador Hitter
he proposed, as a way out of this difference of opinion, to conclude
two treaties now, one regarding German deliveries that can be made
in 12 to 15 months, the other pertaining to deliveries that cannot be
made till later ; the Russian deliveries in both periods of time were to
correspond to the value of what was received. Such an interpretation
would, however, not do justice to German interests, since the
value of the Russian shipments which we were expecting for the
year 1940 would be considerably reduced. I cannot, therefore, refrain
from calling attention to the following considerations on the
other side:
"The request for comparatively short-term balancing is not in
accordance with the explicit wording of the letter which Chairman
Molotov wrote to me on September 28, 1939. The unequivocal statements
of the Soviet Government contained therein can only be interpreted
to mean that the Soviet deliveries, consisting of raw materials
at hand or which can be delivered shortly, are to be carried out as soon
and in as large quantities as possible ; while the German compensatory
deliveries, consisting principally of complicated finished goods, maybe
'extended over a longer period over such period, at least, as is required
for their manufacture.
"Still I should prefer not to place the principal emphasis on the
wording of this statement of the Soviet Government, however unmistakably
it argues in favor of our interpretation. For in these negotiations
it really is not in this I believe I am in agreement with M.
Stalin a matter of an ordinary trade agreement, in which as exact
and simultaneous a balancing of the mutual services as is possible is
the principal thing. It is rather a question of fulfilling punctually
the promise which in effect was given during the September negotiations,
even if for particular reasons it was not literally mentioned in
the exchange of notes namely, the promise that the Soviet Government
was willing to support Germany economically during the war
which had been forced upon her. It was, furthermore, a question of
carrying out the reestablishment of economic relations between the
two countries as quickly and on as large a scale as possible, as had
been decided upon *on the basis and in the sense of the general political
understanding which had been reached.5
"The question concerning the time and extent of advance deliveries
on the j>art of the Soviet Government cannot accordingly be considered
in reference to the purely economic aspects of a balance,
but must rather be regarded in the light of the general political understanding
reached between the two Governments. This understanding
has meanwhile made it possible as must not be overlooked in this
connection for the Soviet Government to realize its desires regarding
FEBRUARY 1940
the former Polish territory and to develop and protect its interests
in the Baltic.
"The fact that this was possible not least of all because of the German
victory in Poland may, it would seem, be considered in this regard
as a not inconsiderable advance payment by Germany and cited as an
important reason justifying our desire to obtain support now, in.
-continuing the war against England and France, by as rapid and as
extensive deliveries of raw materials from the Soviet Government
as possible.
"From these general political considerations the reserved attitude
of the Soviet Government may be deemed all the more unjustifiable,
in view of the accommodating spirit shown thus far by the Germans
in carrying out the Agreement. We have even now on the basis of the
Credit Agreement of August 23, 1989, definitely accepted orders
exceeding 90 million reichsmarks and already begun filling them, and
thereby given unmistakable evidence of our willingness and ability
to make deliveries. In addition, we have stated in the proposed new
agreement that we are prepared to make extensive military deliveries,
although the September agreement concerned only industrial shipments.
Among the war materials which we are willing to deliver
there is a considerable amount of such material as we have never before
shown to foreign countries, not to mention delivered to them. We
agreed to the delivery of war material despite the fact that we ourselves
are at war, and we thereby render an all the more valuable
assistance to the Soviet Government, inasmuch as such war material
is at present scarcely obtainable elsewhere. It was gratifying to
me that M. Stalin in his last conversation with Ambassador Bitter
expressly recognized our accommodating attitude. He will surely
not have failed to appreciate how great a sacrifice this accommodating
spirit regarding the delivery of valuable weapons means in the midst
of war.
"I should therefore sincerely regret it if, in consequence of the Soviet
Government's insistence on requiring short-term settlement, we did
not obtain the deliveries that are so important to us as quicldy or in
such quantities as is actually possible for the Soviet Government,
Therefore, I wish to suggest to M. Stalin that he consider this viewpoint
in re-examining the question mentioned and the others still
undecided and give the necessary instructions that everything be done
to let us have the raw materials which the Soviet Government can
deliver to us, as rapidly as we need them, even if the German compensatory
deliveries will have to be stretched over a more extended
period of time than was previously requested by the Soviet Government.
I am convinced that M. Stalin will not close his mind to these
considerations and that the treaty will be concluded in the framework
originally contemplated."
End of communication.
In case of any hesitation regarding this procedure or any essential
proposals for change, please report by telegram.
742
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 595
265/172174i
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TTCGENT ANKARA, February 5, 19402 : 15 p. m.
No. 79 of February 5 Received February 5 7 : 05 p. m.
Two chiefs of mission who are friends of mine have confirmed to me
that Weygand voiced the following view here : It is not to be expected
that Germany will do the Allied Powers the favor of attacking in the
West. Therefore the war, which France cannot drag out indefinitely,
can be won only by a very great intensification of the blockade. The
Balkans and Russia have to be engaged. They say Ismet and Cakmak
* have violently opposed this plan (cf. the telegraphic report of
the Military Attach^). Massigli, however, is said to have told Ms
friends repeatedly that Turkey would be in the war by May at the
latest. If as late as December the view was voiced in Paris that a
break in relations with Russia had to be avoided in any case (Numan's
statement cf. my written report No. A 458 of February 1) ,
2 the present
change proves how pessimistically the situation is viewed in France
as the result of our naval warfare. England, it is emphasized here,
does not support Weygand's view, because she does not desire a break
with Russia. This difference of opinion is said to be very welcome to
Turkey, which since she is being courted in this way, is again trying
to increase her armament credit.
PAPEN
1 Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, Turkish Chief of Staff.
Not found.
No. 596
2,281/480331-39
Memorandum &^ an Official of the Embassy in Italy
SECRET ROME, February 6, 1940.
CONVERSATION WITH: THE FOREIGN MINISTER [IN BERUDST] ON "WEDNESDAY,
JANUARY 24, 11 A. M. TO 3 : 30 p. M.
The Foreign Minister sent me for my comments the Ambassador's
report of January 11 regarding the conference between Hermanin and
Eeichert,1 and at the same time ordered a conference in his office for
Wednesday, January 24, together with Under State Secretary
Habicht.
1 Document No. 527.
FEBRUARY 1940 743
At this conference the Foreign Minister announced that in planning
the reorganization of the cultural and informational activities at all
German Missions he had made provisions for a special solution for
Italy. He had informed the Embassy in Home that I was to have
charge in the future, under the direction of the Ambassador, of cultural
propaganda and information in Italy (exclusive of the press) .
Secretary of Legation Dr. Blahut and Dr. von der Schulenburg would
be at my disposal for this work. The latter was to be brought in
[&vn,ffebaut~\ in some form or other and given regular contract status.
At the same time the Foreign Minister informed me that he had proposed
to the Führer that I be appointed Consul General. As such I
would be assigned to the Embassy at Rome. He wished, however,
that I should continue to head the Southern Section of his Dienststelle,
and particularly that I should go on with the work I had begun
in Slovakia.2
I then gave the Foreign Minister a report on the propaganda work
so far initiated in Italy and also pointed out to him the operations
carried out from Berlin that had had a negative effect (Stalin leaflet,
Joy and Work pamphlet in November 1939, radio broadcasts from
Munich carrying Russian Army communiques, etc.). I set forth that
while it was possible to supervise from Berlin the general direction
of German propaganda work, it was desirable to do the actual work
in the countries themselves, because that was the only way to conduct
effective propaganda. I also took the stand that the most important
thing in Italy was a positive German cultural program, which, however,
had to be handled on a large scale in every respect.
The Foreign Minister then reviewed in detail the individual fields
of cultural and propaganda activity. He wanted and this was also
the view of the Führer a maximum intensification in all fields of our
work in Italy. We should not fritter away our energies on trivialities,
but rather work on a large scale. He thought that this was also the
wish of the Duce.
Radio. In response to my report on the inadequacy of the daily
Italian-language news broadcast by Radio Munich, the Foreign Minister
directed that the conferences on these broadcasts of Radio
Munich be conducted by Senior Counselor Ruehle from Berlin. The
news must not be a mechanical translation of the wireless service;
rather it should be especially adapted to Italy, and good Italian
speakers were to be put before the microphone. If necessary, another
German transmitter was to be put into service besides Radio Munich.
"In a memorandum of Feb. 20 (100/64940-42), Wtister recorded a conversation
of Feb. IS with Ribbentrop, who ordered that Wuster continue his propaganda
activity regarding Slovakia, and arranged for him to have a deputy in
Bratislava.
744
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Theater^ Music. The Foreign Minister wishes that the very best
German talent be continuously represented in the Italian theaters and
concert halls. A Furtwangler concert, with the Berlin
Philharmonic,,
for instance, could make a great hit. The best German opera, a firstrate
musical or review, as well as plays, should be brought to Italy.
I referred to the inadequate handling of these matters by the Ministry
of Propaganda. The Foreign Minister emphasized that the Filbrer
had put him in charge of the propaganda work abroad.8 The Ministry
of Propaganda should therefore not be consulted ; negotiations
should be directly with him.
Films. The Foreign Minister wants everything to be done to
facilitate the sending of good German films to Italy, with special
attention to newsreels. Should there be any difficulties at this time,
it would be desirable to make arrangements for the greatest possible
number of special showings, such as, for example, the recent presentation
of the West Wall film by invitation of the Ambassador.
The same applied to cultural work in the field of literature and the
creative arts.
Another important aspect was the arrangement of social functions.
He had already made provisions for sending the Bismarck family
from Berlin to Rome in order to maintain contact with Roman society
circles.4 This social activity had to be intensified, however. The
Foreign Minister asked for suggestions as to others to be sent to
Italy.
I called attention to the importance of the German Foreign Institutes
[Auslandsintitute\ for our cultural propaganda and pointed
particularly to the difficulties in filling the post of Director at the
German Academy. I mentioned that the Reich Minister of Education
had considered for this post the former cultural officer at the
Reich Youth Office, ObergebietsFührer Cerff ; I was sure there was no
objection to Cerff on professional grounds, but he had no foreign experience.
The Foreign Minister realized that this post had to be
filled by a person who possessed special social qualifications. The
Ambassador's proposal to reinstate Gericke was not known to me at
the time. I had gathered from a talk at the Reich Ministry of Education
that the Minister of Education felt committed to the removal
of Gericke, and made difficulties about reinstating him. Meanwhile
ia b report te &*e Foreign Miniator I have indicated Gorioko'o roin
otatomont ee the ideal oolution.5
* See document No. 81.
4 On Apr. 1 Bismarck, Deputy Director of the Political Department, became
Counselor of Embassy with the rank of Minister at the Quirinal. * This sentence was scored through in the original. The report to Ribbentrop
has not been found. Professor Gericke subsequently was reinstated.
FEBRUART 1940 74.5
The Foreign Minister then went into details regarding the systematic
propaganda work to be carried out in Italy with the aim of winning
over the Italian people to German interests. I said that I knew
from conversations with friends of Ciano that Herr von Ribbentrop
was regarded there as the one who had neglected German-Italian
friendship for the German-Kussian pact. The Foreign Minister
thereupon related to me in detail the conversations that had taken
place between the Duce and the Führer in Munich, as well as his own
conversations with Count Ciano in Milan, Salzburg, and Berlin, and
explained his viewpoint that England would not have entered this
war if Italy had immediately and unconditionally come forward on
the German side. The Foreign Minister stated that he had repeatedly
emphasized this view in speaking with Signor Attolico. But these
things must by no means be discussed in Italy. His frankness was
probably the cause of a certain annoyance. He would have no objection
against subtle personal propaganda conducted in his favor in
Italy. He was of the opinion, moreover, that a violation of German-
Italian friendship was impossible for Fascist Italy. The fate of the
two authoritarian states was so closely interwoven that either both
would be victorious or both would perish.
The Foreign Minister then described our relations with Russia.
One had to realize that the German-Russian Friendship Pact really
meant what it said. This friendship had nothing to do with ideological
conflicts between Bolshevism and National Socialism, but was
based on sober and realistic considerations. It was absolutely essential
to bring about an understanding in Italy for Germany's orientation
toward the Bast. It should be borne in mind what tremendous
possibilities of economic development would offer themselves to Germany
and Italy once the East was opened for commerce and trade-
There was no danger whatever of bolshevization of Europe. Russia
would not be capable of any full-scale action in less than 10 to 15
years. The Red Army had no leader and was in no position to wage
a war of expansion. Stalin had primarily revisionist aspirations.
The war with Finland was of minor interest to us. We should remember
that the Northern states had always been enemies of the
authoritarian regimes in Germany and Italy. A Russian victory in
Finland was a question of time. Russian revisionist aspirations toward
Bessarabia were entirely possible. Any further advance of the
Russians in the Balkans was not to be anticipated.
8 Perhaps Italian
* In his account of the conversation of Feb. 18 (see footnote 2 above), Wtister
stated that Ribbentrop spoke approximately as foUows : "Mussolini still seemed
to have many doubts about the possibility of German victory in the West On the
other hand, the Ftihrer firmly believes in a brilliant victory there. Finland's
fate was sealed. The Russians had realised through this undertaking, however*
746
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
interest in the German-Russian alliance could be awakened by circulating
appropriate literature on the economic possibilities in Russia.
It was important to point out again and again in Italy that England
was the great enemy of Germany and Italy. The decisive battle in
this war would be fought in the West. Germany was very well prepared.
Our artillery and infantry had a headstart over the enemy
powers in equipment and training which could scarcely be made up.
On the question of a German attack in the West it should be noted that
it is the National-Socialist way to triumph through attack and not
to cling to the defense. The question of a march through Holland
and Belgium was, if possible, not to be discussed. We respected the
neutrality of these states as long as they really behaved as neutrals.
These ideas would have to be disseminated by means of skilful
word-of-mouth propaganda in Italy.
Undoubtedly the most important thing in this connection was to
awaken Italian interest in Russia.
It would be not without interest to find out in Rome what the
Italian Charges d'Affaires reported about the mood in Paris and
London.
His view of Frangois-Poncet was clear ; he did not trust him farther
than he could see him and knew that at heart he was our enemy. It
was important for us, moreover, to appeal to the old-time Fascist
elements, among whom Frangois-Poncet surely found no over-eagerlisteners.
Discussions of Balkan questions were out of place at the present.
But the time would yet come when we would have to speak with the
Italians on the subject.
He was watching very attentively the efforts of the Vatican. He
was of the opinion that an understanding with the Church was useful.
He reminded the Führer of it almost every week. Thus far, however,
the Führer had turned a deaf ear to it because of his bad experience
with the Vatican. For instance, at the request of the Pope, the Fuhrer
had recently ordered all proceedings against the monasteries quashed,
although there was still plenty of material on hand for several years.
The Vatican, however, had not expressed its thanks for this but
instead had immediately come forward with a new demand.
that they were in no position to carry on war. Nor did lie believe that Russia
would risk war with Rumania. It would certainly be more convenient if the
Rumanians would negotiate with Russia on the Bessarabian question and conclude
a nonaggression treaty. Germany was actually uninterested in all Balkan
questions, however. With the return of Austria and the Sudetenland and the
establishment of the Protectorate, the entire Southeastern problem was closed
for us. We were interested only in maintaining good economic relations with
the Balkan States and for this the preservation of peace in the Balkans was
absolutely necessary.
"To the question of what Russia might undertake after the Finnish conflict,
the Foreign Minister replied that he could not see into the brain of a dictator.
Still he did not believe that Russia was interested in any warlike undertakings
in the foreseeable future."
FEBRUARY 1940 747
The Foreign Minister, in conclusion, spoke again at some length,
about the conduct of the propaganda activities in Italy. We must
have no inhibitions of any kind, but had to do whatever was necessary
to preserve German-Italian friendship. To my comment that a great
deal of money would be needed for this, the Foreign Minister said
that he had placed a sizable amount at the disposal of the Ambassador
and that more would follow. The money could for the present
be taken from this fund. For special activities he would gladly make
appropriate sums available. For example, a cleverly made-up edition
of the periodical Joy and Work could easily be circulated in 50,000
copies. He promised he would appropriate 100,000 reichsmarks for
that purpose. He showed great interest in a political exhibition
"Germany at War," or "The Campaign of 18 Days," which I proposed.
For this, too, an allotment of 100,000 reichsmarks could
readily be made.
Moreover, we now had a free hand for the work in Italy. From
now on he wanted to receive no more negative reports saying that
nothing was being done in Italy ; instead we should report what we
had done and what effect had been produced, or we should state that
we were not in a position, to conduct appropriate German cultural
and political propaganda in Italy.
The Foreign Minister considered it desirable to inform the Duce in
a suitable manner of the activity which I was to carry on, in order to
forestall any new criticism that Germany was too inactive in Italy,
as well as to integrate our activities with those of the Italians. The
activity in Rome was important also because from there its effects
could be felt throughout the entire Mediterranean area.
The Foreign Minister asked me to inform the Ambassador that
his trip to Home was only postponed.7 He had agreed to it in principle.
The Foreign Minister asked that I inform him as to when, in the
Ambassador's opinion, this visit should take place,
WtJSTER
7 Ribbentrop delivered Hitler's letter to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See documents
Nos. 663 and 665.
No. 597
297/5875S9-9'2
The Charge d>Affaires in the United States to tTie Foreign Ministry
No. 217 WASHINGTON, February 7, 1940,
Received March 6.
Pol. IX 431,
Subject: Outlook for a third term for Roosevelt.
The signs that President Roosevelt is making a bid for a third
term have greatly increased since the outbreak of the war.
748
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I. Foreign policy aspects of the third term.
It is no exaggeration to say that for the President foreign policy
considerations outweigh all those of a domestic nature in the preparation
for the election campaign. The President's entire
interest, as
one hears from his immediate entourage, is absorbed by foreign policy.
His endeavor to play a prominent role as a peace mediator is undiminished,
as is his desire that America take part in shaping the
peace. The establishment of a special division in the State Department
for preparatory work on post-war problems is an indication of
this.
The endorsement of his re-election by Ambassadors Kennedy,
Davies, and Bullitt is a tactical device for bringing foreign policy to
the fore in reaching important decisions.
The current foreign policy of the United States stands or falls with
President Roosevelt. England and France in particular are aware of
that, too. Under a Republican or a right-wing Democratic President
American foreign policy would depart from its present course and
assume a character which would bring it near to the foreign policy
program of the isolationists.
If Roosevelt were seriously considering retiring into private life at
the beginning of 1941, he would by now have put some curbs on his
inner drive for action. But there is no evidence of any withdrawal;
on the contrary, his political pronouncements and directives indicate
that he is counting on the continuation and realization of his policies,
although he says nothing himself on the subject of re-election. Such
a continuity, however, is conceivable only under his direction. The
motive of refraining as long as possible from saying anything for the
remainder of the term in the interest of maintaining this authority
is secondary to this.
The war in Europe was probably decisive in making up Roosevelt's
mind. In addition to his strongly developed pretensions to leadership
and his vanity vis-a-vis world opinion, he believes that in these
critical times he must make the "sacrifice" of another 4-year term, to
the American people. He is being supported in this belief by a host
of flatterers and hangers-on.
1
II. Domestic aspects of the third term,
The American people at large reject in principle a break with the
two-term tradition. The opposition to Roosevelt is working hard to
stiffen this resistance. Where is this going to end? Are we getting
a Roosevelt dynasty? Will it go on like this with deficits, state
socialism and economic controls ? Is Roosevelt, like Wilson and with
1 This paragraph, as well as the final paragraph of the report, was typed in
code and the decoded text was pasted over the numbered code groups when the
report was received in Berlin.
FEBRUARY 1940 749
the same results, leading us into a war that is not our concern 3 These
arguments capture a considerable proportion of the electorate, but not
the great masses. Roosevelt's name and personality, owing to the
social measures which were energetically pushed within the framework
of the New Deal, kindle a spark even today among the needy
farmers and the industrial workers, whom Roosevelt's social legislation
has given a new basis of existence, as well as among the army of
lower and middle civil servants who owe their jobs to him, the poor
and unemployed, and the youth of the country. Twenty million Catholics
have been won over by the appointment of a special envoy to th#
Pope.
These masses can easily be persuaded to accept the idea of a third
term. The tradition will be thrown overboard if the Roosevelt propaganda
succeeds in making the President's election for the third time
plausible as the only way out of an otherwise hopelessly confused
situation. It is well on the way to success.
Should Roosevelt not permit himself to be renominated there will
be a serious split within the Democratic Party, which the Republicans
will capitalize on in every conceivable way. Roosevelt's own
Vice-President, Garner, has served notice of his candidacy, regardless
of whether his chief becomes a candidate. Thus Roosevelt, confronted
with this candidacy of Garner's which he cannot and will not
endorse, would be constrained to name a candidate of his own choosing.
Among the many personalities from Roosevelt's New Deal camp
who have been mentioned not one, not even Hull, is popular enough
to hold his own against Garner. Garner, on the other hand, will be
unable to beat the Republican candidate if he has to fight a split in the
Democratic Party at the same time.
Roosevelt can cut this Gordian knot by having himself nominated
again. The timing and strategy of the nomination will doubtless be
so cleverly synchronized with the real or pretended seriousness of the
international situation that not only will the wind be taken out of
the sails of the Republicans but Roosevelt will also be able to take over
the role of Cincinnatus, to whom his country appeals in its hour of
need.
The argument that Roosevelt wants to lead America into the war on
the side'of the Allies is already being successfully counteracted by the
subtle propaganda that even such a turn of events would involve little
danger to life and limb, for the American people would not under any
circumstances be expected to send another American Expeditionary
Force to Europe.
HZ The outlook.
For the moment the only conclusion with any claim to probability
that can be drawn from this situation is that Roosevelt's re-election
750
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and a continuation of his foreign policy must be reckoned with, but
that up to that time, that is, until next November, the President will
refrain from any actions that might alienate the voters, including
taking any hasty steps in foreign policy which the American people
are not, or not yet, prepared to participate in or approve.
THOMSBK
No. 598
33/25205
TUe Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST -OKGETTT WASHINGTON, February 8, 1940 1 : 59 p. m.
No. 150 of February 8 Received February 9 1 : 00 a. nu
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles called on me today by
instruction of President Roosevelt to inform me that the President
planned to send him to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London in the near
future as "his personal representative."
l The President asked me to
inform the Führer and the Reich Government of this myself. Sumner
Welles was not instructed to make proposals of any kind; he was
only to report to the President on the basis of the talks which he
would request with the Chiefs of State and government in the countries
concerned. The President had decided on this step in order to
have the numerous opinions and reports which he received on the
European situation supplemented and coordinated by a person whom
he particularly trusted. The President would be extremely grateful
if I could give Mr. Welles the assurance before his departure that lie
would be received by both the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister
in person. Welles plans to leave here on February 17 on the Rex, and
will probably leave from Rome for Berlin on February 28. When I
asked whether a reception by Mussolini had already been arranged,
Welles replied that he had called on me first ; he would see the Italian
Ambassador only subsequently.
This conversation took place at my private residence in order to
avoid all publicity.
The President's decision appears noteworthy, among other reasons,
particularly because it permits the inference that Roosevelt's policies
are planned well in advance, and thus it is necessary to reckon with
his re-election next fall.
A short characterization of Welles will follow.2
Please send telegraphic instructions.
THOMSEN
* These words appear in English in the original text. * Telegram No. 152 of Feb. 8, not printed (33/25206) .
FEBBTTAET 1940 751
No. 599
184&/421136-37
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, February 8, 1940 10 : 40 p. mu
SECEET Received February 9 1 : 00 a. m.
No. 341 of February 8
Ciano asked me to see him tonight in order to tell me the following
on behalf of the Duce, with the request that it be reported immediately
to Berlin :
Anglo-Italian discussions had been in progress for some time,
mainly in London, with a view to reaching an agreement on trade
relations, including certain questions such as the control of Italian
shipping, etc. A total of approximately 20 million pounds sterling
was being contemplated as the basis for Italian deliveries to England.
In view of this great sum it had naturally from the outset been difficult
to find materials suitable for deliveries in large enough quantities.
Now today the British Ambassador had come to his office with
the specific demand that Italy include in her deliveries bombers and
fighter planes, guns, machine guns, etc., otherwise England did not
intend to permit the sea transport of German coal to Italy. If, on
the other hand, Italy agreed to comply with the British wishes, England
would accommodate her also in other respects (shipments of
British coal, relaxation of the control, etc.). Ciano had promptly
consulted with the Duce, who instructed him to tell the British Ambassador
immediately that he would not think of sending even as
much as a single rifle to Germany's enemies. The British Ambassador
had received this statement, communicated to him on this same
day, with extreme coolness and had pointed once more to the consequences
for the sea transport of German coaL Ciano had merely replied
that some other way would then be found. He added that this
meant the collapse of the Anglo-Italian conversations also with respect
to other deliveries. The Duce was unalterably resolved to hold to the
stand which he had already outlined in the pro memoria sent to us.1
As a result of these developments there had been a sharp deterioration
in Anglo-Italian relations.2
MACKEJSTSEK
a See document No. 542.
* Tlie Ciano Diary, entry for Feb. 8, states : "I take Prince Hesse to the Duce.
Hitler proposes a meeting of the two chiefs at the frontier. Mussolini immediately
declared himself favorable." The Haider Diary, introduced in the
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals as document
No. NOKW-3140, contains the following entry for Feb. 12 not included in the
published extracts : "The Prince of Hesse : The Duce wants to come in as soon
as this will be a help and not a hindrance to Germany. The English are convinced
that the Duce holds to his line. New phase of Anglo-Italian relations.
If the situation became more acute, It would mean the break."
752
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No- 600
Memorandum by the Ohairmcm of the German Economic
in the Soviet Union*
Moscow, February 8, 1940.
THE CONVERSATION IN THE KREMLIN FROM 1 TO 2 A. M,,
FBBRTJART 8, 1940
Present :
For Germany : Ambassador Hitter
Minister Schnurre
Counselor of Embassy Hilger
For the Soviet Union: M. Stalin
Chairman Molotov
People's Commissar Mikoyan
People's Commissar Tevossyan
Trade Representative Babarin
M. Stalin opened the discussion with the remark that there was
little time and therefore he wished to get in medias res immediately.
The letter from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop altered the situation.
2 The Soviet Government would take his views into considers
tion. He [Stalin] now had material concerning the possibilities of
delivering wolfram, molybdenum, and cobalt. The Soviet Government
could now promise something, though for a later part of the
treaty.
One treaty and not two should be concluded. The Soviet Union
would deliver commodities worth 420 to 430 million KM within 12
months of the day of signing. When a question was brought up by
People's Commissar Mikoyan, Stalin clarified this figure to the effect
that the Soviet shipments under the Credit Agreement of August 19,
1939, were not included in this. The Credit Agreement was an
independent agreement and would be carried out separately by both.
parties.
Germany should make deliveries of an equal value within 15 months,
that is also 420 to 430 million RM.
For the next 6 months the Soviet Union would make deliveries
worth 220 to 230 million RM. Germany would deliver a like amount
of products within 1 year.
'Marginal notes: "[For] F[Hhrer]" In Bibbentrop's handwriting.
"Shown to the Ftthrer. He[wel], March 2, 1940."
"* See document No. 594.
FEBRUARY 1940 753
The Soviet Union would, therefore, deliver in
12 months
+6 months
18 months 650 to 660 million EM.
Germany would deliver an equivalent value in 2 years and 3 months,
or 27 months.
Stalin then took up the delivery of metals. From Soviet stocks only
the shipments of 5,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel, and 450
tons of tin already promised could be made within the first 12 months.
In the next 6 months the following Soviet deliveries could be
promised :
Copper 6,000 tons
Nickel l, 500 "
Tin 500 "
Molybdenum 500 u
Tungsten 500 "
Cobalt 3 "
M. Stalin then requested the Germans to propose suitable prices
and not to set them too high, as had happened before. As examples
were mentioned the total price of 300 million KM for airplanes and
the German valuation of the cruiser Lutzow at 150 million RM.
One should not take advantage of the Soviet Union's good nature.
He had the following understanding of the settlement of the balance
under the new Treaty :
In that section of the Treaty by which the Soviet Union was to
make deliveries within 12 months and Germany within 15 months,
a settlement in accordance with the contemplated ratio in the mutual
exchange of goods must be called for after 6 and 12 months. This
ratio was 100 : 80. The Soviet Union was to deliver 100 percent in
12 months, and Germany in
6 months 40 percent
6 " 40 percent
3 " 20 percent
In connection with the Soviet deliveries which were to be made
in the succeeding 6 months in the amount of 220 to 230 millionBM and
to be repaid by German compensatory shipments in 12 months
(computed from the 16th to the 27th month after the conclusion
of the treaty) 3 a settlement in accordance with the contemplated
ratio in the mutual exchange of goods must be made every 3 months.
WhenM. Stalin had finished, People's Commissar Mikoyan brought
up our request submitted to the Soviet Government in vain for
months for permission to station a mother ship in Murmansk waters
754
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
for the processing of our catches. M. Stalin decided the matter
affirmatively in accordance with our wishes.
Ambassador Ritter expressed his thanks for the
accommodating
spirit in the question of the fish-processing project in Murmansk
waters. He characterized Stalin's proposal as progress. It was a
compromise between the two interpretations and it seemed to him, subject
to a closer examination, possible to come to an agreement on this
basis. As for Stalin's reproach of charging too high prices, Ambassador
Kitter called attention to the fact that German industry followed
the general rule of making the August prices basic in price
computation, on the assumption, to be sure, that the Soviet Union
does likewise with its deliveries to Germany. The valuations given
for war materials were estimates and permitted no conclusions regarding
the final prices. The final prices were to be determined in
the coming commercial negotiations.
Ambassador Bitter then dealt, in the sense of the last telegraphic
instruction 3 concerning it, with the question of whether 28 or 38 cm.
turrets could be built into Soviet warships which had been constructed
for an armament of 30 cm. turrets. Ambassador Ritter voiced the
willingness of the German Navy to give technical advice and to provide
the necessary technical assistance. It was merely necessary to
send the plans for the ships in question to the Navy. M. Stalin welcomed
this and characterized such advice as desirable.
Ambassador Hitter gave the information that the plans for the
battleship Bismarck could be entered on the list of German deliveries
cf war material, and likewise the drawings for the 28 cm. triple turrets.
M. Stalin inquired about plans for 30.5 cm. turrets. "We replied
that we did not have drawings for this caliber, since we did not
construct such turrets.
M. Stalin, who proved to be particularly well informed on all these
matters, devoted special interest to the question of the construction of
40 cm. turrets, for which we had promised to sell the plans. Ambassador
Ritter called attention to the willingness of the Krupp firm
to build such a turret for the Soviet Union on the basis of workshop
drawings.
Finally M. Stalin inquired what caliber the cruiser Lut&ow carried.
He hoped it carried 20.3 cm. turrets, for the Soviet Union had no
interest in the cruiser if it had a smaller caliber, something like 15 cm.
This question was answered by us to the effect that the cruiser Liitaow
would receive an armament of 20.3 cm. turrets.
SCBCNUKKB
Not printed ( 8434/E693964) .
FEBRUARY 1940 755
No, 601
64/36523
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 137 BEKLIN, February 8, 1940.
Herr Neubacher * told me that the Foreign Minister had authorized
him to state in Bucharest that Herr von Ribbentrop had informed
him Neubacher that he was not concerned about Rumania and did
not anticipate any Russian attack there.
WEIZSACKER
* See document No. 508.
No. 602
103/112030-32
The EinrJbassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST UROEISTT Moscow, February 9, 194:0 5 : 52 p. m.
No. 296 of February 9 Received February 10 12: 10 a; nu
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram N"o. 251 of February 3.1
1. With reference to our telegraphic report No. 256 of February 3 2
and the concluding statement in the above telegraphic instruction, I
wish to state in advance that the gesture was made precisely at the
right moment as far as the situation here is concerned. For at the
first negotiation with Mikoyan based on the proposal made at the
time by Stalin, it was apparent that no acceptable agreement could
be reached on that basis. We would therefore of our own accord
have suggested a demarche on the part of the Foreign Minister with
M. Stalin.
2. Consequently, immediately following receipt of the telegraphic
instruction, we made an appointment with M. Molotov for the purpose
of transmitting the Foreign Minister's personal communication
to M. Stalin. We were immediately received by M. Molotov alone,
apparently because M. Stalin had still not completely recovered from
his indisposition. The personal communication of the Reich Foreign
Minister was presented orally with a small supplementary statement
and upon request was left in writing. M. Molotov conducted the
subsequent lengthy conversation in a noncommittal \unver1>indMcK\
manner, and considerable differences of opinion again became apparent.
1 Document No. 594.
* See document No. 594, footnote 2.
756
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. On February 7 we were asked to call on M. Stalin at one o'clock
at night. He opened the conversation with the remark that the
Reich Foreign Minister's personal communication had created a new
situation. The Soviet Government would take the Foreign Minister's
view into consideration. Then M. Stalin first explained a
rather complicated new scheme with reference to the problem of compensation
"over a more extended period of time" and secondly made
new concessions concerning the delivery of nonferrous and hard
metals from. Soviet supplies.
Note 1. I am refraining from making a telegraphic report on all
the details of the new scheme, which is difficult to understand without
oral explanations.
The most important thing is that only one treaty will be concluded,
and that the Soviet goods will be delivered over a period of 18
months, and the German deliveries in payment thereof over a period
of 27 months. The total value of the Soviet goods delivered during
18 months and the German goods delivered during 27 months (group
garbled) 640 million to 660 million reichsmarks each. In addition
there are the Soviet goods delivered under the Credit Agreement and
to the Protectorate, as well as other Soviet services such as the transit
shipments and the purchase of raw materials in third countries, the
value of which is difficult to estimate and which are to be paid for
separately. Consequently Soviet services over a period of 18 months,
inclusive of the above-mentioned goods delivered under the Credit
Agreement, etc. nevertheless amount to the considerable sum of close to
one billion reichsmarks.
Within this schedule, however, M. Stalin insisted on a few subdivisions
with reference to time which are bothersome. Thus, for example,
he insisted in particular that Soviet goods in the amount of
420 to 430 million reichsmarks, delivered during the first 12 months,
should be paid for during the first 15 months. He inserted a number
of other bottlenecks from the standpoint of time which are causing
us some concern.
Note 2. In addition to the delivery of 5,000 tons of copper, 1,500
tons of nickel and 450 tons of tin promised earlier for the first 12
months, it was promised to deliver from Soviet stocks during the
following 6 months 6,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel, 500 tons
of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, 500 tons of tungsten and 3 tons of
cobalt.3
* In an exchange of letters at Moscow on Feb* 11 (F18/437-S8) In connection
with the conclusion of the Economic Agreement of that date (document No. 607) r
Mikoyan notified Schnurre that the Soviet Government would issue instructions
for delivering the metals in the quantities and periods mentioned here ; these deliveries
were to be included in the totals provided for in articles 1 and 2 of that
Agreement.
FEBRUARY 1940 757
We have reserved taking a final stand on these new proposals until
the details have been worked out. The first negotiation with Mikoyan
for the purpose of working out the details of these new proposals
created a favorable impression. The previous pettifogging
[schiJcanoser] methods have clearly been replaced by a certain ease of
manner. A statement by Mikoyan has shown that there is agreement
that negotiations for the conclusion of a second economic agreement
for 1941 will take place at the proper time. It may therefore be
expected that the schedules for the 1941 deliveries of both sides will
be drawn up later.
We believe that an economic agreement on this basis can be ready
for signature within the next few days. Please give us a free hand in
signing the agreement, depending on the outcome of the attempts at
adjustment and provided no new incidents occur.
Suggestions for possible intermediaries will follow.*
RlTTER
TlFPELSKIRCH
4 According to the telegram, sent (No. 301 of Feb. 9, 103/112035), the garbled
word "intermediaries" should have read "press releases."
No. 603
8S/25209-1O
The ChargS d?Affaires in tTie United States to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TJHGENX WASHINGTON, February 10, 1940 12 : 10 a. m
No. 162 of February 9 Received February 10 10: 00 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No* 156 of February 9.1
Simultaneously with Roosevelt's statement to the press on Welles3
informatory trip to Europe,2
Secretary of State Hull announced a
further American diplomatic action, at the outset of which he had
initiated nonbinding discussions with various neutral states with the
objective, if possible, of restoring world peace,
8 reviving international
trade, and preparing for universal disarmament. The text of his
statement is being simultaneously telegraphed in clear.* So as not
to burden Summer Welles' informatory trip unnecessarily, Hull believes
that this second action should be conducted separately from it.
1 Not printed (33/25208). The telegram reported President Roosevelt's announcement
of Sumner Welles' mission.
*The text of the President's statement is printed in Department of State,
Bulletin, 1940, vol. n, p. 155.
The Secretary of State's statement also included the following: "Matters
involving present war conditions are not a part of these preliminary conversations."
IUd., p. 153.
* Not printed (33/2520$),
758
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It will be difficult for the American Government to do this, however
particularly since Italy is affected by both actions. Up to now Hull
is reported to have established contact with the Italian
representative,
Holland, and Belgium.
Roosevelt probably initiated these two sudden steps for the following
reasons : The American Government, as I have reported, has been
surprised and confused by the course of the war and the international
power situation to date, and has not yet been able to reach any definite
conclusions.
The American Government is afraid that following the collapse of
Finnish resistance, which probably can no longer be avoided, the
European war will not remain localized in its present theaters, but
that the Allies will have to change their current strategy, thus making
Allied military action in the Balkans and the Near East a possibility.
This would render it even more difficult than in the past to predict
the course of the war and its duration, as well as the resulting effect
on American interests. In order to obtain specific information on the
subject, Roosevelt made the sudden decision to despatch Welles.
Welles appears to him to be especially suited for this prospective tour,
among other reasons, because Roosevelt assumes that Welles can count
on a sympathetic reception in Berlin, owing to his sharp attacks on
the Versailles Treaty and its consequences for Germany.
In so far as can be judged from here, this informatory trip suits the
purposes of the British Government very well in order to convince
Roosevelt how essential energetic aid by the United States is for an
early termination of the war. On that account it is an open question
whether the original idea for this trip originated with Roosevelt or
is due to English initiative.
These two actions unquestionably fit in well with Roosevelt*s domestic
political strategy for the impending presidential campaign, in
which he will endeavor to play up his election for the third time as
unavoidable and enforced by circumstances. They also accord with
his desire to go down in history as the great American peacemaker.
I shall report on the reaction of Congress and the press to these two
parallel actions.
FEBRUARY 1940 759
No. 604
133/74049-50
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MADRID, February 10, 1MO.
No. 459 of February 10 Received February 10 9 : 30 p. nu
Also for Staatsrat Wohlthat.
Sofindus* seems to have intensified its efforts lately to obtain a
monopoly. Apart from the Wagner action,
2 the company seeks to beput
in charge of all purchases of Spanish merchandise for Germany,,
under exclusion of other German buyers, etc. A detailed report will
follow at the next safe opportunity.
The attitude of Sofindus appears to be prompted by directives from
Berlin. Establishing a monopoly like that of the late Hisma, a proposal
that has been decisively rejected by the Spanish Government
since the end of the civil war, seems to me to be in contradiction with
the directives laid down by the departments in Berlin which guided
Wohlthat in concluding the German-Spanish economic agreement here
on December 22, 1939.3 It is to be feared that the move would also
compromise the camouflage arrangements for the shipment of goods
(cf. telegram No. 1610 of October 19, 1939) ,
4 and threaten the existence
of the other German businessmen in Spain who are engaged in
a hard struggle just now. If there has been a change in our past
policy which causes Sofindus to take the attitude that it does, please
advise by telegraph ; otherwise, I request that it be ordered to fall in
line.5
In respect to the motor torpedo boats * and other blockade runners
(instruction No. W 533g of February 3 7 and telegraphic instruction
1 Abbreviation for Socledad Financiera Industrial Ltda. For a description of
this enterprise, and the closely related Hisma and Rowak companies, see Editors*
Kote, vol. in, pp. 1-2.
2 The draft copy of this telegram in the files of the German Embassy in Madrid
(1308/348197-98) indicates that this passage was received in Berlin in garbled
form. The Wagner action was a scheme to have a part of the German ships
lying in Spanish ports attempt to run the blockade while the remaining ships
were either to be sold to Spain or to stay there under the German flag for the
time being. Madrid telegram No. 1918 of Nov. 11, 1939 (136/73942-43) had reported
that this plan had been worked out by Kapitfin Wagner of the Transport
Ministry together with the German Naval Attache" and representatives of
Sofindus.
8 See document No. 482.
4 Not printed (322/193529-30).
*This passage is printed as found on the Madrid Embassy copy (see footnote
2) since it was garbled in transmission to Berlin.
* Thus in the Madrid copy ; the Foreign Ministry copy reads here "boat."
7 Not printed (1308/347772). This was a Foreign Ministry instruction informing
the Embassy in Spain tljat the use of motor torpedo boats for transport of
goods between Spain and Italy was being considered even though there was no
complete assurance that it would be successful.
760
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 182 of February 8 8
) Sofindus has received complete telegraphic
instructions in the Eowak cipher and has been instructed to go ahead
immediately with execution in Spain. Please advise if this is not
considered dangerous there because of the need for camouflage especially
at the beginning of this action ; I have given instructions that
Sofindus is not to do anything until further notice. Einhart will
leave tomorrow for Berlin via Rome ; in accordance with instruction
(telegram No. 182 of February 8) he will call on Minister Clodius in
Rome, and on Staatsrat Wohlthat and Geheimrat Sabath in Berlin,
STOHRER
'Not printed (1308/347778). This telegraphic instruction informed the Embassy
in Spain that according to reports from' Home, the Italian authorities
were ready to facilitate in every possible way secret runs of small Spanish boats
(and in cases of necessity Italian boats) from Spain to Italy. These ships
would be unloaded in secret under the protection of the Italian coast guard.
No. 605
51/100155-56
Memorandum* by the Director of the Political Department
St.S. No. 136 g. Rs. BBRUCN-, February 10, 1940.
With reference to telegram No. 7 * frona Genoa and telegrams Nos.
50 2 and 52 3 from Dublin re Ireland.
1. The Irish Republican Army (IEA) is a secret militant society
which fights for the union of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic
and the complete separation of Ireland from the British Empire.
This is also the ultimate objective of the present Irish Government.
The difference between the Government and the IRA lies
mainly in the method. The Government hopes to attain its objective
by legal political means while the IRA tries to achieve success by terrorist
means. Most of the members of the present Irish Government
formerly belonged also to the IRA.
By reason of its militant attitude toward England the IRA is a
natural ally of Germany.
2. The Intelligence Department [Aftwehr] already has strictly secret
connections with the IRA, a part of which utilized a channel
which is now closed as the result of the war. The Intelligence Department
knows of McCarthy's presence in Italy and attaches the
greatest value to resuming the connection at once. It has asked the
Foreign Ministry today to inform the Consulate General at Genoa
that it will immediately dispatch there two of its representatives for
the purpose of establishing contact with McCarthy, The Intelli-
1 Document No. 562.
Not printed (91/10014&-49).
Not printed (91/100150).
FEBRUARY 1940 761
gence Department has been asked to establish contact only after the
Consulate General at Genoa gives the cue for it. The interest of the
Intelligence Department is confined to the promotion of acts of
sabotage.
3. It is technically possible to take John Russell (Irish name : Sean
Russell) to Ireland aboard a German submarine.
4:. In his telegram No. 50 of January 27, which is herewith enclosed,*
Minister Hempel, upon inquiry, expressed himself against dispatching
John Russell to Ireland at the present moment. He is of the
opinion that the IRA in Ireland does not have enough striking power
to bring about success. He fears that John Russell's arrival and Germany's
part therein will become known, that this will lead to a further
discrediting of the IRA, and that England will profit therefrom in
the end. Thus an incident would be created that would be parallel
to the landing of Sir Roger Casement by a German submarine in the
World War.
5. In the opinion of the Political Department such an action may
very well be considered. However, the proper time for it would not
arrive until Great Britain is in considerable difficulties all along the
line. The operation would then have to be carried out, if possible*
suddenly, in connection with other operations within the British
Empire or at its periphery. For the present, Minister Hempel's objections
are shared. If it learned of Russell's arrival, the Irish Government
would in all probability have him arrested and, if German
complicity became known, as could be expected, it would have to take
the necessary steps with reference to us. Irish neutrality would
thereby be jeopardized.
6. It is therefore proposed that the contact with McCarthy be
maintained so that the plan can be pursued further at the proper
moment. Since the Intelligence Department already has connections
with McCarthy, it is suggested that for the time being such connections
not be established through another channel as well.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
WOEBMABTN
4 See footnote 2.
No. 606
84&4/H596826
Memorand^l/m, l)y the Director of the Political Department
BERLIN-, February 10,
The Finnish Minister told me today at a chance meeting not in the
Ministry that he had information to the effect that the German Gov
762
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
eminent was bringing influence to bear on Sweden to induce her not
to give any military assistance to Finland. I told the Minister that
these reports were false. According to our information Sweden had
herself declined to assist Finland with Swedish troops, but permitted
the departure of volunteers, who, however, if they were members of
the Swedish armed forces, had to resign from the service. Wehad not
taken any official stand on this action by Sweden. A different situation
would naturally arise if forces of the powers with whom we were
at war should arrive in Sweden or Norway en route to Finland. ,That
would be an issue of importance to us.
The Minister remarked that the coming two months would be the
most critical for Finland. If they could be weathered, Finland would
surely be able to hold out until the end of the summer, for climatic
conditions in the spring would confront Russia with even greater
difficulties than in the winter.
WOERMANN
No. 607
F6/0026-0021
Economic Agreement of February 11, 194D, Between the German Reich
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
zu RM 9 g. Es.1
In the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939,2 between the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics it was established that the Government of
the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, on the basis of and in the sense of the general political
understanding achieved, desired by all possible means to develop the
commercial relations and the exchange of commodities between Germany
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For this purpose
an economic program was to be drawn up by both sides, according to
which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should make deliveries
of raw materials to Germany, which should be compensated for by
Germany with industrial deliveries over a more extended period of
time.
As a result of the negotiations for the establishment and execution
of the contemplated economic program, the Government of the German
Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
have made the following Agreement :
1 RM 9 g. Rs : Document No. 636.
* Document No. 162.
FEBRUARY 1940 7Q3
Article 1
In the period February 11, 1040, to February 11, 1941, in addition
to the deliveries provided for in the Credit Agreement of August 19,
1939,
3 the commodities enumerated in List 1 * to the value of 420 to
430 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to Germany.
Article 2
In the period February 11, 1941, to August 11, 1941, there shall be
delivered, likewise in addition to the deliveries provided for in the
Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, commodities to the value of 220
to 230 million reichsmarks from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to Germany, namely, in each case, half of the values or amounts
specified for the various commodities in List 1.
Article 3
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pledges
itself to take all measures necessary to insure the performance of the
deliveries named in Articles 1 and 2. The deliveries shall begin immediately.
Article 4
In payment for the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, German
products of the kind designated in List 2 (-war material) 5 and List
3 Vol. vii, document No. 131.
4 Not printed (2093/452908-09). In addition to the products summarized in
general terms in section 2 of document No. 636, the list also includes such items
as asbestos, sulphur, rags, powdered arsenate, iridium, tobacco, guts, herbs, iodine,
turpentine, oils of ether, opium, nicotine, spruce-needle oil, endocrine products,
brownstone, mica ore, glycerine, licorice, horn materials, albumin, seeds, vegetable
tar, and lime.
'Not printed (1137/324410-51), a 42 page typewritten list on which contract
negotiations were to begin without delay. The principal items in the 14 cate--
gories of the list are summarized as follows :
1. Naval construction. Cruiser ex-Liitsr&t0: After launching, the hull and all
the equipment, armament, spare parts, etc., to be delivered for completion in
the USSR, with 80 percent of the total to be delivered within 12 months of the
signature of the Economic Agreement, the rest within 15 months. Complete plans,
specifications, working drawings, and trial results of vx.-tiutzow, plus information
on the performance of Sevdlitz and Prinz Eugen or Admiral Hipper. Plans
for battleship Bism&rck and a large destroyer with 15 cm. guns ; complete machinery
for a large destroyer.
2. Shipbuilding material. Electrodes for welding, 365 tons; armor plate,
31,000 tons ; various types of boiler tubing, 2628 tons ; 175 power shafts of various
lengths ; 1 submarine periscope ; several thousand items of electrical equipment ;
and various tanks, motors, ventilating systems, etc,
3. Naval artillery. One 381 mm. double turret, fully equipped, to be delivered
by Mar. 1, 1941 ; preliminary sketches for a 406 mm. triple turret and working
drawings for a 280 mm. triple turret ; 2 noncorrosive submarine guns ; fire control
apparatus; etc.
4. Mine and torpedo gear.
5. Marine acoustical devices; precision clocks and watches.
6. Hydrographic instruments ; optical instruments.
7. Aircraft. 10 Heinkel "He-100" ; 5 Messerschmitt 109 ; 5 Messerschmitt 110;
2 Junkers "Ju-88" ; 2 Dornier "r>o-215" ; 3 Buecker "Bu-131", 3 "Bu-133"; 3
260090 54 54
764 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAIST FOREIGN POLICY
3 (industrial equipment and other industrial products) 6 to the value of
420 to 430 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from Germany to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of February 11
1940 to May 11, 1941.
Article 5
In payment of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 2,
German products of the kind designated in List 4 (war material) 7
Fokke-Wulf "Fw~-5S-V-13" ; 2 Fokke-Wulf "Fa-266" helicopters ; all of these for
delivery within 12 months. One Messerschmitt 209 in 15 months, if ready ; various
motors, instruments, spare parts, armaments, bombs, etc.
8. Field artillery and ballistics instruments. Two 211 mm. heavy howitzers
fully equipped; a complete 105 mm, antiaircraft battery comprising 4 guns; a
ballistics laboratory like that of Krupp at the proving grounds near Meppen;
laboratory equipment.
9. Communications. Radio, telephone, and telegraph equipment.
10. Chemical warfare equipment; synthetic rubber (Buna S, SS, N, NN).
11. Engineer equipment. Roadbuilding gear, explosives, pumps, etc.
12. Munitions. Samples of pyroxylin and dinitroglikol powder ; 500 105 mm.
mortar charges; 150 parachute flares ; a shell-loading plant (75-150 mm.) -with
hourly capacity of. 1000 75 mm. shells, similar to plant at arsenal in Jiiterbog;
installations to produce nitroglycerine, hexogen, TNT, natrium acid, and TNRS.
13. Armored vehicles and accessories. One medium tank, type III, fully
equipped ; 5 10-ton trailers ; 2 20-ton trailers ; 5 half-tracks.
14. Machine tools and other equipment. 308 machines of various types.
Not printed (2093/452910-21). The principal items on this list were the
following :
1. Mining equipment. 146 excavators, 90 of them to be delivered within 10
months; drills worth 8,325,000 RM; electric locomotives; cars; electric motors;
compressors worth 3,900,000 RM; pumps with electric motors worth 1,380,000 RM ; etc.
2. Locomobiles and turbines, 7,700,000 RM and 1,900,000 RM respectively, including
generators.
3. Equipment for petroleum industry. Diesel engines worth 6,500,000 RM;
compressors worth 8,100,000 RM ; drills and parts worth 4,500,000 RM ; electric
motors worth 6,250,000 RM ; pumps worth 1,800,000 RM; drill-tubes worth
6,500,000 RM; pump compressor tubes worth 5,000,000 RM; etc.
4. Equipment for electric power plants. Turbines with generators up to 6000
KW, worth 10,000,000 RM; steam generators with armatures, worth 30,000,000 RM ; transformers worth 5,250,000 RM ; oil switches (high power) worth 10,000,-
000 RM ; meters and protection worth 4,000,000 RM ; etc.
5. Equipment for the chemical industry. Turbo-compressors and gas-bellows
for nitrogen and sulphuric acid; numerous items of laboratory and industrial
apparatus ; plastics machines ; high-pressure tubes ; etc., with a total value of
about 12,000,000 RM.
6. Equipment for steel wire works ; machinery worth 6,900,000 RM.
7. Forges and presses, 800,000 RM.
8. Coal and steel tubing. Coal worth 52,500,000 RM, of which 20,000,000 RM
worth was to be delivered between Sept. 28, 1939, and Sept. 27, 1940 ; 12,500,000 RM worth between Sept. 28, 1940, and May [Feft.f] 11, 1941 ; and the rest between
Feb. 11, 1940, and May 11, 1941. Steel tubing worth 16,250,000 RM, with 10,-
000,000 RM worth to be delivered between Sept. 28, 1939 and Sept. 27, 1940, and
the rest by May 11, 1941.
9. Ships. To be delivered "promptly": one tanker of about 12,000 tons; M/S
Memel; M/S Phoenicia; S/S Nurnberg. To be delivered within 12 months: 1
training vessel ; 1 repair ship ; 1 hoist-ship.
10. Metals. 50,000 tons of steel tubing (including the quantities shown in
sections 3 and 8 above) ; about 45,000 tons of other metals and metal products.
'Not printed (1137/324452-57). The main items were the following:
1. Naval construction. 5 floating cranes, 3 of them having 250 tons capacity;
outfitting an electrode shop ; various other items similar to those in List 2. ,
2. Naval artillery and other materiel. Two 381 mm. double turrets for
delivery in 17 and 20 months ; 3 280 mm. triple turrets for delivery within 30-36
FEBRUARY 1940 765
:and List 5 (industrial equipment and other industrial products) 8
to the value of 220 to 230 million reichsmarks shall be delivered from
Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period
of May 11, 1941 to May 11, 1942.
Article 6
The Government of the German Reich pledges itself to take all steps
necessary to insure the performance of the deliveries named in Articles
4 and 5. The German, deliveries shall begin immediately.
Article 7
In List 6 9 appended to this Agreement are specified the machinery.
months (or alternatively 3 additional 381 mm. double turrets within 23-29
months) ; 4 149.1 mm. triple turrets within 18-22 months ; 14 105 mm. twin mounts
(including 4 sets to be included with Liitzow) ; all naval artillery to be fully
equipped with fire control apparatus and spare parts; 28m. submarine
periscopes, by mid-1941.
3. Hydrographie gear. 1950 stop-clocks ; 2000 stop-watches ; 80 chronometers ;
3 gyro-compasses for training ; 150 deck clocks.
4. Aircraft equipment. Three installations for altitude testing of motors; 2
motion picture theodolite stations ; 5 fully-equipped motor testing establishments ;
1 cylinder-testing device.
5. Machine tools, etc. Seventeen machine tools for delivery in fall 1941;
29 others, delivery dates unspecified ; 1 plant for bimetallic rotating bands for
shells, capacity 2000 tons per year, during second half of 1941; 1 plant for
widia and titanite alloys, with capacity of 30 tons per year (the exact production
formulas to be furnished, and the plants to be set up in working order in the
USSR, with a 2-year period for installation and training of personnel). Delivery
of these 2 plants will be governed by the conditions stated in List 6.
8 Not printed (2093/452922-23) . Principal items :
1. Mining equipment : various excavators worth 15,000,000 BM ; cars, drills,
compressors, and electric motors, totaling 12,500,000 RM.
2. Diesels, locomobiles, turbines, and boilers : 32,500,000 KM.
3. Equipment for electric power plants : 12,000,000 RM.
4. Coal : 40,000,000 RM.
5. Metal-working machines, especially of Hasse & Wrede system, in quantities
to be agreed upon.
6. Forges, presses, and equipment for steel wire plants: 2,000,000 RM.
7. Ships : 1 crane ship with 75-ton lift ; 5,450 h.p. tugs ; 1 self-propelled river
tanker.
8. Metals : 50,000 tons of drill tubing and compressor tubing ; 15,000 tons of
steel cable ; 300 tons of rustproof steel tubing ; 3,000 tons of zinc-coated wire.
'Not printed (2093/452924-26). This list Is prefaced by two general conditions:
(1) that the industrial processes revealed by Germany to the Soviet
Union be kept secret; (2) that the Soviet Union refrain from competing with
German firms in the world market witfc products of the installations, plants,
and processes furnished by Germany.
The list includes the following items to be ready, depending on conditions, in
"normal delivery time":
1. Complete plants for recovering old rubber by analysis (capacity 5 to 10
tons) ; for continuous vulcanizing of fabrics; and for hydrogenation of coal to
produce 20O,OOO tons of oil per year.
2. Plans and equipment for plants to produce Rohgummi Buna [synthetic
rubber] ; synthetic urea (2,000 tons annually) ; aniline and chlorbenzol (10,000
tons annually) ; phenol and chlorbenzol (6,000 tons annually) ; 4 types of anilines
(5000 tons annually) ; chlorbenzol by continuous chlorination ; betauaftol,
tiuram; koptaks, difinilguanidin ; concentrated nitric acid (10-15,000 tons annually)
; hydrosulphate by electrolysis; cellulose wool.
3. A plant for rapid vulcanization.
4. Plans and equipment for Renn and Lurgi [metallurgical] installations,
ready in 12 and 12 to 15 months, respectively.
766
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
equipment, and processes of production which the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics is interested in acquiring or receiving. Both par*
ties shall take all steps that may be necessary in order that commercial
contracts for machinery, equipment, and processes of production of
the kind enumerated in the list may be concluded as soon as possible.
The payments that become due on the basis of these contracts during
the validity of this Agreement shall be made from special accounts
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany by way
of the German-Soviet clearing system. If they become due during
the first 15 months of the Treaty they shall be used in settlement of
the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, and insofar as they
become due in the succeeding 12 months, in settlement of the Soviet
deliveries provided for in Article 2.
For this settlement other payments which are credited to the special
accounts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for example for
transit traffic, shall also be used.
Article 8
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has declared
by the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, that it is
prepared to deliver, in addition to the quantities of petroleum otherwise
agreed upon or still to be agreed upon, a supplementary quantity
of petroleum equivalent to the annual production of the Drohobycz
and Boryslaw oil region, in such proportions that half of this
amount shall be delivered to Germany from the oil fields of the said
oil region and the other half from the other oil regions of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. As compensation for these petroleum
deliveries the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall receive deliveries
of coal and steel tubing.
It is agreed that the quantities of petroleum and petroleum products
to be delivered in accordance herewith during the period September
28, 1939, to September 28, 1940, shall be included in the amount
named in List 1. In calculating the value of the compensatory deliveries
of coal and steel tubing, it shall be assumed that this first
annual amount is equal to the value of 30 million reichsmarks. These
petroleum, deliveries shall be compensated by German deliveries of
coal to the value of 20 million reichsmarks and steel tubing to the value
of 10 million reichsmarks. These deliveries shall be made by September
28, 1940.
Article 9
Both parties take it for granted that the mutual deliveries based on
this Agreement are to balance.
The Soviet deliveries made during the first 12 months of the duration
of this Agreement shall be compensated by German deliveries
FEBRTJAKY 1940 767
by May 11, 1941 ; that is, after the first six months 50 percent of the
Soviet deliveries provided for in the first period of the treaty shall be
balanced by 40 percent of the German deliveries provided for in
the same period of time ; after 12 months 100 percent of the Soviet
deliveries shall be balanced by 80 percent of the German deliveries.
The rest of the German deliveries shall be made within the following
3 months.
The Soviet deliveries made during the period from the 13th to
the end of the 18th month of the duration of this Agreement shall be
compensated by German deliveries to be made during the period from
the 16th to the end of the 27th month, computed from the date this
Agreement goes into effect, in equal quarterly amounts. It is provided
that during this second period of the Agreement a balance
sheet of the mutual deliveries shall be drawn up every three months.
Article 10
Each of the two Governments shall appoint plenipotentiaries who
shall meet on the date specified in the previous Article. The task of
these plenipotentiaries shall be to study currently the total commercial
intercourse between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
.Republics and the observance of the percentage relationship between
the German and the Soviet deliveries mentioned in Article 9, and to
take all measures necessary to carry out the economic program agreed
upon between the Governments, especially to balance the above-mentioned
percentage relationship.
The Plenipotentiaries of both Governments shall be empowered
within the scope of their duties to communicate with each other
directly, either in writing or orally. They may from time to time
draw the experts needed in their work into their consultations.
If the percentage relationship fixed by Article 9 for the mutual
deliveries is disturbed in one of the periods of time, both parties shall
take measures in the shortest possible time for the removal of the
disproportion, in which connection supplementary deliveries, especially
of coal, shall be used by Germany as a means of settlement.
In case this cannot be arranged, the interested party shall have the
right to discontinue temporarily its deliveries until the stipulated
relationship is attained.
Article 11
In the execution of this Agreement the following shall be applied:
a) the Agreement regarding exchange of goods and payments: of
December 31, 1939 ;
10
f ^
&) the provisions of Article IV and of section 3 of Article V of tha
Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939.
* Not printed (3782/E3041719-21).
768
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Besides, in connection with the payment of Soviet obligations arising
from orders made on the basis of this Agreement, the provisions
of section 5 of Article V of the above-mentioned Credit Agreement
shall be correspondingly applicable;
c) the Confidential Protocol of August 26, 1939.11
Article 12
Both Parties have agreed that the accommodations granted or
transit traffic on the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28,,
1939 (freight reductions of 50 percent on soybeans and the payment
of all railway freight charges in the transit traffic through the German-
Soviet clearing system) shall remain in force during the entire
period of the validity of this Agreement. In order to facilitate use
of the sums paid in reichsmarks by Germany for freight charges,
Germany shall lend her cooperation to the Soviets in placing orders
in Germany and in acquiring goods and techniques of production
there.
Article 13
This Agreement shall not affect the Credit Agreement between the
German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August
19, 1939, which shall remain completely in force.
Article 14
This Agreement shall become effective upon signature.
Done in two original copies in the German and the Russian languages
respectively, both texts being equally authentic.
Done in Moscow, February 11, 1940.
For the Government Representing the Government of the
of the German Reich : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
K. RlTTER A, MlKOYAK
K. SCHNTORE BABABTK
CONFIDBKTIA30 PROTOCOL
In connection with the Economic Agreement signed today between
the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the1
undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of both Parties
have agreed concerning the following :
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall
instruct the proper Soviet commercial organizations to enter into
negotiations with the German organizations and firms designated by
the Government of the German Reich in regard to the purchase by
the Soviet Union of metals and other goods in third countries and in
11 Vol. vn, document No. 340,
FEBRUARY 1940 769
regard to the sale of these metals and goods to Germany. Such sales
shall be made by the Soviet organizations on the following basis :
Payment for the goods by the German purchasers up to 70 percent
in transferable foreign currency to be designated by the Soviet commercial
organization making the delivery and 30 percent in reichsmarks
in accordance with the German-Soviet Agreement regarding
exchange of goods and payments of December 31, 1939. If the German
purchaser is not in a position to make payment in the currency
suggested by the Soviet commercial organization, he may offer to
make payment in another transferable currency. If the Soviet commercial
organization refuses this currency, payment shall be made in
gold on conditions to be agreed upon between the purchaser and the
Soviet commercial organization making delivery.
In this connection the Germans shall, for the purpose of utilization
of the sums in reichsmarks paid by the Germans to the Soviet
commercial organizations, lend their cooperation in placing orders in
Germany and in the acquisition of goods and production techniques
in Germany.
Moscow, February 11, 1940.
For the Government Representing the Government of the
of the German Reich : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
K. RlTTER A. MlKOYAN
K. SCHNURRE BABARIX
No. 608
F18/436
The Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in Germany to the
Chairman of the German Economic Delegation
at present in Moscow, February 11, 1940.
HERR MINISTER : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your communication of today's date, which reads as follows :
*
"Germany agrees that the amounts of money totaling 58.4 million
reichsmarks provided for war material by the Credit Agreement of
August 19, 1939, may in accordance with the provisions of the said
Credit Agreement also be used for ordering articles from Lasts 2 and
4 appended to the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940. It is
agreed that articles to be ordered in this manner shall be decided
upon between the Ministry of Economics of the Reich and the Trade
Agency of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany."
I declare myself to be in agreement with the contents.
Please accept, Herr Minister, the assurance of my highest
consideration.
BABABUT
1 Not printed (P18/436) .
770
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 609
1T3/84.191-93
The Legation m the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECKET THE HAGUE, February 12, 1940 6 : 45 p. m.
No. 109 of February 12 Received February 12 9 : 30 p. m.
A neutral source which is very well disposed toward us indicated
to me that the Japanese offer to conclude a nonaggression pact with
the Netherlands is Japan's answer to Roosevelt's step of sending
Welles to Europe. Roosevelt is especially concerned about East Asia,
since a Japanese reaction to the American embargo is feared, and this
reaction is expected to take the direction of new expansion. In view
of the aroused and united public opinion in the United States, Roosevelt
is not in a position to give his policy in the Far East a different
direction.
Behind the Japanese attempt at political rapprochement with the
Netherlands there is the Japanese desire of obtaining from the Netherlands
not only new concessions in Borneo but also the permission very
quickly to make both the old, impoverished concessions and the new
ones productive by permitting thousands of Chinese workers to come
in. Japan is said to be striving to win Chinese youth through promising
prospects of colonization in the Netherlands Indies. Although it
is recognized here that Japan must obtain new sources of oil, the
influence of the oil magnates here, who are tinder British domination
and are accustomed to seeing things only through British eyes, is too
great to make rapprochement with Japan appear feasible for the
time being.
It was pointed out to me that developments attending Welles' trip
would be the more advantageous from our point of view if Germany
would as ostentatiously as possible during his European trip, promote
open rapprochement with Japan, particularly economic negotiations
concerning, possibly, concessions in Northern China ; this would bring
effective pressure to bear on Roosevelt toward considering German demands
and objectives with greater understanding than would otherwise
be the case. It is Roosevelt's anxiety which brings Welles here.
England and France, involved in the European war, could (group
missing) the United States of America alone in a conflict with Japan,
which would be tantamount to a political defeat and a tremendous loss
of prestige for presidential candidate Roosevelt, especially since he
does not at present have at his disposal the forces for maintaining his
policy. Since the War Council in Paris is said to have considered East
Asiatic questions in the sense of giving secondary priority to all interests
there for the present, Welles' trip was hastened. Roosevelt's
FEBRUARY 1940 77J
fears would be confirmed if German-Japanese rapprochement in the
economic field were now making visible progress. Eoosevelt would
then have to bring all of his influence to bear on England and France
to break off the futile war, accept the new situation in Europe and
devote themselves explicitly to the greater interests in the Far East.
Roosevelt's fears are confirmed by increasing indications that England
is planning a tighter consolidation of the Empire in the Near East
and Africa, without giving up her position in British India. With
reference to the African report it is significant that a strong Anglo-
French financial group is having the Banque de Paris et Pays-Bas
buy up all Belgian-Congo shares obtainable on the open market (a
report which could probably be checked unobtrusively) .
Thereby it is also intended to exert pressure on the King of the Belgians,
whose family probably holds most of the shares. The main
objective, however, is to prepare for England in the African area a
visible increase in power, consolidation, and extension of the British
sphere of influence, and maintenance of British prestige in the world
which cannot be attained, as circumspect circles in England are coming
to realize more and more, through the war with Germany.
The fact that England's active policy vis-a-vis Turkey is also already
serving the greater plan of consolidating the Empire in a
smaller circle (Near East and Africa) is confirmed in today's article
by the diplomatic correspondent of the Sunday Times, who writes that
England cannot remain indifferent to developments in the area of
Iran and Iraq.
If rumors here should prove correct, to the effect that the British
Government induced the Imperial Chemical trust (Eden) to offer to
the Italian Government, in spite of the well-known capital investments
at the Dead Sea, the financing of the potash exploitation in
Ethiopia, and further, that the British Government is again playing
up increased Italian participation in the Administration of the Suez
Canal, this should be considered a further confirmation of British
plans. Since the British Government realizes that such offers would
not satisfy Italian aspirations and that France is not prepared to
make territorial concessions in Tunisia, consideration is being given
to obtaining Italian participation in the planned "Chartered Compagnie
Africa" through the cession of Jibuti and Somaliland.
A contributing factor in Welles' trip is the American fear that the
war will end with the division of European markets between the
Anglo-French economic bloc and Germany, which would mean a total
loss of Europe as a customer of the American export industry.
The American plan of suggesting a four-year truce to the belligerents
and then of intervening in the meantime in economic negotiations
in which Japan (but not Russia) and Italy would be included springs
772 DOOTMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
originally from this same concern. A new course becomes apparent
from HulPs statement about making preparations with the neutrals
for economic policy after the war,1 and it is typical that he first received
the Dutch Minister, to the surprise of the Government here
(by way of a counteraction to Japan's offer to conclude a nonaggression
pact with the Netherlands).
* See document No. 60S.
* Gottfried Aschmann had been Director of the Press Department of the Foreign
Ministry from 1936 to 1939. Pensioned in 1939 with the rank of Minister he was called back into service at the outbreak of war and attached to the Legation
at the Hague to be in charge of the greatly expanded press activities of the
Missions in the Netherlands and Belgium.
No. 610
183/8606-1
Memorandivm, l>y the State Secretary
St.S. No, 146 BERLIN, February 12, 1940.
The President of the Swiss National Council, Henry Vallotton, of
Lausanne, was in Finland to study the present condition of the Finnish
people. He appears also to have left there a donation of Swiss
money.
M. Vallotton, with whom I have been well acquainted for a long time,
also came around to talking about the atmosphere in Switzerland and
the threat from Germany. I assured him how urgently necessary for
Germany it was to leave Switzerland out of the present war. I authorized
him to mention this wish of ours in talks with his friends
in Parliament provided he made sure that the Swiss press did not
make a "declaration" out of it. I did not want to be mentioned in
the Swiss press at all, for I was not authorized to make any such
"declaration." I availed myself moreover of the opportunity to impress
upon him how necessary it was for the Swiss press to adopt a
different attitude from that heretofore taken.
WEIZSACKEH
No. 611
tfll/0139-0141
TTie Chief of the Security Police and of the Secwrity Service to the
Foreign Minister
ICOST TOGHGBTT BEBUosT, February 12, 1940.
By orderly RM 7 g Es.
TT F C.d,S. AZ : 53081/40 Bi./H.
DEAR PARTT COMRADE VON HIRKENXROP ! A confidential agent of
my office has proved on several occasions in the past to have excellent
PBBRTJART 1940 773
-connections with Netherlands governmental circles. He is personally
.acquainted with Foreign Minister Kleffens and, he says, was included
in several recent meetings of an "action committee" of the Netherlands
Government to which belong Minister President de Geer and
Foreign Minister KlefFens, among others.
The informant describes the view on the present situation held by
the Netherlands Government as follows: The Netherlands Government
fails to understand why Belgium on the occasion of the recent
crisis (mobilization, phase D), secured for herself an option, as it
were, on England's help. It believes that this decision was imprudent
and does not contemplate any similar action. It wants to have
.a good understanding with Belgium, but not military alliance by any
jneans. Outwardly, a pretense of unconcern is maintained : Holland
has the Führer's promise! Inwardly, however, the Government is
practical enough to reckon with "possibilities."
If Holland keeps her present government and there is every indication
that she will then Holland will solve all the problems that
might possibly arise independently of foreign powers. If Germany
should march through Belgium, Holland would do nothing. If German
troops march through southern Limburg, Holland would offer
local resistance and raise a big outcry, but definitely would not counterattack
or beg England and France for help.
The informant has assured us that his statements are absolutely
reliable although they must not, of course, be expressed publicly. He
also asks that Berlin should bear in mind at all times that the attitudes
of Belgium and Holland are widely divergent in the present situation.
The men governing Holland at present regard independence
as the highest good and would do everything to find solutions that
would end the conflict as soon as possible. These men also realize
that the difficulty lies with England alone. It is not impossible that
the Netherlands Government might in the very near future make
semiofficial inquiries in Italy since the Duce is the only man in a
position to take such an initiative.
Most important among the statements of the informant seem to
be those referring to a possible passage of German troops. The
impression is that Germany is perhaps to be approached through
the informant with certain suggestions, but that conversely, he could
Also be used to convey them to the "action committee" of the Netherlands
Government.
The informant can probably be reached until Wednesday of this
week.1
"The Foreign Minister requested on Feb. 14 (ItLl/OISS) that Heydrfch be
thanked for forwarding the report, but that the informant for the moment be given
no suggestion for further action.
774
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 612
B1S/B003384
Memorandum!, T^y the Minister to finland 1
SECRET BERLIN, February 13, 1940.
The Reich Foreign Minister told me yesterday at the conclusion of
a lengthy conference that Germany did not wish to mediate in tlie
Finnish-Russian conflict at the moment. It could not be predicted
today how that question would stand in a few weeks.
The Foreign Minister then raised the question whether I could
find out in a discreet way in Finland what conditions the Finnish
Government would agree to if the occasion should arise. I replied
that this was a difficult task in view of the situation. But even if
real mediation were out of the question, still it might be possible tomake
discreet arrangements for a Finn who was persona grata in
Moscow, such as, M. Paasikivi, to have an interview with some Russian
in Berlin. The Foreign Minister replied that I could suggest
to the Finnish Foreign Minister as my own idea that he might
through me ask the Reich Foreign Minister to sound out Moscow as
to whether the Russians were disposed to send someone to Berlin for
a talk with Paasikivi.
BLUCHER
*For another account of this Interview see Wipert von Blticher, Gesandter
sfwischen Diktattw und Democratic (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 172-174.
No. 613
33/25221
The Foreign Minister to tTie Embassy in. the United States
Telegram
No. 136 of February 14 BERLJN, February 14, 1940.
RAM 57.
With reference to your telegram No. 150 of February 8, 1940.1
Please inform Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles orally
of the following:
The Reich Government has taken cognizance of President Roosevelt's
intention to send a special representative to Europe and, among
other capitals, also to Berlin. It seems to the Reich Government
that there is a certain contradiction between the recall of American
Ambassador Wilson and President Roosevelt's desire to inform himself
on the situation in Germany. The Reich Government is not
acquainted with the intention and objective pursued by President
1 Document No. 598.
TEBRTJAKT 1940 775
Boosevelt in sending Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to
Europe, but is prepared to receive Mr. Sumner Welles. The German
position on the international situation and the war has been made
unmistakably clear to the world in the Ftihrer's speeches. As regards
Germany's relations with the United States in particular, it should
be noted that the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory to both
peoples. Should the American Government desire in sending Mr.
Sumner Welles to Berlin to express the intention of terminating this
situation to the development of which the Reich Government has
not contributed in any way and effecting a change, this would
undoubtedly be in the interest of both peoples.
2
B.IBBENTROP
'Thomsen replied in a telegram of Feb. 15 (33/25222) that lie liad handed
Welles an aide-memoire in the sense of these instructions which Welles had
promised to transmit to the President. Welles had emphasized that his journey
had no purpose other than to provide the President with a coordinated picture
of the European situation based on conversations with its leading statesmen.
On Feb. 20, Japanese Counselor of Embassy Usami asked Woermann about
Germany's interpretation of the Welles mission. Woermann replied that Germany
knew no more about the Welles mission than the official American communiquS
stated. He pointed out that the subject had "not exactly been treated
as a sensation on the front page of our newspapers," and recalled that Roosevelt
as well as Welles himself had made many anti-German speeches. Woermann
memorandum of Feb. 20 (33/25226).
On Feb. 27, WeizsRcker recorded in a memorandum (B21/B005410) that American
Charg^ d'Affaires Kirk said he was uninformed as to the contents of Welles'
talks in Europe. Weizs&cker also noted: "Kirk's personal views are well
known. For him Europe now confronts a choice between peace and Bolshevism."
No. 614
SS68/E398117-18
Memorandum, "by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 152 BEKUN, February 14, 1940. W 782 g.
The Greek Minister * called on me today and opened the conversation
with a few political statements which culminated in the assurance
that Greece would preserve her neutrality with all her strength and
to the very last.
After that, the Minister turned to Greek foreign trade relations.
He set forth Greece's dependence on British coal and the income derived
from Greek shipping. He added that his Minister President
wished not only to maintain but also to expand trade with Germany.
Finally the Minister turned to our deliveries of war material to
Greece. In this connection I had to refute a misstatement on the part
of the Minister when he spoke of the delivery of German planes to
Bulgaria, which could have no other target than Greece. A remark
1 Alexander Rizo-Rangab6.
776
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by the Minister about the fear of Germany in the Balkans also
prompted me to make it quite plain to him who it was that had an
interest in disturbing the peace in the Balkans, and that it might be
better for him to consider the purpose of the Weygand army. Germany,
I continued, did not inject any political considerations into her
trade relations with Greece.
On this basis, which the Minister surely could not fail to
recognize,
I would gladly take under consideration his troubles about the delivery
of war material.
Herewith submitted to the Economic Policy Department with, a
request that, at a suitable opportunity, information be given concerning
the justification of the Greek wishes.
No. 615
S6S7/E035544
TTie Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Norway
Telegram
MOST TJRGENT BjHRiJGNr, February 17, 1940 2:45 a. m.
No. 133 of February 17 Received Oslo, February 17 3 : 40 a. m.
The OKM has reported that the steamer A2tmarJc was molested in
Norwegian territorial waters near the coast by a British destroyer
which attempted to come alongside.
Please instruct all Consulates in question to exercise constantly
the greatest watchfulness.
Please also point out to the Norwegian Government at once in earnest
terms at an unconventional hour if necessary that Norway's
neutrality has been violated and that there is acute danger of further
violations.1
Please take all measures required by the situation there in cooperation
with the Naval Attache^2
1 On Feb. 17, Brauer sent Jens Bull, Secretary-General of the Norwegian Foreign
Ministry, a note (3687/E035542) confirming a telephone conversation at
9:30 that morning. Brauer had protested the "outrage" perpetrated by the
British destroyer Cossack against AltmarJc, charged that the Norwegian Government
had afforded her inadequate protection, called for restoration of the
ship to her original condition, and demanded that all measures be taken against
the assailants. In a telegram later that day (3687/E035549-50 ) , Brauer reported
that he had been officially notified that the Norwegian Legation in London had
been instructed to protest to the British Government about the violation of Norway's
sovereignty by British naval forces against Altmark. The text of the Norwegian
note of Feb. 17, together with a British record of the conversation wMch
took place when the Norwegian Minister, B. A. Colban, presented it to Halifax,
are printed in Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and the Norwegian Government Respecting tJie German Steamer "A.Umark",
London, IVth Febrttary-lSth March, 1940 (Cmd. 8012), London, 1950.
3 See document No. 618.
FEBRUARY 1940 777
No, 616
186/74058-6*
TTie Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECRET MADRID, February 17, 1940.
No. 550 of February 17 Received February 17 : 45 p. m.
Make no copies
For the Foreign Ministry only.
With reference to my telegram No. 459 of February 10 * and to your
telegram No. 225 of February 14.2
It is being said in Sofindus circles that Bernhardt is returning to
Spain equipped with the fullest powers because the Spanish-German
agreement of December 22 3 is supposedly a complete failure. This
tallies with the recent monopoly pretensions of Sofindus reported in
despatchW201/40 of February 14,* and the position of the Economics
Ministry, reported in instructionsW601 g of February 7 5 andW681 g
of February 10,
6 which amounts to nothing less than a partial elimination
or a "bowing out" of the Embassy, A reliable source in Berlin
further indicates that Bernhardt intends to submit to Franco here
in Spain plans for the reconstruction of Spain; that would be a renewal
of Bernhardt's political activity in Spain, prohibited once before
by the Foreign Ministry.7 Bernhardt is also said to have declared
in Germany that it would be he who would dispense the orders
for industry. Furthermore, it appears to be a positive fact that
the Economics Ministry is again going to send Bernhardt to Spain
on a permanent basis as the top man in Sofindus.
To what extent these stories are completely true it is impossible to
judge from here. It is certain, however, that Bernhardt's impending
reappearance here will bring on all the serious difficulties which
I have been anticipating.
If impossible situations like those during the civil war are not to
recur and if a politically dangerous dissatisfaction of the Spanish
Government over the new attempts at monopoly of a German firm
is to be avoided, it would be essential to define exactly Bernhardt's
powers and responsibilities in writing, indicating the limitation as to
scope and time, and to inform me of the particulars.
Please inform Staatsrat Wohlthat.
STOITTTOR.
x Document No. 604. ., * Not printed (1308/348194). This announced the impending arrival in Spain
of Johannes Bernhardt. The instruction stated that no change of policy wa
tinder consideration with regard to Sofindus.
8 Document No. 482.
4 Not printed (1308/348147-^tS) .
'Not printed (1308/348228).
Not printed (1308/348223-25). * See vol. m, documents Nos. 794 and 795.
778
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 617
B1S/B003396-97
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TJBGENT HELSINKI, February 17, 1940 6 : 44 p. m.
SECRET Received February 17 10 : 00 p. m.
No. 71 of February 17
I had a long talk today with the Foreign Minister. I remonstrated
with him for the statement reported in our telegram No. 62.1
JVL
Tanner defended himself with the argument that he had had to assume
that the rumors about mediation had been launched by the Russians
in order to paralyze the will of the Finnish people to defend themselves.
His statement had had the purpose of strengthening the home
front. After a further rather heated discussion M. Tanner stated
that he had not meant to say anything against Germany.
I then told him that the Finnish army, notwithstanding all local
successes, could not in the long run hold out against Russia's superior
force, that none of the powers would dare to side openly with Finland,
and that assistance in the form of volunteers and arms was insufficient.
Besides, I did not see how a third state could undertake any
mediation, and German mediation could not be considered at this time,
either.
M. Tanner said mournfully that I had only bad news for him when
he had hoped that I would have something cheerful to say. After
talking about many other things I said that on my lonely return trip
I had constantly been turning the matter over in my mind, and had
come to the entirely personal conclusion that something might perhaps
be accomplished if a Finn who was respected [beliebt] in Moscow
should have a secret meeting with some Russian in a third country.
M. Tanner seized upon the idea, and remarked, on the personal side,
that he himself, being a Menshevik, was persona ingrata in Moscow.
We agreed that Paasikivi met the requisite of being well looked upon
in Moscow. At the end of the talk I formulated the idea to the effect
that M. Tanner would ask the Reich Foreign Minister through me
whether he was willing to sound out the Kremlin as to whether th&
Russian Government was disposed to send someone to Berlin for a
secret exchange of views with M. Paasikivi. I emphasized that this
*This telegram (B18/B003388) transmitted Tanner's statement to the Finnish
Chamber denying foreign press reports that "a Great Power" was expected to
mediate in the Rtisso-Finnish conflict. Tanner said that the Finnish Government
had taken no steps In this direction and knew of none, and also that Finland
with the help now coming in response to the league of Nations resolutionwould
be able to meet all attacks. Finland would not accept a dictated
peace, and the rumors of mediation might well be spread merely to paralyze
foreign aid.
FEBRXTART 1940 779
was my own personal idea and that its execution was contingent on
two conditions, both unknown to me ; first, the willingness of the Reich
Foreign Minister, and second, that of the Russian Government. M.
Tanner thanked me for the interest I had shown for Finland and
added that he would discuss the matter with his Cabinet colleagues and
would inform me of further developments.
.OLXJOjbLtSJJtC
No. 618
S076/612953-57
Memorcmduan. by the Naval AttaoTie in Norway T
(SECRET OSLO, February 17, 1940.
B. No. 590 g
Subject: S. S. Altmark.
1. February 15, evening: A message was received from Bergen
(telegram from the captain of Altmarfe) that the ship was lying
north of Bergen, having been stopped by a patrol vessel and kept
from proceeding on the ground that the declared area cannot be passed
at night. Thereupon, the following steps were taken:
a) The matter was cleared with Admiral Diesen (Commanding
Admiral). The steamer received authorization to pass through the
declared area at night.
b) A coded telephone message was sent to the OKM that the
steamer would pass Bergen on a southerly course around 11 p. m
2. February 16, forenoon: Clarification was sought by a coded telephone
call to Haugesund whether the steamer actually had passed
through the Bergen zone during the night. Haugesund notified the
OKM in code via the Foreign Ministry that the steamer had passed.
3. February 16, 6 p. m.: A telephone call was received from the
Naval Attache section, OKM, giving the approximate position of the
steamer as well as instructions to make appropriate arrangements
for her safety. Action taken :
A telephone call was made to the Commanding Admiral, requesting
that arrangements be made to escort the steamer through the coastal
district or Kristiansand (which also comprises the district of
Eigeroy). Emphasis was placed on the importance of the vessel
which flies the official Reich ensign. A promise was received that due
attention would be given to this information.
x Tbe files also contain detailed reports of the AltmarTt incident by Captain
Ban, master of the vessel, and by the Legation in Oslo. Ban's report, dated
Feb. 20 (3076/612962-72), describes events of Feb. 16 and 17 directly involving
his ship. Tbe basic text of tne Legation report (3687/E03556&-77) , which took
a wider view of the incident, was initialed by Neuhaus, the Counselor of Legation,
on Feb. 28, and various amplifications were inserted later.
780
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
4:. February 16, late afternoon: Another telephone call was made
to the Commanding Admiral requesting information. The reply
was : "We have heard nothing specific. Protection is assured. I cannot
tell you anything more."
5. February 16, 9:5O p. m.: Prompted by the special bulletin of
the Deutschland transmitter, I telephoned the Admiralty once more.
I was now referred to the Secretary General, who in turn referred
me to Admiral Diesen. Information: There has been an incident
The steamer is safe. There is no more reason for concern. The
steamer is covered by Norwegian patrol vessels. I was not given her
exact position although I asked for it. I then telephoned to OEM
and reported directly to Admiral Schniewind.
Despite Admiral Diesen's assurance that he would keep me informed
of any news he should receive, I had no further call, so that
it was reasonable to assume that the steamer was safe. Despite the
advanced hour of the night, the Minister intervened once more personally
and talked with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry*
He, too, received reassuring information.
6. February 17, m the mornvng: I telephoned the Admiralty requesting
information concerning possible additional news. Embarrassed
silence. Admiral Diesen alone could give me the information.
Diesen was in the Foreign Ministry. He did not come to
the telephone. I asked that he receive me at once.
February 17, 9 a. m.: Lieutenant von Krosigk (OKM) telephoned. A cipher telegram was transmitted reading: News from steamer
lacking.
The telegrams of the captain arrived at the Legation giving an account
of the attack. The Minister in person energetically took the
matter in hand. Then followed the Minister's reports to the Foreign
Ministry with the request that they be forwarded to OKM.
February 17, 10:30 a. m.: With the concurrence of the Minister, I
called upon the Admiralty where Admiral Diesen at last received
me. He was very dejected and upon my request gave the following
account:
His statement of the evening of February 15 that the steamer had
received authorization to pass the Bergen declared area during the
night was correct. He had done even more and had the ship escorted
by a Norwegian patrol vessel. This patrol vessel had constantly
been with Altmark, and was relieved south of Bergen by the
Norwegian torpedo boat SJcarv (an old vessel of 90 tons displacement),
which continued to escort Altmark. He deplored that Altmark had
used her radio near Bergen, which was forbidden, and he, Diesen,
presumed that the British established her location through the radio
signal. (Altmark did actually use the radio to send a telegram to
FEBRUARY 1940
the Legation requesting its intervention to secure the transit permit.
When it was indicated to him that the sending of radio signals was
forbidden, the captain of Altmark apologized to the Admiral in Bergen.)
At about 5 p. m. a British cruiser and 5 destroyers hove into
sight east of Eigeroy. One of the destroyers tried to stop Altmark.
The British cruiser sent out a boat. Altmark however paid no attention
and continued on her course. The Norwegian patrol vessel
protested very sharply to the British destroyer against this interference
within Norwegian territorial waters. Altmark then turned
into Jossing Fjord. At that time a second Norwegian torpedo boat
joined Skarv (following my telephone call to Admiral Diesen concerning
protection of Altmark) . Altmark thus was guarded by two
Norwegian naval vessels. Nevertheless, two British destroyers also
headed into the fjord while the cruiser and, two destroyers remained
outside. Skarv placed herself between Altmark and the British and
protested once more in the sharpest terms, whereupon the British
left. That was the situation at the time when he talked with me on
the telephone the night before and he had therefore been justified in
stating that all danger was past.
Later in the evening, at about 8 p. m., one destroyer suddenly reappeared,
approached Altmark and turned searchlights on her. One
of the Norwegian torpedo boats again protested. The British replied
that they had to take several hundred British prisoners off the
ship and boarded Altmark without paying any attention to the protest.
Shooting was then heard and after a relatively short time the
destroyers steamed out again at full speed. When I asked why the
Norwegian torpedo boats had not resisted by force of arms this
monstrous violation of international law, Admiral Diesen replied in
these words : "What is a little torpedo boat with two automatic weapons
on board (two 47 mm.) to do against a cruiser? A single salvo
would wipe her out. Besides, the ice was so heavy that our small
Norwegian boats were in no position to pursue the powerful British
destroyers." (Comment by Naval Attache: According to the captain
of Altmark the ice was not that heavy.)
When I said that I, as an officer of the German Navy, found it
nevertheless impossible to understand and approve the weak attitude
of the commander of the Norwegian torpedo boat, he replied
only by shrugging his shoulders.
Admiral Diesen continued : The last message he received this morning
stated that all of the British ships had steamed out of sight. The
coastal patrol posts no longer had contact with the British ships. The
wounded had been placed under medical care. He would extend every
facility for getting in touch with the captain of Altmark. He spoke
bitterly, but in very cautious and reserved terms, about the action
782
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the British. He also added that the crew of Altmark had returned
the fire. I denied this immediately, stating that Altmark was no
naval vessel and had no weapons. Reply : "But she does ; she has antiaircraft
guns." To this I replied: "That is entirely unknown to me*
what has your Navy observed ?" Reply : "It has been reported to me
that the ship has antiaircraft guns, but that they are kept below deck."
To this I countered : "Which is proof that they cannot be fired."
While I was still with the Admiral, a Norwegian message arrived
that Altmark was preparing to blow herself up. Admiral Diesen
called to my attention that there were important Norwegian industrial
plants nearby which might be damaged as a result. I replied that I
could not imagine that the captain was planning to blow her up.
I then had a talk with several other officers of the Admiralty, including
Commander Gottwald, who said in the presence of two of his
fellow officers: "That's just like the British as I know them." I
stressed in this talk once more my utter failure to comprehend the
attitude of the commanders of the two Norwegian torpedo boats,
who could have furnished proof, despite the odds against them, that
they could not only talk about neutrality but also die a hero's death
for neutrality. The reply was : "They were young officers who naturally
did not have the courage to open fire on the British without
orders."
I further wish to report that the Naval Press Chief, Captain Steen,
with whom I have so far maintained very good and even friendly
relations, has unfortunately been taken seriously ill and that his
successor did not have the courage to give me the information which
Captain Steen would surely have given me.
All that could be done for the protection of Altmark by the Legation
and by myself since the ship's appearance off Bergen was, I believe,
done. The S. S. Altmark was actually given the strongest protection
ever accorded a German ship by Norway.
7. February 17\ 11 a. m.: The Minister ordered that all measures
be taken to assure the refloating of the ship and the protection of the
crew. The Consul in Stavanger was instructed to go immediately to
the location where the incident occurred. Furthermore, Captain
Kempf, who is an expert in navigational matters, is being sent up by
car to be at the disposal of the captain of Altmark. An improvised
telephone post has been established near the location, so that the
captain can be reached at all times.
The captain reported that all secret materials had been held in
readiness in sacks with sufficient weight for throwing overboard and
were dropped in 60 to 80 meters of water before the ship was boarded
by the British destroyer. He thought it would be impossible to
retrieve them. Captain Kempf will look into this once more himself.
FEBRUART 1940 783
Altmark has for the time being declined any assistance rby salvage
tugs. The diver will go down on February 18 to survey the damage to
the stern which has run aground on rock. The captain will then decide
what to do. He has reported that so far the losses are six dead; three
very seriously wounded, one of whom is expected to die ; three seriously
wounded who will probably recover ; and one missing, who was probably
drowned. The British fired indiscriminately into the unarmed
crew. The captain of AltmarTc is very critical of the action of the
Norwegian torpedo boats. He did not want to be more specific on the
telephone.
For the rest I refer to the Minister's extensive telephone reports to
the Foreign Ministry, and to my brief interim report telephoned
directly to Admiral Fricke.2
*On Feb. 18, the Director of the Press Department sent telegraphic instructions
(3076/612958-59) for guidance of AltmarTc.9$ captain in dealing with the
foreign press. He was to emphasize that she carried only small arms and offered
no resistance ; that she was an ordinary oil transport with a civilian crew, assigned
at the outbreak of war as a supply ship for Admiral Graf Spee ; that the
small naval party aboard did not change AltmarTc's status as an unarmed vessel ;
and that living conditions were the same for Germans and prisoners. He should
avoid mentioning her call at a Mexican port and the particulars of her cooperation
with Graf Spee.
On Feb. 21, BrSuer reported by telegraph (3076/612975-76) on a conversation
that day with Koht who condemned the British action but regarded further violations
of Norwegian territorial waters as unlikely. Koht said that his Government
contemplated submitting the AltmarJc incident to arbitration to determine
not whether Britain had violated international law, which he said was "quite
patent," but whether any blame could be attached to Norway. The further disposition
of AltmarTc and crew was also discussed in this conversation ; 'then in
a memorandum of Feb. 24, Brauer recorded a conversation of that morning with
Secretary General Bull who asked that the ship be removed from Norwegian
waters as soon as possible. Bull noted that Halifax had advanced the view
that AltmarJc's crew should be interned (see document No. 615, footnote 1).
Brfiuer opposed this view, pointing out that AltmarJc was in a Norwegian port
involuntarily because of damage resulting from a violation of international law
and arguing that she was entitled to remain until fully repaired. On Mar. 26,
Brauer telegraphed (3687/EO35578) that AltmarTc, accompanied by a German
tug and a Norwegian destroyer, had entered Swedish waters at 7:00 a. m.,
Mar. 22.
No. 619
8118/641586-88
The President of the German-Japanese Society a to the State
Secretary
BERLIN, February 17, 194
784
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure]
MEMORANDTTM
February 16, 1940.
Today on the occasion of a luncheon I had a lengthy conversation
with the Japanese Ambassador on the policy of the United States of
America, from which the following ideas may be of interest. The
Ambassador expressed himself as follows :
"The Americans have no politicians and diplomats of any stature.
They do not pursue a long-range policy ; their policy is strongly influenced
by personal interests, and at present the presidential election
plays an important role. I always tell my American friends that in
the present world situation the Americans ought to pursue an absolutely
impartial policy; they also ought to avoid committing themselves
emotionally on one side or another, so that they are always in
a position to play the part of mediator, should the occasion arise."
Since I had the feeling that this recommendation of an impartial
policy was supposed also to refer to the attitude of the Americans
toward Japan, I went further into this point and said that a partisanship
of the Americans for the British in East Asia would only be
harmful to them in the long run. They should be encouraged as much
as possible to take an economic interest in East Asia; this was not
dangerous for Japan, since in my opinion the United States had no
power interests in East Asia. On the other hand, economic competition
might thereby arise between America and England in East Asia
which could only be of advantage to Japan,2 since it would greatly
weaken the power position of England in East Asia, in the preservation
of which England must under all circumstances be interested. A
participation of the United States in the European war for the purpose
of defeating Germany would have serious results for Japan,
since a victorious England supported by America would never permit
the new order in East Asia which was desired by Japan. The Ambassador
agreed with me.
* Marginal note in Weizg&cker's handwriting : "To Japan's benefit?"
No. 620
B1&/BOOS898
The Foreign Ministers Secretariat to the Minister in Finland
Telegram
No. 76 of February 19 BERLIN, February 19, 1940.
For the Minister.
With reference to telegraphic report No. 71 of February 17.1
* Document No. 617.
FEBRUARY 1940 785
The Foreign Minister requests you to be entirely noncommittal in
future talks with Tanner, so as to arouse no false hopes.
(Foreign Minister's Secretariat)
No. 621
124/122669i
Minister ZecTi to State Secretary Wei&sacker
SECRET THE HAGUE, February 19, 1940.
DEAR WEJZSACKER : The Duke of W., about whom I wrote to you in
my letter of the 27th of last month,1 has said that the Allied War
Council devoted an exhaustive discussion at its last meeting to the
situation that would arise if Germany invaded Belgium. [Reference
was made throughout to a German invasion plan said to have been
found in an airplane that made a forced landing in Belgium. On
the military side, it was held that the best plan would be to make
the main resistance effort in the line behind the Belgian-French
border, even at the risk that Belgium should be occupied by us. The
political authorities are said to have at first opposed this plan : After
the humiliation suffered in Poland, it would be impossible to surrender
Belgium and the Netherlands also to the Germans. In the end,
however, the political authorities became more yielding.
Heil Hitler!
ZECH
x Document No. 580.
No. 622
B18/B003405-06
The Minister in Finland to tTie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST OTGEXT HixsiKKT, February 20, 1940 10 : 00 p. m.
No. 79 of February 20 Received February 21 3 : 45 a. m.
The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him today and brought
up the subject of our last talk.1 He opened the conversation by saying
that I had told him that there was no prospect of successful mediation
at this time and that I had introduced into the discussion as my
personal idea the proposal of an exchange of views between emissaries
of Finland and Russia in Berlin. He asked if this was not selfcontradictory.
Telegram No. 76 2 having arrived before this conversation took
place, I adapted my answers to the instructions contained therein.
* See document No. 617.
3 Document No. 62O.
786
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I replied that mediation by a third power and an exchange of views
between two parties were different matters. What held for one, did
not necessarily apply to the other.
Tanner then asked whether he could count on the German Government's
guaranteeing that the exchange of views would actually take
place. I said that I could not answer that question.
Tanner raised the question as to the conditions Russia would make.
I stated that I was not in a position to answer that question.
Upon this Tanner wanted to terminate the conversation. I took
the opportunity, however, to tell him that information had been received
from various quarters indicating that Finland was seeking
military assistance from Germany's enemies. I wished to inquire if
this was true, Tanner replied that he could not answer that question.
By remaining silent for a long while I gave him an opportunity to
modify this reply. He made no use of that opportunity, however,
and the conversation which he had started on a distinctly friendly
note terminated coldly.
I cannot at the moment judge what significance to attach to his
not answering my question, in particular whether the Finnish Government
will adhere to the policy it has pursued heretofore of keeping
out of coalitions with the Great Powers. It is possible that the Government
is wavering on a knife edge between trying to reach an
understanding and approaching the Western Powers. The decision
may come soon, for the pressure on the front is increasing and, with
the Baltic Sea ice-bound, German military weight will not be felt
in the North for months. Humors have it that the Foreign Minister
and Mannerheim's personal representative, General Walden, will fly
to London within the next few days.
No. 623
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
SECRET ROME, February 20, 1940.
No. 423 of February 20
I. For the purpose of strongly impressing upon the Italian Government
once more the special political and military significance attaching
to the current trade negotiations I, together with Clodius,
today called on Count CLano and, on the basis of various communications
received by the delegation in the last few days appraising the
Italian attitude at the trade negotiations, made approximately the
following statement :
FEBRUARY 1940 787
The view was held in Berlin that in the present situation Italy
ought to do her utmost in economic aid to Germany. So far, however,
the impression had been that this was not the case. This was
especially true with respect to the Italian deliveries of raw materials
and the Italian demands for German compensatory deliveries, with
respect to the transit question, and, finally, also as regards the Italian
attitude toward our demand for at least partial maintenance of the
old Czechoslovak treaty duties. We recognized that Ambassador
Giannini had tried his best to induce the individual Ministries to
adopt a cooperative attitude in the various fields, but we had the impression
that there was insufficient recognition of the great military
and especially political significance which attaches to satisfactory conclusion
of these particular negotiations. In individual instances,
where the Duce had intervened in person, e. g., in connection with
the increase in mercury deliveries from 30,000 flasks to 40,000 flasks,
the results had been favorable, and we were glad to acknowledge this.
But in other areas which were of vital importance to us this had not
been the case.
Regarding the individual questions, Clodius made the following
statement :
1) Raw material deliveries. Generally speaking, scarcely any of
the earlier promises had been kept, except in the case of mercury.
The increase in some products did not make up for the severe shortage
in hemp.
2) German deliveries of strategic materials. The compensatory
deliveries of benzol, toluol and naphthalene demanded by Italy represented
a major sacrifice for Germany's wartime armament industry
and could be warranted only if Italy in turn made sacrifices and
delivered equivalent strategic materials to Germany.
3) Transit. Despite repeated protestations of good will, it was evident
that the confidential instructions to the Italian authorities concerned
had obviously not been emphatic enough. Difficulties were
cropping up time and again especially, for instance, in the refusal to
camouflage transit shipments in both directions by handling them as
Italian imports. It was therefore absolutely essential that the customs
authorities be given appropriate confidential instructions to
waive customs formalities.
4) Italian copper purcTiases from Yugoslavia. The fact that Italy
appeared as a buyer of copper in Yugoslavia at this very juncture had
caused extreme irritation among the interested offices in Berlin. Italy
was expected to leave to Germany the few markets for strategic raw
materials that were still freely accessible and to cover her own requirements
overseas. The question of the Yugloslav copper was of very
special importance to us; a similar situation prevailed also as to the
purchase of nickel ores from Greece. ,
5) The Czechoslovak treaty duties. Italy's refusal to maintain,
partially at least, the old Czechoslovak treaty duties was of special
importance for the economy of the Protectorate and thus also 1or the
entire German economy, because this refusal would surely result in a
788
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
refusal by the other chief customers of the Protectorate, i. e., Hungary
Yugoslavia, Eumania, and Bulgaria, to recognize these tariff rates
after April 1. We had been advised from Berlin that as a result the
question of the incorporation of the Protectorate into the German customs
territory would once more be submitted to the Führer. It would
naturally be of considerable political significance if the execution of
a measure of such economic and political importance, which had already
been publicly announced, were thwarted now owing to the attitude
of none other than Italy. We believed it our duty to call particular
attention to this circumstance. The least that we were entitled
to expect was that tariff concessions would be made to us on
a scale that would enable us to cite them advantageously in dealing
with the other countries. Besides, total or partial maintenance of the
old Czechoslovak tariffs in the states of southeastern Europe was of no
inconsiderable interest for Italian exports in view of the most-favorednation
clause involved.
6) The rate of exchange. In deference to the Duce's personal request
that for political and psychological reasons the
clearing rate of
the lira in relation to the reichsmark should not be changed despite
the 4 percent devaluation of the lira, we were willing to accept this
arrangement. We had the right to expect, however, that the Italian
Government would clearly recognize that no further changes in the
exchange rate to the disadvantage of the reichsmark must occur. The
Italian proposals at this time were aimed at precisely the opposite.
II, Ciano reiterated the assurance that Italy was willing to go to the
utmost limits of her capacity as regards raw materials deliveries from
Italy. The Duce's attitude in this respect was unchanged. Nothing
could be done about hemp, however, since there actually were no more
supplies on hand. Upon my remark that I had construed his latest
statements about the Anglo-Italian negotiations to mean that now
the trade agreements would all become void and that the shipments
of hemp included therein, as he himself had said, would thereby also
be canceled and so become available for us, Ciano replied that deliveries
of non-war materials from Italy, which were relatively small
in value (6 million pounds sterling as compared with 17 million
pounds) would be continued on the basis of old treaties. That applied
especially to hemp. He readily admitted that we were not incorrect
in stating that in this case materials had been sold to England
which on the basis of our treaties should have been earmarked for
us. However, he would make another close check to determine whether
it was not still possible to find some quantities for us.
The copper purchases in Yugoslavia, which in any case were small,
were unavoidable in Italy's present situation. Industry was threatened
with a standstill because Italy was cut off from overseas imports.
At this point Ciano stated with strong feeling that Italy's
FEBRUARY 1940 7gQ
attitude toward the entire transit question was closely linked to the
status of her relations with England- Italy had only to comply with
British wishes on a small scale to gain greater freedom immediately.
We surely would be the last in the world, however, to advise Italy to
do so. Besides, Italy was resolved, and the Duce had definitely so
decided, that her policy and political freedom were not to be sold
for copper.
In closing, Ciano promised that he would submit all questions to
the Duce again tomorrow morning. The Duce was standing firmly
and unalterably by his declarations of August 26 x and would therefore
certainly do everything to exhaust all possibilities.
MACKENSEK
1 See vol. vn, document No. 301.
No. 624
91/100160
The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 96 of February 21 DUBLIN, February 21, 1940.
Received February 21 6 : 50 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 40 of January 22.1
Lord Tavistock, now Chairman of the British People's Party, requested
an interview with me. I had Thomseii 2 refuse for me. He
repeated emphatically to Thomsen that the strong English peace sentiment
could be strengthened decisively by the declaration referred to in
telegram No. 40. Halifax apparently had shown Lord Tavistock
little interest when he visited him.8
1 Document No. 659.
* Henning Thomsen, Secretary of Legation in the German legation in Eire.
*In telegram No. 119 of Mar. 1 (91/100164-65), Hempel reported that
the morning papers carried a United Press story of an interview with Lord
Tavistock concerning alleged discussions with the German Legation about peace
terms. Hempel denied that any such discussions had taken place and proposed
to issue such a denial to the press. , ^ j. ^
In telegram No. 137 of Mar. 8 (91/100170), Hempel suggested that the
publication of the alleged German peace terms represented a personal publicity
effort on the part of those involved, but that provocation by the British Government
was also a possibility. Prompt denial both by the Legation and by Berlin
had had a good effect, he said.
790
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 625
2153/469326-28
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT ANKARA, February 21, 1940 12 p. m.
No. Ill of February 21 Received February 22 6 a. m. W III c 64&
Reasons for the present disagreements on Schedule II.1
1. Intensified efforts on the part of the enemy powers to prevent
conclusion of a new agreement after conclusion of the first one,2 which
they considered a defeat.
2. The difficulty experienced by Turkish governmental agencies in
reaching agreement regarding the many deliveries desired.
3. The Turkish view that their concessions are too favorable to us
and that the goods on Schedule III will not be available in sufficient
quantity ; hence the request to combine Schedules II and III, to which
we agreed, though noting that in this case a basic agreement on the
chromium question became a prerequisite.
In my conversation with Numan on this topic today he took his
stand on the familiar Turkish argument :
1, Failure to deliver merchant vessels and certain categories of war
material to Turkey meant discrimination, because such material was
beingdelivered to other neutral powers in spite of the state of war.
2. The Turkish Government had to manage the limited means of
its national production very economically and could give its products
only in exchange for deliveries of vital importance to Turkey; this
would include heavy armament.
I explained to Numan that we were in an entirely different position
following conclusion of the commercial treaty with Russia, so that
Turkish products were at most of secondary importance but in no
circumstances decisive for German warfare. If in spite of this I continued
my efforts to maintain economic relations, I did so primarily
for political considerations. My Government was convinced that
Turkey had the sincere desire to resist the pressure of the Western
Powers and keep out of the war. We wished to support this attitude.
Numan replied that the policy of his Government pursued a similar
aim. It was merely a question of weighing mutual interests in order
to arrive at a commercial exchange. At the same time he reiterated
that no commitments had been made to the Western Powers concerning
Turkish export products. To confirm this I asked him whether
1 The files are incomplete on the Schedules referred to in this document. Some
relevant material, however, has been filmed in Serials 8489 and 8493.
See document No. 512.
FEBRUARY 1940 79]
Turkey would, for instance, be prepared to make deliveries of chromium
if Germany would deliver several heavy guns. Numan promised
to ask his Government and also to find out whether his
Government was in principle still interested in the promised light
war material. He suggested that we meanwhile draw up with the
Economic Department the joint project for Schedules II and IIL
I request instructions :
1. Does the chromium situation demand that we make further concessions,
and in that case would there be more prospects of keeping
Turkey neutral ? On the other hand, is the delivery of some heavy
guns possible ?
2. Can we dispense with the chromium, thus of course eliminating
delivery of any war material ?
3. If we are not dependent on chromium, I suggest that Schedules
II and III be approved in return for the delivery of corresponding
quantities of commercial goods of interest to us as well as the assurance
that old agreements will be canceled by mutual agreement.
Unless the negotiations are continued, the amicable settlement concerning
cancellation of agreements, which is so urgently needed because
of our general situation and its serious economic consequences,
appears to be hopeless.
The principal argument for going on with the negotiations seems
to me to be the struggle that we must continue with all our means
against the ever-increasing British-French efforts to eliminate all
German influence in Turkey, while any further agreement in this
difficult field would be taken by the enemy to mean that Turkey was
moving away from him.
PAFEN
No. 626
Memorandum T>y an Official of the Attssenpolitisches
BERLIN-, February 21, 1940.
SOJOURN- IN NORWAY
FROM JANUARY 20 TO FEBRUARY 20, 1940
I. General feeling in Norway
Even though there has been no pro-German sentiment in the last few
years to speak of, British propaganda in Norway has nevertheless
been intensified. I am not certain whether the wherewithal for
this propaganda flows directly from England to Norway or
*The document is unsigned but was found in a file of reports by Wilfcelm
Scheldt relating to Norway.
792
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
rather whether British propaganda in Norway has become independent
and is leading an autonomous existence. This is
entirely
possible since all Norway is hypnotized into believing that
nothing
can be undertaken against England and that, in view of the extensive
maritime trade carried on by Norway, one is dependent on the British
rule of the sea. It would be a grave mistake to assume that Labor
is an exception in this respect and that the Anglophile attitude is
confined merely to the business world and particularly to the groups
interested in maritime shipping. Even the simple worker fears that
he would immediately have to lower his tremendously high standard
of living by 50 percent if the British should initiate any sort of
reprisals. Without knowing the real circumstances, they place the
entire blame for the Finnish conflict on Germany and, beyond that,
call the attention of all Scandinavia to the dangers involved in having
a ruthless neighbor to the East and a neighbor unreliable in its
diplomatic alignments to the South. (The following terminology is
used in this connection: nonaggression pact with Poland rape of
Poland ; constant assurances of having no further claims, but conflicts
just the same Austria, the Sudetenland, Czechia, Danzig and the
Corridor.)
The German Legation in Norway has recently protested against
the atrocity propaganda against Germany tolerated by official Norwegian
circles. No one in Norway speaks of British atrocities. But
there are always quite a few people ready uncritically to pass on unverifiable
rumors concerning injured seamen. Oslo and other Norwegian
cities are full of seamen telling about "their personal
experiences.
5' Time and again the story recurs that German naval
vessels and planes fired on unarmed seamen who were already in
lifeboats. Every steamer that has hit a mine anywhere has been
torpedoed. Furthermore, there are always seamen who have seen
the submarine. A case related to me on separate occasions in several
different places is characteristic ; it concerns a former German national
who had become a Norwegian citizen. His son, who was a German
citizen, had supposedly taken a long trip in September of last year.
In his absence his father accepted two letters from Germany addressed
to the son but did not open them. Upon the son's return it developed
that these letters were orders to report for military service. The
father, who was worried, left for Germany with his son. Here the
young man placed himself at the disposal of the Wehrmacht
authorities and his father heard nothing of him for several days,
When he inquired about the son he was told, yes, he could see him,
but he would have to step down into the courtyard where his son
lay shot dead. Thereupon, the father became insane. There are
Germans in Oslo who have offered considerable sums to learn the
FEBRUARY 1940 793
name of this man. In no case was that possible. But there are also
Germans in Oslo who believe this nonsense. At the same time stories
are told of mysterious doings in the German Legation. Persons are
said to have been murdered there and shipped to Germany in zinc
coffins, and other similar nonsense is spread as rumors. One can,
of course, leave these things as they are, but the effect of such atrocity
propaganda in a small country and especially in a place as prone
to gossip as Oslo should not be underestimated. In any event, the
tendency of the Norwegians to accept such atrocity accounts as long
as they are spread in connection with Germany or Russia, and
the fact that nothing whatsoever is heard of any British doings
indicate what this atrocity propaganda is aiming to do. In its present
frame of mind the Norwegian public is not open to reasoning that
is objective and politically mature. The political thinking of even
highly intellectual Norwegian circles is on a level that is shockingly
low from our point of view. In this connection, I again wish to caU
attention to the two periodicals, Utewriks Chronik and Ragnarok.
Of special significance is an article by Hjort, a well-known Norwegian
attorney, which appeared in the latter periodical (issue of January-
February 1940) . This article is entitled "The North in 1940", and
its stand is amazingly naive throughout* Intellectual circles that
are known to have pro-German leanings and to be close to the
nationalist ideas of the twentieth century attach importance to Hjort's
opinion. All political editorials have two characteristic traits : first,
as previously stated, political naivete and the inability to grasp the
true motives of the political events of our time and, second, a keen
business sense by virtue of which the Norwegians are able to look
after their business interests with great skill. In my opinion, the
official statements of the Norwegian Government should be received
with utmost distrust if only for the reason that the extensive anti-
German propaganda being carried on in the press as well as by word
of mouth cannot be explained in any other way than that the Government
not only tolerates but even promotes it. Naturally, the
Government can at all times claim that the free press of a "free
country" may write what it pleases. Germany, however, must not
accept this statement because, after all, it is only an excuse, and in
reality the propaganda may well be centrally directed. In this small
country all prominent people know one another. They have the
most peculiar connections with each other and are somehow also
dependent on one another be it only in their knowledge that nothing
binds people more closely together than infamous acts jointly committed.
Personal and business interests, tax matters, drinking parties,
and all possible family indiscretions play the biggest possible role in
this connection.
794
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In regard to the Altmark affair, it was of interest to me to obtain
reports from my agents on the public discussion of this matter. On
Saturday, February 17, the extra release on this affair appeared in the
show windows of the Oslo newspaper offices. The fact that England
had flagrantly violated neutrality had a surprising but by no means
the alarming effect so frequently alleged in other quarters. The mob
clustered outside the show windows greeted the fact that five German
sailors (this was the number originally published but later changed)
were killed in this British surprise attack with cries of "What, only
five! why weren't all of them killed!" I was very much interested
in finding out whether only a few individuals had said this and
whether others had protested, but to my regret I learned that these
outcries had evoked a general murmur of approval. During the next
2 days as well, the British act of piracy was characterized as an excellent
job 2 whenever no Germans were in evidence. The attitude of the
Norwegian sailors aboard the small torpedo boats which accompanied
Altmark is likewise significant. One of these Norwegian sailors called
to a German sailor who had jumped from Altmark into the fjord and
was swimming toward the Norwegian naval vessel: "Swim to the
British !" I have learned from the German Military Attache in Oslo
that this German sailor, who was, after all, in distress at sea, was not
taken aboard the Norwegian torpedo boat.
On Monday, February 19, M. Hagelin was able to be at a tea attended
by a number of members of the Norwegian Storting. On that
occasion he overheard the conversation of two men, one of whom
expressed the opinion that the Norwegians should at least have
fired in the air, whereupon the other corrected him saying that this
was entirely out of the question since the attitude displayed by the
captains of the two torpedo boats, with reference to the British, was
after all "a matter of instructions". It was further stated in authoritative
Norwegian circles that control of the northern North Sea and
the North Atlantic by Germany was extremely problematical. The
incident in the Jossing Fjord induced several Norwegians, among
them several Norwegian seamen, to remark to me that although this
attack was a scandalous encroachment on the part of the British, it
nevertheless proved once again the extent of England's supremacy at
sea; it had been possible to carry out the entire operation without
intervention or interference from the Germans, and not the Germans
but the British controlled the North Atlantic and were likewise masters
of the northern North Sea. The German contention that the
British fleet was hiding in the ports of western England in fear oi
German planes and submarines was incorrect, as could also be seen
from the Altmark incident.
* This word appears in English in the text.
FEBRUARY 1940 795
II. The opinion of the German Minister in Oslo
Upon my return to Norway on January 21, 1 immediately conferred
with Dr. Brauer, the German Minister. I told him on that occasion
that I was warning against an optimistic appraisal of the situation
in Norway with respect to the Norwegian-German relationship. In
my opinion, it was obvious that as I had mentioned in my previous
report
3 Norway, in agreement with England, was doing everything
possible to allay the fears of the German official agencies here by
official statements. Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, was certainly
a gentleman, but by no means an honest broker in relation to
the interests of Norway and those of the belligerent countries. He
probably has very little to say anyway, but it is certain that he must
conduct a seesaw policy, for which no one in Norway envies him.
Even at the last moment the Norwegians would protest against
alleged violations by England, but they would do so for tactical reasons
and not by conviction. They would explain that they could do
nothing against a superior enemy anyway and while they would raise
a clamor in case of a violation, they would nevertheless display great
sympathy. [Our] Minister must have strong reasons to differ with my
appraisal of the Norwegian attitude in spite of this, and I am the last
person to underestimate his difficult mission in Norway. Nevertheless,
I expected that the information I subsequently sent him would, if not
convince him, at least give him pause for reflection. During the night
of Monday, January 29, 1 saw (as indicated in the previous report)
uniformed members of the British Medical Corps in Oslo for the
first time. My report to this effect to the Naval Attaeh6 and the
Minister was received very noncommittally. Later, however, the
Legation and the Naval Attache informed me that the Norwegian authorities
had admitted the presence of 150 members of the British
Medical Corps.* Some time later, I was informed by a supervisor in
the Norwegian Telephone and Telegraph Office that she had overheard
a telephone conversation between members of the Norwegian
delegation engaged in the Norwegian-British economic negotiations,
in which it was mentioned that the British had demanded naval bases
in Norway and freedom of action in Norwegian territorial waters.
The Norwegian Government had rejected this demand. Thereupon
the British had threatened reprisals of an economic nature.
I reported this to the Minister that same day; he made light of the
report and tried to explain to me that the British were not in any
'Not printed (4467/E087430-40). A memorandum of Feb. 2 arguing that the
German Legation in Oslo was unaware of the real state of Norwegian public
opinion strongly but covertly pro-British and asking that Scheldt be given
some regular position in Norway that would enable him to conduct his liaison
and intelligence activities more effectively. *_ ~* ^ +**.*. *, 4 BrSuer informed the Foreign Ministry in a telegram sent Feb. 19 that he
had asked Koht about the reported presence of uniformed Britons in Norway,
but as instructed, had refrained from comment (22/13818-19) .
260090 64 56
796
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
position to initiate economic reprisals. I tried to verify the report and
made inquiries through my contact, Quisling. Quisling told me that
he knew nothing of this matter, but would try to obtain more detailed
information. He did know, however, that the British had made such
a demand about Christmas and that the Norwegian King had at that
time approached the British King directly with the request that he
prevail upon his Government to withdraw this demand for the time
being, as such action was premature. By now, Quisling said, nearly
2 months had passed and the British had very probably reiterated
their demand. I asked Quisling from what source he had learned of
this matter, and he told me that he had asked a friend of his, an officer
in the King's immediate entourage, who had given him this information.
This, too, I reported to the Minister. Some time later the
German Naval Attach^ told me that a German, who had been living
in Norway for a long time, had given him the same information, and
that this matter was being discussed on the west coast. In my opinion,
the fact that such information is being spread about does not necessarily
indicate that it is not true, because in this small country even indiscretions
that concern confidential matters are passed on. Quisling
has now made further inquiries and learned that a secret agreement
between the Norwegian Government and England actually exists, by
virtue of which the Norwegians are prepared to react to British encroachments
merely with paper protests. All this occurred before
the Altmark affair. The AZtmark incident itself offers the first evidence
that the Norwegian-British agreement is functioning. On
Saturday, February 17, I once more spoke with the Minister, and he
again expressed the same view, namely that the Norwegians were in
no position to take a stand against us. In this connection, the Minister
hinted that, especially of late, important Norwegian-German
agreements were in process of preparation, and that the Norwegians
were attaching increased importance to the ratification of these agreements
; in the event these agreements, the details of which I did not
learn from him, entered into force, all of Norwegian economic life
would be so firmly in our hands that the Norwegians would not be
able to make any moves against us at all. I do not know what negotiations
are involved, but from the tenor of the entire conversation,
I assume that they are connected with the German-Norwegian economic
negotiations.
6 In no circumstances do I think that the Norwegians
would feel dependent on us with regard to their attitude, even
if the agreements went into force. England always tells Norway that
5 BrUuer reported by telegram on Feb. 20 that the German-Norwegian trade
agreement for 1940, "which goes far toward meeting our wishes,*' was initialed
that day (3518/E021071). The text of the agreement, which finally bore the
date Feb. 23, is not printed (3072/612811-16) .
FEBRUARY 1940 797
the present blockade line, northern England-Iceland-Greenland, is
ineffective, and that this is endangering all of Norway's overseas
shipping. If the British could turn the blockade line against Germany
45 degrees to the east and organize it along a much shorter route than
heretofore between northern England and southern Norway, all Norwegian
overseas shipping could develop completely unrestrictedly
behind this blockade, allegedly even protected and favored by England.
As indicated above, an incident such as occurred in Jossing Fjord contributes
toward convincing the Norwegians once more that the British
control the northern North Sea. I do not know what advantages
Germany would have to offer Norway in such a case. Naturally, it is
not certain whether the Norwegians will turn out to be right. I, personally,
am of the opinion that Norway by her actions is plunging
into an adventure that will definitely undermine her existence. The
Norwegians are not of my opinion, however, and I am inclined to
believe that in the end England will take advantage of them as of other
small states.
III. Quisling cmd the Na&jonal Samling
As agreed, I have so far given M. Quisling the equivalent of RM
100,000 in British pounds. Quisling has successfully launched his
propaganda campaign and trebled the street sales of his periodical
in Oslo within 4 weeks. Twenty-five thousand copies are now being
sent through the mails. He gives particular attention to seeing that
the entire Norwegian officer corps receives this periodical, and on
the basis of an extensive mailing list he also supplies them with personal
letters and other communications. At my suggestion and at the
request of the German Naval Attache, Quisling is now organizing an
intelligence network along the Norwegian coast with the help of the
members of his party. The arrangement is such that the country is
divided into three major sectors and a party follower of Quisling
familiar with maritime shipping is placed in charge of each sector
(southern, central, and northern Norway) on a full-time basis.
Wherever possible, an effort is made to have an agent on every vessel,
who will duly report to Quisling. The questions of interest to us
will then be transmitted by Quisling to the German Naval Attach^
through me. The German Naval Attach^ promises himself a great
deal from these facilities, and I agree with him that the old intelligence
methods are no longer very useful. Even in the small countries
the police are so well acquainted with the modern methods of police
work that the traditional secret service methods break down sooner
or later. The latest case of this kind in Stockholm has attracted
considerable attention in Scandinavia. There the British Intelligence
Service worked along conservative lines and failed. The method
of hiring agents and supplying them with money is costly and unre
798
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
liable, since only such elements agree to something of this sort as are
predisposed by their own inclination. In Norway we have an opportunity
to operate through a political movement, the followers of
which act by conviction. The German Military Attach^ has also
asked me to present this view to the Commander in Chief of the Navy.
The support of the Quisling party is certainly of great advantage
to us for very important reasons. Regardless of the development in
the situation in Norway and the means which we may some day employ,
we must have in Norway a movement that is as strong as possible
and friendly to us. The more we support this movement now,
the better it will be for us in the future. The funds hitherto made
available are inadequate when compared to the tasks facing Quisling.
Even if I deliver KM 100,000 more as agreed, German support
cannot stop there.6
If, for instance, Quisling -wished to turn his
weekly periodical into a daily paper (preparations for this have been
made), this daily paper would cost him at the outset 1,500 kroner a
day, or 45,000 kroner per month. This represents the immediate
cost of mailing and printing. The political staff also costs a lot of
money. In addition there are the costs of the propaganda and of the
constantly growing organization. Quisling is correct, however, in Ms
view that he must make the decision to undertake publication of a
daily paper dependent on whether the necessary funds will also be
guaranteed in the future. If these funds should cease to be forthcoming
sooner or later, then the setback suffered by his party and his
own political prestige would be so much the greater. I therefore request
that steps be taken to assure the greatest possible security in this
respect.
IV. A daily newspaper
For the past year, I have been advocating everywhere that the
German Government ought to take over a Norwegian daily paper. It
would be well to have available a Norwegian newspaper that does not
belong to Quisling directly. At one time the newspaper Tidens Tegn
was for sale. This newspaper could then have been taken over for
approximately 400,000 kroner. For reasons not fully known to me
this offer was declined at the time by the Germans. In the meantime,
the British cleverly took possession of this newspaper (without
investing any of their own capital) so that it is today by no means pro-
On Feb. 24, Rosenberg reminded Ribbentrop that it had been agreed between
them to make 200 to 300 thousand RM immediately available to Quisling
and that it was urgent for Scheldt to receive the second installment to take back
with him to Norway. (Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxvi, document
No. 957-PS, Exhibit GB-139, p. 431). In the restrospective memorandum
of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of June 15 (H>id., vol. xxv, document No. 004-PS,
Exhibit GB-140, p. 29), it is stated that this agreement was made "in January,"
but no contemporary document giving the exact terms has been found.
FEBRUARY 1940 799
German. I was told by the Legation that the Tidens Tegn matter
was hopeless. An influential Norwegian of my acquaintance, Professor
Glaus Hansen, the chairman of the Norwegian-German Society,
asked me recently whether an attempt could not again be made
to interest Germany in the Tidens Tegn. I told him that I had
nothing to do with these things and for obvious reasons did not care
to get involved in such matters. In spite of this statement, I learned
from him that he saw a possibility for taking over Tidens Tegn, and
he wishes to give me exact information in this respect within 2 weeks.
When I asked why he did not do this through the Legation, he
told me that he did not want to do it through official channels and
asked me to inquire here in Berlin whether any interest existed.
V. In my opinion the work undertaken in Norway in connection
with the Nasjonal Samling is unfortunately somewhat jeopardized
by the fact that too many offices in Germany are handling Scandinavian
matters. Aside from the fact that even in peacetime it was
often difficult to centralize all the offices interested in Scandinavia,
it would be downright disastrous now, during the war, if more offices
than absolutely necessary were to deal with Scandinavia. For example,
long before the war, I failed to understand why no office of
the Reichsbahn was established in Oslo for the Germany tourist trade
in Norway. As far as I know, such Reichsbahn offices in London,
Paris, and especially in Vienna and Prague, have worked well politically
and with respect to intelligence, and it would not have been bad
to undertake this work in Norway as well. Now that we have been
waging war for 6 months, Herr Winter, the business manager of this
organization, has come to Oslo to examine the feasibility of setting
up a Reichsbahn office. In Oslo itself, it is now considered clear that
Germany intends to set up an espionage center in Norway. This case
again demonstrates that an opportunity once passed up can under
new and entirely different conditions be a still-born child. I should
consider the establishment of such a Reichsbahn office as unobjectionable
only if its work were confined exclusively to the tourist trade.
I regard all other activity with great suspicion because it will at some
point run counter to our work some day and may possibly have very
unpleasant consequences for us. It would be advisable to arrange
that no German agency whatever, with the exception of the Wehrmacht
components and, of course, the Foreign Ministry within the
scope of the tasks assigned to it, should deal with Norwegian matters
of any kind.7
7 Rosenberg recorded in his personal diary the following entry for Mar.
"On February 29 I was caUed to the Ftihrer for a rather long visit. On the
basis of Scheldt's memorandum I reported extensively about Norwegian affairs.
The Ftihrer naturally is extraordinarily interested, emphasized as before that
N[orway]'s and Sw[eden]'s neutrality is desirable, but that In view of Britisn
800
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Footnote (
7
) Continued
actions a dramatic climax clearly had to come, and yet that after all we an>
fully ready. We have abstained from any attempt at an active political actioa
originating in the country [Norway] itself, but at the same time there has been
other support on an especially generous scale for the forces favorable to us
The Ptihrer wished to speak to Scheldt personally, but he was already in Oslo
again." Bosenberg's diary, Nuremberg document No. 1749-PS, has not been
published, but excerpts concerning Norway and Denmark, Jan. 2-May 7, IJ&Q
are published in Walther Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzunff von Danemark w&
Norwegen 1940, pp. 452-456.
No. 627
1848/421151-52
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
TOP SECRET ROME, February 22, 1940.
No. 429 of February 21 Received February 22 10 : 00 a. m.
I. Following the Ambassador's demarche with Ciano yesterday,
1
the Duce had a conference with the Minister of Finance this morning,
and another conference with Ciano, Foreign Trade Minister Riccardi,
and Ambassador Giannini tonight [February 21]. The Duce made
the following decisions there regarding Italy's stand on the several
questions discussed with Ciano, which Giannini by direction of the
Duce has just communicated to me:
1) Raw materials. The Duce is prepared as in the past to go to
the utmost limits in delivering Italian raw materials. Inasmuch as
there actually is no more hemp on the market, the Duce has ordered
the requisitioning of 1,500 tons for Germany. Requisitioning of
larger quantities is impossible on account of the extreme scarcity of
supplies.
2) Copper from Yugoslavia. The Duce stated that inasmucli as
Italy was unable to increase her trade with the Western Powers, in
view of her consistent policy in accord with Germany and especially
her refusal to deliver war materials, and moreover, as we knew, had
trouble with the blockade, she had to depend on certain supplies from
southeastern Europe. Nevertheless, he intended to help Germany
in the vital matter of the copper question. Since Italy could not at
the moment spare the 3,500 tons of copper earmarked for immediate
shipment from Yugoslavia and since it was to be feared, moreover,
that this quantity would not be made available to Germany even if
Italy renounced ner claim, he was prepared to carry through a very
rigorous requisitioning of copper, including house and even church
implements, and place 3,500 tons of the proceeds of this requisitioning
at the disposal of Germany. The Duce requested that this promise
be treated with the strictest secrecy.
* See document No. 623.
FEBRUARY 1940
As to the imports of nickel ore from Greece, there was no possibility
at present of replacing them by other imports.
3) Transit. The Duce reaffirmed that Italy was willing to help
Germany, but it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution and
moderation because, with the indiscretions that were to be feared, any
excess in these transit transactions was sure to result in Italy's being
cut off from all imports. To preclude this was, in the last analysis,
as much in Germany's interest as it was in Italy's.
4) German deliveries of strategic materials. The Duce requested
urgently that the relatively small quantities of benzol, toluol, and
naphthalene requested by the Italian delegation be made available.
Military considerations of the very first order were involved and
he was sure that those responsible in Germany would not leave Italy
in the lurch on this.
5) The former Czechoslovak treaty duties. Giannini informed the
Duce that according to a telephone communication 2 which I had received
from Berlin today the Führer had decided not to put into effect
the inclusion of the Protectorate in the German customs territory on
April 1. This being so, the Duce declared that the question was no
longer a live issue at the moment. Otherwise, however, he would
have had to ask Germany to desist from her demand for the maintenace
of Czechoslovak treaty duties. The benefits accruing to Germany
from the maintenance of these tariffs would be entirely out of
proportion to the serious damage which the most-favored-nation
clause would thereby inflict on Italian industry.
In conclusion Giannini stated that Count Ciano planned to receive
the Ambassador tomorrow in order to give him the reply to his
demarche.3
II. The Duce's decision to order requisitions for the delivery of
more hemp and particularly the delivery of 3,500 tons of copper a
very considerable quantity of gasoline [sic] which Italy urgently needs
for her own armaments constitutes a great sacrifice for Italy. Giannini
acknowledged that the Duce had made this decision as a special
gesture of friendship toward Germany and hinted that the Duce was
very anxious that this gesture should be appreciated accordingly by
German leaders.
It is my opinion that in view of this situation the few Italian wishes
concerning the delivery of the aforementioned strategic materials
must be complied with to a satisfactory degree.
Cl^ODITJS
' This anticipated reply was reported by Mackensen in a telegram of Feb. 23
(1848/421153-54). Ciano had spoken again of Mussolini's desire to do everything
possible in economic support, which he said was motivated in part by his
wish to express once more his personal friendship for G6ring. Ciano had added
that the Italians thought it particularly important to stress Italo-German solidarity
at this time, and he had ordered a draft prepared of a joint communique
emphasizing this and particularly Mussilini's personal influence on the negotiations.
802 IX)CUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 628
1822/416878-&1
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
No, 563 KDLO, February 22, 1940,
Received February 26
Pol. VI 519!
POI^ITICAI, REPORT
Subject: The situation in Finland.1
In the last few days an event occurred in Finland which deeply
affects the whole situation here.
The Russians, who until now had nothing but defeats at the front,
have for the first time scored a military victory in an important sector.
Day after day the Russian Army Command, throwing tremeudous
quantities of artillery ammunition, tanks, and planes into the
battle, hurled its shock troops against the Mannerheim Line at Stimma
along the highway leading to Viipuri from the south. The Finns
fought back with their characteristic tenacity and bravery and iaflicted
heavy losses on the Russians. But the Finnish troops, receiving
no relief, eventually were unable, because of sheer exhaustion, to hold
the first line against the continuous waves of Russian reinforcements
Field Marshal Mannerheim had to make the decision to withdraw
the right wing and take up new positions. The sector affected was the
line from Makslahti, on the Gulf of Finland, to Lake Ayrapaa. The
new positions are laid out so that in the west, where they receded the
furthest, they run about 15 kilometers from the original line, again
approaching the Mannerheim. Line toward the east, where they connect
with it at Lake Ayrapaa. But the island of Koivisto with its
30.5 cm. battery, which is behind the Russian lines, is still in Finnish
hands.
This penetration of the Mannerheim Line must not be looked upon
as a breakthrough likely to decide the campaign. On the Karelian
Isthmus the Russians will encounter still other fortifications and much
resistance before they can attack Viipuri, and after that they will run
UP against the Saima position, which represents a natural obstacle
to invading the interior of the country. Nevertheless this first victory
of the Russians has apparently caused concern at Finnish headquarters,
and the Field Marshal is reported to show signs of nervousness.
The members of the Government also give the impression that
they are troubled about the future. However, this is less apparent
in the spirit of the broad masses, because victories were scored at the
same time at the front north of Lake Ladoga ; these have no tactical
1 Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting : "[For] F[tthrer]."
FEBRUARY 1940
significance, to be sure, but they brought great booty ; besides, the hope
for foreign aid constantly feeds the imagination of the people.
Under the impact of the reverse at Summa, the military and political
leaders seem to have come to the conclusion that Finland lacks
the manpower to withstand the Russian pressure in the long run, and
that help from abroad, which up to now has been chiefly in materiel,
would have to be activated in some other way. First an attempt was
made to bring about intervention by regular Swedish troops. This
attempt failed because of the negative attitude of the Stockholm
cabinet. It remains to be seen whether the Finns will resign themselves
to this. The formation of increasing numbers of volunteer
organizations, the mounting deliveries of war material, and related
actions automatically tend to draw Sweden more and more into the
Russo-Finnish conflict. The view can be heard expressed in Finland
that the time is coming when it will be possible to overthrow the present
Swedish cabinet and replace it with an activist cabinet.
The aid measures under way in the other Scandinavian countries
and in Holland, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, and North
America are to be intensified without altering their character. But
they are not on a scale that could ever decisively influence the outcome
of the war.
The big question now arising is whether Finland is going to ask
or has already asked the two Western Powers at war with Germany,
which so far have supplied war material only, to assist her with troops.
It is very hard for me to obtain accurate information on that point
because at present such matters are carefully kept from me. In a
roundabout way I have learned that a French colonel, Ganeval, who
is on Gamelin's staff, and an English major have arrived at Mannerheim's
headquarters. Rumors have been circulating in Helsinki for
the past few days that the Foreign Minister and General Walden, the
personal representative of the Field Marshal, were going to fly to
London. In newspaper circles the question of Finland's joining the
"Western Powers is openly discussed. Finally I squarely put the question
to the Foreign Minister as to whether Finland was seeking military
aid from the Western Powers. The Foreign Minister gave me
no reply. This in itself could be construed as an affirmative reply to
my question. Yet I instinctively had the impression that the Foreign
Minister was still wavering at the time of the conversation as to
whether to avail himself of certain possibilities of coming to terms
with Russia that I had hinted at, or to decide on approaching the
Western Powers. The decision may possibly be made within the
next days.
The determining factor in evaluating the decision will be the form
in which this aid is planned and carried out and, more particularly,
804
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
whether it will go so far as to unite Finland and the Western Powers
as allies.
Accepting the hypothesis that France and England will send troops
to aid Finland, this could in my opinion be done by three routes:
Narvik, Petsamo, and Murmansk. It would probably be the simplest
and most effective to land troops at Narvik. That would violate Norway's
neutrality, it is true, but since the Altmark affair 2 we need not
expect any particular scruples in that respect on the part of the Western
Powers. Further, to be sure, the route would have to go through
Sweden, whose present government would hardly agree to it ; by the
time the occasion arises, however, it may possibly have been supplanted
by an activist government.
In any case it must be borne in mind that the Western Powers need
not during the present season fear any German military opposition
to operations in the northern countries. The Baltic Sea, which in
normal years would have permitted the German High Command to
operate on the inner line, is completely frozen over this year and will
for months form a natural obstacle to any German military operations
in the North.
Should the suggested possibilities of military intervention on the
part of the Western Powers from Narvik materialize, it is doubtful
whether this would help Finland; there can be no doubt, however,
that the Swedish iron ore mines would come under the control of the
Western Powers.
In view of the uncertain basis of these speculations, I shall at
present refrain from going into German military counter measures.
There is no doubt in my mind, however, that the neatest [eleganteste]
solution would be to compose the Finnish-Russian conflict before the
Western guardian angels have time to arrive and take the Swedish
ore, instead of Finland, under their wings.
BOUCHER
a See documents Nos. 615 and 618.
No. 629
~by an Official of the Dienststelle JRibbentrop
SECRET i BERUDST, February 22, 1940.
Hauptreferat VI
Colonies
Ka/Hr
For the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Referring to my memorandum of December 2, 1939,
1 in which I
proposed that a statement as indicated in the enclosure be sent to the
1 Not found.
FEBRUARY 1940 gQ5
leaders of the South African opposition, I wish to report that, following
approval of my suggestion by the Foreign Minister, I sent Frau
Maria Badley to South Africa. Frau Radley has meanwhile arrived
in Bloemfontein and has sent her husband, as the latter informed me
today, a message which, after decoding, reads as follows:
"Delivered in order. Atmosphere healthy. Satisfied with contents*
Possibility of being able to show a reaction soon uncertain."
From this it is clear : 1) that the leaders of the opposition, Hertzog
and Malan, are familiar with the offer of the German Government
and that they know that the means are in their hands to make the offer
official; 2) that an immediate decision, particularly on the part of
Hertzog, cannot yet be expected. As can be seen from today's DNB
reports (No. 53 West, pages 2 and 3) , General Hertzog has even made
a statement to a special correspondent of the Hague newspaper, Het
Vaderlandj expressing the belief of the South Africans that they
would be faced with grave dangers if Germany were eventually to win
this war. The transmission of the declaration by Frau Radley therefore
came at just the right time to dissipate these foolish fears of
Hertzog's and enable the Malan-Kendsburg 2 group to work upon
the old General with sensible arguments.
KAHLOWA
[Enclosure]
I. The Government of the German Reich will, upon conclusion of
peace with the Union of South Africa, recognize and guarantee its
national territory, consisting of the Cape Province, Transvaal, Oranje,
and Natal, as well as the three Protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland,
and Bechuanaland.
II. The Government of the German Reich will, in case peace is concluded
with the "Union of South Africa, declare that Germany is
disinterested if the Union of South Africa extends its national territory
to what is now Southern Rhodesia.
III. The Government of the German Reich is prepared to negotiate
a long-term commercial treaty with the Union of South Africa after
peace is concluded.
IV. The Government of the German Reich declares that, in demanding
the return of her colonies, it is pursuing the aim of broadening
the German raw materials base in such a way as to ensure its supply
of tropical and sub-tropical raw materials from Germany's own
African colonies. It is not contemplating, however, the creation of
a separate state on African soil and recognizes the Union of South
Africa as the leading white state in the South African
a
r>r. J. F. J. van Rensburg (Rendsburg), Nationalist leader, former
tary of State for Justice and Administrator of tne Orange Free State, lujd
visited
Germany and been received by a number of prominent Germans m
806
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 630
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 143 of February 23 TOKYO, February 23, 19408 : 45 a. m.
Received February 23 5 : 55 p. m,
Pol. VIII 383 g.
For the State Secretary personally.
After my arrival here I found that the Japanese with whom I was
already acquainted, such as Oshirna, Shiratori, Terauchi, Ishii, etc,,
had not changed their friendly attitude and were willing to give
assistance in every respect. As regards the political situation my impression
is as follows :
All groups and parties are primarily occupied with domestic difficulties
at present.
With respect to foreign policy, the Government is making an effort
not to be drawn into a European combination. The attitude toward
England and America is friendly. No important decisions can be expected
before the impact of military operations in Europe is felt.
The influence of the Army, which had been weakening since the last
summer session, is already growing again. A further increase may
be expected. Well-known pro-German officials in the Foreign Ministry
and like-minded officers in the General Staff and the War Ministry
have for several months been transferred systematically to posts
abroad or in China. Every effort is being made here to reverse this
measure.
I have got in touch with the circles concerned and arranged for
continued work after my return from America.
Popular sentiment is largely pro-German and also anti-British;
conditions are thus favorable for our political goals. Public opinion
with respect to Court and financial circles is not as yet very greatly
aroused. It would be advantageous if Russian willingness to reach
a settlement with Japan could be made more evident. Aside from improving
the political atmosphere, this might affect favorably the current
efforts to improve German-Japanese trade via Siberia.
STAHMER 1
On
1 See document No. 567, footnote 1.
FEBRTTAKY 1940 807
No. 631
F18/06S
Memorandum T>y the Foreign Minister
HM No. 4 BEMUN, February 23, 1940.
Today I received the Hungarian Minister, who made statements to
me similar to those he had made to the State Secretary.
1
He informed me that the United States had inquired of the Hungarian
Government as to its thoughts on disarmament and economic
questions in a future peace settlement. The Hungarian Government
had indicated its willingness to cooperate in the solution of all questions
of world economy ; disarmament, however, could not be considered
as long as the question of the Hungarian minorities in Rumania
had not been satisfactorily settled.
The Hungarian Minister then broached the subject of the approaching
visit of Mr. Sumner Welles. I told him that in view of
the British war aim of partitioning Germany, the latter was resolved
to wage the war until her enemies were annihilated and begged for
peace. I hoped that this would c'ome about more quickly than was
thought possible in some quarters today.
1 Memorandum not printed (73/52251).
No. 632
4353/E07992&
The Foreign Ministry to the National Socialist War Veterans League
BEKIJN, February 21, 194:0.
Sent February 24w
Partei 846.
Drafting Officers : Senior Counselor Luther.
Secretary of Legation Dr. Garben.
For attention of Major (ret.) von Rechenberg.
With reference to your letter of February 13, Auslandsabt.
IX 55/40.1
The Foreign Ministry requests that you notify the proper authorities
of the National Socialist War Veterans League [JReichskriegerbund~\
and in particular its district headquarters in the city of Aachen
that no support must be lent to the efforts of young men from Eupen-
MalmSdy to evade Belgian military service by flight to Germany.
*Not printed (723/264647-53).
808
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The flight to Germany of any considerable number of residents ol
Eupen-Malm4dy would cause an undesirable weakening of the German
ethnic element there.
Heil Hitler I
By order:
No. 633
ITS/84215-16
Memorandum T>y an Official of Political Division II
February 24, 1940,
Secretary of Legation de Beus of the Netherlands Legation today
handed me the attached note verbale * which made the spotting of seven
German planes over Netherlands territory on February 20 the subject
of a protest. Upon delivering the note, M. de Beus at once remarked
that presumably it was not a case of seven planes but only of
two or three, since several of the spotters' reports evidently referred to
the same plane.
In reply to the request for information at the end of the note verbale
as to whether the planes that had passed over Holland on the night of
February 20-21 were German, I at once told M. de Beus that I could
tell him immediately that they had been British. Besides, we had
again received a great many reports of British planes flying over the
Netherlands in the last few days.
M. de Beus also handed me the memorandum, likewise attached
hereto,
2 containing a list of all alleged German flights over Holland
observed by the Netherlands military authorities in the period from
September 8 to January {February} 3. The Netherlands Legation
obviously intends thereby to maintain its previous allegations about
German flights over Netherlands territory in the face of our replies,
which had been negative for the most part. Accordingly, I immediately
told M. de Beus that the list was erroneous ; we had long ago
stated our position on all these cases in our notes verbales. I would
go over the list again and the result would surely be that we would
once more demonstrate this error to the Legation.
8
1 Not printed (173/84217-18). The note, which concluded with the request for
information as to whether any of the planes which flew over HoUand during the
night of Feb. 2O-21 were German, stated that a similar Question bad been addressed
to the British Government. * Not printed (173/84219-21 ) .
* The files contain a considerable number of communications from the Operations
Staff of the Luftwaffe to the Foreign Ministry indicating that flights by
German planes over Netherlands territory had taken place on numerous occasions,
e. g., 173/84046, 84056-58, 84065, 84067, etc.
FEBRUARY 1940
Regarding the case of the flight by a Netherlands plane over Nordhorn
on January 14, also referred to in the memorandum, I maintained
with respect to the assertion that such a flight was out of the question,
that the flight over Nordhorn by a Netherlands plane on the day mentioned
was indisputable because it had been observed with absolute
certainty.
No. 634
8330/E590060-6C
ffermarirZtalian Commercial Agreement^ Signed in Rome,
February $4, 1940 *
zu W g 1045.*
FOURTH SECRET PROTOCOL s
Pursuant to instructions from their Governments, the chairman of
the German governmental committee and the chairman of the Italian
governmental committee for the regulation of economic relations
between the German Reich and Italy, in consultation with several
members of the governmental committees and several experts and
on the basis of the agreements reached in the Secret Protocols of
May 14, 1937; December 18, 1937; and February 13, 1939, have
studied the question of how the German Reich and Italy, in the
present abnormal situation, can grant each other special economic
assistance over and above what has been done to date.
These discussions have led to the following results :
1. The two Governments will use their best efforts to carry through
during the year 1940 the deliveries in both directions provided tor
in Schedules C and D, attached hereto.
Drafting of Schedules A and B for deliveries in normal times has
been waived in view of the present extraordinary situation.
2. The chairmen of the two governmental committees, on the basis
of the reports of their respective experts, have carefully studied the
1 The series of minor agreements (8339/E589998-E590075) which accompanied
the signing of the Secret Protocol on Feb. 24 Included three secret exchanges of
letters. In the first (8339/E590044-45), the German Government agreed to an
exchange rate fixed at 7.63 lire to 1 reichsmark for 1940, with provision for
modification if price relationships changed. The second (8339/E590054r-55)
concerned credit arrangements involving the German nationals and Volksdeutsche
emigrating from Alto Adige Province to Germany. The third
(8339/E590068-69) voided the secret exchange of letters of Feb. 13, 1939, regarding
Itaio-German tourist traffic (see vol. iv, document No. 451, footnote 1) and
established new regulations to apply until the funds involved were liquidated,
*W g 1045 : Not found.
The original Secret Protocol was signed May 14, 1937 (7199/E529736-41).
For text of the Second Secret Protocol, signed Dec. 18, 1937, see vol. i, document
No. 84 ; for the text of the Third Secret Protocol, signed Feb. 13, 1939, see vol. iv,
document No. 451.
810
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
transport situation and the results of the conference on this subject
held during the past months by these experts. They are agreed that
the two Governments will use all means at their command to facilitate
shipments between the two countries.
3. The chairman of the German governmental committee calls
attention to the fact that the assumption of the obligation by the German Government to assure, as far as production is concerned
the delivery of 12 million tons of coal from the German Reich to
Italy during 1040, requires an extraordinary effort on the part of
the German economy. Transport for this quantity of coal by the
land route can be assured, however, only at the rate of 500,000 tons
per month, and then only if the Italian railway administration makes
5,000 coal cars available for these shipments at all times. This
obligation remains in force even in the event of the elimination of
certain rail routes in the German Reich, but with the proviso of
forces beyond control, such as, e.g., production or transport difficulties
caused by severe frost, floods, or enemy action. Moreover,
the German Government will use every means to render possible
the shipment of a quantity greater than 500,000 tons, but cannot
at this time commit itself to any definite figures in that respect.*
Signed at Rome on February 24, 1940, in the German and the
Italian languages, in two originals each.
The Chairman of the The Chairman of the
German Governmental Committee Italian Governmental Committee
CAIEL CLODIUS A. GIANNIOT
* See document No. 669, footnote 12,
[Annex 1]
Schedule C
ITALIAN IMPORTS
Coal 12,000,000 tons
Benzol, unrefined 10,000
"
Toluol, refined 1,500
"
Naphthalene 2,500
"
Aceton 300 "
Magnesium 200 "
[Annex 2]
Schedule D
GERMAN IMPORTS
Rice In accordance with the agreements between
Ente Risi [Rice Growers Association] and
the German Rice Syndicate.
Hemp, hemp-tow and hackled hemp. ... 25, 000* tons
Tobacco 3, 500, 000 reichsmarks
f(
ft
FEBRTTART 1940
Cork, raw 1, 500 tons
Tannin 1, 000 "
Cheese , . 2, 000, 000 f reichsmarks
Hides and skins (cow, lamb, sheep, etc.) . . tons
Sponges 53
Bauxite (second grade) 100, 000 "
Zinc ore 35, OOOJ
Pyrites 50,000
Pyrite roasting residues 50, 000
Mercury 40, 000
Sulphur 70, 000 tons
Boric acid 300 "
Tartar, crude 2, 500 "
Citrus fruit oils 105 "
Chestnut wood extract 5, 000 "
Sumac extract 300 "
Raw silk, single, double, thrown 700 "
Floss silk 400 "
Moss silk, spun, undyed; single or twisted . 250 "
*Including the 10,000 tons bought during the current crop year. [Footnote in
the original.]
flncluding: 1.400,000 reichsmarks under German Tariff Schedule No. 135b
200,000
" " " " " " 135d
400,000
" " " " " " 135e
[Footnote in the original.]
JUp to 40,000 tons if possible. [Footnote in the original.]
50 percent lemon, 25 percent bergamot, 10 percent orange, and 15 percent
tangerine. [Footnote in the original.]
No. 635
173/84227-28/2
The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT THE HAGUE, February 25, 1940 8 : 14 p. m.
No. 141 of February 25 Received February 26 1 : 00 a. m.
Benzler and I x conferred with. Hirschfeld yesterday on the following
questions :
1. Conduct of naval warfare : Hirschfeld stated that he had been
authorized by the inner Council of Ministers to discuss with us the
economic aspect of the torpedoing of Dutch vessels. I assume that
he was not only authorized but actually instructed to do so. He
stated that the torpedoings of the last few days (Burgerdijk, den Eaag
1 Felix Benzler, Consul General at Amsterdam, and Dr. Walter, Ministerialdirektor
in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who had been engaged in
economic negotiations with the Netherlands.
812
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and Tara) had aroused alarm in Holland. The Government was
sensible and had thus far prevented any violent press campaign. The
bad part was that both the Burgerdijk and the Tara were sunk despite
the fact that they were carrying government grain, the Tara evidently
even without prior warning. He did not wish to go further
into the political aspect of the question. A note of protest was being
prepared on the Burgerdijk^ but it was hoped in Holland that Germany
would be willing to offer an explanatory apology, referring to
the case as an isolated incident and perhaps offer indemnification even
before the arrival of this note. He was not authorized to say anything
on this point. At any rate, the situation was extremely grave
because the Netherlands Government could not be content with notes
of protest. It was consequently more difficult than before to meet
Germany's wishes. How was the Netherlands Government to
justify
to the people the continued exportation of foodstuffs to Germany
when Germany was sinking foodstuffs and fodder destined for Holland?
Germany's action against Dutch foodstuffs and fodder transports
would undoubtedly have a serious effect on the fixing of tlie quota
limits for exports in the future. At the least Holland would not be
able to supply any agricultural products dependent on other foreign
imports if Germany prevented their importation. He must ask
whether Germany was at all prepared to discuss the question of how
such torpedoings could be avoided in the future. He could not yet
make any specific proposals.
We pointed out that we were not authorized to discuss political
and military matters but were prepared to pass his question on.
Comment: The torpedoing of Dutch ships with foodstuffs and
fodder destined for Holland produces dangerous sources of conflict,
particularly because the Dutch rightly point out that only they, a
neutral country, are hurt by it. I believe that the intimation that
export of foodstuffs to Germany may be sharply reduced must be
taken quite seriously, and I take a grave view of the consequences of
such action on the part of the Dutch, especially for the German food
situation. Without presuming to be able to judge the political and
military situation, I consider it essential that the German Government
decide immediately whether it is prepared to discuss with Holland
a procedure that would, if possible, preclude such torpedoings
in the future. These discussions would have to be conducted through
diplomatic channels.
'WelzsRcker recorded in a memorandum of Mar. 18 (173/84255), that the
Netherlands Minister presented a note of protest regarding the sinking of the
Burgerdijk. Weizsacker replied that the case was then so many weeks old that
he could not go into it without further investigation.
FEBRUARY 194:0
2. Armament deliveries: Keferring to his letter to the Reich Minister
of Economics,3 Hirschfeld stressed emphatically that Germany's
delay in the execution of the arms contracts which had largely been
concluded after the beginning of the war, has caused great annoyance
in Holland. The statement of the Minister of Economics that
the Führer had approved the delivery of arms to Holland had at the
time been noted with satisfaction. It was therefore all the more disappointing
now that the promises were not being kept. The Netherlands
Minister of War was pressing for an immediate decision so that,
if necessary, he could place the orders elsewhere. He, Hirschfeld,
was being reproached for having urged so strongly that the contracts
be given to Germany. He had of late no longer been able to recommend
that his Government place orders in Germany, particularly since
difficulties were now also being made in instances where Holland had
already supplied the necessary raw materials (for example, refusal
of the Atlas Works to deliver ship propellers despite previous delivery
of manganese bronze) . He was constrained to say that if Germany
contemplated soliciting contracts for the three armored cruisers there
would be no inclination in Holland to consider German offers so long
as the execution of the armament contracts already concluded was not
assured.
Nonfulfillment of the armament contracts would undoubtedly discredit
the activity of the governmental committees and this would also
be bound to have an extremely adverse effect on commercial relations.
This applied especially to the delivery of the Eslandsfontain^ since
there was at hand here a written statement by the German chairman
dating from the summer of 1938, to the effect that the German Government
would place no difficulties in the way of the delivery of this
ship. It was precisely the possibility of a war that they had been
thinking of at that time.
Comment: If Germany considers it of importance to maintain orderly
relations with Holland, the question of the execution of the
armament contracts must be solved affirmatively and at once. If they
must be rescinded, it would be better to do so immediately and in all
frankness.
In the latter case, I consider it necessary to appoint another chairman
for the delegation in my place, who would not be handicapped
in his activity by the fact that statements made by him on behalf of
the German Government cannot be lived up to. It is to be expected
in that case that Hirschfeld, too, would then probably resign as head
of their delegation, and this would undoubtedly entail serious disadvantages
for Germany.
'Not printed (6783/B513744-47).
814
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. Conversations regarding England: A. separate telegram 'will
follow on this subject stating my conclusion that Holland's conduct
gives us no cause for countermeasures.*
4. Continuation of the conversation on the above questions lias
been agreed with Hirschfeld for Tuesday. I request immediate instructions
on points 1 and 2 by Monday evening, if possible.8
5. I shall make a separate report on the threatening development in
German exports to the Netherlands and the consequences that would
result.*
WALTER
ZECH
4 In this telegram No. 142 of Feb. 25 (173/84229-32), Dr. Walter stated
that conclusion of British-Dutch economic negotiations might be expected in a
few weeks. He reported that German submarine warfare and the delay in
armaments deliveries did not seem to have affected the Dutch attitude in the
negotiations with Britain thus far, but that there should be continued pressure
from Germany to prevent any deterioration of the situation.
6 The instruction on point 1 was delayed in order to be submitted to the Naval
Stan?. The Hague was finally informed by telegram No. 172 of Mar. 9 (8373/
H3590701-02) that nothing was known of the sinking of den Haag or the Tara,
but that the BurgerdijTc had been sunk in accordance with the rules of the London
Declaration. The German Foreign Ministry agreed that the sinking of ships
laden with foodstuffs should be avoided, and were willing to discuss the matter
with the Netherlands Government, with the guarantee, however, that such shipments
did not go to England.
As for arms deliveries, in spite of a recommendation of the Economic Policy
Department against further dilatory treatment of the subject* the decision of
the Ftihrer on Mar. 4 was that deliveries should not be made and that dilatory
treatment should be continued (G783/E513726 28) .
'This report was made in telegram No. 159 of Mar. 2 (173/84238-40). It
noted that the reduced level of German exports was viewed with concern in
Holland and suggested that, in view of the importance of maintaining a balance
in German-Dutch trade, attention be given to keeping up German exports to Holland,
especially of iron and steel products.
No. 636
F18/213-20&
Memorandum T>y the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation
to the Soviet Union
TOP SECRET BERIJCN-, February 26, 1940. W 1027 g. Rs
TfcM 9 g. Ks.
THE GERMAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC AGREEMENT SIGNED ON"
FEBRUARY 11, 1940 x
The Agreement is based on the exchange of letters mentioned in
the preamble between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and
the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, dated
September 28, 1939.2 The Agreement represents the first great step
1 Document No. 607.
3 Document No. 162,
FEBRtJAKT 1940
toward the economic program envisaged by both sides and is to be
followed by others.
1. The Agreement covers a period of 27 months, i. e., the Soviet deliveries,
which are to be made within 18 months, will be compensated
by German deliveries in turn within 27 months. The most difficult
point of the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, namely, that
the Soviet raw material deliveries are to be compensated by German
industrial deliveries over a more extended period of time, is thereby
settled in accordance with our wishes. This was not possible without
a hard fight. Only the personal message of the Reich Foreign Minister
to Stalin brought the final settlement.8 The stipulation of 18 and 27
months represents a compromise solution, since at stated intervals
namely, every 6 months the mutual deliveries of goods must be balanced
according to the fixed ratio. If this balance does not exist, i. e.,
particularly if the German deliveries fall behind the ratio of the
Soviet deliveries fixed by the Agreement, the other side is entitled to
suspend its deliveries temporarily until the fixed ratio is reestablished.
This stipulation is annoying, but could not be eliminated by us, as
Stalin himself had adopted it during the final talks.
2. The Soviet deliveries. According to the Agreement, the Soviet
Union shall within the first 12 months deliver raw materials in the
amount of approximately 500 million RM.
In addition, the Soviets will deliver raw materials, contemplated ia
the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939,
4 for the same period, in the
amount of approximately 100 million RM.
The most important raw materials are the following:
1,000,000 tons of feed grains and legumes worth 120 million KM.
900,000 tons of petroleum worth approximately 115 million KM.
100,000 tons of cotton worth approximately 90 million RM.
500,000 tons of phosphates.
100,000 tons of chromium ores.
500,000 tons of iron ore.
300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron.
2,400 kg. of platinum.
Manganese ore, metals, lumber, and numerous other raw materials.
To this must also be added the Soviet exports to the Protectorate,
which are not included in the Agreement, in the amount of about 50
million RM so that the net deliveries of goods from the Soviet Union
during the first treaty year amount to a total of 650 million RM.
In addition, there are other important benefits. On the basis of the
exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union had
granted us the right of transit to and from Rumania, Iran, and
Afghanistan and the countries of the Far East, which is particularly
See documents Nos. 594 and 600*
4 See vol. vn, document No. 131.
816
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
important in view of the German soybean purchases from
chukuo. The freight rates of the Trans-Siberian Railroad wera
reduced by 50 percent for soybeans. The transit freight charges are
to be settled by a clearing system and amount to approximately 100
million RM. ;
Adding certain other items (clearing charges in purchase of ra^
materials by the Soviet Union in third countries) , it may be assumed
that during the first 12 months Soviet deliveries and services will
amount to a total of about 800 million RM.
3. Thus far, only part of the Soviet deliveries has been fixed for the
second treaty year. During the first six months of the second treaty
year the Soviet Union will deliver to Germany 230 million RM worth
of raw materials of the same kind as in the first treaty year. It is
contemplated that negotiations will be resumed in good time before the
expiration of the first treaty year and the quantities for the exchange
'of goods for the second treaty year fixed and even increased beyond
the volume of the first treaty year.
4. The German deliveries comprise industrial products, industrial
processes and installations as well as war material. The Soviet deliveries
of the first 12 months are to be compensated by us within 15
months. The Soviet deliveries of the first 6 months of the second
treaty year (13th to 18th month) are to be compensated by us within
12 months (from the 16th to the 27th month) .
5. Among the Soviet deliveries within the first 18 months are
11,000 tons of copper, 3,000 tons of nickel, 950 tons of tin, 500 tons
of molybdenum, 500 tons of wolfram, 40 tons of cobalt. These deliveries
of metals are intended for the carrying out of the German
deliveries to the Soviet Union. Since these metals are not immediately
available in Germany and will not be delivered until the treaty
is in force, it will be necessary to bridge the initial period by using
metals from our own stocks for the German deliveries to the Soviet
Union and to replace them from the incoming Soviet metal deliveries.
Any different arrangement, such as the advance delivery of
metals which we demanded at first, could not be achieved.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union declared her willingness to act as
buyer of metals and raw materials in third countries. To what degree
this promise can be realized in view of the intensified English
countermeasures cannot be judged at the present time. Since Stalin
himself has repeatedly promised generous help in this respect it may
be expected that the Soviet Union will make every effort.
6. The negotiations were difficult and lengthy. There were material
and psychological reasons for this. Undoubtedly, the Soviet
Union promised far more deliveries than are defensible from a purely
economic point of view, and she must make the deliveries to Germany
FEBRUARY 1940 817
partly at the expense of her own supply. On the other hand, it is
understandable that the Soviet Government is anxious to receive as
compensation those things which the Soviet Union lacks. Since the
Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods whatsoever, their
wishes concerned exclusively capital goods and war material. Thus,
in numerous cases, Soviet bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks,
such as machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition.
It was not easy to find a compromise between the interests of
both sides. Psychologically the ever-present distrust by the Russians
was of importance as well as the fear of any responsibility. Even
People's Commissar Mikoyan had to refer numerous questions to
Stalin personally, since his authority was not sufficient.
Despite all these difficulties, during the long negotiations the desire
of the Soviet Government to help Germany and to consolidate
firmly the political understanding in economic matters as well, became
more and more evident.
The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for us. The
raw material purchases from the Soviet Union and from the countries
bordering the Soviet Union can still be considerably increased. But
it is essential to meet the German commitments to the extent required*
In view of the great volume this will require a special effort. If we
succeed in extending and expanding exports to the East in the required
volume, the effects of the English blockade will be decisively
weakened by the incoming raw materials.5
SOHITORBB
*The reaction in Berlin to tlae new agreement was described by Hitter in a
letter of Mar. 4 to Schulenburg as follows : "Our reception in Berlin was on the
whole very good. The Foreign Minister especially received us in a very friendly,
almost cordial way. He is very pleased with the outcome. All the offices involved
are convinced that the treaty must be conscientiously observed on our
part. I am convinced that we can do it, even if it will no doubt often be very
difficult." (276/178605-06)
No. 637
66/46595-98
Memorandum T>y the Fuhrer
DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONVERSATIONS WITH MR, STTMKER WEWJBS
February 29, 1940.
1. In general I request that on the German side reserve be exercised
in the conversations, and that as far as possible Mr. Sumner Welles
be allowed to do the talking.
2. In regard to Germany's relations with the United States, it may
be stressed that the present situation is unsatisfactory to both na
818
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tions. The Government of the Keich has done nothing for its part
to bring about this development in the relations between the two conntries
; if by sending Mr. Sumner Welles to Berlin the American Government
is seeking to bring about a change in this regard, that would
doubtless be in the interest of both peoples.
3. Germany's viewpoint with regard to the international situation
and the war has been made known to the world through my speeches,
In particular, the following points are to be stressed :
Germany did not declare war on the Western Powers, but, on the
contrary, they declared war on Germany,
England and France had no justifiable reason at all for a wax
against Germany. Just as on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine the
United States would firmly reject any interference by European governments
in Mexican affairs, for example, Germany regards the Eastern
European area as her sphere of interest, concerning which she
must come to an understanding with Russia alone, but never with England
and France. After the end of the Polish campaign, Germany
came to terms with Russia on Eastern questions and thus conclusively
safeguarded her European position by this revision in the East which
had become unavoidable. Then at the beginning of October, I again
made one last offer of peace to England and France. Thereupon
both these countries committed the biggest blunder they could poasibly
have made : they considered this offer a sign of weakness and
rejected it with scorn.
Germany drew the only possible conclusion from this : she accepted
the challenge of England and France.
Since then the war aim of England and France has been revealed
more and more clearly. It consists, as is now openly stated, in the
destruction of the German state and the dismemberment of the German
people under a Versailles system even worse than before. Considering
this development, Germany, as a state under attack, has
nothing to say on the subject of peace. She is unshakable in her
determination once and for all to break the will to annihilate [Germany]
which now dominates British and French policy and to utilize
the power of her 80 million people to this end. Not until the Anglo-
French will to annihilate [Germany] has been broken can a new,
really peaceful Europe be built. While in their unprecedented delusion
England and France are more and more openly proclaiming
as their war aim the annihilation of Germany and a new division of
Europe into nations with rights and others without rights, even today
Germany does not demand the annihilation of the British Empire
and France; rather she regards the satisfaction of the vital interests
of the great nations in their natural Lebensraum as a guarantee for
the consolidation of Europe, in which there is room for small states
which have proved their viability in the course of history as well as
MARCH 1940
for the large ones. Germany is convinced that this goal can be attained
only by a German victory.
4. As regards economic matters, it can be stated that the British
blockade is not of decisive importance to Germany. In both food
and raw materials Germany can defeat any blockade by her selfsufficient
economy and her trade with the European countries, with
Bussia, and by way of Russia with Japan and a large part of the
world.
National Socialist Germany is not at all opposed to a world economy.
The trade policy of the world forced upon her the development
of her own self-contained economy. Only with its attainment, which
is coming ever closer to realization, will Germany be in a position to
participate in the world economy again as a sound partner.
5. A discussion of single concrete political questions, such as the
question of a future Polish state, is to be avoided as much as possible.
In case the other side brings up subjects of this kind, the reply should
be that such questions are decided by me. It is self-evident that it
is entirely out of the question for Germany to discuss the subject of
Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which has
constantly been brought up by England and France.
6. Attention may be called to Germany's completely changed international
position as compared to 1914. All statements are to be
avoided which could be interpreted by the other side to mean that
Germany is in any way interested at present in discussing possibilities
of peace. I request rather that Mr. Sumner Welles not be
given the slightest reason to doubt that Germany is determined to
end this war victoriously and that the German people united today
as never before in their thousand year history and their leadership
are unshakable in their confidence in victory.
ADOIJB*
No. 638
265/1724.99
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTRGE:NT ANKARA, March 1, 1940 1 : 45 a. m.
No. 136 of March 1 Received March 1 4 : 30 a. m.
Numan, who dined with me this evening, told me that today's speech
by the Minister President * was of decisive importance in establishing
1 On Feb. 29, Minister President Reflk Saydam in a radio address to tfce nation
stated that Tiirkey was ready now for any eventuality but ^**^n"J2**
only if her national existence or interests were threatened ; **^**?%S
policy and tne question of ner participation in the war would not be influenced.
by any outside combination.
820
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Turkey's policy. The intention was to oppose an unmistakable "no"
to the pressure exerted by London and Paris for an extension of the
theater of war.
This speech thus signified a notable success for our efforts to stiffen
Turkey's backbone. It would be very desirable if the effect of the
speech in London and Paris could be enhanced by a Russian statement
in the sense ofmy telegram No. 115 of February 22.a
PAPEN
"Not printed (265/172193-94). The reference here Is obscure.
No. 639
174/136262
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 169 of March 1 TOKTO, March 1, 194010 : 55 p. m.
Received March 1 8:35 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister*
My mission 1 has made good progress up to now. My personal
reception was splendid. My factual observations confirm the previous
impression of the Embassy. It is absolutely necessary for overcoming
the existing difficulties here and for the success of my mission that the
line of Germany's economic policies coincide with her political line.
Adoption of Germany's economic measures toward Japan since the
beginning of September and their effects, especially as regards the
instruction of December 9 2 on terms of payment, are contrary to your
political aims in Japan. Support by economic policy of the political
line is necessary even if Germany makes economic concessions without
return for the present. Because Japanese confidence can be
restored only by German acts of confidence, and this is a prerequisite,
for everything else, I believe that our political intentions make it
necessary for us to make economic concessions to Japan, especially
considering Japan's decided economic difficulties. I should be grateful
if the economic policy were coordinated with the political line
immediately and should become felt even during my sojourn here. I
intend to return at the end of March.
HELITBRICH
Orr
*The files contain nothing on the background of Helfferich's mission.
Not found.
MARCH 1940 821
No. 640
F14/353-79
Memorandum* 'by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat
BM 7 BEMUOT, March 1, 1940.
[Pol. IX 498 g.]
1
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MlL
SUMNER WELLES IN THE PRESENCE or AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
KERB: AND MINISTER VON DORNBERQ
After a few brief words of greeting, Mr, Stunner Welles explained
the motives and nature of his mission. Simmer Welles stressed particularly
two points in the public announcement made by President
Roosevelt shortly before his departure: (1) his mission to report to
the President on the actual situation in Europe and, for that purpose,
to visit Italy, Germany, France, and Great Britain, without, however,
being authorized to make any proposals or commitments in the name
of the American Government; and (2) the strictly confidential character
of his mission. He would report any information received from
foreign statesmen in the course of his trip to President Roosevelt
alone.
He had already had a conversation with the Dues and Count Ciano.
After completion of his visit to Germany he would go to Paris and
London via Switzerland, and return to America by way of Rome,
where another conversation was scheduled with the Duce.
Sumner Welles then stated that Germany probably appreciated the
fact that the present situation filled the United States with deep concern.
President Roosevelt had done everything within his power to
avert the disaster of the present war and now had directed him, Sum-
Ber Welles, to ascertain the views of the European statesmen regarding
the possibilities of establishing a lasting and stable peace in [Europe.
He added that this peace should be no temporary, improvised
settlement but a permanent structure resting on a firm foundation.
He had asked to be received by the Reich Foreign Minister in order
to ascertain his views regarding the possibilities of such a peace.
Sumner Welles added that the United States Government had publicly
declared on various occasions that when and so Soon as the time
had come for the establishment of such a peace, it would, for its part,
take its full share in the measures necessary for disarmament and the
establishment of sound economic conditions.
*Tfae file number appears OB another copy (33/25240-60) found in the file* of
Under State Secretary Woermann, This copy, which was also distributed to the
State Secretary, carried the handwritten notation; "long version." The text I*
the same as that printed here.
822
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he took note of the interest
in European questions shown by the President of the United States,
as well as of his desire to study the possibilities for bringing about
a happier state of affairs "once the moment for it had come." In this
connection he felt constrained to express his regret, however, that the
United States' desire to change the situation for the better had not
been given effect some months ago. It was difficult at the moment, of
course, and it would have to be left to future historians to make clear
to world opinion the pattern of events which led to the war. He believed,
however, that if, to further the above-stated objective of achieving
a happier state of affairs, America had used her influence on other
countries, especially England, before the war broke out, things might
perhaps have taken a different course altogether.
The Reich Foreign Minister then turned to a discussion of German-
American relations and stated that in recent years, especially since the
[National Socialist] assumption of power, they had developed in
a manner unsatisfactory for both peoples. He wished to point out in
all frankness that nothing had been done on the part of Germany
that could in any way justify the present unsatisfactory state of German-
American relations. The recall of American Ambassador Wilson,
who enjoyed great esteem in Germany, was also deeply regretted
on the part of Germany. Many misunderstandings between the countries,
which were due to distortions and propaganda, probably could
have been averted if each country had had in the other country an
ambassador who could have maintained close relations not only with
the Governments but above all with the two leading- personalities, the
Führer and President Roosevelt. The Reich Foreign Minister said
in this connection that he did not know whether Sumner Welles' trip
also had the purpose of doing something toward improving German-
American relations and restoring the former friendly relations between
the two countries. If this was the case, he would for his part
welcome it.
If President Roosevelt wished to have a picture of the European
situation in general and the war situation in particular, it would be
well, in view of the numerous American misunderstandings and misconceptions
about the interests and the attitude of Germany, to look
back into the past and to clarify the causes of the war.
In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed especially
to Germany's situation resulting from the Versailles Treaty, which
for a 'self-respecting nation was intolerable. Sumner Welles was indeed
very well informed on this matter himself for, as the Reich Foreign
Minister recalled, he had on several occasions expressed his opposition
to the Versailles Treaty. Not only Germans but also statesmen
of the Entente countries had criticized in word and print the
evils of the Versailles Treaty.
MARCH 1940 823
At the very moment when Germany was well on her way toward a
settlement with Poland on some of the most oppressive of these evils,
outside influences opposing an agreement made themselves felt in
Warsaw. It was very well known in Germany today that England
and the other countries not only did nothing to ease the tension of
the situation in those critical moments, but on the contrary incited
Poland against Germany. It was clearly proved today that forces
had been at work which took advantage of the Polish question to start
a new war against Germany.
The Reich Foreign Minister then turned the conversation to the
German sphere of interest, which was as real a fact as was America's
Monroe Doctrine, the significance of which he was fully able to appreciate
after spending 4 years in the United States and in Canada. Germany,
too, had her Monroe Doctrine* Just as America would justifiably
oppose any intervention by Germany in Mexican affairs, so
Germany would not tolerate interference by other countries in her
vital sphere of interest. This stand had been repeatedly affirmed
vis-i-vis England, namely, in the case of Austria, in connection with
Czechoslovakia, and lastly in the Polish crisis. The German Monroe
Doctrine signified that there existed a German sphere of interest in
Eastern Europe, which was no concern of England, France, and other
Western countries; this was a matter that Germany had to discuss
with only one power, Soviet Russia, with which an understanding
had already been reached. It was a regrettable atavistic manifestation
of Versailles that the world and, in particular, England, by
reason of a 14-year-old habit, kept on meddling in all European affairs
and treating them as their own interests. A strong Germany
would never tolerate that, and England had repeatedly been served
notice of tins in. the most unequivocal manner. Despite the Führer's
desire for an understanding with England, which surely must be
knowu to Mr. Sunnier Welles, England had blocked Germany's every
forward step, because, obsessed by the mentality of Versailles, she
believed that she could exercise tutelage over a nation of 80 million
people. That had been a bad blunder on the part of England.
Without going into details since Mr. Sumner Welles could be presumed
to havg a detailed knowledge of events the Eeich Foreign
Minister emphasized the Führer's efforts for an understanding with
England and the establishment of a lasting general peace on the basis
of such an Anglo-German understanding. England had rejected all
offers, some of which had been in very concrete form, and it was to be
viewed as a great tragedy in world history that precisely the Führer
who, like Cecil Rhodes, had advocated the collaboration of Germany,
England, and the United States, should have found so little response
IB England.
824
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It was thus especially regrettable that Great Britain should have
declared war on Germany at the very moment when she had put into
effect the last and absolutely necessary revision of the Versailles
Treaty and had thereby created the basis for a harmonious life with
other nations. The fact must never be forgotten that it was not
Germany that had declared war but that England and France had
declared war on Germany. No propaganda and no attempt at distortion
could nullify that fact. England and France had not had
the least reason for going to war against Germany, considering that
even politicians in these two countries had characterized the Corridor
and Danzig as an "intolerable wrong." And yet they resorted to
war against Germany when she took steps to undo that "intolerable
wrong." Germany had accepted the challenge and would now fight.
Therefore, no study of the possibilities of realizing happier and better
conditions should lose sight of the fact that Germany was the party
attacked and was conducting a war of defense. Even though these
matters might be represented differently in the United States, thesa
were facts which no one could deny.
What, now, had happened since the outbreak of the war? After
the termination of the Polish war, the Fuhrer had made one more
peace offer to England and France in October, because he was convinced
that it was senseless to wage a war of annihilation just because
certain intolerable wrongs had been righted. These things
had doubtless been closely followed in America. Again Great Britain
had made the one blunder she ought not to have made : she had construed
the peace offer as a sign of weakness and rejected it with disdain.
It was the same blunder into which Great Britain had fallen,
repeatedly in recent years because she lived in total misapprehension
of the Führer's character and philosophy. In any case, the offer was
rejected and Germany accepted the consequences of that.
Since then the British and French statesmen had announced their
war aims. These amounted to a dismemberment of the German Reich
and a return of the German people to the status of Versailles, which
was tantamount to its annihilation. Germany, by contrast, had not
proclaimed the annihilation of France or the British Empire as her
war aim, but was now, as before, pursuing this goal : to build Europe's
future on the basis of a rational balancing of interests. To this end
the Great Powers would have to define and respect definite spheres
of interest. This new Europe would have room also for the smaller
states which had given historical proof of their right to existence as
independent national communities. This German war aim differed
fundamentally from that of the British. Without wishing to anticipate
the Fuhrer, who would receive Mr. Sumner Welles tomorrow at
11 o'clock, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his personal convic
MARCH 1940 825
tion that this rational state of affairs in Europe could be realized only
through a German victory. Germany was fully determined in any
event to crush her enemies' will to destroy and would carry out her
resolution. Any study of the possibility of achieving a better future
for Europe would of necessity have to take account of the mentality
that finds expression in the Allies' war aims. President Roosevelt
would then realize the difficulties that would have to be overcome to
achieve a reasonable settlement.
That Germany, in contrast to England and France, had not wanted
the war, had been demonstrated unmistakably before the whole world
not only by the Führer's words but also by his actions and offers. Germany
had concluded an agreement with France in December 1938,
a
which had been broken by France. To England, Germany had made
offer after offer, which had been rejected by the British. The Reich
Foreign Minister had never been able to understand this British and
French attitude, and he believed that its chief cause was the utter lack
of outstanding leadership in the two countries in recent years.
Germany, on the other hand, had never throughout her history been
so united as today and she was determined to crush once and for all
her enemies' will to annihilate. She could look upon her present situation
with deep satisfaction. It gave her assurance and confidence.
Conditions wore basically different from those in 1914. Germany now
had the biggest and best equipped army and air force. The Army was
determined to win. It had been possible in the span of 18 days to
force to its knees a nation of M millions, which as late as the end of
August had raved about a parade march to Berlin. This victory, incidentally,
had been achieved with only a small fraction of the forces
now assembled at the West Wall. Mr. Sumner Welles would thus be
able to appreciate with what confidence the German people were facing
the events to come.
Not much needed to be said about the political situation. Germany
was entirely satisfied. She had clear friendships and it was only to
be regretted that a similar clear relationship did not also exist to the
same extent with the United States.
Economically, Germany was just as invincible as she was militarily.
The British blockade was a delusion. Germany's food supplies were
assured within her own Lebensraum. Moreover, beyond that, Germany
had access to a large portion of Europe, the whole of Russia,
and, by way of Russia, to wide areas of the world. As regards raw
materials, Germany had by her planning for autarky achieved the
greatest possible independence and was broadening this independence
every day and every hour. Besides, half the world, if not the whole
* For the text of the Franco-German declaration of Dec. 6, 1938, see vol. iv,
document No.
826
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
world, was still open to Germany in that respect, and the blockade
would turn out to be a failure for England.
The Foreign Minister finally mentioned England's miscalculations
about creating disunity among the German people. There was one
thing to be borne in mind under all circumstances : No matter how
long the war should last, whether 1 year, or 5 or 10 years, the German
people never would become disunited. To believe that they would
was an utter delusion.
In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister spoke once more about
German-American relations and repeated a statement he once made to
American Ambassador Wilson. Nothing whatever could set the German
and American nations against each other, if they considered their
mutual interests realistically. There were no territorial ambitions to
form an obstacle to friendly relations. All Germany wanted was to
expand her trade with the United States. The Reich Foreign Minister
stressed in this connection that Germany was xiot opposed to a
world economy. If by autarky Germany had succeeded in putting
her own economy in order again, the world only had reason to be
grateful to her for becoming by this means a sound business partner
again. Germany, moreover, had not introduced an autarkic economic
system of her own volition, but rather had been forced into it
by the economic effects of the Versailles settlement and the unwise
trade policies of certain countries. The autarkic measures provided
the essential conditions for her joining the world economy again, as a
really sound partner. Besides, every big country sooner or later would
of itself return to a world economy, and after the conclusion of peace
Germany would become one of the most active participants in the
world economy.
Upon the Reich Foreign Minister's request that Mr. Sumner Welles
should now in turn take a stand on these problems and state President
Roosevelt's views, Sumner Welles, promising to speak with equal
frankness, began to talk first about German-American relations. He
admitted that they were far from satisfactory and said that he regretted
this in view of the close and genuine friendship which had
linked the two countries for generations. In this connection he also
recalled the many contributions which individuals of German descent
had made to America's history and culture. He cited two reasons
which had led to the estrangement between the two countries :
1. The American attitude toward certain problems was conditioned
by sentiment and governed by humanitarian considerations. He
granted that propaganda had an effect in America, as it did also in all
other countries, and stated that everything possible had to be done to
remove misunderstandings.
[2.] As the second reason for the German-American estrangement
Sumner Welles mentioned the events of the last year and a half.
MARCH 1940 827
Americans believed in peaceful methods for removing difficulties.
They held that the use of force had to be supplanted by peaceful means!
Sumner Welles added that when the time should come to make peace
a lasting and just peace and if Germany did her share in working
it out, it was his belief that the friendly; sentiments toward Germany
in America would assert themselves again.
He would report to President Roosevelt in detail on the Reich Foreign
Minister's comments regarding the recall of the American Ambassador,
lie added that the American Government had the fullest
confidence in the present ChargS d'Affaires.
The Reich Foreign Minister in turn expressed confidence in Mr^
Kirk and added that Kirk had shown great circumspection in difficult
situations and had done his best to improve German-American relations.
The comments on the recall of the American Ambassador had
no personal implications but were aimed at the principle involved.
Sumner Welles them replied to the Reich Foreign Minister's statements
regarding the Monroe Doctrine, saying that to clarify the matter
he had to point out the following : The Monroe Doctrine had during
some periods of American history been interpreted as a right of the
United States to hegemony over the other American states as well as
a right to intervene actively in the internal affairs of these states.
These times, however, were gone forever. America today was merely
one member in a partnership of 21 nations joined in a common effort
to prevent any interference in their affairs by non-American countries.
Thus the Monroe Doctrine, in its present form, was not something that
was imposed upon the American states but something in which they
all participated equally.
Summer Welles then put some questions. He explained that it was
not clear to him whether Germany's war aims mentioned by the Reich
Foreign Minister (i. e., clearly defined and mutually respected spheres
of interest for the Great Powers and room for the smaller countries
which had #iven historical proof of an independent national life)
could be attained only after elimination of the opposition's will to
annihilate and following a German victory, or were attainable even
earlier.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the answer to this question
was already anticipated by his statements. In view of the enemy's
will to annihilate, which had been expressed again only yesterday in
a speech by Eden on the annihilation of Hitlerism, a rational consolidation
of Europe could be achieved only through a German
victory.
As to the Monroe Doctrine, he was very well aware of the difference
as regards European conditions and had merely intended to show by
this comparison that Germany, just as much, as the United States,
had her sphere of interest.
828
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Regarding the American view on substituting peaceful methods
for the use of force, he, as the person responsible for carrying out the
Führer's foreign policy, could point out that since January 30, 1933,
the Führer had not taken a single step toward a revision of intolerable
situations without first seeking to obtain such revision by means of
negotiations. To that end, in every instance where a revision was at
issue in the last 6% years, he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had first
entered into official and unofficial contact with British and French
statesmen.
The Reich Foreign Minister moreover recalled the proposals for
negotiation of the 200,000 and 300,000-man army and the prohibition
of heavy weapons made by the Führer at the time when Germany
was still at the Disarmament Conference. In all these instances, as
also in connection with the reintroduction of compulsory military service,
the occupation of the Rhineland, and in the Austrian and Sudeten-
German questions, efforts were always made to the last to reach amicable
settlements of these matters through negotiations. Time and
again Germany was put off until the Fuhrer was compelled to take matters
into his own hands. The achievement of the Fuhrer in carrying
out without bloodshed the revisions of the Versailles Treaty essential
to the unification of the entire German people, would be recognized
by history as a unique achievement. America, too, should be able to
appreciate this achievement if she recalled how much blood was spilled
before the unification of the American people could be accomplished.
Besides, the Führer could not have acted otherwise. The problems in
question had to be solved sooner or later since the Germans living
outside the borders were pressing for a return to the Reich. Had they
not been solved, each one of these problems might eventually have set
off a European war. Thus, for instance, England first stiffened Benes'
opposition to Germany and so turned the Sudeten-German problem
into a major crisis. Despite that, the Fuhrer had succeeded, up to the
time of the Polish war, in completing the process of unifying the
German people without spilling a drop of blood. In solving the last
and most intolerable burden imposed upon Germany by Versailles,
namely, the question of Danzig and the Corridor, it was England
again that opposed Germany. England was therefore guilty before
history that this question could not also be settled peacefully. In any
case, probably never before in history had the unification of a great
nation been accomplished with less bloodshed than was the unification
of the German people.
Mr. Sumner Welles then set forth what a disaster it would be for
the world if the war of annihilation were really to break out in the
West. All countries of the world, not only the belligerents, would be
affected directly or indirectly by that catastrophe. He would like to
MARCH 1040 829
emphasize once more that President Roosevelt had sent Tim\ to Europe
to see if there was not some possibility of avoiding this last development
and perhaps still to find a settlement.
After the Reich Foreign Minister had once more stressed that he
had given Mr. Sumner Welles his personal ideas about the developments
of recent years and on the question of the present war, and that
he did not wish to anticipate the Führer, who was going to receive
Mr. Sumner Welles tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock, the American
thanked him for the information received and again expressed his
hope that a way might yet be found out of all difficulties.
SCHMIDT
Minister
No. 641
60/46599
Supplement to the Memorandum of the Conversation Between the
Foreign Minister and Summer Welles on March 1^ 1940
When Sumner Welles mentioned the humanitarian attitude of the
Americans as one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of German-
American relations, the Foreign Minister interrupted to ask
whether this attitude resulted in condemnation of the German \Brit*
ish?~] blockade against German women and children. Sumner Welles
replied in the affirmative and stated that for Americans humanitarian
values applied to all peoples and races. The Foreign Minister replied
that if Mr. Sumner Welles wished to learn something about the human
aspect of things, he would do best to stay a short time in Germany ;
he should come to understand the difference between the Germany of
1918-19, when the British blockade was still continuing despite termination
of the war, or between the Germany of 1931-32 and the Germany
of today. It was a difference between night and day. While
earlier not a single happy face was to be seen in Germany, now there
was a nation of 80 millions of enthusiastic, happy human beings; that
was the humane work to which the Führer had devoted his life.
No. 642
33/25243-44
Memor&ndwrn, "by the State Secretary
SECRET BEBIXN-, March 1, 1940.
St.S. No. 203
Mr. Sumner Welles (unaccompanied) called on me for an informal
discussion this afternoon. Neither of us made any notes during the
conversation. The following remarks by the American are worth
noting :
830
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1. If the war should set in with full force, it would lead to economic,
financial, and social ruin and to the destruction of all that we cherish
and treasure on earth, not only in Europe but also overseas, especially
in the USA. The United States could not remain passive in the face
of that.
2. Herr von Ribbentrop had outlined the German view for him. If
our Government really believed that its objective could be achieved
only by a military victory, then his, Welles', trip to Europe was pointless.
He could not verify the will to annihilation which we imputed to
England.
3. He planned to be back in Washington on March 26, after talking
with Mussolini once more on his return trip via Italy. What Mussolini
had already told him was a basis and a hope, a point of departure
for constructive proposals.
To be sure, if the war was once fully unleashed that would be the end
of any discussion.
4. The United States could not be a party to negotiations, but it
could offer assistance. Welles inquired if Roosevelt should act alone
or preferably in conjunction with Mussolini, if the occasion should
arise.
I rejected having this question put to me ; it was not my business to
discuss peace actions.
5. Welles made it very clear that he was averse to any public peace
action. He is undoubtedly thinking of discreet proposals by the
President at the conclusion of his trip.
6. The mistakes of 1918 must by all means be avoided.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
WKIZSACKBR
No. 643
33/25245
Memorandum T>y the State Secretary
St.S. No. 204 BERLIN, March 1, 1940.
Mr. Sumner Welles made the following additional oral statements
to me today ;
1. In case he saw Field Marshal Goring, he intended to hand him a
memorandum on the question of economic relations and disarmament.
This memorandum was actually addressed only to the neutrals. However,
the belligerents would naturally not be excluded from the discussion
suggested in it. Welles described the response to the memorandum
by the neutrals as very satisfactory so far.
Welles will have the Embassy transmit a copy of the memorandum
directly to the Foreign Ministry.1
2. Welles wants to see Dr. Schacht. Mr. Hull had asked him to do
so because of Minister Sehacht's knowledge of economic matters.2
*A copy of this memorandum (B21/B005421-22) was banded to Welsssilcker
by Kirk on Mar. 5 (B21/B005420). See also document No. 673, footnote 1.
Welles had a conversation with Schacht on Mar. 3 at the home of the American
Charg6 d'Affaires, Alexander Kirk. No other mention of this meeting has been
found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Welles made a report to the President,, an account of which is published in William L. danger and S. Everett Gleason,, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952), p. S67.
S3JL
S. Welles asked what other members of the Government he ought to
see. He wants to restrict himself to people in official positions. I
reserved the answer to that question for the Foreign Minister.
4. Welles praised the calm, sure way in which Counselor of Embassy
Thomsen conducts his affairs in Washington.
WEIZSACKER
No. 644
S589/E602673-76
Directive "by the Führer and Supreme Commander of tJie WeTirmacht
CHTOPBACHK BERLIN, March 1, 1940.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
WFA/Abt. L, No. 22070/40 g. Kdos. Chefs.
By officer only
DIRECTIVE FOR Fall Weserubung
1. The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway
by a part of the Wehrmacht (Fall Weserubung) . This operation
should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic.
Further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy
and Luftwaffe a wider start-line against Britain.
The part which the Navy and the Luftwaffe will have to play, within
the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the
interference of British naval and air striking forces.
In view of our military and political power in comparison with
that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the Fall
Weserutntng will be kept as small as possible* The numerical weakness
will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution.
On principles we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as
a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection
of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands
will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the
occupation. If necessary, naval and air demonstrations will provide
the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met
with, all military means will be used to crush it.
2. I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation
against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the
XXI Army Corps, General of Infantry von Falkenhorst (Commander
of "Group XXI"). In questions of the conduct of operations, the
above-named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed
from all three branches of the Wehrmacht.
The forces which will be selected for the purpose of Fall
Weseriibung will be under separate command. They will not be
allocated for other operational theaters. The part of the Luftwaffe
832
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
detailed for the purpose of the Weserubung will be tactically under
the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task, they
will revert to the command of C.-in-C., Luftwaffe.
The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and
Luftwaffe command will take place in agreement with the Commander
of Group XXI.
The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI
will be ensured by the Wehrmacht branches themselves according to
the demands of the Commander.
3. The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes
the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately
our own countermeasures. It is most important that the Scandinavian
States as well as the Western opponents should be taken 'by surprise
by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport
and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be
made with this factor in mind. In case the preparations for embarkation
can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be
deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted
with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.
4. Occupation of Denmark (Weserubung Sud).
The Task of Group XXI : occupation by surprise of Jutland and
of Fyn immediately after occupation of Sjaelland.
Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group
will break through as quickly as possible to Skagen and to the east
coast of Fyn. In Sjaelland bases will be captured early. These will
serve as starting points for later occupation.
The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection
Nyborg-Kors0r and for swift capture of the Lille-Belt Bridge as well
as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. They will also
prepare the defense of the coast.
The Luftwaffe will provide squadrons of which the primary object
will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the
existing Danish ground defenses and air defense must be ensured.
5. Occupation of Norway (We&erubwng Nord).
The task of the Group XXI : capture by surprise of the most important
places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.
The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the
forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the
operation. They will escort supplies and reserves on the way over
by sea. Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal
defense in Norway.
MARCH 1940 833
The Laiftwaffe, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure
air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare
against Britain.
6. Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning
the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary
of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of
time between the issue of the order for Weserubwng and its execution
must be reported.
Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.
Code names : Wesertag the day of the operation. Weser&eit the
hour of the operation.1
ADOUF HITLER
1 Additional documents from German military records relating to preparations
for Wcserubung are published in several volumes in Beretning til Folketinget
, . . vedrtfrende Forholdene ved Danmarks Besaettelse den ,9. April 1940
(Ktfbenhavn, 1945-51), and Innstilling fra Underwketees-Kommissjonen av
1945 (Oslo, 1946-47), by Danish and Norwegian parliamentary commissions,
respectively.
No. 645
124/122472-75
Consul General Krauel to State Secretary Weizadcker
GENEVA, March 1, 1940,
DEAR MR. STATE SECRETARY : With reference to my last oral report
to you and my report (K. No. 394) of February 20 * concerning the
impressions of the representative of the International Committee of
the Red Cross in Finland, I am now in a position to inform you that
Professor Burckhardt will arrive in Berlin some time next week as
the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The ostensible occasion for the visit is furnished by the fact that M.
Burckhardt is to discuss several Red Cross questions in Berlin; the
International Committee shows particular interest in the possibility
of establishing contact with Russia to alleviate the condition of the
Finnish prisoners in Russia. Apart from this, Professor Burckhardt
will be glad to use the opportunity to arrange, especially with
you, Mr. State Secretary, a discussion of a general political character.
To detail here the questions which are of special interest to
M. Burckhardt would be going too far. I should only like to point
out that he was recently visited by a Prince Hohenlohe, who apparently
came to him on instructions from Field Marshal Goring, in
order to discuss with him any possible British peace projects.
In this connection and with reference to my report (K. No. 469
Rumors concerning British-French offensive intentions) of Febru-
1 Not found.
834
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ary 26,
2 I should also like to inform you that a few days ago a Czech,
coining from London, who formerly played an important role in the
Benes Government (possibly Masaryk) , stated the following here concerning
the frame of mind in England : The British Government is
greatly alarmed over the fact that the repeatedly announced and also
actually planned German offensive apparently was not going to come
off now. The British had hoped that this German attack on France,
with England as its objective, would be launched by the Germans.
The British thought that this offensive would result in the depletion
of the German materiel reserves in several months, after which the
British-French-American superiority in materiel would surely have
led to a victory of the Allies. If everything remained quiet on the
Rhine, however, and Germany still could not be induced to use up her
materiel reserves, the British did not know how they could win the
war, because in these circumstances the weapon of the blockade evidently
was not sufficient to force Germany to her knees. Since the
French evidently could not be induced to launch an attack on the
German West Wall on their own, the British considered the war
situation pretty much at a deadlock. This feeling of uneasiness and
uncertainty concerning the further possibilities of prosecuting the
war accounted for the various attempts to "extend the theater of
war", either in the North, in conjunction with the Russo-Finnish
war, or in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In spite of this, however,
one must not deceive oneself as to the fact that the determination
of the British Government and the British people to continue the
war, no matter what, is growing rather than diminishing, whereas in
France, he thought there was undoubtedly a growing disposition to
conclude a compromise peace, (In this connection it is perhaps interesting
to note that even Massigli, the fanatical enemy of the Germans,
on his recent passage through Switzerland en route from Ankara to
Paris, told Burckhardt in Geneva that he considered the French war
aims widely supported by the public regarding the "dismemberment
of Germany" as altogether nonsensical, and that it was merely a question
of restoring the status quo in Europe for the purpose of preventing
Germany from further expanding her sphere of domination.)
But apart from this there is no room for doubt that a German offensive
on the Rhine would be keenly welcomed by the British as well as
the present French Government. My authority for these reports is
the Japanese Consul General, Yanai, who, however, was likewise
unable to give me the name of the Czech personage but nevertheless
termed these statements absolutely authentic. From another reliable
source I have learned that the French Jew, Ganem, who formerly
played a decisive role next to Comert in the Information Division of
the League of Nations Secretariat and since the outbreak of the war
'Not found.
MARCH: 1940 835
has been working in the French Propaganda Division at the Quai
836
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I consider it necessary in principle for Germany to make economic
concessions to Japan, in view of the latest political developments. The
Japanese Government is striving for a progressive easing of tension
in its relations with England and America in order to weaken the
pressure of these powers on its China policy and to alleviate its
own economic distress by more stable trade relations. Secret concessions
to England can be assumed to exist in certain Chinese
questions such as Tientsin silver and North China currency, also in
deliveries of raw materials from the Dominions, as for example wool.
Also the recovery of Japanese shipping and textiles (group garbled)
shares point to this. It is noteworthy that the textile industrialists
are beginning to abandon their previous leadership in anti-British
activities. In collaboration with England, America has eased the
pressure of the embargo for the time being.
The most important thing sought of Japan in return is evidently
the breaking off of Japanese-German trade and transit traffic to
and from Germany via Japan. Events of the past week which the
Eeich missions in East Asia have reported by wire show an over-all
picture of extensive interruption of transit traffic as the result of
measures which probably stem from the Japanese Government.
They also point to an increasing number of reports emanating from
Hong Kong that control of Russian shipping in the Pacific would be
advisable.
At present we still lack effective means of power with which to
counter blockade attempts in the Far East so long as compelling
German military successes have not beeen achieved. The anti-British
sentiment among the general masses has not yet asserted itself
against leading political circles. Even a change in regime would
presumably result in an interim cabinet which, confronted with the
China problem and economic distress, would remain sensitive to
Anglo-American pressure. If we should adopt a threatening attitude,
however, this would require strong Russian collaboration and could
drive Japan, and particularly the Army, into the arms of the hostile
powers.
I therefore propose, despite the exigencies of war for Germany,
that we make economic concessions in principle with the aim for
the time being of counteracting the blockade trend and making transit
business possible. I expect that prior concessions by Germany will
create a favorable psychological atmosphere for our further efforts.
The same sort of concessions by Russia in the negotiations pending
MARCH: 1940 337
in Moscow and in the Siberian railroad question would do much to
support our economic policy.
2 OTT
*I>eputy Director Clodlus of the Economic Policy Department replied In a
telegram of Mnr. 8 < 2310/485042^*3) that Germany was not in a position to
make new economic concessions to Japan. Even if credits were granted or terms
of payment eased, Germany, because of the war and commitments to her near
neighbors, did not have the goods to deliver. He added : "Moreover, the Foreign
Minister is of the opinion that, in view of the attitude Japan has taken of late
toward Germany, especially with regard to transfer shipments, there is no
occasion for special economic concessions, particularly as previous experience
indicates that the later Japanese counterfavors anticipated hy us would probably
not be realized anyway*"
No. 647
63S8/RC89894
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 234 of March 2 [BERUCN], March 2, 1940.
e. o. W III B 1151.
For several days we have received vague British and French press
reports that as of March 1 the British Government will begin to confiscate
German coal going from Rotterdam to Italy on Italian or other
ships. The Italian Government is supposed to have received a communication
on this subject from the British Government. For various
reasons we are, of course, very much interested in the matter.
It is not possible, however, to obtain authentic information here. The
German Consul at Rotterdam was only able to learn that the Italian
steamer Flanona put out to sea the night of February 29 with 7,000
tons of coal and that the Pozynoldi was planning to depart on March
1 with 10,000 tons.
Please investigate and wire at once :
1. Whether the Italian Government has received an official communication
from the British or the French;
2. If so, the content of the communication ;
3. What attitude the Italian Government will adopt in that case.1
HITTER
1 See document No. 652.
No. 648
124/122671
State Secretary Wefescteker to Minister ZeoK
BY COURIER BEHIOT, March 2, 1940.
DKAR ZECBC : I still owe you a reply to your two letters of January
27 * and February 19 * regarding the Duke of W.
* Document No. 580,
* Document No. 621.
838
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I submitted both letters to the Foreign Minister; he even showed
the second one to the Fuhrer. (However, I had added a marginal
note next to the last two lines of your letter of February 19, "Abandoning
the coast?** *)
If you can without inconvenience obtain further information of this
nature, I should be grateful if you would pass it on to me ; please do
so preferably in the form of a report with the outer address directing
It to me personally. The Foreign Minister wants it in this form because
he does not like private-official letters; in fact, he will soon issue
another general directive that nothing is to be handled through the
private-official channel unless it pertains to personnel matters and
absolutely cannot be fitted into the official reporting.
Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler 1
Yours, etc, WEIZSACKER
* Tfce text of Zech*s letter wnich has been used for document No. 621 is that of
a copy made in the Foreign Ministry and it does not contain the marginal note
mentioned here. The original has not been found.
No. 649
F3L4/3SO-400
Memorandum, ~by an OfficiaZ of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat
T, March 2, 1940.
EPol. IX 493 g.]
*
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FXJHRER AND CHANCELLOR AND AMERICAN
UNDER SECRETART OF STATE STJMNER WEUQES, IN THE PRESENCE OF
THE FOREIGN MINISTER, STATE SECRETARY MEISSNER,* AND AMERICAN
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES KIRK
After a word of thanks for the reception by the Fuhrer, Sumner
Welles began with a statement already made at yesterday's conversation
with the Foreign Minister regarding the nature of his mission.
He explained that the President of the United States had instructed
him to go to Italy, Germany, France, and England in order to report
to him on the present situation in Europe, and he emphasized, as in
yesterday's conversation with the Foreign Minister, that he was not
authorized to make any proposals or enter into any commitments in
the name of the United States. As in yesterday's conversation, he
added that he would consider the statements made to him in the course
of his conversations with foreign statesmen as strictly confidential
and would use them only for the information of President Roosevelt,
*The file number appears on another copy (33/25261-74) fonnd in the files of
under State Secretary Woermann. a Melssner's correct title waa that of State Minister.
MARCH 1040 839
President Roosevelt had given him this mission in order to ascertain
whether there were any possibilities at all at the present moment
for the establishment of a secure and lasting peace in Europe, President
Roosevelt was not interested in any temporary, insecure condition
of peace. He was of the opinion that a war of annihilation would
bring with it a tremendous destruction of life and of everything that
our civilization had taught us to prize, and he was aware that such a
war of annihilation would affect every country. The United States
also, as the largest nexxtral country, would feel the effects of such a
war on her social, economic, financial, and commercial life.
President Roosevelt had in public statements already declared the
readiness of the United States, for its part, after the establishment of
a secure and lasting peace, to collaborate fully in the limitation and
reduction of armaments and the attainment of a sound economic life.
For all these reasons Sumner Welles had asked for an audience
with the Fuhrar and would be grateful if the latter would inform him
of his views.
The Fiilirer replied that the first statement he had to make related
to the fact that it was not Germany which had declared war on England
and France, but that the reverse was the case; that it was not
Germany which had war aims that were directed against England
and France, but that here, too, the reverse was true. The crux of the
matter, therefore, was whether England and France would abandon
their war iiims or not. The enemy's war aims were known to Germany
and were such that they could not be discussed at all. Germany
did not now believe that England and France would depart from
these war aims, and was therefore of the opinion that the conflict
would have to be fought to a finish.
The Führer himself, moreover, in his speech of October 6 had expressed
his concern over an extension of the conflict. He was in no
doubt as to the results of such an extension and had therefore in this
speech extended his hand to the enemy once again. He had met with
a brusque rejection. Moreover, what the statesmen said officially was
perhaps less significant than what the actual moulders of public
opinion circulated concerning the enemy's war aims. They plainly
revealed the destructive intentions of our foes, and since Germany
already hud one experience with such war aims she was determined
to do away with them. Furthermore, the Führer's last offer had again
been construed as weakness, so that there was now really nothing more
to be said on the German side. If England desired to destroy Germany's
future, the German nation would know how to frustrate this
intention.
For the rest, it should be observed that the economic and disarmament
problems which President Roosevelt wished to settle after peace
840
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
was established had existed for decades. During this long period the
other countries had not only not been able to solve any economic or
disarmament problem, but had even opposed the sensible proposals
that had been made by the Führer for settlements in the disarmament
and economic fields.
Only this morning news had come from America that a new boycott
had been launched against Germany. Hence it followed that
the present atmosphere was not conducive to economic collaboration*
In this connection the Führer recalled the boycott movement that
started in America when he came to power in a completely democratic
way as a result of the German plebiscite and tried, in view of the 7
million unemployed and the collapse of economic life, to expand German
trade. Although at that time the German-American trade balance
was in America's favor (American sales to Germany of 700 to
900 millions as against German sales of 300 millions to the United
States), a boycott movement was at once started against Germany
in the United States, and no attempt whatever was made to check it.
As it progressed, Germany naturally found herself compelled also
to restrict her imports from the United States (namely, to the extent
of two-thirds, as compared with a one-third reduction of German
sales to America) . This reduction could surely not be blamed on the
Führer, for Germany's interest had, quite to the contrary, been directed
at an extension. In economic matters one should not allow
oneself to be swayed by ideological considerations. Germany had
carried on trade with the democratic countries just as with Russia,
without troubling about the regimes of the trade partners ; other countries,
however, had allowed themselves to be governed by ideological
considerations and had often not wanted to trade with Germany
simply because of the difference of the regime and the economic
structure. It had often been forgotten in such cases that Germany
with its 140 persons to the square kilometer naturally had to have a
different economic structure from the United States, in which there
were only 13 or 14 persons to the square kilometer. This comparison
alone showed that Germany had to produce about 10 times as much
per square kilometer as the United States in order to feed herself, etc.
And it would have been possible to expand trade but ideological
impediments had made this impossible.
The Führer mentioned that he had always respected the manner
in which other countries tried to settle their problems, but had failed
to find the same respect from others for Germany's efforts. The prerequisite
for economic collaboration was, however, respect for the
methods that other countries were forced to employ. All attempts,
that the Führer had made to achieve something by generous proposals
with respect to economic matters, armaments, and a political detente
MARCH: 1940 841
had been repulsed. Shortly before the outbreak of the war the British
Ambassador had sat exactly where Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles was now sitting, and the Führer had made him the greatest
offer of his life. This, too, had not been accepted, and it must not be
forgotten that for the Führer,, too, the moment had to come in which a
further yielding to the others would be a dereliction of his duty to the
German people. And if, in addition, sensible proposals such as that
made in October were even construed as signs of weakness, then all that
Germany could do was to rely on her strength, and the only path then
still open was to fight the battle out to a finish not, indeed, to accomplish
war aims of any kind, but to defend herself against the
destructive intent of the enemy's war aims. A bloc of 100 million
people would not think of allowing itself to be annihilated by other
countries, and in Germany further developments were awaited with
icy determination.
Sumner Welles replied that his Government had fully recognized
the efforts of the Führer to obtain a limitation and reduction of armaments.
He was also of the opinion that it must be regarded as a real
tragedy for Europe and for the world that the offers the Ftihrer had
made in these fields had not been generously examined and put into
effect.
Sumner Welles said he was not informed about the boycott against
Germany which hud broken out in America, according to the latest
reports to reach Berlin; ho observed that the American Government
had at no time promoted or encouraged any sort of boycott movement,
since it was one of its fundamental beliefs that no greater harm could
be done than by employing economic or financial means for political
purposes. The Government of the United States had, therefore, perhaps
as the only government in the world, up until very recently
sought to lower trade barriers and to remove the artificial obstructions
to a free exchange of goods ; and it was aware of the fact that nothing
was more conducive to a stable condition of peace than a rise in
purchasing1 power and the standard of living and a decrease in unemployment
through expansion of world trade.
Sumner Welles stated that he was deeply impressed with the Führers
words and would regret it deeply if he had to feel after this conversation
that there was no longer any hope of avoiding the war of
annihilation. The American Government took the stand that there
was still time to avert this disaster and that certain statesmen could
still banish the horrors that threatened the world if a war of annihilation
were unleashed. Although the communications that he was receiving
from the statesmen had to be treated in confidence, he wanted
to say this much about the views of the Duce, that the latter, too, was
of the opinion that there was still time to settle the difficulties by
peaceful means.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Führer replied that he had stated at the beginning that this
question had nothing to do with Germany, since it was not we who
had declared war. If it had been left to Germany absolute peace
would now prevail, and if England and France had accepted the
Führer's proposal they would probably now for some time have been
sitting down together to settle by negotiation the problems still to be
solved. Often governments could not act as they wished. Public
opinion which was moulded by other elements intervened and often
came to dominate the governments.
In principle it was necessary to distinguish three elements :
1. Historical memories, which must not be underestimated;
2. Political interests, which in part were related to security questions
and the like ;
3. Economic interests.
On the first point the Führer remarked that it was impossible permanently
to deny to a great nation the position in the world which
was its due by virtue of tradition and history. This applied particularly
to Italy and Germany. As much as 500 years before the arrival
of the first Europeans in America, half a millennium before Columbus,
a great German empire had existed which even then had included
all the territories which the Führer had now re-incorporated into the
Reich. Perhaps these historical facts receded into the background
temporarily for a few hundred years during a period in which these
nations slumbered, but, as was plainly shown in the case of Italy and
Germany, when the nations regained their strength they immediately
reappeared on the surface and asserted themselves.
Second, with regard to the political element the Führer st ated that
it was an absurdity in the era of nationalism to want to prevent the
unification of one people into a great empire. If England or America
were split up into different parts, these parts would also strive undeniably
to reunite. The same had been evident in the case of Germany
and Italy. If now a political coalition had grown accustomed
to ignoring such natural tendencies, as in the case of Italy and Germany,
it would naturally be awkward if at a certain time these forces
became so strong that they could no longer be overlooked. The idea,
however, of wanting to prevent the political unification of the German
nation, ultimately by war, was simply absurd.
As far as the economic side was concerned, it was simply foolish
to want to exclude from raw material sources a people that had to live
with 140 persons to the square kilometer. Germany had won her
colonies not by conquest and force but by purchase, exchange, and
treaty. These colonies had been taken from her without a solution
being offered for vital problems connected with this step. Thus a
bloc of 80 million people had been plunged into the greatest subsistence
MARCH 1940 843
difficulties, and a nation that had been deprived in this way of the
bases for its existence could not be expected to be grateful for it in
the bargain. It was only natural that as soon as this people was
restored to strength it would strive to regain the bases of its existence.
Germany also failed to understand the "peace-time blockade," which
consisted in the fact that certain countries simply reserved to
themselves great areas of the world, as had been done in the Ottawa
Agreement.
It must be stated, moreover, that world trade was not the only
remedy for economic ills. As an example the Führer cited German-
American relations. America was producing a surplus of foods, raw
materials, and industrial products. Germany was suffering from a
shortage of foods and raw materials, but had a surplus of industrial
products. America would surely be glad to place at Germany's disposal
the available quantities out of her surplus production of food
and raw materials, but could not accept industrial exports Germany
thought to give in return because she had a surplus industrial production
of her own. Thus it was impossible in this way to supply the
Central European Lebensraum with all its needs; therefore this
Lebensraum must create within itself the bases for its raw materials
and food supplies. If this were not done, the greatest economic difficulties
would arise. Either the Central European area would be forced
to resort to underbidding and dumping or a dangerous state of tension
would develop.
The Führer then pointed out that he had proposed to England and
France that they proceed to joint collaboration in the economic field
after the return of the German colonies. These proposals had been
rejected, however. He was not waging war for its own sake; on the
contrary, the war meant for him a loss of time if one considered that
he had been given the gigantic task of organizing the Central European
Lebensraum of the German people and making it viable. The
German people were 100 percent behind him in this endeavor.
In summary, the Führer pointed out that if the economic, political,
and historical realities which he had just discussed were disregarded,
no really lasting and sound condition of peace could be achieved.
Respect for these three elements was the condition for a lasting peace.
For the rest, Germany did not desire to penetrate the Lebensraum of
other great nations, but only to retain what actually belonged to her.
She had effected the unification of all the German people as the most
natural requirement of the present. She wanted to secure for herself
the economic and spatial foundations necessary for her existence.
The immense British world empire with its large, unused tracts of
land surely had no use for the German colonies. Th military argument,
too, was not convincing, since Germany was the only power
which had not used her colonies for military purposes. If these views
844
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
were not respected, the Führer said in conclusion, there was no other
solution than a life-and-death struggle which Germany, however, was
facing with complete confidence.
Sumner Welles stated that he personally fully recognized the work
of reconstruction performed by the Fuhrer in the 7 years of his government.
He had also recognized very well the significance of die
historical and political exigencies of which the Fuhrer had spoken
to him. The American Government was of the opinion that there
could be no greater guarantee of a lasting ami sound peace that a unified,
contented, and prosperous German nation.
With regard to the statements by the Fuhrer regarding German-
American trade and the impossibility of settling all diiiiculties by
world trade only, Sumner Welles remarked that he agreed with this
latter opinion, but with the proviso that a more liberal conduct of
world trade, although it could not alone resolve all difficulties, was
nevertheless one of the greatest and most important means of eliminating
them. With respect to German-American trade, Sumner Welles
recalled the fact that America, despite her own industrial production,
had been very glad to import certain manufactured products from
Germany, just as Germany, despite her own agricultural production,
also imported agricultural products from America. The remainder
of the export surplus simply had to be disposed of through the channels
of multilateral trade, and here the liberalization of world trade
was of great importance.
Sumner Welles then pointed out that in economic and disarmament
questions the German and the American Governments were of the
same opinion on many points, and in this connection asked the Fuhrer
whether he agreed with the American Government that after the
establishment of a lasting and sound peace which gave the German
people every security, in accordatice with the principles just described
by the Fuhrer, the disarmament and economic problems could be
solved simultaneously.
The Fuhrer replied that he was personally of the opinion that the
armaments burden had to be reduced because it would otherwise lead
to the ruin of all nations. It represented not only the greatest impediment
to social reconstruction, but also millions of workers were
employed for nonproductive purposes who could better be occupied
in other fields for increasing the well-being of the people. There were
two possibilities for limiting armaments :
1. By international agreements on the basis of which all the nations
would disarm simultaneously according to a definite plan by tedious
and involved procedures.
2. By the union of a number of peoples that were ready to disarm, who would pool their defense interests and despite their own disarmament
would still remain strong enough collectively to prevail against
MARCH 1940 845
other nations not willing to disarm ; the latter, as a result of tlie great
burden of their armaments, would finally have to collapse. He had
made such proposals to England and France, but without success-
Sumner Welles replied that the Government of the United States
considered the armaments question one of the most serious problems,
just as did the Führer, and agreed with him that it now resulted in
diverting the people to work aimed at destruction instead of employing
them productively. If rearmament continued, the various
countries would be faced with ruin, as the Führer had very correctly
observed.
He could not at the moment express himself on the technical procedure
for disarmament.
The Führer repeated that the decisive thing was that it was not a
matter of the German war aims but the war aims of the others who
were seeking the annihilation of Germany. He could assure Mr. Sumner
Welles that Germany would never be annihilated. He had been
a soldier on the western front for 4 years, and was of the opinion that
Germany would not have been defeated then either if there had been
another regime at the helm. It was not a question of whether Germany
would be annihilated ; Germany would know how to defend herself
from annihilation, and in the very worst case everyone would
be annihilated. Today Germany was in a totally different situation
from the last war and he, the Führer, had made all preparations,
and made them thoroughly, in order to be able to break the will to annihilation
of the others. The German war aim "peace" stood opposed
to the war aim of the others "annihilation". The German
people, who had learned from the terrible experience of 1918, stood
behind him to a man. Anybody who wanted to establish peace had to
induce Germany's opponents to abandon their war aims of annihilation.
Germany was of the view that America even with the best will
in the world which was recognized by the Germans without question
would find it difficult to attain this goal.
Sumner Welles thanked the Führer for the open and candid way in
which he had made his statements. He was deeply impressed with
what he had heard and would report it to President Roosevelt as accurately
as possible- Responding to a remark by the Führer, Sumner
Welles said that the American Government hoped that not only would
it be possible to prevent everyone from being destroyed, as the
Führer had expressed it, but that not even one of the countries now
engaged in the conflict would be destroyed. He took cognizance,
moreover, of the fact that the Führer had declared peace to be the
German war aim. He would not forget this.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
SCHMIDT
Minister
846
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 650
Fll/0140-52
Memorandum T>y the Minister to Norway
TO* SECRET at present in BERLIN, March 2, 1940.1
VIOLATION OF NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS
I. As seen from England.
Despite the Altmark case and despite England's interest in harassing
German ore shipments along the Norwegian coast, there are
weighty reasons for England to abstain from further violations of international
law in this direction.
1) The Altmark case is justified by England principally on the
ground of the necessity of freeing the prisoners. A new violation
of Norwegian territorial waters, particularly a series of such violations,
would tear the mask from England's face; there are strong
checks operating against such action.
2) England realizes that any actions of this sort would open up the
whole Norwegian question, and indeed not only to German counteractions
but also to those of Russia.
3) From this it follows that the harassing maneuver would have
to be supported by strong military forces, and they would be exposed
to very great danger.
4) The harassing operation would be directed not only against Norway
but also against Sweden (Swedish ore) .
5) The prospects of success must seem uncertain to England.
6) The Finnish conflict could no longer be made a pretext for intervention
because of the present attitude of Sweden and Norway.
The landing at and occupation of Norwegian ports, such as Narvik,
for example, is indeed entirely out of the question for England.2
II. As seen from Norway.
1) Norway is adhering strictly to her neutrality and consequently
to the maintenance of her sovereignty in territorial waters.
2) Norwegian territorial waters are especially important for the
country. The Norwegian coastline is some 2500 kilometers long ; the
west coast from the North Cape to Stavanger some 1600 kilometers.
When the country is impassable, the territorial waters also serve as a
trade route. In view of Norway's thousand years of ocean navigation
she is especially sensitive on this score.
a ln a telegram of Feb. 28 from Ribbentrop's Secretariat, BrUuer had been
summoned to Berlin for consultation on the situation that had developed in Norway
since the AltmarJo incident and the intensification of the Russo-Finnish conflict.
The telegram stated that the Foreign Minister "would like in particular
to hear your opinion about all the reports you have received regarding a possible
intervention by the Western Powers in northern Norway or a contemplated disruption
of shipping in Norwegian territorial waters." (22/13846/2)
Marginal note in bold pencil, probably by Rlbbentrop : "?"
MARCH 1940 847
3) A pact with England regarding British intervention is out of
the question. This would mean a renunciation of Norway's sovereignty.
Besides disrupting trade routes, it would also have an unfavorable
effect upon trade relations with Germany., which are especially
important today in view of the uncertainty of overseas trade.
4) Norway knows that if England invades her territorial waters she
.will become legitimate prey, not only for Germany, but probably also
for Russia as far as northern Norway is concerned.
5) The question of territorial waters is thus extremely vital for
Norway. To be sure, the only thing she can do to defend herself is
protest,
III. The above statements are naturally to be regarded only as indicative.
England's interest in German traffic in Norwegian territorial
waters and her vigilance still continue. Since the AUmark incident
a number of flights by British planes over Norwegian coastal
territory ami territorial waters have been reported, to which I have
directed the attention of the Norwegian Government.
The following changes in the situation might affect the British
attitude :
1) A deterioration of the situation for England and a growing
realization that the blockade against Germany has loopholes in Scandinavia
as well as elsewhere.
2) A German breach of neutrality by military operations against
neutral states.
In this case, to lx* sure, England's forces will automatically be tied
down to continental warfare.
3) A great military victory by Ifcussia in Finland. In that event, it
will *>e necessary to see to it that Norway and Sweden are not threatened
by Russia's advance.
4) Norwegian shipping losses as a result of German operations
which would be contrary to the rules we ourselves have set up. (The
sinking of supply ships for Norway, of ships with neutral cargo between
neutral ports, etc.)
IV. Proposals.
1) There is no occasion at present for preventive action against
Norway. If such action is considered, the prospects of success must
be very carefully calculated. The protection of the long and jagged
coast and of navigation in coastal waters requires special consideration
in view of inadequate air bases.
2) If the situation remains the same, the control and strengthening
of Norway's existing determination to remain neutral is desirable.
Hints should be dropped to the effect that Norway would be gambling
with her very existence if something should happen in her coastal
waters. It would also be well to continue the policy of close economic
Tvtla tirhnoh i TVQ
848
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3) Our naval warfare should continue firm on the points established
by us. Norway's interests, which in terms of our supply situation are
identical with our own, must be given consideration by means of instructions
to our forces operating at sea.
4) The Russo-Finnish conflict has a salutary effect upon the Norwegian
determination to remain neutral. In the event of a [Russian
advance, thought will have to be given to the protection of Norway
and Sweden.
5) Great vigilance with regard to British operations in the northern
part of the North Sea is necessary. Counter-operations by our
naval and air forces seem desirable in order to harass England which
feels secure north of the Shetland Islands-Bergen line.
BRATTER
No. 651
B19/B003506-07
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT HELSINKI, March 3, 1040 1 : 20 a. m.
No. 94 of March 2 Received March 3 6 : 30 a. m.
Hackzell, the former Finnish Foreign Minister, visited me this evening
and informed me confidentially of the following :
The Finnish Government had for several dys been negotiating with
the Russian Government through the mediation of the Swedish Foreign
Minister. The negotiations were progressing favorably and at
such a pace that their conclusion might be a matter of days. The
Finnish Government was willing to cede not only the islands in the
eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland, but also Hango, as well as the
protruding portion of Karelia approximately where the Russian positions
now were. The Russian Government was not interested in Petsamo
and other conquests north of Lake Ladoga. The point of disagreement
was that the Russian Government was at this time still insisting
on Viipuri and the area northwest of Lake Ladoga, including
Sortavala.
Hackzell raised the question whether Germany could not use her
influence in Moscow to persuade the Russians to give up their demand
for Viipuri and the area northwest of Lake Ladoga.
I began by expressing by astonishment to M. Hackzell that this
demarche was being made by him as a private individual. M. Hackzell
replied that no envoy aside from the Swedish Minister had been
informed by the Foreign Minister. He, Hackzell, had, however,
wished to acquaint me with these facts as an old friend, particularly
since the Finnish Minister in Stockholm was today also going to in.-
MARCH: 1940 849
form Prince Wied. The Finnish Government had a special interest in
withholding this information from the governments of the countries
whence aid was corning, so that activity to obtain aid would not be hindered.
I suggest that the above information be immediately checked
by our Ambassador in Moscow and, that if it is correct, we take advantage
of the opportunity of entering into the negotiations.1 It is
in Germany ?s interest that at least Viipuri, as an important port, and
the valuable Kiikisalmi works, owned by Waldhof,2 are preserved for
Finland's economy.
BLTJCHER
* An instruction along these lines was submitted for the approval of the Foreign
Minister, who, however, decided that nothing should be done (34/23693). * The Waldhof cellulose corporation of Mannheim.
No, 652
83S8/K589889-90
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, March 3, 1940 5 : 05 p. m.
No. 492 of March 3 Received March 3 10 : 00 p. m, WIII b 1143.
With reference to your telegram No. 234 of March 2.1
This afternoon I called on Ciano, who had not yet on his own informed
me about the developments of the past few days, although we
had at least touched on the coal question in every one of our conversations
during recent weeks ; I asked questions of him in accordance
with the instruction mentioned above. It became evident that the
British Government (but not the French) had given official notice
during the last few days although Ciano avoided disclosing the
exact date that the delivery of German coal by sea via Holland would
no longer be permitted after March I.2 At the same time Ciano
showed me the text of a sharp note of protest which will be presented
by him to the British Charg6 d'Affaires at 1 o'clock this afternoon and
is to be published by the Italian press tomorrow morning.3 Since the
text of the note of protest was in need of additional minor editing, as
Ciano noticed in looking through the copy which he had intended for
me, I shall receive the definitive text in approximately an hour and
shall then transmit it by teletype.* The note is not limited to the pro-
1 Document No. 647.
*On Feb. 29, the British Government announced that beginning Mar. 1 German
coal exports by sea to Italy, previously allowed to pass despite the Order
in Council of Nov. 27, 1039, would be liable to detention.
* The text of this note was printed in the New York Times, Mar. 5, 1940.
4 Not printed (S338/E589891-93),
850
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
test in the coal-supply question, but objects in its first part to England's
arbitrary handling of maritime law in general.
When I asked (on the basis of yesterday's telephone conversation
with Clodius 5
) whether the British measures would also affect coal
ships that were already en route, Ciano replied that this was not yet
clear to the Italians themselves at the moment. According to the
text of the note which he showed me, however, it appears that only
such ships are to be affected as were still in Dutch harbors after
March I.6
Subsequently, I informed Ciano of my telephone conversation with
Clodius yesterday on the treatment to be accorded in the German press
to the matter concerning which Minister Rooeo 7 had stated after
conferring with Propaganda Minister Pavolini that its grave political
importance should be pointed out, to be sure, but that it might
be better to avoid an intensive campaign for the time being. Ciano
thanked us for our willingness to coordinate our press approach in
this matter; he felt that Rocco was right and said that it would
probably be best if the German press would go along with the Italian
press, in other words, would not go further in polemics than the
latter.
MACKENSKN
Clodius' memorandum of this convernation contained the information that
26 ships carrying about 200,000 tons of coal were already en route (2060/448107-
08).
* On Mar. 11, Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that agreement had
been reached on Mar. 9 with the Italian Government regard! n# 33 coal ships detained
by the British after Mar. 1. These ships would b released, but the coal
traffic would be discontinued, and it was honed that thin agreement would open
the way for a resumption of negotiations "for the furtherance of trade to our
mutual advantage." Then on Mar. 2O, in a note which waH published in the
Times of London, the British Government replied to the more general aspects of
the Italian protest of Mar. 3. The British reply called attention to British
belligerent rights but emphasized the fullest regard for neutral rightn.
Guido Rocco, Director General of the Foreign PreKH section of the Italian
Foreign Ministry.
No. 653
6/46573r-94
Memorandum ~by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat
BERLIN, March 4, 1940.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN FIELD MARSHAL, GORING AND UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE STJMNER WELJUES IN KARINHAUL ON MARCH 3, 1940
Sumner Welles opened the conversation, exactly as he had the
discussions with the Führer, the Reich Foreign Minister, and the
Führer's Deputy,1 to which he referred briefly, by outlining in almost
1 Welles had seen Rudolf Hess earlier on Mar. 3. The memorandum of their
conversation is not printed (66/46568-72).
MARCH 1940 851
the same words the nature and purpose of his mission to Europe.
President Boosevelt had instructed him to take a trip to Italy, Germany,
France, and England in order to report on the present situation
in Europe and any existing possibilities of bringing about a firm
and lasting peace in Europe. President Roosevelt had no interest in
a temporary or insecure state of peace, but only in a lasting peace
which would give all the peoples the security to which they are entitled.
Sumner Welles emphasized that he would treat the information
given him by the European statesmen as strictly confidential
and only for the information of President Roosevelt. Finally, he
added that he had not been authorized to make any proposals or
suggestions.
He mentioned his long conversation with the Duce in Rome, which
he characterized as constructive and helpful. Although because of
the previously mentioned confidential nature of his conversations
with the European statesmen he could not give any details about his
conversation with the Duce, he did want to say this much: that in
the opinion of the Duce there was still a possibility of bringing about
a firm and lasting peace in Europe. The American Government was
of the opinion that if a war of annihilation were let loose, not only
would millions of lives be lost, but also the social order as well as
the greater pnrt of the material wealth which civilization had amassed
in bygone times would be destroyed. For this reason the American
Government hoped that there was still time to find ways and means
of assuring a just political peace on a firm and lasting basis. If this
possibility existed, America would, in accordance with the public pronouncements
of President Roosevelt, take over her full share in all
plans drawn up for disarmament which at the same time provided
for the security needs of the various nations, as well as all measures
for improving economic relations, which for their part would also
he able to contribute to the security and stability of the world. He
had come to Europe in this spirit, and he would now appreciate
hearing the Field Marshal's views.
Field Marshal Goring replied that in order to state his views correctly
regarding the above-mentioned questions, he would first have
to .go back u bit and sketch the past development.
When National Socialism came to power and the first principles
of foreign policy were formulated, the Fuhrer, as the Field Marshal
still remembered very well, had in a conference stressed the two leading
principles of German foreign policy which would now be followed :
(1) The traditional friendship with Italy; this policy was already
being followed, owing to the common ideological background. (2)
The closest and most intimate cooperation with the British Empire.
This latter principle was to be translated into action as soon as pos
852
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
sible. Now a veritable courtship of England set in, and when on later
occasions others expressed the opinion that England could not be
trusted and it was better to be careful in dealing with her, the Führer
rejected this idea energetically and declared that the pro- British policy
must be followed under all circumstances. England had an important
task to fulfill in consolidating her Empire, while Germany, for her
part, must act as a stabilizing factor on the continent of Europe.
Everything possible had been done in order to make cooperation with
England a reality. To every one of the leading political personalities
from England who subsequently came to Germany in great numbers
it was explained that it would be insane and criminal if Kngland and
Germany ever went to war against each other again. The World War
must be the first and last armed conflict between the two countries,
and the interests of both nations were mutual. The Führer even
went so far in his desire to cooperate with England that he was prepared
to guarantee the continued existence of the British Empire with
the aid of German armed might.
The England of MacDonald and later of Baldwin was very reserved
in the face of this; one did not seem to understand the German desire
for a rapprochement, and it was also pointed out that one had commitments
to France. Thereupon the Führer declared that he was willing
to come to an agreement with France, too* It had surely been a
rather bitter and difficult step for him definitely to renounce Alsace-
Lorraine in order to come to a settlement with France and thereby also
with England. For France the only condition stipulated was a satisfactory
settlement of the Saar question.
In order to clear away further difficulties the Führer made disarmament
proposals, which, as was known, provided for an army of 200 to
300 thousand men. At the same time Polish-German relations, which
at the time of the assumption of power had been extremely tense, were
consolidated.
In connection with the efforts to come to an agreement with England,
Herr von Ribbentrop was also called in, since he in particular had
excellent connections with England. In order to carry out the task
given him by the Führer, he set up an independent office which
brought prominent Englishmen to Germany in order to aid the mutual
rapprochement in this way.
Germany had only very limited plans: the consolidation of the
Reich, abrogation of the Versailles Treaty, and her own security.
When Ambassador von Hoesch died, Herr von Ribbentrop was sent
to London as Ambassador with express instructions to carry out the
German-British rapprochement. Previously he had concluded the
Naval Agreement with England, in which the Führer made the great
concession that German naval forces should be only 35 percent as
MARCH 1940 853
large as the British. Only when one knew how dear to the Führer's
heart German naval influence was and how he had always intended
to give Germany a strong fleet again could one comprehend what a
great personal sacrifice ht nnule to German-British rapprochement in
entering into the Gorman-British Naval Agreement.
In England, to be sure, some individuals had shown appreciation
of this. But British officialdom and the people who formed public
opinion had rejected ull these plans for a rapprochement, and this
already at a time when there could not yet be any question whatsoever
of any sort of aspirations to power on the part of Germany. All of
Germany's efforts to come to terms with England had been rejected,
and not for any logical reasons. One could perhaps have understood
that But not in a gentlemanly way, either, but with scorn, disdain,
and insults to leading German personalities. It had often been difficult
for Germany to hold to the pro-British course, and those who
worked with the Fuhrer had often been astonished that in spite of
everything lie adhered to his objective of cooperation with England.
Of course, there had been short periods of uncertainty in German-
British relations, but each time the Fuhrer had afterwards returned
to his old pro-British course.
Field Marshal Goring then began to speak of the later developments
in more recent times. He mentioned the occupation of the Rhineland,
which only represented the realization of the most primitive
right of a people to exercise complete sovereignty over all of its territory.
He spoke of Austria, a land which, except for a few Jews, was
peopled entirely by Germans. She had desired to return to the Reich
and as early us 1918 had made a decision to that effect in her parliament,
but was forbidden by the Entente to carry it out. It has therefore
a realty amusing effect when M. Daladier declares today that the
question of Austria will have to be opened again. It is exactly as if
one of the states of the USA had been detached from the United States
as a result of an unfortunate war and later reincorporated, and then a
foreign statesman declared that the condition of separation would
have to be restored. One could just as well demand that Bavaria or
WQrttemberg should again be separated from the Reich.
Passing to the Czech question, the Field Marshal remarked that it
was a matter of two things here: (1) An ethnic question. Under
general pressure the Sudeten-German question had been settled at
Munich. There a guarantee of the rump state of Czechoslovakia had
been considered. He himself had been present when the Fuhrer had
rejected this idea because one ought first to wait for the Czechs to
reach a settlement with the Slovaks, Hungarians, and Poles, and should
also watch the future internal developments in Czechoslovakia.
854
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Then came the second point regarding1 Czechoslovakia, the question
of security. In order to understand this clearly, Suiucar Welles
should try cutting the map of the old Czechoslovakia out of an atlas
and then placing it somewhere next to the border on a map of the
United States, in such a way that it would lie within the U. S. territory.
Then he would understand what sort of menace Czechoslovakia
as she existed then had been to Germany. She had threatened the
heart of Germany like the point of a spear, situated as she was only
20 minutes by air from the capital and the important industrial centers
and arteries of traffic. What responsible chief of state would
have been able to endure such a state of affairs, especially since this
enclave within Germany had a hostile orientation toward the Reich.
Czechoslovakia would perhaps still be in existence if this anti-German
attitude had not predominated, which in the words of the French
Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, made her an aircraft carrier directed
against Germany. Germany's security was not guaranteed as long
as Czechoslovakia was hostile toward us.
After Munich Germany had followed developments in Czechoslovakia
very closely. The Fuhrer had uttered repeated warnings. The
new Czech President, however, had proved to be too weak. A military
clique, embittered by the Munich Agreement, had called for revenge,
and the hostility toward Germany had been worse than before
Munich. The army had not been reduced, and this was a serious
threat to Germany. Czechoslovakia's economy had not been brought
into alignment with that of Germany to the extent necessary for salutary
living together. The vital security of the German nation necessitated
an absolutely clear relationship, however. And HO tho Protectorate
had been set up. This Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
was to remain completely independent in its internal administration
and its culture, and would even be permitted to maintain a small army.
Naturally this could only be considered in time of peace ; in wartime
there were special laws, of course.
Now after France and England had lost these valuable outposts,
they had been terribly indignant. In view of their hostile attitude
toward Germany, that was altogether understandable. But it was
also understandable that Germany had seized this hostile bastion in
the midst of her territory.
Passing on to Poland, the Field Marshal pointed out that here,
too, Germany had done everything possible to arrive at a good relationship
with this country. Just as Herr von Ribbentrop was supposed
to maintain the tie with England, the Field Marshal had been
commissioned to take care of that with Poland. He had maintained
the very best of relations with numerous Polish personalities, with
Pilsudski, Beck, and others, who had been his personal guests. Ger
MARCH 1940
many had had no objections to the existence of Poland, but on the
contrary, had stressed her interest in a strong Poland. The Poles
had also acknowledged that Danzig was German, just as Germany
had recognized that Poland had economic interests in Danzig; and
therefore one had believed that the Danzig question could best be
solved by having Danzig return to Germany, and by not only guaranteeing
all of Poland's economic interests there but also granting her
a free harbor area. In addition, there was also to be a sort of small
corridor in the shape of a highway and a four-track railroad through
this corridor to maintain connections with East Prussia. In return
the Fuhrer had been prepared to give up once and for all a great German
province in which many Germans lived, to guarantee the boundaries
of Poland, and to conclude a 25-year nonaggression pact. To
judge from his personal acquaintance with Beck and Moscicki, these
two statesmen at least would probably have agreed to the German
proposals, in spite of the fact that the Poles in their past history had
almost always been destroyed because of their own delusions and
over-emphasis on prestige.
At this moment England had intervened. When on the day after
the Munich Agreement the declaration by the Fuhrer and Chamberlain
was signed, according to which there would never be another war
between Germany and England, the German people had been very
happy. The long-cherished wish of the Fuhrer appeared to have been
fulfilled. Consequently, people in Germany had been dumbfounded
when a short time thereafter Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Eden, Mr. Duff
Cooper, and others stated that Munich was a defeat for England and
declared that England would have to rearm to an extraordinary degree
so that there could never be a second Munich. This was in a
sense the first covert declaration of war against Germany by England,
Also the Fuhrer had realized at this moment that the British had
agreed to the settlement at Munich only under pressure.
Then England eume forward with the Polish guarantee, which
Beck wanted to have nothing to do with at first, and which he was
more or less forced to accept. As a result the attitude of the Poles
stiffened ; from day to day they became more rabid and insulting in
their utterances, and finally they went so far as to murder and torture
members of the German minority. Today there was photographic
documentary evidence of the fury of the Polish bands ; and the atrocities
depicted in these documents appeared to him (the Field Marshal)
even to overshadow anything which occurred in. the Middle Ages.
The German nation could not have permitted this. In a matter such
as tlxis, which also touched the national honor most profoundly, no
compromise was possible. Thus action had had to be taken against
Poland. It must be stressed, however, that England had been assured
856
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by Germany that this was the only question that remained to be
settled, and that then the joint settlement of European problems could
be begun both with England and with France. In addition to the
official negotiations, the Field Marshal's liaison men hud also been
constantly active in this sense up to the very last moment before the
outbreak of the war, in order to point out the absurdity of a European
conflict in view of this attitude of Germany's.
Then the unilateral declaration of war by the Western Powers had
followed. Germany would never have declared war of her own volition.
Moreover, in this connection it should be remarked that the
French Foreign Minister plainly indicated to the German Foreign
Minister at the time of the latter's visit to Paris in December 1038
that France was no longer interested in the eastern questions.
3 France
would also never have gone to war of her own accord, but England
did not want to fail to make use of this pretext for destroying Germany.
Another sure proof that England was the actual instigator of the
war was furnished by the fact that Mussolini's compromise proposal,
which he made at the last minute to the powers concerned, was accepted
by Germany and France.8 Only England rejected it and
finally forced France to revise her attitude, too. These were absolute,
facts, whatever interpretation M. Dalatlier might choose to jarive them
n'ow.
After the Polish war had been brought to an end within 18 days,
the Führer had made one more last offer of peace. Not a single
French village or a single piece of British territory had been demanded
by Germany. Now that Germany's claims had been met,
Germany offered to conclude peace, and the Führer declared that he
was even now ready to carry out all of the earlier plans for cooperation.
It was hoped in Germany that England would clearly recognize
how advantageous such an arrangement would be, providing as
it did for the cooperation of the four great European powers. Instead
the German peace offer was rejected with scorn, the worst
possible blunder was committed it was interpreted as weakness.
That had been very foolish, of course. Anyone who knew the Führer
knew that his forbearance and patience were often very great. But
when the limit had once been reached, the Führer hardened in iron
determination and nothing could deter him from his aim. He had
perceived England's intentions of returning Germany to her Versailles
Treaty status, that is, in other words, to annihilate her. In
spite of the formal qualifications which would perhaps be put forward
by the English, all Germans were convinced of their opponent's
a For tne German record of the Ribbentrop-Bonnet conversation of Bee 6 1938
see vol. iv, document No. 370.
' '
1 See vol, vir, documents Nos. 535, 539, and 554.
MARCH 1940 857
intention to annihilate them. The situation was thus clear. Germany
desired peace. But rather than permit herself to be destroyed
by her enemies she would fight, even if the war lasted 30 years.
Sir John Simon's speech of the previous day, which, by the way,
he recommended that Mr. Sumner Welles read very carefully, absolutely
corroborated what he had just said. It was harsh, arrogant,
and impudent. Whether there had to be any fighting did not depend
upon Germany, but upon her opponents. In order to protect herself
from annihilation Germany woxild fight to the last man.
Since Germany had been aware for a considerable length of time
of this desire on the part of the other countries to annihilate her, she
had made all the preparations in plenty of time to protect herself
both materially and psychologically. The morale of the troops,
whom he had just visited at the front, was excellent. They were
burning with a desire to break the outrageous will to annihilation of
the others, and they were firmly convinced that this could only be
done by victory over their opponents. Before God and the world he
(the Field Marshal) could state that Germany had not desired the
war. It had boon forced upon her, and the Field Marshal himself
had personally done everything he possibly could up to the very last
minute to avert it. But what was Germany to do when the others
wanted to destroy her? "Hitlerism must be destroyed" was their
slogan, and since Hitler was equivalent to Germany, this simply
meant the annihilation of the Reich.
Now the British believed that they could achieve their goal without
fighting by means of a blockade. In this the Field Marshal
could only wish them the best of luck. He was a soldier by profession,
but for the last 3% years he had also concerned himself with
economic questions. The shortage of raw materials from which Germany
suffered had been met by the use of substitutes for the raw
materials which were lacking, and also by accumulating huge stockpiles.
Besides, there were many loopholes in the blockade* Germany
had also been reproached because of her preparations to defeat
the blockade. In this connection the Four Year Plan factories which
it had been necessary to erect and which would perhaps not have been
necessary if there had been normal commercial relations between all
countries, were nothing more than a living testimony of the folly of
the world in economic matters.
Germany, however, had two very important raw materials: iron
and coal. From coal Germany could manufacture an exceedingly
large number of things; even butter could be made from coal, In
addition, Germany's agriculture was intact. She had entered the war
with 7% million tons of bread grains as a standing reserve. In addition
there were her own current production and also the amounts
858
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
imported from southeastern Europe. Thus under no circumstances
would there be a famine, for the bread supply was absolutely assured.
Many school buildings and assembly halls were filled to the roof with
grain. Moreover, the supplies were being properly rationed.
Although Germany suffered from a shortage of fats, the average
German got more butter than was distributed in wealthy England.
Soldiers and heavy manual workers received three times as much.
England had always said that it would be a long war. Consequently,
Germany had known what to do and had prepared herself. Whether
the war would be short or long, certainly no revolution would occur
behind the backs of those fighting at the front.
By way of recapitulation, the Field Marshal declared that it was
a great tragedy that a sword should be thrust into the hands of the
very man who had done his utmost to bring about a rapprochement
with the nation he was to fight, and whose particular aim had always
been to reach a settlement with this nation. Fate or England
had decided otherwise, for after all it took two to make an agreement.
Now a real blow would have to be dealt to England's ambition
for hegemony. Even today Germany did not want to destroy either
England or the Empire; England merely had to be shown that she
no longer possessed the hegemony. Germany understood and respected
the world-wide interests of the British Empire, but she would
not submit to any tutelage.
Mr. Stunner Welles replied that he was deeply impressed by the
extraordinarily lucid explanations of the Field Marshal. If the German
Government was absolutely convinced that the war was her only
possibility of obtaining the security to which the German people were
entitled, then of course there was nothing more for him to say; he
had to confess, to be sure, that he had fully and completely appreciated
the Field Marshal's remarks. If, however, the Germans also thought
there was still a possibility of obtaining a lasting peace and some sort
of guarantee of security by means of negotiation, then he could report
to President Roosevelt with a certain amount of hope, after alL
Sumner Welles declared that he fully understood the desire of the
German people for security, and he also comprehended that a proud
people such as the Germans, if they were absolutely sure that the
other side wished to annihilate them, would oppose this aim with all
possible energy. Moreover, he had already observed on other occasions
that a lasting peace could only be established on a firm foundation if
the German people were unified, happy, and prosperous, and could
be convinced that they had the same opportunities as other countries*
That was, so to speak, a sine qua non for any lasting peace.
With the same frankness with which the Field Marshal had spoken,
he would point out several difficulties which the outside world had
MARCH 1940 859
experienced in evaluating Germany's statements of what she desired.
On repeated occasions it had been stated by responsible Germans that
certain measures which had been taken for the unification of the German
people or for other purposes were absolutely the last, and that
Germany had no further territorial aspirations,
At Munich the Führer had spoken of the vital interests of the
Reich. From the Field Marshal's statements it had become more or
less clear to him what was meant. He would like to ask the Field
Marshal, however, to define these vital interests somewhat more explicitly.
Once again calling attention to the impossibility of bringing about
peace through negotiations,, if the other side did not desist from its
desire to annihilat e Germany, Field Marshal Goring replied that under
these conditions peace could only be obtained by a victorious passage
at arms. Simon's speech yesterday had again confirmed this viewpoint.
The vital requirements of Germany were as follows:
1. Absolute security for the German nation united in a Greater
Reich, so that the Germans would not be forced to wage a new war
every 20 or 30 years ;
2. Adequate means of supplying the German economy;
3. The return of the colonies (not for military purposes) ;
4. The recognition of Germany as a full-fledged member of the
international community.
In the further course of the conversation the Field Marshal put in
a personal word in z*egard to German-American relations. He had
always spoken in advance to the prominent Germans who visited
America and told them that in their contacts with leading Americans
they should constantly stress the fact that Germany had nothing
against America and only desired increased trade with her. If the
people in America objected to some of the German methods, it should
be said that these methods suited us and that often things which
seemed hard had to be that way in order to provide counterpressure.
If Germany had taken measures against the Jews, on racial grounds,
then lie wanted to point out in that connection the racial feeling of the
Americans, on the basis of which colored people were not even allowed
to travel in the same railroad cars as the whites.
Here Sumner Welles interjected that this was true only in a small
part of America, and that furthermore there was even a colored congressman
in the House of Representatives.
Field Marshal Goring went on to say that in America the Germans
had been called anti-Christians. The churches were open everywhere
in Germany, however, and divine services were held. There had only
been the desire to attack a certain political party which had hoped to
make a business out of religion, but not religion itself.
860
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Sumner Welles replied that he was very glad that the Field Marshal
had brought up the question of German-American relations. For
many generations America had not had closer, more friendly or more
agreeable relations with anyone than with Germany. He desired in
all frankness to call attention to the fact that the question of the treatment
of minorities affected all Americans very deeply. The Americans
were an idealistic people with deep humanitarian sentiments.
Bad treatment of human beings, whether mistreatment of the blacks
by the British, or things which occurred in Germany, affected this
humanitarian feeling of the Americans very deeply.
A further reason for the unsatisfactory relations between America
and Germany was the firm belief of the Americans that international
differences of opinion could be settled by peaceful means. In the last
few years the use of force, not only by Germany but also in other parts
of the world, had been steadily increasing, so that finally only the
American hemisphere still remained free from war. This fact of the
increasing use of force affected every American directly and personally
in his feeling for the safety of his own country. For this reason
the trip of Under Secretary of State Snmner Welles was being followed
with extraordinary interest in America, and people hoped, although
this hope had already been almost extinguished, that a peaceful
solution would still be found after all. America realized that she
was no longer separated from Europe by long distances, and knew that
her vital interests were intimately affected by what was happening
in Europe. If in some way or another the German Government
should be able to participate in this last effort to establish a basis for
a sound peace in Europe, with consideration being taken of everything
the Field Marshal had said, then the close friendly relations between
America and Germany could surely also be reestablished.
Sumner Welles added that if the basis for security and for a just
political peace were found in which connection he continually
stressed the fact that the German demands would have to be taken into
consideration America was prepared to take part in all efforts which
would then doubtless be made to find practical ways and means for
armament reduction and for the reestablishment of a freer world
trade. The Field Marshal was probably aware that America had
already gotten in touch with the neutral countries in order to determine
whether it was possible to agree with them on certain general
principles for the promotion of world trade. He hoped that the German
Government could perhaps also declare its adherence to these
principles. Naturally they would not apply in time of war, but only
be recognized as a goal to be striven for after the conclusion of peace. He again stressed the fact that without a sound world trade no lasting
peace could be established, and following this he presented a
MARCH 1940 861
memorandum containing in short general form these principles regarding
nondiserimination, most-favored-nation treatment, etc,4
After the Field Marshal had agreed with these principles of his own
accord and had again stressed the fact that Germany would be very
glad to return to an economic system without the restrictions which
she had only assumed under the force of circumstances, he called attention,
with regard to nondiscrimination, to the discriminatory treatment
which (Herman exports were subjected to in America.
Summer Welles expressed his very great satisfaction with the attitude
of the Field Marshal toward the American economic proposals,
and explained the discrimination against German goods in America
as due to a certain automatism in American commercial legislation.
He then asked whether the Field Marshal or some prominent personality
in Germany might perhaps declare himself publicly in favor
of the principles set forth in the American memorandum, and he was
extremely piwised when the Field Marshal promised that this would
be done.
Simmer Welles finally declared that he was leaving the Field Marshal
with the hope that some way could still be found to avoid the
tragedy of a war of annihilation. He stated that he would visit the
DUC.O a^ain and that about March 26 he would report personally to
President, Koosevelt in Washington regarding the impressions he had
obtained in Europe. He would be glad if these impressions indicated
that there was still some hope of peace.
Stunner Welles said that during his European trip or after his
return to America he, might have certain information to transmit to
the Field Marshal, and he proposed that it be sent directly through
Mr. Kirk. The Field Marshal was agreeable to this.
In conclusion the Field Marshal declared that he was happy that
Mr. Stunner Welles, as a neutral, clear-thinking and calm observer,
had come to Germany to see the situation as it actually was. He (the
Field Marshal) had high hopes that much could be accomplished by
such a direct exchange of views by leading personalities. Sumner
Welles hud seen that Germany's war aim was peace. If the desire for
annihilation on the part of Germany's enemies should be abandoned
something which he unfortunately could not believe then peace could
be concluded soon. But in this matter Sumner Welles would have a
difficult time with Germany's enemies. In any case, he had undertaken
one of the greatest and noblest tasks which any man could be
given, and if his mission was successful, that would be a wonderful
reward for all his efforts.
Mr, Sumner Welles thanked the Field Marshal for his words and
said that he was very deeply impressed by what he had learned in
* See document No. 673.
862
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the course of this conversation. He would give President Roosevelt
a complete report regarding it. Such a man to man and heart to heart
conversation was better calculated to obviate difficulties than the
unsuccessful efforts of the past by all too many fourth and fifth rate
personalities.
After a tour through Karinhall the conversation, which had lasted
almost 3 hours, came to an end.
SCHMIDT
No. 654
Fl7/433r-35
Memorandum ~by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat
BERLIN, March 4, 11)40.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THB FUHREK AND SVEN HEDIN IN THH
PRESENCE OF MINISTER MEISSNER ON MARCH: 4, 1940 1
After a lengthy conversation on his personal experiences in his
travels in Asia, Sven Hedin asked the Führer the same question he
had put to the Foreign Minister a few days ago,
2 namely, whether
Germany could not do something to put an end to the Russo-Fmnish
conflict by mediation between the two belligerent parties.
The Führer replied by first reading an item from the Finnish press
which had just come to his attention, approximately to the effect
that the Finnish war was beginning to be inconvenient to Stalin and
Hitler and that they were therefore seeking to settle the conflict. The
Finns, however, had no intention of spontaneously making any sacrifices
but would keep on fighting.
The Führer commented that the attitude of the ITinns as indicated
by this newspaper item was entirely senseless, but also showed how
impossible German mediation in the conflict would be. If the Finns
themselves rejected mediation, as they did in the newspaper report
just cited, and wished to keep on fighting, there was really not the
slightest justification for Germany to step in.
Furthermore, Germany had to look after her own interests in the
difficult struggle for existence in which she now found herself. An
understanding had been reached with Russia on the basis of a clear
division of interest in the East. This had freed Germany at the rear,
and she could now in contrast to the World War, where she had had
to carry on a war not only on two fronts but on many fronts concentrate
her entire forces in the West. As a result of the new relationship
jmJ-iaS?
8 acc
iPt of this conversation appears In Sven Hedin'a German, Diary,
* Hedin's conversation with Klbbentrop on randum by Paul Otto Schmidt (F18/067-055).FebH.e2d8inw'sasverrescioorndeadppIenaras mienmhoi-s
Ovary, pp. 63^-70.
MARCH 1940
which she had established with Bussia her sympathies were naturally
also on the side of that country.
Sven Hedin interjected here that some consideration should be
given to the Finns, too, who were fighting so bravely. The Führer
admitted that the Finns were brave, but their policy had been
entirely senseless. It was absolutely sure that they would not stand
up against the Russians in the long run. "Up to now the bad weather
had been extremely advantageous to them. They should never have
entered into a conflict with the Russians, for Stalin had after all
asked nothing more of them than a secure access to an ice-free sea.
Stalin was undergoing a change, anyway. He was no longer the
international bolshevist, but showed himself as an absolute Russian
nationalist and was in the last analysis following exactly the same
natural policy of Russian nationalism as the Tsars. A constant and
easily understandable element of this policy had always been the
striving for an ice-free port. Otherwise, except for a shifting of
the Finnish-Russian border at the Karelian Isthmus which was
necessary for the safety of Leningrad and would even be compensated
for by cession of other territory north of Lake Ladoga Stalin had
asked nothing more of the Finns. It would have been the wisest
thing for the Finns to make an agreement with the Russians on this
basis.
Instead of this they had slipped into a war without exactly knowing
why. The only way out was to be sought not in mediation by
third parties but in a direct settlement between Finland and Russia.
Sven Hedin then came to speak of the Swedish attitude toward
the Finnish conflict and mentioned, as he had already done in his
conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, the current in Swedish
public opinion, constantly growing in strength, which advocated
granting the. Finns more Swedish aid than heretofore. Officially,
Sweden would naturally remain neutral, but the flow of Swedish
volunteers to Finland would probably increase to an extraordinary
degree in the course of time, especially when the stream of refugees
from Finland became much larger. How would Germany feel about
this? Would she take steps against Sweden?
The Führer answered in the negative, but pointed out that in his
opinion even Swedish help would have no effect on the ultimate
outcome of the Finnish-Russian war. The Scandinavian countries
ought above all else to beware of intervention by England. The
British cared nothing about Finland per se, and when the Finns
had played their part in the British plan, the British smiling coldly
[kaltUehelnd] would drop them. One thing was sure: If England
got a foothold anywhere in Scandinavia, then Germany for her part
would also intervene at once, since she could not permit such a threat
to her flank.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In the further course of the conversation, the Führer tried to dispel
certain misgivings of Sven Hedin to the effect that the Russians
might possibly advance beyond Finland to Sweden and Norway;
Sven Hedin remarked that it could be disagreeable for Germany, too,
if Russia gained control of the Swedish iron mines from which
Germany obtained a large part of her iron ore.
The Führer stated in this connection that he did not believe that
Stalin had such expansionist aspirations; he again stressed Stalin's
policy of Russian nationalism with its drive for an ice- free port and
emphasized that once this goal had been achieved there need be no
fear of further expansion. He was also not concerned about a
possible advance by the Russians into the Baltic, which was being
discussed so much abroad as an alleged threat to the German position
there. In the age of the airplane, the Baltic was no longer an operations
area for navies. Even the North Sea had lost this character
for the British Navy as a result of German air supremacy in that area.
When Sven Hedin asked once more that something bo done for
the poor Finns by means of mediation between Finland and Russia,
the Führer refused with the observation that he predicted the
Finns would certainly not thank him, but at most blame hint subsequently
for the loss of Hango or other areas. The Finns had every
reason, by the way, to be grateful to Germany, for without the active
interference of the German troops in 1918 Finland would never have
come into being at all. Now, however, the only solution was a direct
agreement with Russia.
SCHMIDT
Minister
No. 655
83/25282
Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff
SECRET BERLIN, March 4, 1940.
Mr. Sunxner Welles said in a brief talk with me at the railroad
station yesterday evening that he expected his trip to be successful
if only Europe remained quiet
aln tho next four to five weeks.** He
would be back in Washington on March 26.1
1 On Mar. 4 the American Charge1
MARCH 1940 865
Moreover, he expressed himself as very appreciative and grateful
that the German press had handled his mission with such calm and
reserve; "if only people \vould keep their mouths shut!" 2
.Regarding myself he said that he had already told Herr von
Mackensen in Itome that he hoped to meet me in Berlin. He was glad
to have seen me here and hoped to work with me again in Washington
soon. Thomson was respected everywhere in Washington, but the
Ambassador had broader opportunities, after all. In parting he repeated
that he hoped to see me in Washington again soon.
He said nothing about Hugh Wilson and the American Embassy
here.
DIECEJHOFF
to Germany'** determination to break her enemies* will to accomplish her
destruction."
Ambassador Mtirkemwu at Home \va sent a special instruction on Mar. 7
(2281/48o:*HT> S7> which <>y Ambassador DieoJchoff
BERLIN, March 5, 1940.
I talked with Mr. Mooney on March 4, after his reception by the
ITiihrer.1 In his rather verbose statements he seemed to be interested
chiefly in the following three points:
1. President Roosevelt's intentions with respect to Germany were
considerably moro friendly and sympathetic than was generally believed
in Berlin,
2. President Roosevelt was prepared to act as "moderator" 2
(i. e.,
as honest broker) in bringing together the belligerents, but was not
willing to make a decision as an "arbitrator."
1 Jamett D. Mooney wan a vice president of General Motors Corporation, The
ftl contain n memorandum of his conversation with Hitler which is not printed
(6O/4557 -7). It records statements hy Mooney similar to those summarized
by Dtorkhnff in h! memorandum. Hitler repeated much the same line he had
taken with W>Hs Britain ami France had declared war and sought Germany's
destruction, eopU* were united and determined and 1018 would not repeat itself.
On Mar. 11 the German rhargd d'Affaires in Washington sent to Berlin a confidential
memorandum (2422/511800-72) prepared for him by an unnamed American
informant, It stated that Mooney, who was described as "more or less pro-
German," bad informed President Roosevelt on the basis of an earlier talk with
Hitler that tin* latter "was desirous for peace and wished to prevent the bloodshed
of a spring campaign." The memorandum added that "several other important
industrialists and hankers who had visited Germany came back with the same
story to the President," and that in consequence of these reports he had resolved
upon the Welles mission, . . . .
* This aiid the other quoted words appear thus and in English m the original.
866
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. Future German statements, especially in the German press, ought
to stress, in so far as possible, what Germany and America had in common,
and not what separated them,
I do not believe that the Mooney initiative has any great importance,
particularly since he proceeds from an erroneous, though doubtless
sincere, conception, as point 1 shows. We are thoroughly familiar
with what President Roosevelt thinks about Germany* It was certainly
well to listen to Mr, Mooney politely, but not much can come
of the discussion of such "generalities." If any American initiative
can lead to results, it is that of Sumner Welles, but not of Mooney.
DIECKHOFF
No. 657
108/112062
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 461 of March 6 Moscow, March 7, 19401 : 10 a. m.
Received March 7 1 : 30 a* m.
With reference to instruction Pol V 1856 of February KJ.1
When I asked Molotov whether there was any truth in the rumors
concerning an imminent improvement in relations between Italy and
the Soviet Union, Molotov answered that such rumors were purposely
being spread by the Italians. The Soviet Government was at
present little interested in Italy's attitude, which was definitely unfriendly.
2
*Not printed (366/206724). In this Instruction Brhliop sent to the Embassy
In Moscow for comment a United Press report of Feb. 8 from Homo to the effect
that Italy and the Soviet Union were seeking to improve their relations.
*0n Mar. 9, Mackensen reported on a conversation between Kulajenkov, Secretary
of the Soviet Embassy in Italy, and Graoff, Commercial Attach^ of the
German Embassy. Kulajenkov denied that any Italo-Soviet economic talks
were taking place and said that relations must still be regarded as "strained."
Improvement might come when the Finnish war was ended and when Italy
understood that the real enemy of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union was
Britain. "One must ardently hope the world war will begin in earnest as soon
as possible." (366/206726-28)
MARCH 1940 867
No. 658
los/i120es
The Ambassador m the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 463 of March 6 Moscow, March 7, 19401 : 10 a. m.
Received March 7 4 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 394 of February 29.1
In a conversation with Molotov I most emphatically called attention
to the intolerable conditions at the German-Soviet border and,
pointing to the seriousness of the situation, demanded that they be
remedied at once. 1 also requested an immediate concrete reply to our
proposal regarding the provisional settlement of border incidents.
Molotov, who iirst attempted to defend the Soviet Border Guard,
finally declared himself willing to take the measures demanded by us
and promised an early reply to our proposal.
2
SCHTJUENBDBG
'Not printed (103/112058). An Instruction by Woermann to make the representations
rtHror in the first paragraph of the document printed here. The
caso Involved varioutt incidents of tiring by Soviet border patrols upon German
customs guards, and \Voenmmn stut^l that there was considerable demand in
Germany for return fire when nwensary.
* In a telegram of Mar. 7 (dispatched Mar. 8), Schulenburg reported that after
a telephone call from Schllep he had again seen Molotov, this time to transmit a
personal requewt by Kihhentrop that Molotov remedy the "intolerable conditions" ;
Molotov gave "r**rw*wd asBuranccB that he would emphatically repeat his instructions
to that effect."
No. 659
B21/B005425
The Charge &Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URQBNT WASHINGTON, March 7, 1940 3 : 40 p. m.
No. 318 of March 7 Received March 8 5 : 00 a. m.
For the State Secretary*
With reference to your telegram No. 209 of March 4 (Pol. IX 422) J1
Following the lengthy and for the most part favorable speculations
of the American press on the resumption of full diplomatic relations
between Germany and the USA as a result of Welles5
visit, at yesterday's
press conference Roosevelt dismissed an inquiry on that point
rather categorically with the comment that he had not yet given any
thought to the question of sending an ambassador to Berlin.
'Not printed <83/2S288-ai).
868
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The President has been informed by Welles of the statements which
I made to him orally before his departure, as instructed. Welles will
have told him in the meanwhile that the question of ambassadors was
not discussed in Berlin. It is my impression that Roosevelt is not disposed
to take the first step, because he does not wish to permit us the
prestige victory implied. The attitude of the American Government
toward us has not improved in any way. Although the President
has said that he is willing to receive the Duke of Coburg, there are
nevertheless indications that the State Department intends to sabotage
the success of the trip* Whereas at first the American Red Cross,
both in the capital and in the provinces, showed a cooperative spirit,
the contrary is evident now, apparently by direction of the State Department.
Large functions which were previously arranged are either
being canceled on flimsy excuses or reduced to a smaller scale. Characteristic
of Roosevelt's attitude is his officially announced decision to
receive Archduke Otto as his house guest.
THOMSEN
No. 660
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Mini*try
Telegram
MOST URGENT BUCHAREST, March 7, 1940 5 : 20 p. m.
No. 305 of March 7 Received March 7 5: 00 a. m. fj0]. W 1247 g.
With reference to our telegram No. 206 of March 4. 1
An interim agreement 2 with the Armaments Minister has been
signed this evening. We undertake to deliver immediately : 360 antitank
guns, 10 40-mm antiaircraft guns, 10 20-mm antiaircraft guns,
artillery sights, and, when ready for shipment, 80 French field guns.
Beginning March 1, our oil purchases come under the provisional
arrangement and will be financed with an initial COO million lei out
of the funds of the Armaments Ministry. Further advances on purchases
will be regulated by the volume of our deliveries. I have
promised the Armaments Minister that I shall support his forthcoming
wishes regarding armaments. On the occasion of the signing
the Armaments Minister confirmed in writing the relation in value
between war material and petroleum which we proposed and thus
1 Not printed (5556/1339552^25).
2 Not printed (5556/E395528-35).
MARCH 1940 869
recognized the basic price of 78.1 reichsmarks per ton weighted average,
f, o. b. Constanta, for any new armaments transactions.
Secrecy is requested with respect to the concessions granted to us*8
NEUBAOHE.R
FABRIOITJS
'Marginal not< : "For Minister Clodius: Keeping this arrangement secret is
inconvenient in us much as Russian oil is reckoned on the basis of the price
paid in Rumania. It would be desirable for us to find a way whereby we were
allowed to reduce the price of what we import from Russia. Ju[nker] Mar. 3."
In a minute of Mar. 13 ( r>r>r>/J&'&)5r>2tt ) , Junker noted that Neubacher had agreed
that the details could be made known to the Russians in connection with oil
price negotiations,
No. 661
171/134107
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 434 of March 7 BERLIN, March 7, 1940 8 : 32 p. m.
Received March 8 3 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 455.1
Pleas thank M. Molotov on a suitable occasion for the information
on the present status of the Finnish question, and in that connection
give him an informal account of our own attitude about as follows:
Soon after the outbreak of the conflict it was suggested to us by
Finland, as nlso by other especially Scandinavian quarters, to
initiate mediation between the two parties in one form or another. In
conformity to the Moscow agreements, which placed us on the side
of the Soviet Union in the Russo-Finnish conflict, we had in no instance
fallen in with such mediation proposals. On the contrary,
our replies were always to the effect that we had no reason whatsoever
to believe that the Soviet Union wanted German mediation
and naturally must decline to undertake any such steps on our own
initiative. Kven when during the last weeks, under the impression
of the victories of the Soviet Army, the Finnish Government and
other governments intensified their requests that we open the way for
mediation, we maintained complete aloofness to such urgings.
2
RlBBENTROP
"Not prints! (171/134112-13). This telegram of Mar. 5 described the conversation
funnmarisMHl more fully In tiie memorandum printed as an enclosure
to document No. tM. The telegram also noted that Molotov did not mention the
Kuuslnen government, the demand for the withdrawal of Tanner and Mannerhelm,
nor a ban on fortifying the new frontier.
*In a telegram of Mar. 12 <119/B003551), Schulenburg stated that because
of reported new Soviet demands the situation appeared critical. He asked permission
to hint to Molotov that Germany would welcome a positive conclusion
of the negotiations, but In a marginal note of Mar. 12, Weizsacker directed
Woerwann to telephone Schulenburg not to do so.
870
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 662
2060/448113-14
Ambassador Bitter to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 255 BERLIN, March 7, 1040.
e. o. R 428 g,
I. For the time being, for information only: After the issuance of
the British Order in Council of November 27, 1939, against German
exports and the corresponding French decree of November 28, 1939,3
the German Government at that time refrained for several reasons
from immediately taking the same measures against British and
French exports. The official press statement at that time said only
that the German Government took cognizance of this new violation of
international law by England and France and "reserved all
measures." 2
The main reason for not taking immediate steps then was* that many
neutral states concerned lodged protests with England and France
at the time. The German Government did not want to anticipate
the results of these protests by immediately taking the same measures
against British and French exports. We were especially intent on
not giving England any pretext whatever for attacking German coal
exports to Italy. For this and other reasons the German order for
corresponding countermeasures, which had already been drawn up at
that time, was temporarily set aside at the Fuhrer's order.8 The neutral
protests, however, did not have any appreciable effect. Rather,
after England's present action against German coal exports to Italy,
it must be assumed that all hope of any general yielding on this point
by England must definitely be abandoned.
Consequently, the German offices participating in the naval measures
are planning to promulgate the order now. However, the
Führer's final decision has not yet been obtained. We wish to inform
the Italian Government of this intention in advance, before the order
is published, and also give the additional information that the German
naval forces will, of course, be instructed not to molest Italian ships
which may wish and be able to continue carrying coal from England
in the former quantities. When your demarche is made, it should not
1 These new British and French measures provided for the seizure and disposition
of various categories of goods from ports under enemy control or of
enemy origin or ownership. The British and French orders were published in
the Times (London) and Le Temps (Paris), respectively, on Nov. 29, li&9.
* The German press statement of Nov. 29, 1939, is printed in Pokumente der
Deutschen PoUtifc, voL vn, pt, if pp. 311-812.
'Not found.
MARCH 1040
be in the form of a question or of a request for Italian agreement but
rather as unilateral advance notification.
II. A further communication will follow concerning the time for
carrying out the above demarche.4
RlTTER
4 On Mar. 0, Hitter sent a top secret, special security handling telegram
(2281/480394), to be deciphered by Mackensen or his deputy personally, as follows
: "The Ptthrer has deferred issuance of the directive until further notice.
Thus nothing further is to be done in this matter for the time being."
No. 663
F7/0562-0679
The Führer and Chancellor to Benito Mussolini'1
BERLIN, March 8, 1940.
DUCK ! Let me introduce my report first of all with a word of thanks
for the account in your last letter 2 of the situation in Italy and the
measures you have taken, and for your evaluation of the other general
problems.
3 The frankness of your statements encourages me, too, to
present and describe all matters and problems as I myself see them.
To begin with, Puce, I read in your letter a passage that makes me
suspect that you thought my decision to take action against Poland
arose entirely from the conviction that England and France would
not enter into the war on any account. I should like to call to mind,
Duce, my letter of August 2t>, 1939, which was delivered to you on
that day at 4 oYlock in the afternoon by my Ambassador, von Mackensen.
4 In its closing passage I wrote that since neither France nor
England could gain decisive victories in the West, whereas after defeating
Poland Germany would be enabled by the agreement with
Russia to free all her forces in the East, and with superiority in the
air unequivocally on our side, I was not afraid to settle the question
in the East, even at the risk of an entanglement in the West. I also
wrote the following in my reply to your final statement of your position,
which was delivered to you, Duce, on September 28,
e 1939 : "If,
as I have said, a major war should develop, the issue in the East will
be decided before the Western Powers can score any success. Then in
the winter, at latest in the spring, I shall deploy in the West with
forces which will be at least the equal of France and Britain . . ."
* Rlbbentrop delivered the letter to Mussolini on Mar. 10. See document
No. 665.
* See dooiment No, 504.
4 See vol. vn, document No. 307.
*
Actually the letter to which reference is made fcere was delivered to tne
Dnce early fca Uie morning of Atig. 27, 1939. See vol. vu, document No. 341.
872
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Duce! When I made up my mind lust fall to take action against
Poland I did so in order to ward off attacks winch would have been
intolerable for any great power, To be sure, Germany had previously
endured these attacks for almost a mutter of decades I admit that;
however, in the beginning, she was not the Germany of National
Socialism, and later shu was a National-Socialist Germany, to be
sure, but one that was unarmed and consequently helpless in the face
of such developments. A drastic change then took place in recent
years. There came a moment when the German people would not
have deserved to be regarded as a great nation if they had put up
with such treatment any longer. I believe that what wo swallowed
for months even, in the year 1989 can hi* explained only by the stolid
nature of the German temperament. If in a similar situation and
with a similar distribution of forces the Italians had had to endure
only 5 percent of what the Germans in the territories stolen by Poland
had been, subjected to for nearly 2 decades there would have been an
explosion, Any further toleration of these incidents would not have
led to relieving the situation but would have resulted in the severest
damage to Germany's prestige as a great power. And the question
was not whether the problem might not possibly have been put off,
say, another 2, 3, or 4 months, for there in no doubt that considering
the intensity of the hate propaganda among the Polish people (which,
moreover, was constantly fanned by the British!), incidents would
have occurred which would eventually either have forced the German
people to act, or else would have brought about an irremediable breach
between the people and the Government. In particular, however,
Poland would have been able to carry into effect her plan to annex
Danzig with much less risk in the winter. Beginning with October,
Germany would have been in a difficult position to meet such attempts
with the vigor which it was still possible to muster in September.
From that season onwards, the climate of eastern Europe precludes
any fast-moving tactical operations. In that event, the result might
have been just what our Western enemies wex*e hoping for: the prolonged
containment of a, large number of German divisions in the
East, with all the undesirable consequences of a war on two fronts.
Hence there remains only the question whether, in view of the possibility
that England and France might enter the war, Germany
should have abstained from any reaction, even in the event of an
occupation of Danzig by Poland, in order to postpone the big altercation
until some later date 1
Duce ! I have naturally given very thorough thought to these questions.
It would have been really impossible to endure patiently these
intolerable conditions any longer and they might have grown even
worse without gravely injuring the prestige of the German Reich
MARCH 1940 873
internationally, and above all of Its Government at home. And even
apart from this an objective consideration of the general situation
made it imperative to reject such an alternative.
Duce! From the moment when England discovered during the
Ethiopian conflict that Germany is not a vassal state that can be
ordered about at will, and especially since the intervention by the
Keich in Spain in behalf of the Spanish Nationalist regime, she began
to think about and prepare for the conflict with the Reich, With
the introduction of universal military service in England, it became
clear that the leading British government circles had already made
up their minds about the coming war on the totalitarian states. To
my mind it seemed rather unimportant against whom the first blow
would be directed. The elements behind this decision aimed at the
whole, that in, nothing less than the elimination of the regimes which
by their very natures represent a threat to the feudalistic-reactionary
plutocracies. In this objective all forces inimical to us are agreed.
In view of the planned British armaments and the provisions made
by England for mobilizing all imaginable auxiliary forces (first of
all Poland), I thought that it would be wiser after all not to lose any
more time, which would involve a further loss of prestige, but instead
to take up the defense at once, even at the risk of setting off 2 or 3
years ahead of schedule the war which was being planned by the West.
For how could our armaments have been improved upon in 2 or 3 years,
Duce? As far as the relative strength of the German Wehrmacht
was concerned, there was scarcely any room for a substantial change
in our favor, considering the manner in which England was building
up her armament under full steam. In the East, moreover, the situation
could only have deteriorated. Thus it has been possible for me
in less than a month entirely to eliminate the Polish state as a threat
and thereby free Germany in the rear. The losses which we suffered
in this campaign grievous as they are, of course, for the individuals
affected and their families were insignificant on the whole. The
number of the dead which I announced at the Keichstag 6 at the time
has been reduced by nearly 2,000, because many of the casualties reported
dead by their companies turned out to be in hospitals as
wounded ; in the final accounting, therefore, the total number of the
dead in this campaign is barely 8,400, that of wounded approximately
28,000. To these must be added nearly 3,000 missing, however, who in
the light of our experiences must unfortunately be presumed murdered.
Our losses in materiel are not worth mentioning. In weapons
and ammunition they are offset many times by the booty which fell
into our hands. The psychological gains for the German Wehr-
* See Editors' Note, p. 227.
874
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
macht (especially for the Ivuftwaffe and the Army) are immense. The
soundness of our tactical training as a whole and in detail was demonstrated
as dramatically as was the correctness of our general strategic
principles. No additional training of any sort could have taken the
place of that combat experience* Tens of thousands of young reserve
officers with 3 years of active service behind them the new Germany
has abolished the 1-year volunteer system now have in addition
to their officer training courses the finishing course of combat experience.
I myself have had the opportunity to talk with and instruct in
their new duties many thousands of there young officers, all of whom
possess the Iron Cross or some other decoration* Puce, it is indeed
no exaggeration when I assure you here that there can be absolutely
no comparison between the present German Army and that of the
year 1914. It is the best-tried and best-equipped Wehrmacht that
Germany has ever had at her command I Not alone that, but it is also
filled with a spirit that could not have been produced by anything
but National-Socialist education. But even if we had not succeeded
in giving them that education, the idiotic propaganda and the war
aims of the British and French would have put the last touches to it.
The period of seeming inactivity which the weather imposed upon the
fronts was utilized to the utmost for the activation of scheduled and
additional units. And wherever the German weapons and ammunition
industry had not already reached peak production, it now has
achieved its planned wartime capacity.
The sense of superiority over our Western opponents animating
both officers and troops is absolute and unqualified ! This feeling has
been strengthened by the development of the war to date in the West,
on the sea and in the air. Nevertheless I fully realize, Duoe, that the
coming battle will not be a walkover, but the fiercest struggle in
Germany's history. The troops,, too, are aware of thin. They are
entering into this struggle with a holy, nay, truly awesome resolution.
This realization, Duce, that this is a battle for life or death imposes
upon me the imperative necessity to take everything into consideration
that might in any way be of benefit to us in this struggle.
In enumerating these factors, Duce, I should like to begin with
what for me, through her people, her system and especially her leader,
has always been our foremost friend, and always will remain our
foremost friend : Italy!
I fully understand, Duce, your attitude and your decision in August
of last year. Such understanding has been all the easier for me because
naturally I, too, am not unfamiliar with the material and personal
difficulties attending such decisions, I also share your view,
Duce, that under the conditions which then prevailed it was probably
even a good thing that Italy was not immediately drawn into the war
MARCH 1940 875
on our side. Yet I believe, I)ue<% that there can be no doubt that the
outcome of this war will also decide the futureof Italy. If that future
is viewed in your count ry merely as the continued survival of a modest
European state, then I am wrong. But if that future is conceived as
a guarantee of the existence of the Italian people from the historical,
geopolitical, and general moral viewpoints, that is, according to the
criteria of your people's right to existence, Duce, then you will some
day be confronted by the same opponents who are fighting Germany
today. I know full well, Dticc, that you yourself do not think differently
on the subject. I also know that all your measures to date, the
many forms of aid which you have extended to me in the past months,
diplomatically through your press, militarily through your mobilization,
and in material things,, too, are all prompted by this realization.
I, too, sec the destinies of our two countries, our peoples, our revolutions
and our regimes indissolubly joined with each other. It is just
because* of ibis feeling that I have decided to direct the German, authorities
concerned to investigate unco more all resom*ces, especially as
regards coal, which, if in any way possible, would make you, Duce, independent
of the Western democracies. 1 have a profound belief that
men such as we two could not but succeed in finding some way of
breaking the world-wide terrorist blockade of these democracies not
only by military means but by economic means as well. My Foreign
Minister, von Rihhentrop, into whose hands have already been placed
the principal findings of the investigations made here, will present
vhem to you, I>uce, to let you decide whether and to what extent you believe
tbo methods proposed afford sufficient guarantees for satisfying
your interest s.7 For I am quite aware, Duce, that without coal it is impossible
to sustain a normal economy, let alone ~a wartime economy.
I also realise that the resulting pressures can. be very severe, transcending
the intentions of a single individual. I should also like to take
this occasion to thank you, Duce, for your support during the recent
negotiations on our trade agreement,8 and wish to assure you that in
view of the British action against your coal shipments from Rotterdam,"
I have clone everything on my part in order if at all possible,
as 1 hope to help you.
I also wish to thank you for the military measures taken, which will
always afford us relief in one way or another.
Germany's relationship to Russia is the outcome of:
1. An over-all appraisal of the general European development, and
2, Consideration of the special situation in which the Reich finds
itself today.
T X*K riocmnetit No. 6ftT>.
*
Sofc document No. 027.
* Be* documentR Nos. 647 and 652.
2CO09O 54 61
876
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The appraisal of the general situation gives the following result:
Since Stalin's final victory, Russia has without doubt experienced
a modification of the Bolshevist principle in the direction of a nationalist
Russian way of life, which is out of the question for us, but
which could not be replaced by anything else in Russia herself at the
present time. That which made National Socialism the mortal enemy
of Communism was the hitter's Jewish-international leadership with
its avowed goal of destroying the non-Jewish nations or their leading
forces. How far-reaching this, to our minds, epochal change in
Russia has been is something which the Reich Foreign Minister will
be able to describe to you, Duce, from his personal impressions and
experience. For my part I merely wish to say that since Litvinov's
departure
10 there has unquestionably been a change in Russia's attitude
toward Germany. There can be no doubt that the conditions
for establishing a reasonable relationship between the two countries
exist today. We no longer have any reason for believing that any
Russian, agency is trying to exert influence on German domestic affairs.
I do not have to emphasize, moreover, that National-Socialist
Germany is completely immune to any ideological attacks by Bolshevism.
Accordingly, nobody here thinks of making concessions.
But if Bolshevism in Russia is developing into a Russian national
state ideology and economy, it constitutes a reality which we have
neither interest nor reason to combat. On the contrary! in our
struggle against the blockade of the world by the plutocratic democracies,
Duce, we can only welcome every factor and every assistance.
Germany and .Russia have often lived in peace and friendship for
very long periods of time. Our economies complement each other to
an extraordinary degree. There is almost no raw material which
we need that Russia does not possess or could not make available to
us within a reasonable time. And, conversely, there is not a product
of German industry which Russia does not either already need or
will not need in the foreseeable future. The trade agreement which
we have concluded with Russia, Duce, means a great deal in our
situation !
Specifically, however, what Germany has done was simply a clearcut
delimitation of zones of interest with respect to Russia, in which
nothing will ever change again. I took here only the same step that I
took with you earlier, Duce, when I accepted the Brenner as the final
line of demarcation between the lives and destinies of our two peoples.
11 The emigration of more than 200,000 Germans from Italy
will ratify this decision for all time and thus give it final sanction.
ao Maxim Litvinov was succeeded as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
by V. M. M See HMitolleort'osvleitnteMraoyf 1M9a3r9.. 11, 1938, to Mussolini (vol. i, document No. 352).
MARCH 1940 877
Fiiiland! Germany, as I have already stressed, Duce, is fighting
for her existence. We have been denied the most natural rights to
such a degree that we could not today withhold sympathy for the
situation of a great power, such as Russia undeniably is, with respect
to its access to the seas. 1 believe that a modicum of reason and
objectivity in examining and deciding these problems would have
given the Finns better counsel than that of resorting to arms. Russia,
I am convinced, never intended to take up this fight, for otherwise
she would have chosen a different season of the year; and in that
event there is no doubt in my mind that Finnish resistance would
have been broken very quickly. The criticisms which have been made
of the Russian soldiers in consequence of the operations to date are
not borne out, Duee, by reality and the facts. During the World
War we fought the Russians so long and so bitterly that we can
permit ourselves an opinion on that. Taking into consideration the
available supply facilities, no power in the world would have been
able, except after the most thoroughgoing preparations, to achieve
any other results at 30 to 40 degrees below zero [C] on such, terrain
than did the Russians at the very first. The scorn heaped upon the
Russian troops, however, has in my opinion made it very hard for
Stalin to accept, not to speak of to offer, a compromise. But in this
instance England has no other aim than to secure a legal basis under
the terms of the league of Nations by which other nations could
gradually be drawn into the war. We are watching this maneuver,
Duee, with calm attention. Besides, Germany has no particular obligations
toward Finland. The Finnish state owes its existence entirely
to a sea of blood from German soldiers, German regiments and
divisions, and its subsequent independence is also due to German units
under General von der Qoltz.12 In appreciation of this Finland later
took sides against Germany on every occasion, and so far as it was
possible took active part in every repressive measure against Germany.
This does not imply, Duce, that the German people feel any
hatx-ed for the Finnish people; it merely signifies that we have no
cause to champion Finland's interests.
Poland/ In regard to Poland, Germany has only one outstanding
interest, and that is absolute security for the eastern boundary of the
Reich. At least during the war we cannot avoid also taking on the
ballast of administering the General Government. But there is one
fact one must not deceive oneself about: If I had withdrawn the
German troops from the General Government at the end of the war,
this would not have brought about a pacification of Poland, but a
hideous chaos. And the Church would not have been able to exercise
** The reference is to the intervention by German troops under General Count
Rtidiger von der Goltas in Finland in 1918.
878
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
its function in praise of the Lord there, but the priests would have
had their heads chopped off, as was done in all places from which
the German troops were withdrawn. Moreover, the big Polish landowners
and the Polish intelligentsia, would not \w in that part of
Poland now continuing their rule as of old, that is, mistreating the
Polish people, but would now really be sitting in Paris or London,
because it is evident they would have lacked the means of brute force
to save themselves from the lovo of their subjects. Apart from all
this, Duce, that country would hardly have survived this winter at
all if it had not been for our reconstruction effort, especially in the
field of transport. For although the Polish soldiers were incapable
of checking the advance of the German Army, they destroyed thousands
of railroad bridges, crossings, etc., and so caused all traffic to
come to a standstill. The achievements in the reconstruction effort
accomplished by the German engineers, railroad construction battalions,
and the Reich Labor Service cannot find the appreciation
abroad that they deserve because they are either unknown or wilfully
ignored.
I shall have a copy of the interim report
ia on the conditions in that
country and the circumstances which compelled us to take action there
delivered to you, Duce. That account portrays a mere fraction of what
actually happened there. On my travels in Poland, I witnessed such
an incident myself in the Tucheler Heath as early as September 4,
Twenty minutes before we passed along one of those long forest roads,
a German hospital convoy with its entire complement of doctors and
medical corps men, together with 80 wounded, was cut down or massacred
by a Polish cavalry brigade which was still roaming through that
area; only one man escaped who had pretended to be dead and then,
covered with blood, made his report directly to me when we reached the
scene. But those are only minor matters, Duce. The Poles were
lucky indeed that they had the good-natured German people to deal
with, and what is more, with the more than restrained German Wehrmacht.
When the Commune was crushed in Paris in 1871 it is estimated
that the Versailles troops put to death between *K),000 and
50,000 communards. And these men were the most innocent lambs
compared with those Polish criminals, and their deeds mere childish
pranks measured against the horrifying incidents which occurred in
Poland. In all this, Duce, I am naturally speaking only of the fate
that overcame the Germans in Poland. Bnt or* could go a step further
and speak of the fate of the Ruthemaus. J-Cven the blood night
at Bromberg and the massacres of the Germans in Thorn pale compared
to this, it must be admitted. I need not assure you, Duce, that
once this war is over we ourselves have only the greatest interest in
ridding ourselves of this ballast of administration and responsibility
" Not fonnd.
MARCH 1940 879
provided, however, that every further threat to the eastern boundary
of the Ileieh is precluded.
The Balkan*! I was very happy to learn, Duce, that Count Ciano
has undertaken to prevail upon the Hungarians to defer their revisionist
demands for the time being (regardless of whether or not they are
justified), I do not, however, believe, Duce, that any danger will
threaten the Balkans from Ilussia. But I do fear that once someone
has tried to realize any revisionist aspirations, he will have set a fire
which may become quite, general. This is something that would be
in the interest of neither Italy nor Germany.
Turkey! The attempt to line up Turkey against Germany, which
does not threaten her but which on the contrary cooperates with her
economically, can bo traced to the desire of the Allies to make sure
of a state whose military forces, reinforced by Anglo-French aid,
could be committed whenever needed. This is as much a threat to-
Italy as it IK to Russia and of necessity also Rumania. That is, with
respect to Russia and Rumania, for the purpose of blockading the
sources of critical raw materials from the authoritarian states.
Spain ! Germa ny's relat ions with Nationalist Spain, Duce, are basically
normal. I have no cause to complain in any way about the attitude
of the, Chief of the Spanish State; on the contrary. Besides, I
quite understand the desire of that country after years of bloody civil
war not to be involved in a new war. Moreover, the material and
general military prerequisites would be lacking for Spain's participation
in this war, no matter where the sympathies of the Spanish Government
and of t he Spanish people may lie.
JafHinJ
880
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germany has absolutely no other war aim than peace! England
and France have basically no other war aim than the annihilation
of the totalitarian people's states, and thus of Germany. Germany
will therefore fight until this plutocratic clique of war criminals is
forced to abandon this design once and for all- This resolve cannot
be shaken I It can be all the better understood because over and
above this task we must in any case settle a chapter of world history
which, through fraud on one side and weakness on the other, forced
the German people into the most humiliating and frightful period
of their entire development.
In summing up, let me thank you once moro for your lust letter,
Duce, and the exposition which you gave inc. Let ma also ask you
to believe that I understand and appreciate your attitude. And,
finally, let me assure you that in spite of everything I believe that
sooner or later fate will force us after all to fight side by side, that
is, that you will likewise not escape this clash of arms, no matter
how the individual aspects of the situation may develop today, and
that your place will then more than ever be at our stile, just as
mine will be at yours. I, too, would be glad if a personal meeting
could be arranged to talk about the gigantic complex of the general
and special problems connected with the situation. There arc many
things which can be explained only in lengthy discussions. In conclusion,
let me hope that it might be possible to strengthen even
further the economic relations between our two countries, and just
at this time to find a solution for the coal problem, which is perhaps
causing you great concern. For anything that helps to make one
country stronger is of benefit to both !
In this belief I salute you cordially, with my bent wishes for you
and your country !
Yours, ADOLF HITLER
No. 664
1&03/428438-41
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Mhiifttry
SECRET Moscow, March 8, 1940.
No. A 1261 Received March 12.
Pol. VI 652.
POLITICAL RBPORT
Subject : Finnish-Soviet conflict.
With reference to our telegram No. 455 of March 5, 1940.1
With reference to the above-mentioned telegram I am sending you
for your information the enclosed memorandum concerning my con-
* See document No. 661, footnote 1.
MARCH 1940
versatiou on March 5, 1040, with Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars and Foreign Commissar Molotov with regard to the Finnish-
Soviet conflict.
COUNT v. ix SCHTTLENBTJRQ
[Enclosure]
SECHKT Moscow, March 7, 1940.
MEMORANDUM
Subject: Finnish-Soviet conflict.
In the conversation between the Ambassador and M. Molotov on
March 5, 1040, the Finnish-Soviet conflict was also discussed.
The Ambassador tunned the recent great successes of the Red troops
an outstanding achievement, on which he congratulated the Soviet
Government. Since, as the course of events indicated, the capture of
Viipuri by Soviet troops was imminent, the question arose as to what
would happen next. He would therefore be grateful if M. Molotov
could tell him something about it.
M. Molotov received the above statement with visible pleasure and
replied that the Ambassador was unquestionably right in his assumption
that Viipuri would fall within the next few days. The Red Army
had now shown what it could do and had thereby confuted the estimate
of the Red Army which had been assiduously spread all over
the world* [ Signs of skepticism about the Red Army had appeared
even in the German press; the facts, however, had disproved the
validity of such a skeptical attitude.
The Ambassador replied that anyone who knew the situation was
from the start aware of the capabilities of the Red Army in war. He
therefore had to reject the reproach of skepticism for himself and his
associates.
M. Molotov said that he could very well imagine a different view of
the lied Army; he himself had complete confidence in the capabilities
of the German Army, and just as much confidence in the Red Army.
The latter had successfully passed its test at the Mannerheim Line.] 2
Passing on to the general political situation, Molotov gave the Ambassador
the following information:
Some time ago, the Finnish Government, through the mediation of
Sweden, inquired of the Soviet Government whether it was ready for
a settlement of the present conflict. The Soviet Government had
thereupon agreed to inform the Swedish Government of the conditions
under which it thought a cessation of hostilities possible. The
*Th!s passage in brackets appears In tbe Moscow draft (171/134101-04) but
was deleted before dispatch.
882
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Soviet Government held that after so much bloodshed, an agreement
such as originally considered was now out of the question. The character
and magnitude of the hostilities clearly showed that the Finns
had established a well-prepared place cFarm^s against the Soviet
Union. In view of this, the Soviet Union had to be especially careful
in the future and could not limit itself to the security precautions
contemplated originally. An agreement could now only be made on
the following basis :
1. The demand for Hangd would be maintained, that is, the Finns
would have to lease the whole Hango peninsula to the Soviet Union
for the establishment of a naval base there.
2. The demand for cession of the island group [in the Gulf of Finland]
previously stipulated, would of course be maintained.
3. The Soviet Government demands the cession of the whole
Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Viipuri and Viipuri Buy, as
well as the shoreline of Lake Ladoga up to its northernmost point,
including the town of Cortavala.
4. The territorial rectifications at the Karelian border in favor
of Finland, originally projected, naturally wero in doubt now,
5. The Soviet Union made no claim on the territory around Petsamp,
provided that all specifications pertaining to tho security of
Leningrad were met.
M. Molotov added that the above-mentioned demands held only for
the present moment. Should the obstinate, stubborn Finns persist
in their thickheadedness, the Soviets would follow these with even
harder demands.
[In answer to the Ambassador's question whether the Soviet Government
contemplated prohibiting the construction of a new Mumierheim
Line by the Finns, M. Molotov said that tho old Mannerheim
Line no longer existed and that nothing had boon said in the meantime
about a new one.]
s
HlLGKR
a This passage in brackets was deleted before dispatch to Berlin.
No. 665
F6/0386-403 ;
F13/41&-23
Memorandum l>y an Official of the Foreign M-fauKtrr** Swvtariat
B-M 9 BOMB, March 10, 1040.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUOE,
IN THE PRESENCE OP COUNT CIANO AND AMBASSADOR VON MACKENSEN,
AT THE PAI^AZZO VENEZIA, ROME ON MARCH 10, 1940
The Reich Foreign Minister, presenting the Führer's most cordial
greetings, delivered the reply to the letter which the Duce had ad
MARCH 1040 883
dressed to the latter some time previously.
1 It had taken some time
to draft the answer because the Führer, as he had already informed
the Duce through Ambassador Attolico, had wished to have a clear
picture himself before committing his reply to writing.
2 This had
now been done in the past week. The German position in all its aspects
was sot forth in the Führer's letter, which contained everything that
needed to be said on the important issues at the moment. The Führer
had instructed the Foreign Minister to furnish amplifications to
the letter if the Duce had any questions to ask, and to underline certain
specific points.
Among these points singled out for particular mention, the Foreign
Minister brought, up the coal question. The Führer was deeply
aroused by the latest British measures to block the shipment of coal
from Germany to Italy by the sea route. He viewed these measures
as an outrageous attempt of the plutocratic democratic states at
strangling Italy economically. It went without saying that Germany
was able and willing to supply the entire coal requirements of
Italy. Minister Clodius, who had accompanied the Foreign Minister,
could inform his Italian colleagues of the details of the arrangements
contemplated by Germany. He also brought with him proposals for
solving the difficult question of transport.
The Duce mentioned in this connection a monthly delivery quota
of from 500,000 to 700,000 tons.
The Foreign Minister replied that Minister Clodius was in a position
to make proposals for siipplying the total requirement of 1 million
tons per month. In response to the Duce's reference to the difficult
problem of railroad cars, the Foreign Minister stated that Minister
Olodius, after negotiations with the military authorities, had
now also found a way of obtaining the requisite additional cars and
so, through collaboration between Germany and Italy, of guaranteeing
the transport of all the coal.8
Upon the Dace's remark that the solution of the coal problem was
an absolute necessity for Italy's military plans and that "without coal
there could be no cannons," the Foreign Minister stated the Führer
held the belief that two men like the Duce and himself would be able
to find a solution for this problem, too.
Besides, the coal difficulties in Germany had diminished since the
end of the cold season. The hard winter had been a splendid test of
the unity of the German people. Although the people in Germany
had "shivered like tailors," this did not bring on any discontent, but
1 Stn document*! Nws. 504 and 663.
^ SO* (It X*ll!ll*!l Nfo SH*i
* For th agreement cm coal reached by Clodius with the Italians, see document
No, 6419, footnote 12.
gg4
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
on the contrary everyone had good-naturedly taken the difficulties in
his stride.
The Duce commented that this had been a test of the discipline of
the German people.
The Foreign Minister added that if there should be any further
wishes of an economic nature on the part of Italy, Minister Clodius
would gladly discuss them with the Italian officials concerned. Germany
was aware of Italy's wishes in that field, and the Fuhrer had
instructed him to tell the Duce that Germany would do everything
possible in this respect in order to satisfy Italy's wishes.
Passing on to the over-all situation, the Foreign Minister pointed
out that the Fuhrer did not believe in any possibility of peace, but
was resolved to attack France and England this very year, being
fully convinced that he would be able to Ixnit the French Army in the
course of the summer, and that the British coukl be driven out of
France before fall. The Fuhrer had made this decision because in consideration
of the mentality of the French ami British he did not
believe in the possibility of any other solution. It was a matter of
principle, a contest between two systems.
To illustrate the mentality prevailing on the enemy side, the Foreign
Minister then handed the. Duce the Polish originals and German
translations of reports of the Polish Ambassadors in Washington,
Paris, and London to Colonel Keck, which had been found by Germany
in the Polish archives.4 These reports brought out two things
in particular : first, the monstrous war guilt of the United States, and,
second, the tremendous hatred of National Socialism together with a
boundless will to destroy that regime. This outlook governed all actions
of the British, the French, and unfortunately also the American
plutocracies.
The Duce remarked here that these, documents, while certainly very
interesting, offered nothing essentially new, since it had been known
all along that France, England, and the United States were opposed
to the authoritarian regimes.
The Foreign Minister explained that these documents showexl specifically
the sinister role of the American Ambassadors Bullitt, Kennedy,
and Drexel Biddle who in particular had exeHed a decisive influence
011 the British attitude. They gave an intimation of the
machinations of that Jewish-plutocratic clique whose influence,
* Presumably a reference to the aocumentft published as AuRwtirtitftw Anit 1940
No. 3, Polnische Dokumente sur Vorffeschichtc dot Kriege* < llorlin, 1040). An
unofficial English translation, The German White, Paper; Full Test of the Palish
Documents and the Report on American Ambaxwdor ttullitt'x War Attitude
(New York, 1940), was also published.
MARCH 1940 885
through Morgan and Rockefeller, reached all the way up to Roosevelt.5
The Duce noted at this point that this was probably a case of the
three hundred rulers of the world, of whom Rathenau had spoken in
his time.*
Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that Germany was not indulging
in any illusions; the will of these elements to destroy was a
fact, and everyt lung that happened was done only to conceal this will.
Stunner Welles 1 visit to Berlin,7 as the Führer had already informed
the Dare, had not produced any new facts. They were wondering
in Germany what Roosevelt hud actually intended with this,
action*
The Duce suggested that it probably had mainly to do with American
domestic politico
In eorroboration of this, the Foreign Minister read a report of
January 10;tS)
H by the Polish Ambassador in Washington, PotockL
When the Foreign Minister had finished, the Duce remarked that
Roosevelt now held different views on many points because the people
of the United States were against war and nothing would change that
attitude*
The Foreign Minister concurred, referring once more to the interesting
revelations contained in the report just read.
Following this, he turned the conversation to Russia. The Führer
had already given expression in his letter to Mussolini to everything
that needed to be ai reports of Jan. 12 and 16, 1939, purportedly toy Potocki, appear in the
publication cited in footnote 4. A telegram of Mar. SI, 1940, from Thomsen in
Washington, which will be published in vol. ix, states "that material for Potocki's
report of January, 1089, on the influence of the Jews was placed at the disposal
of the socialist at the Polish Embassy at nis request in January, 1939, by the
specialist In our Embassy" < B21/B005462 ) . Internal evidence suggests that it
was Potockl's report of Jan. 12 to which Thomsen refers here, and that this was
the report which Rihbentrop read to Mussolini.
886
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
"Do you really believe that?" inquired the Duee.
The Foreign Minister gave an affirmative answer and stated that
the Spanish adventure hud been the last bid for world revolution.
At the Duce's query whether the Third International hud also given
up all thought of a world revolution, the Foreign Minister replied that
the Third International, in his opinion, confined itself exclusively to
propaganda and informational work. His impression was that Russia
was not only in the process of becoming a normal national state, but
had even progressed quite far in that direction. There wen* no more
Jews in the central agencies, and even Kagtuiovirh,, who had always
been said to be of Jewish blood something which he had no way of
checking looked more like a Georgian. After Ufvinov's departure
all Jews had left the key positions. On his | Rihhentrop's | second visit
to Moscow 9 he had had the opportunity at a dinner given by Stalin to
talk with all of the members of the Politburo. The German party had
also included some old National Socialists, like Gauleiter Forster, and
it was Forster in particular who had declared after the banquet that it
had been just like talking with old party comrades. That had been
also his own (the Foreign Minister's) impression. This might perhaps
sound a little strange, but to his mind the Russian orientation
which was of course Communistic and therefore unthinkable for a
National Socialist had nothing to do with world revolution any
longer. Stalin was seeking to give the Russian empire a centralized
organization and had already achieved this goal to a large extent,
for nothing happened in Russia any longer without his desire. To
this end he had employed methods which had been the order of the
day in Russia since time immemorial, and on seeing the. picture of
Tsar Alexander that was still hanging in the Kremlin one might
almost have the illusion, in view of these tendencies, of railing on a
Tsar and not on Stalin.
The Duce remarked to this that Stalin actually thought that he
was Alexander's successor. The Foreign Minister went on to say that
the Politburo consisted of 100 percent Muscovites who no longer had
much interest in other countries, but on the contrary had the tendency
to isolate their country from the rest of the world. Russia did not
constitute either an internal or an external threat to National Socialism
or Fascism. As a matter of fact, there was no evidence that the
Russians had tried any meddling in Germany's domestic affairs since
the conclusion of the Russian pact. The Fuhrer held that there was
naturally a clear distinction between Bolshevism and National Socialism,
but that a favorable trade agreement could be concluded with
Russia just the same; that a sizable number of divisions, which in
* See document No. 152, footnote 3,
MARCH 1940 g7
different circumstances it would have been necessary to hold in reserve
as a covering fom against t lie Russians, had now become available for
the West ; ami that the understanding with Russia had freed Germany
at the rear. Russia was going through a change of global proportions.
She had dropped the idea of world revolution. The ties
with the Third International had, to Germany's knowledge, been
loosenet!, and the Russian figures in the Third International had been
largely frozen out.
Wit h her orient at ion turned entirely inward as a result of the organizational
changes which the Bolshevist regime was undergoing,.
Russia was not contemplating any action in the international field.
The Finnish conflict Germany had accurate knowledge of this
from special sources was an affair into which Russia had slid without
her own doing. The Finnish foreign Minister, Tanner, a Menshevik,
had given his country bad advice, and as a result of English influence
a situation hud eventually been brought about which had affected
Russia's prestige and had left her no choice but to go to war in the
middle of winter. Russia's original intention had been to conclude
treaties with Finland similar to those concluded with the Baltic
States.10
In these circumstances the Russians were no threat to the Balkans,
either* Stalin would, of course, at any time conclude a treaty with
Rumania that would give him the whole or part of Bessarabia. But
considering the. unpredictable repercussions in other countries and the
certainty that as u result the war would spread over the entire Orient^
he would surely not embark upon a war with Rumania.
The ail-important, consideration was that the men in the Politburo,
such us, for instance, the chief of the GPU,11 with whom the Foreign
Minister had had it long talk, were 100 percent Muscovites, who would
have nothing to do with Paris, London, and Washington, and were
tending toward a Russian' not a Pan-Slavic nationalism, but also
hud certain revisionist aspirations.
The I>uce conceded that possibly the Third International was actually
unable to launch a world revolution any more because the
Genuun-Kussiun agreement has caused a tremendous confusion in the
Communist parties of the Western countries, which to him marked
the end of the Communist world movement The Communists in the
Western countries believed, moreover, that "Stalin had gone to Berlin,"
and not vice versa.
In this connection the Foreign Minister underlined the firm attitude
of the National-Socialist party comrades in Germany, who, as a result
ct the General State Police Administration, the secret
police.
888
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the realistic political thinking which had been gradually developed
under National Socialist training, had unreservedly welcomed the
German-Russian agreement.
The Duce stated in this connection that he had already written
the Fuhrer that he had a full understanding of the political necessity
for the agreement, since it spared Germany a second front and
guarded her flank. Although Russia was perhaps not quite in top
form militarily, yet she was in a posit ion to operate with large masses,
and mass always meant strength. On that account it was really
foolish of the Western European preas to try to make the Russian
Army an object of scorn by calling it a "herd," an expression which
Herriot had used. This was absolutely false propaganda.
The Foreign Minister concurred and pointed out that the Fuhrer,
too, in his letter to the Duce had characterized British propaganda
as idiotic. The British always took the wrong line in their propaganda.
Thus, for instance, by their recent proclamation of their goal
of annihilation they had brought the Germans behind tho Fuhrer
to the very last man. The Duce said that the operations of the British
Ministry of Information were an utter failure [ahfutfittff Kataxtro-phe\.
The British propaganda, the Foreign Minister continued, impeded
the conclusion of a peace. In the Finnish conflict, too, England had
at first made a great show of indignation over the outbreak of the
war. Now she was just as strongly opposed to the conclusion of a
peace.
The Duce remarked that England was extremely displeased by
the prospect of a peace between Finland and Kussiu, but Finland had
no other choice, for she could count on no help.
The Foreign Minister agreed. Sweden and Norway would do
their utmost to remain neutral because they knew that if England
and France intervened in Scandinavia, Germany would have to do
so also.
At the Duce's question whether he thought there wan any prospect
of peace, the Foreign Minister said it was difficult to say. If the
Finns were wise they would make peace with the Russians now. The
Finns had pursued a very bad policy all along. The Foreign Minister
had had them advised before the outbreak of the conflict that they
should make every effort to reach a peaceable solution.18 He distinctly
recalled that reports of a forthcoming agreement had arrived in
Berlin on a certain day from both Helsinki mid Moscow.13 But at
that point Anglo-French influence had been brought to bear on Finland
through the former Swedish Foreign Minister, Sandier, which
bolstered the position of Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner and so
13
* NSeoet, ffoourndin.stance, document No 221
MARCH 1940 889
brought on the war. Twenty-four hours after the outbreak of hostilities,
however, the Finnish Minister to Berlin had told him, the Reich.
Foreign Minister, that the Finns were pi^epared to accept all of the
Russian demands,14 AH this only went to show how badly Finnish
poliey had been conducted.
The Foreign Minister next turned to the situation in terms of the
German Army. lie repented that the Führer did not believe there
were any possibilities of peace. Sumner Welles* mission was easily
explained in terms of strictly domestic political issues in America;
there were other interpretations which claimed that his actions were
a maneuver in collusion with England calculated to cause Germany
to defer the execution of certain plans. But even if in view of the
anti-war attitude of the American people one did not wish to deny
that Sumner Welles* mission had the character o an honest attempt,
Germany's enemies hud gone too far in committing themselves to the
repeatedly proclaimed aim of a war of annihilation to be able to
change their goal now. In view of this situation the Führer was
determined to break the ene.my^s will to annihilate and, in order to
accomplish this, to attack Knglaiid and France at the time he considered
proper. Playing the prophet was always a dubious business,
but he, the Foreign Minister, was in a position to state that Germany
hoped that the French Army would be beaten before next fall and
that after that the only British soldiers left on the Continent would
he prisoners of war.
The Foreign Minister recalled that while he had told Count Ciano
at Salzburg f hut lie did not think England and France would necessarily
go to ro!nnd\s aid, yet he had always reckoned with the possibility
of an intervention by the Western Powers.15 He was now glad
that matters hud taken such a turn because, in the first place^ it had
always IXH*U obvious that the clash would occur sooner or later and
that it was inescapable. As to the timing, they on the German side
had taken the position, partly in consideration of Italy's preparation,
that the conllirt would not break out before 2 or 3 years had passed.
These had also been t he Puhrer\s views. On the other hand, however,
he hail been aware that it would be desirable to get the conflict over
with during t he 1 i let i me, of t he Duce and the Führer. The attempt on
the FührerV life at Munich 16 had shown that a statesman's life often
hung by a silken thread, and on that account the Führer had sought to
bring about a decision while he was still in the prime of life. Secondly,
from the moment when England introduced universal military service,
17 it was clear that in the long run the ratio of power could not
**Not found.
** See vol. vrz, documents Kos, 43 and 47. M A bomb exploded in the Munich BttrgerbrSukeUer shortly after Hitler fi^ni>sh^ed
a speech there on Nov. 8, 1939.
*f i* A*II Krai w* vnl vr_ document No, 272.
890
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
be maintained in Germany's and Italy's favor. This consideration
had been a factor in shaping th*> Führer's decision to solve the Polish
question even at the risk of mlervent ion by t he West eru 1 *o\vers. The
decisive factor, however, hud been that a, Great Power could not afford
to put up with certain things.
The Foreign Minister handed Mussolini the book on the Polish
atrocities,
18 with the promise that n Italian translation would follow
later. The situation, which had been diilieult from the outset, had
reached such a point that in recent months Polish chauvinism had
almost gone head-over-heels in its ravings about a march on Berlin,
while terrorization of the Volksdeutsche continued on an increasing
scale. In August the Poles had sent notes to Berlin of such insolence
that, had they been published, the cannons might have gone off by
themselves, so outraged would the feelings of the German people have
been. There were limits to one's forbearance. On top of tins, the
Polish agreement of 1034 had been concluded only upon the insistence
of the Führer, and even so it was very unpopular in Germany.1* But
instead of utilizing this agreement to settle the difficult ies bet ween the
two countries, the Poles had on the contrary taken ml vantage of it to
maltreat the German minority in an incredible manner. This, of
course, became known in Germany, and popular sentiment became
inflamed to the extreme, so that last summer the PTihrer was faced
with the question whether to accept a long winter campaign against
Poland, as England and France evidently intended, at the same time
exposing the Germans in Poland to unbearable abuse during the campaign,
or else to strike promptly. In the given circumstances the
Fxihrer could not have done anything but choose t he second alt ernat ivo.
"In any case, events proved the Führer to be. right," commented
the Duce.
The Foreign Minister continued by stressing the German people's
unshakable faith in victory. There was not a Gorman soldier who
did not believe that victory would be won this year. That, mid the
Duce, was an extremely interesting remark. What animated the
German people was not the flag-waving sort of patriotism \hnrra-
Patriotismus] but a firm purpose. Germany's position was favorable.
The blockade had proved ineffective. Germany's food supply
was assured with the help of the reconquered former German
provinces. It was only in fats that the German people had to accept
** See document No, 663.
"The German-Polish Agreement of 1934, signed .Tan. 2CJ, 1034, by Nenrath and
Lipski, stated that it was intended "to open up a new piine In the political relations
between Germany and Poland." It pledged the pnrtiw to conduct their
relations in accordance with the principles of the Pact of Paris, to settle diHpntea
by direct negotiation or other peaceful means, and "in no cironmxtawes to renort
to force. For the full text see British and Foreign State J'afcr, 188+, vol.
oxxxvn, pp. 495-496.
MARCH 1940
any restrictions, but that could only better their health. Under the
trade agreement Germany was to receive from Russia 1 million tons
of grain in the fin-l year, and from 1.5 to 2 million tons later. He
was able to state confidentially that Russia was very generous in
the matter of raw material deliveries and even used her own gold
to purchases some, of the raw materials destined for Germany. In
addition, she pave valuable assistance in respect to transit of goods.
Thus largo quantities of critical materials were being sent from
Manchukuo through Kusnia. Also the Balkan countries, such as
Rumania, had a share in supplying Germany; and Italy was not
last in providing valuable economic assistance, for which the Führer
had asked him to convoy special thanks to the Duce. Thus Germany's
supply of food and raw materials would not encounter any difficulties
even in the. event of a long war.
Tho Foreign Minister then pointed out that he was very unpopular
in England; they always reproached him for having declared that
there would never he a war with England. As a matter of fact, he
hud asked the Fuhrer in 1037 to send him as Ambassador to London,
although this had required that a decision already taken be rescinded.
He had told the Kuhrer on that occasion that he was certain there
would he* a war with England and that only King Edward had a
slight chance of averting it; he had added immediately, however,
that he did n<*t think Edward would be able to prevail* Given this
situation, he had told the Fuhrer as early as 1937 that the chances
for a war were a hundred to one. If he had been asked at that
time what line-up he would like for that war, he would not even
in his boldest imagination have been able to think up so favorable
a situation as the one in which Germany found herself today.
At the I)uce*s question,
uWhat program do you have for your stay
in Rome, Comrade Rthbentrop?", the Foreign Minister replied that
lie was entirely at the Duce's disposal. The Duce then proposed
having another discussion on Monday afternoon at 5 o'clock. He,
the Duce, would then outline the situation from the Italian point of
view ami deal particularly with the future, adding that he, too, had
documents to show.
Tho Foreign Minister then informed the Duce confidentially that
Germany would take the offensive with 205 fully equipped and welltrained
divisions. He pointed out that Germany's experience in the
West, especially a recent raid on a British outpost, where 16 British
soldiers had been captured, showed that the British were miserably
trained and poorly equipped, and that the superiority of the German
foot soldier over his opponent was equivalent to three to one. The
British lacked any training in modern fighting, as needed for bunker
warfare, for instance. It was not as simple as all that to put civilians
892 DOCUMENTS ON GERMANT FOREIGN POLICY
into uniform, give them a smattering of training and then send
them to the front to do the job of full-fledged soldiers.
The Duce estimated the British troops actually ut the front at
50,000 to 60,000 (out of a total of 200,000), with the rest occupied
in the communications zone.
Next the Foreign Minister talked about the experience of World
War I. The British had had very poor leadership in the last, war.
Some of their crack units had been good, but on the avcnigc they had
been inferior to the German Army. The French Army, too, was
no longer what it had been in 1914, as recent experience in the West
had demonstrated.
The Duce commented that the French had a defensive mentality.
Everything was all right as long as they were Kitting in their pill
boxes, but as soon as they had to leave that shelter the consequences
of the bad morale in France became evident in the troops, too, When
he referred to the Communist movement in France and to the fact that
Communist papers were even allowed to continue publication, the
Foreign Minister replied laughingly that Home of these Communist
papers were printed in Germany.
The Duce referred in this context also to the bad morale in England,
where an anti-war meeting had recently been held with a large
attendance, and the number of conscientious objectors*' had risen to
24,000. Besides, the Foreign Minister added, in a recent by-election
a candidate had been elected on an anti-war platform.
The Foreign Minister also stated that the Führer was enjoying the
best of health and was very eager for the fray. The Duce added on
his part that the Führer was quite right in saying that the Gorman and
Italian peoples had a common destiny. The Western democracies
made no distinction in their hostility to the two countries.
The Foreign Minister replied that one basic reason for the attitude
of the plutocracies was the fear that the leading ideas of Germany
and Italy might find their way to the other countries and so put an end
to the plutocracies in the United States, England, and France, The
Polish documents which he had given the Duce showed that the plutocracies
hated the Duce and the Führer from the bottom of their hearts.
This was partly explained by their bad consciences and by the fear
that the Fascist and National Socialist ideas might find adherents.
The Duce interjected that Germany and Italy were the proletarians,
as it were, and the other countries the conservatives, and it should be
borne in mind that the Western countries would do everything in their
power to defend their system to the last. But their morale was low
and they had no officers. The Foreign Minister replied that he was
fully convinced that the British and French Armies were moving
** "Conscientious objectors" is in English in the original.
MARCH 1940
toward the greatest disaster of their histories. Germany was quite
aware that the campaign would not be as easy as the one in Poland,
but the Flihrw, who was very cautious in his calculations, was firmly
convinced after a careful comparison of the relative merits of the opposing
armies and an accurate appraisal of the total situation that
England and France would receive a crushing defeat.
In answer to tha Duce's question whether Germany believed it was
possible to break through the Maginot Line, the Foreign Minister
stated that the Germain < ieneral Staff, on the basis of its perhaps somewhat
slow but therefore all the more thorough study, had reached the
conclusion that the Magi not Line was no longer an insurmountable
obstacle. The special tactics in which the German troops had been
trained in the lust few months, together with their special weapons,
would enable them to (leal even with the Maginot Line.
At the close of the conversation, the Duce said that he would give
thought to all the points raised and added, pointing to the Führer's
letter,
UI believe the Führer is right."
SCHMIDT
Minister
No. 666
B19/B003503
Unsigned Memorandum
BERLIN, March 10, 1940,
The Foreign Minister decided today in the matter enclosed herewith
(repatriation of German nationals from Finland to the Reich) 1
as follows : There was no objection to a slow and very cautious return
of German nationals from Finland to the Reich, if this action could
be carried through without arousing any notice. In no case could
any organized action be considered. Foreign policy considerations
toward Russia demanded such caution. The Reich Foreign Minister
accordingly asks the State Secretary and Chief of the AO to see
to it that this project does not develop into any organized action and
that nothing appears in the press, especially in Finland. In order
to forestall this-, no written instructions must be issued, e. g., to the
Ortagruppen. Moreover, it was self-evident that the projected action
could extend only to those German nationals who were willing to come
to Germany.
Transmitted to State Secretary and Chief of the AO Bohle.
* Knclosure not found.
894
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No, 667
F17/278 ;
F7/0531-0530
The Foreign Minuter to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ROME, March II, 10-10 8 : 15 p. m.
No. 531 of March 11 Received March 11 8 : 40 p* m.
Only for the Fflhrer personally,
1
My reception by the Duce and Ciano was especially cordial. In the
first conversation I commented to the Duce on the Fixhrer's letter.3
I told the Duce on the coal question that Germany was able and
willing, with Italy's cooperation, to supply and transport all the coal
needed by Italy, and that I had brought along Minister Clodius, who
would be at the disposal of the Italian Government at once for
settling all details. Any further economic wishes which Italy might
have would receive the utmost consideration from us. I further explained
in detail that the Fuhrer did not believe in the possibility of
peace and in the sense of the disinterestment s was determined to
break the enemy's will to annihilate; I believed that the French
Army would be beaten this summer and the British driven out of
France.
I handed the Duce seven Polish documents,4 of which I read him
the last, most interesting one, which is an especially crass documentation
of the hatred of the democracies for Italy ami Germany, and of
America's co-responsibility for the outbreak of the war. The Duce
said that he had always thought this was the case and that he would
study the documents carefully,
1 then explained to the Duce our view of the Russian question on
the basis of my personal impressions of Moscow. The Duce interrupted
to ask various questions and replied that, in his opinion, world
Communism had received a mortal blow as a result of the* German-
Russian Non-Aggression Pact.
With reference to the Führer's letter, I then described to the Duce
Germany's incomparable economic, political, and military situation,
and, referring to the progress of the war so far specific operations
on the Western Front, the recent capture of British soldiers, etc* I
'This document was not circulated outside* the Btiro Rt.S. in the Foreign
Ministry. The working copy went to Ribbentrop's own office.
2 See documents Nos. 60S and
MARCH 1940 895
pointed out the vast superiority of the German soldier. The Duce
agreed and remarked that, in his opinion, the British had a total of
200,000 troops in France, of which, however, only 50,000 were usable;
the rest were in rear ureas. He spoke disparagingly about the spirit
of the French Army and called it a defensive spirit. The Duce also
stated that the British officers and noncommissioned officers were unfit.
In confirmation of the Ftihrer's letter, I then commented in detail
on the Fuhrer's satisfaction that things had taken this course; the
conflict with Knglaml had been unavoidable, and it was therefore well
that it had broken out during the lifetime of the Fuhrer and the Duce
and before England was fully armed from the standpoint both of men
and materiel. I stressed the firm confidence in victory entertained
by the German people and the German Army, who felt vastly superior
to their foes. The German Army had mustered over 200 divisions of
full, wartime strength. The Duce asked whether Germany believed
she could break through the Maginot Line, to which I replied that the
German General Stuff always gave things very careful consideration
and that with the tactics and weapons of the modern German Army
the Maginot !Line no longer represented an insuperable obstable by
any means.
Finally, I spoke again of the irreconcilable difference between, the
democracies and our two totalitarian countries and referred to the
Führer's letter, according to which this was no accidental war but a
question of the determination of one system to destroy the other.
The Duce, who asked a number of other questions regarding which
I shall report orally, finally said that he wished to think over at
leisure the Fuhrer's letter, which I had sent him half an hour before
the conversation, and that he was contemplating giving his stand on
the questions tomorrow* He was therefore asking me to see him,
tomorrow, that is, this afternoon at 5 o'clock.5 In conclusion, the Duce
added that the Ffthrer's letter was very interesting; he believed that
the Fuhrer was right and that Germany and Italy had a common
destiny.
I have no indications at all at present as to what attitude the Duce
will take today. Even at dinner yesterday with Ciano, who was very
reserved, perhaps in order not to anticipate the Duce, I obtained no
hint as to the Duce's thoughts. We have learned in confidence from
Italian Government circles, first, that for the time being Italy would
apparently like to continue to import certain amounts of coal from
England, particularly in view of the fact that certain portions of
her industry are equipped for British coal and, secondly, that, as far
as the military situation is concerned, Italy is not yet prepared.
Whether and to what extent these reports are correct and, above all,
* See document No.
896
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
whether they agree with the Duce's personal views will become evident
in the conversation this afternoon.
The conversation with the Pope took the course agreed upon with
the Fuhrer. I shall report on it orally. I am leaving tonight at
9 : 10 6 and shall arrive in Berlin sometime Tuesday evening.
RlBBENTBOF
*"9: 50" In the draft described in footnote tt.
No. 668
FI 3/420;
FS/01 25-129
Unsigned Memorandum
RAM 10A.
RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOKKION MINIBTKU AND
THE POPE ON MARCH II, 1040
After the Foreign Minister had conveyed the Fuhrer\s greetings,
the Pope opened the conversation by referring to his 17 years
of activity in Germany. Those years spent in the orbit of German
culture represented perhaps the most delightful period of his life and
the Reich Government could be sure that he hud a warm heart for
Germany and always would have.
After he had emphasized, with the lively assent of the Pope, that he
wanted to speak frankly and without diplomatic <*iivimil
MAECH 1940
within the clergy's province. The recognition of the necessity of such
a radical separut ion, however, could not yet be considered to be the
dominant view of Catholic clergymen in Germany. Similar to the
manner in which Rngland, in international politics, had claimed the
role of a kim! of guardian of the continent and the right of intervening
in every possible problem of third countries, the Catholic Church had
also become accustomed, in the course of events, to intervention in
politics. The Catholic Church in Germany had come into the possession
of positions and rights of the most various kind which it considered,
to be sure, duly acquired, but which were not compatible with
the absolutely necessary limitation to its spiritual functions. The
Catholic clergy must be imbued with the realization that with National
Socialism an entirely new form of political and national life had appeared
in the world. Only after this had happened could a fundamental
settlement ami understanding be approached with any chance
for a lasting success. One must not repeat the mistake made with the
prematurely concluded concordats (Liinder concordats and Reich concordat),
which already had to be considered out of date, if only on account
of the formal constitutional developments in Germany which
had taken place since they were concluded. In the opinion of the
Fuhrer, what muttered for the time being was to maintain the existing
truce and, if possible, to expand it. In this respect, Germany had
made very considerable preliminary concessions. The Führer had
quashed no less than 7 thousand indictments of Catholic clergymen.
Also, it should not be forgotten that the National Socialist State
was spending; i billion KM annually for the Catholic Church; no other
state could boast of such an achievement.
The Pope showed complete understanding toward the Foreign
Minister's statements and admitted without qualifications that the concrete
facts were as mentioned. True, he attempted to turn the conversation
toward certain special problems and complaints of the
Curia, but
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tive relationship between the two countries had beon established. This
had been made possible for National Socialism by the fact that the
German people were now immune to any kind of Communist infection
and that the Soviets also had not attempted to gain support for ideas
of world revolution in Germany.
In the subsequent conversation between the Foreign Minister and
Cardinal State Secretary Maglione, the latter tried to discuss several
concrete issues, namely, the problem of confessional schools, the permission
for a representative of the Nunciature in Berlin to go to Warsaw
and the subsidies sent to Poland by the Curia. The Foreign
Minister, however, did not enter into a discussion of the substance of
the problem of confessional schools. He called the admission of diplomatic
representatives into Warsaw as generally not yet possible, and
when the Cardinal State Secretary in this connection spoke of the
necessary control over the use of papal money payments he [the Foreign
Minister] vigorously rejected the suspicion cast on German authorities
which was therein implied, whereupon the Cardinal State
Secretary dropped that subject too* With regard to a further question
raised by the Cardinal State Secretary, namely, whether it was
not possible to prohibit the distribiition of certain anti-church books
which had been brought out by Ludendorff's publishing firm, the
Foreign Minister promised to examine the matter, without, however,
giving any positive assurances.
No. 669
66/46522-39-
Memorandiwn by an Official of the Foreign Ministers 8e THE D0CB
IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR VON MAGKENBEN AND COUNT CIANO
ON MARCH 11, 1940
At the exchange of greetings the Du-ce remarked, referring to the
Foreign Minister's call on the Pope, that there was little to be gained
from having the Catholic Church for a friend, but the enmity of the
Pope, even if it was not dangerous, could be quite troublesome, as he
knew from personal experience.
In connection with the memorandum * on the machinations of Otto
von Hapsburg, presented the day before, the Duce commented that
just as Emperor Charles had been given the nickname "Charles the
1 Not found. Archduke Otto had recently arrived In New York, where be fcftd
spoken on a plan for a Dannblan federation. See the N&to Forfe Times, Mar. 7,
1940. In April he was received by President Roosevelt.
MARCH 1940 899
Sudden,'* so Otto now was dubbed "Otto the Fantastic" for his utterly
senseless exertions. Otto's plans could only be described as "the decline
of the. mind/' He was going to have them published in the
Italian press, and (Jayda 2 had already spoken about them in the
Giarndfe $Italia.
Next the Duce thanked the Foreign Minister for the amplifications
which he had made to the Fuhrer's letter during yesterday's conversation,
and said that he had read the letter over three times. He then
proceeded to state his position on the individual problems in the current
political situation as follows:
itolative to Russia, he wished to recall that in 1924 the Fascist Government
had l>een the first European Government to recognize the
Soviets, and that, he himself had concluded a comprehensive pact
with JNitvinov 10 years later.3 On that occasion the Russians had
even been given a banquet, though no toasts had been made. So far
everything had been sat isfurtory. On the Italian side, however, a clear
distinction hud been drawn between the political and the ideological
aspect of this relationship. As regards the ideological aspect, the
Dura had remained absolutely intransigent. "I am and always will be
anti-Communist,*' he stressed with vigor, for Communism was incompatible
with the historical and economic, that is, the natural
foundations of lifi*. The Foreign Minister agreed with him and
characterized Communism as being even contrary to nature, to which
the Ducc added that it was precisely in nature that the principle of
inequality was constantly demonstrated to us.
He believed that Russia would refrain from any propaganda work
for a while since, as he had said yesterday, a tremendous confusion
had broken out among the Communists of all countries as a result
of the German-Russian agreement. But once Russia has disposed of
these international difficulties, the Bolshevists were sure to start up
their propaganda all over again. Germany had been wise to conclude
the pact with Russia, as he had already said in his letter 4 to the
Fuhrer, because the pact gave Germany the assurance that she would
have to fight on only one front, which was a factor of capital importance.
Owing to certain issues, a rupture had now occurred between Russia
and Italy. The Russians were inclined to exaggerate things in this
respect, and they overlooked, for instance, the fact that Count Ciano,
in his sixrcch of December 15 [JW], had mentioned neither Russia
nor Finland. Very recently the Russians had made inquiries regard-
* VIrginio Gayda* Mitor of the Giomate
* Bee document No. 504, footnote 12.
4 S*t* document No. 504.
document No. 478.
900
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ing the possibilities of having ships built in Italy. Incidentally, the
world's fastest cruiser, the Tashkent, had been built for the Russians in
Leghorn. The exchange of views between the Italian and Russian authorities
on this subject was still going on. If the Russians wished to
resume normal relations he, for his part, was entirely willing. The
Foreign Minister stated that it would be of benefit to the Axis if good
relations were restored between Italy and Russia.
Regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict the Duce noted that a peace
would be entirely advantageous to Germany and Italy. He added
that Germany and Italy had an interest in Russia's not taking action
against Rumania. Any Russian move against Bessarabia would result
in an extremely complicated situation and the entire Danube
basin would be in danger of becoming involved in the conflict, which
would certainly be against Germany's interests in view of the supply
situation. The Foreign Minister stated with emphasis that Germany,
too, wanted the Balkans to remain quiet.
The Duce stated further that he had advised the Hungarians to
remain quiet and not bring up the question of Transylvania, which,
moreover, was highly complicated by reason of the number of different
nationalities involved. It was interesting to note that the German
minority in Transylvania tended to prefer the Rumanians to the
Hungarians. The Foreign Minister confirmed this and added that the
German minority in Rumania had not nearly so many grievances as
the minority in Hungary.
The Duce inquired if it were not possible for Germany to prevail
on Russia to leave the Balkans alone and to confirm this intention by
some sort of declaration or gesture. A step of this kind would also
provide favorable conditions for the restoration of good relations between
Russia and Italy, mainly of an economic but also of a political
nature.
Passing on to England, the Duce stated that the British probably
did not delude themselves for even a moment that the requests which
they had actually made of Italy for the delivery of cannon, armored
cars, or bombers would be answered with anything but a categorical
no. "They will not get a single nail for military purposes." As regards
raw materials such as mercury, sulphur, and hemp, Italy was
willing to discuss the matter. Moreover, a written statement on this
question had already been communicated to Germany, defining the
stand Italy would take up to the moment of the final break with the
British and French.*
Going on to Italy's situation, the Duce stated that Italy had not
been ready at the outbreak of the war on September S. He had been
* Presumably the pro meinoria contained in document No. 542.
MARCH 1940 QQJ
sincerely grateful for iho telegram in which the Führer had told him
that he would not rrquira Italy's military help in the Polish campaign.
Publication of the tdigram in Germany would have been desirable/
adclexl th I>wro, for they should know there in all circumstances that
the hypothesis m-cording to which Italy might fight on the side of
France and England was impossible and insulting. The Italy of today
was entirely different from the former Italy. The Foreign. Minister
saifl with conviction that no one in Germany believed anything different,
a statement which the Due heard with visible satisfaction. The
Duca stated in this connection that it was practically impossible for
Italy to keep out of the conflict. She would join the war at the proper
time and fight tit the side of Germany and parallel with her, for Italy,
too, had certain problems to solve. Now that the problem of the land
boundaries was settled, he had to turn his attention to the sea boundary.
Never IK* fort* had Italy's need for free access to the oceans been
demonstrated mom clearly than at the present moment. No country
was really free unless It hnd absolutely free access to the oceans. Italy
was in a prison, as it were, the bars of which were formed by Corsica,
Tunisia, and Malta, and the walls Gibraltar, Suez, and the Dardanelles.
Italy was very patient and had to remain so as long as she
was not prepared, just as a boxer in the ring had to put up with a great
deal at certain moments. This test of patience was nearing its end,
however. Italy had made great advances in her rearmament, and he
would shortly give the Italian people an opportunity to judge with
their own eyes the accomplishments in this field. He had sacrificed
almost every aspect of civilian life in order to make progress in
rearmament .
The Italian navy would soon be the strongest in heavy battleships,
for Italy would have four 35,000 ton vessels, as compared with
Britain's two. One hundred and twenty submarines would be available
by next May, and 150,000 naval personnel would be mobilized
in April.
Italy had made great strides in the air, too. All work in that sector
was directly under the Duce, because it had turned out that he had
to look after the work even of the technicians.
The ground forces would be 2 million strong by next May ; 1 million
of them could f >e rated as highly qualified and well trained, and were
imbued with the best fighting spirit of Fascism (the age classes of
1917, 1018, 1910, and 1020).
The Duee had often pondered the question whether the events which
had proved the FCihrer right had not proved him right too. He had
to answer this question in the affirmative. If Italy had entered the war
1 Sw document No. 23,
902
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
on September 3, she would have had to ask for Germany's help. The
Foreign Minister agreed with him and added that the Fuhrer himself
had said it was better that Italy had not come into the war at once.
The Duce went on to explain that at home as well as in Libya, the
Aegean Sea, Albania, and Africa, Italy would have hud to conduct
not only a two-front but a multiple-front war. In theso ciivumst ances
the war would immediately have spread, reaching us far as the Danube
basin especially since the Turkish-French- British pact
H was directed
against Italy and the Weygand army 9 was maintained solely for
operations against Libya, and for no other purpose. If one asked
whether Italy's attitude was true to the spirit of the alliance and was
of political and economic advantage to Germany, one could only
conclude that Italy's actions were those of a real ally. In the economic
field particularly, Italy's assistance in supplying food should be noted,
especially those foods which contained the important vitamin C, without
which the body could not develop. In the month of February
alone, according to his statistics, 9,800 railroad cars loaded with food
had gone into Germany, and he hoped to be able to reach as much as
10,000 in the near future. (The Duce handed over a detailed statement.)
10
In the military field, Italy was containing large numbers of Anglo-
French home and colonial troops in various parts of Europe and
Africa. The Duce presented several maps which showed tho exact
figures, and repeated that large masses of enemy troops were tied down
in this manner. When the Reich Foreign Minister asked how many
French divisions were contained at the Franco-Itiilmn border, the
Duce answered approximately 10 to 12 divisions, and insisted on this
figure in spite of the Foreign Minister's remark tlu;t German authorities
assumed the figure to Ixj lower; he explained this lower figure
by the snow conditions during the severe winter, which made it unnecessary
to keep large forces at the border. Their number would be
immediately augmented, however, when the weather chunked.
Following this the Duce turned to the question of when Italy would
be able to enter the war. The question of timing was extremely delicate,
for he ought not intervene until all his preparations were completed,
so as not to be a burden to his partner. In any event he had
to state at this time with all distinctnass that Italy was in no position
financially to sustain a long war. He could not afford to spend
a billion lire a day, as England and France were doing whose expenditures,
indeed, were reported to be even higher. Those coun-
8 See document No. 287, footnote 1.
9 General Mnxime Weygand was commander in chtef of the Froneh forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
* Not found.
MARCH 1040 903
tries* too, would encounter financial difficulties, but Italy would not
be able to stand up under anything of that sort.
The Duce said ho was convinced that France and England were
opposed to Germany and Italy, and that they made no difference between
ilia two countries. Once one was destroyed, it would be the
turn of (liu other, for Fascism and National Socialism were looked
upon an tho same thing by the Western states, which proved the community
of interest between Germany and Italy. Italy represented
the reserve that would do its duty when the time came, and wanted
to be regarded as such. Germany had as little need for Italy's aid
at the moment as she had had in the Polish campaign because, apart
from clashes between patrols, the war on the Western front against
England and France had not yet started in earnest. From the standpoint
of the, alliance, Italy's attitude had benefited both Germany and
Italy herself, for as a ramlt she had been able to rearm twice as fast
as would have been possible otherwise. She was now contimiing her
armament effort with all of her resources. He was able in all candor
to Buy of the orientation of the Italian people that to claim that they
favored France and England was a lie. The Italians despised France
and Kngluud, and they had not forgotten the sanctions. The Italian
people were realistic. The Duee had trained them to view things
realistically, and they were fully aware that their problems could be
solved only in conjunction with, but never in opposition to, Germany.
The Foreign Minister replied that this showed very realistic thinking
and was also his own and the Führer's opinion.
In conclusion the Duce remarked that he wanted to write a short
letter in reply to the Führer's latest letter. He judged a man by the
facts. The main thing was that he be vindicated by the facts.
Th Foreign Minister thanked the Duce for his clear expositions,
which he would faithfully report to the Führer, and then asked several
more questions. First, referring to a question conveyed by the
Prince of !!i\sst* u and also raised in the Fuhrer's letter, the Foreign
Minister inquired what the possibilities were for an early meeting between
the Fuhrer and the Duce. The Duce replied without hesitation
that he was ready any time to have a talk with, the Fuhrer. The
Foreign Minister added that since so long a time had passed since
their last pernonnl meeting1
, the Führer wanted to have another talk
with the Duce. It was then proposed that the date of the meeting be
set for the latter half of March, after the 19th. The Brenner was
named as the place for the meeting because, as the Foreign Minister
explained, it was not easy for the Fuhrer to leave the country during
wart ime. J ust before his departure the Fuhrer had told him that cer-
11 No record nf the Prince ot Hesse's communication has been found.
904
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tain thoughts could not be committed to writing, ami that a personal
exchange of ideas was more suitable in such cases.
In the subsequent course of the conversation, the Foreign Minister
recapitulated the statements of the Duce, as follows: If ho had understood
him correctly, the Duco believed that Italy would join in the
war. The conduct of the British, in the words of the Duce, was becoming
more and more outrageous. The Fuhrer, oil the other hand,
did not believe in any possibility of peace, which meant that at the
appointed time the opposing armies would clash in the West. The
Foreign Minister had no way of knowing when this would come to
pass, for the Fuhrer did not disclose the details of his military plans
even to his Foreign Minister. At any rate it was tht^ Fuhror'n opinion
that the war would be won on the battlefield. In this connection he
wanted to ask the Duce how further developments looked to him from
the Italian viewpoint. The British had lately been making more and
more difficulties. They had attempted to bring economic pressure to
bear on Italy to obtain the delivery of war material and, judging from
the Foreign Minister's knowledge of them, would continue that game.
He therefore asked the Duce what course he, thought developments
would take in the aforementioned circumstances.
The Duce replied that there were two possibilities: Kit her the situation
would become more strained because of the attitude of England
and France, or he would himself bring the entire complex of problems
relating to Italy out into the open. In either eventuality the moment
would come when a "definition of Italy's relations with France
iind England," L e. ? a break with these countries, would occur. In
response to a question of the Foreign Minister, the Duce afiirmed that
the situation would develop in the same direction in either case.
Following this the coal problem was briefly touched on once more;
the Foreign Minister reiterated that Minister Clodius was available to
the Italian authorities for the discussion of specific, issues, as he had
already stated yesterday. It would be a matter of studying in what
way the coal question could be settled to Italy's satisfaction through
collaboration of the appropriate authorities on both sides. The Duce
welcomed the opportunity for discussions between Clodius and Host-
Venturi, adding that he would like, if in any way possible, to get the
coal "in its totality" from Germany. The Foreign Minister replied
that Germany would do everything necessary to make this possible.
12
**On Mar. 13, Clodius and Giannini signed for their two Governments a Secret
Supplementary Protocol to the Fourth Secret Protocol of Feb. 24, 194Q (document
No. 634). The new agreement, whioh wa to take effrct upon Ki*natnrt>, called
for German deliveries by laud of 1 million tons of coal monthly to Italy, with
Germany providing 1,500 and Italy 500 coal oars a day (Including holidays?). Hound trips should take no longer than 15 days, German cars should not be
sent south of the line Piombino-Fiorence-Rlmlnl, and contractual and clearing
arrangements should be worked out as expedltiously as possible (4535/B144296-
98) *
MARCH 1940 9Q5
The Foreign Minister further stated that he had understood the
Duce to say he helievetl that the relations with France and England
would deteriorate. The I hire immediately replied in the affirmative,
saying that such a deterioration was "easy to arrange" because the
feeling of the Italian people against England and France was very
strong Besides t hese t \v<> count ries were making the worst blunders.
dust recently it had been stated in the French press that the neutrals
would have to make up their minds whether they wanted to side with
England and France or not. So far these two countries alone had
had the eon rage to fight, and therefore they alone would conclude the
peace. The neut nils who had been unwilling to make a decision would
then be ignored.
The Foreign Minister's comment on this was that the neutrals had
lately awakened to the* facts and were no longer willing to fight for
England. Hi* repeated in this connection his question whether he
had correctly understood that the Duce believed there would be a
gradual general deterioration of Italy's relations with England and
France. Tins opinion was naturally of great importance to Germany
for the moment when the German Army would strike.
The Duce replied that such a deterioration could easily be provoked.
To his mind there were, two hypotheses: Either Germany's situation
would develop favornhly, in which case it would naturally be in Italy's
interest to join her in battle, or developments would take an adverse
turn for Germany- an eventuality which he hastened to describe as
purely theoret icni in view of what he, too, recognized as the great improvement
in the German Army as compared to 1914 in which case
Italy would be all the more compelled to step in, because she would
then he in #reat peril herself.
Another question by the Foreign Minister referred to Italo-Bussian
relations. If he had correctly understood the Duce, there was a possibility
that these relations would be improved. That would be very
welcome to Germany. The- Duce stated that such an improvement
was entirely possible and pointed to the anxiety voiced in the press of
the Western Powers in connection with the Foreign Minister's visit
to Rome, to the effect that it might lead to the formation of a Spanish-
Italian-Russian-Oerman-Japauese bloc. And perhaps this was a
possibility.
The Foreign Minister also recalled that the Führer had pointed out
in his letter to the Duce that a strong Japan would be beneficial to
the interests of Italy and Germany, because on the one hand she could
keep England under pressure in the Far East, and on the other would
constitute a useful counterpoise to America. How true that was could
be gathered from the fact that America had intervened actively in the
World War only after she had obtained Japan's written assurance
906
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that the latter would engage in no action detrimental to America's
interests in the Far East and the Pacific (Venn.13
If, In the* World
War, America had deemed this neees^iry with ivspect to a country
which after all was at that time an ally, she would I HI more than ever
constrained to take account of Japan in th present circumstances.
Accordingly, the German Ambassadors in Moscow and Tokyo had
been instructed to work for an understanding lx>tweeu Japan and
Russia,1* Moreover, Stalin, whom the Korei/rn Minister had approached
on that question,1* haul shown a very reasonable attitude,
and the Foreign Minister had pointed out in a statement to the press
after the conclusion, of the German-Russian pact that this pact did not
in any way change the German-Japanese friendship.
10
The Foreign Minister then asked the Puce whether lie, too, would
be willing to give his Ambassadors in Tokyo and Moscow similar instructions
to promote an understanding. Tho freer Japan's hands
were with respect to Rxissiu, the more effective would she l*e in her
function of exerting pressure on England and America.
The Duce replied that he had given relatively little attention to
Japanese policy in recent times. However, he thought Japan's policies
"disastrously slow-moving1."
The Foreign Minister commented that this was a result of the
party system, the influence exerted hy the Army and the Navy, and
the lack of any leader.
The Duce stated in conclusion that an understanding tatween Russia
and Japan would be desirable* An Itnlo-Russian rapprochement,
moreover, would make it easier for Italy to work in that direction.
The Foreign Minister mentioned in thin connection a telegram
which he had received from Tokyo, informing him that according to
an unofficial informant Japan was ready to associate herself with any
action against England's encroachments at sea, 17
In the further course of the conversation tho Foreign Minister informed
the Duce of the Führer's intention to send several German
submarines into the western Mediterranean, exclusively for operations
against British and French shipping. In the spirit of German*
Italian collaboration he wished to advise the Duce of it beforehand*
The Duce replied that he had already heard of the plan us a result
of the contacts between the naval authorities ltt of their respective
countries, and he had no objection.
11 The basis for this statement by Kibhentrop is not <-Uar. 14 See documents Nos. 40, 70, and I4O.
18 Se>e vol. vii, document No. 2i:*.
16 See vol. vir, document No. 234. "On Mar. 9, Ritter forwarded (2060/448116-17) to the Embassy in Home for
Ribbentrop's consideration the text of a telegram to this effect from the Embassy in Tokyo.
"This question had been provisionally raised by the German Naval AttaehS
at the end of February (4450/B308tf8S3--87).
MARCH 1940 907
At a remark of the Foreign Minister that the Führer would be
interested to know something about the situation in Libya, the Duce
stated it hud greatly improved since last September. A total of 14
divisions was now assembled in Libya. Besides, there was a double
line of defense works, and Balbo was confidently prepared to face
any eventual ity. Whereas Libya had been a very weak point last September,
2CX),(H)0 men were there now, together with two efficient Arab
divisions,
On being asked by tine Foreign Minister about the Italian submarines
in the Mediterranean, the Duce replied that in this respect Italy
ruled the Mediterranean. The Foreign Minister mentioned in this
connection that the British fleet had disappeared from the North Sea.
The British would no longer risk any heavy cruisers* there, let alone
a dreadnought. The Duce added that the British would disappear
from the Mediterranean as soon as a conflict broke out there.
Referring to Italy's repeatedly stated anxiety about the inadequate
protection of her industrial areas against aerial attack, the Foreign
Minister pointed out Germany's experience with enemy bombers. To
this day not one enemy Ixmiber had been over Germany with bombs,
except for the attack on the Kiel Canal in the first days of the war,
when T2 out of 40 planes were shot down. Germany's enemies
dropped no bombs on Germany because they greatly feared German
reprisals* Similarly, Italy's enemies would not dare to bomb the
Italian industrial centers because they were well aware that Germany
would immediately retaliate against England and France in the sharpest
manner. Th Duce then pointed to the system of Italian bases
in tlm Mediterranean, calling particular attention to the impregnable
key |x>sitioxi of the island of Pantelleria, which the Foreign Minister
characterized as an original military discovery made by the Duce
himself.
The Foreign Minister stated that all this led to the conclusion that
in the DuceV vie.w there existed a community of destiny between the
two countries which sooner or later would bring about Italy's entry
into the war. The Duce replied that such a development was inescapable.
Germany and Italy represented the new ideology. The other
countries, on the other hand, represented the old concepts and ideas.
Besides, these old countries had such an increasing population deficit
that they could no longer be counted among the European nations
pro|>er. British ships were manned with Indians, French ships with
Negroes, These countries no longer had any "elan vital", and they
looked with jealousy upon the young nations.
The Duce answered in the affirmative the Foreign Minister's question
as to whether he thought the French would again concentrate
stronger forces on the Italian border. He added that these troops
008
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
included many Negroes, who wen* very impulsive but not good in
sustained fighting. No one know what was really going on in the
minds of these African auxiliaries. Among themselves they talked a
language which the French did not understand, and their attitude
coxzld be a great threat to France in the event of military reverses.
' The Foreign Minister asked the Dnce if lie were correct in understanding
him to say that Italy intended to adopt an attitude that
would tie up a maximum number of French and British troops. The
Duce confirmed this, and remarked regarding America's attitude that
a press campaign was the most that wan to iw> expected in reaction to
European events. It was his conviction that the United States would
never enter the war. In corroboration of this vituv the Duce read an
article in the New York Daily New#^ according to which 5K) percent of
all Americans wanted to remain neutral and had no inclination to go
to war every 20 years in order to preserve England's power position
in JBurope. It was in America's interest to stay out of the conflict.
The Americans, the Duce added, took that attitude because they were
doubtful of the success of the Allies and did not want to put their
money on a losing horse.
They were quite right about that, said the Foreign Minister. In
conclusion he repeated that although he did not know when this would
be, it was certain that the German Army would clash with the British
and French in the near future. Perhaps Italy would have the opportunity
even before this time of taking a demonstrative attitude which
would make things easier for Germany from the outset,
In closing, a press communique was agreed upon. As he was
leaving, the Duce asked the Foreign Minister about his talk with the
Pope. The Foreign Minister replied that both the Fikhrer and the
Pope were of the opinion that an understanding was possible between
the National Socialist State and the Catholic Church. The Führer
was thinking of a long-term solution, not a temporary one. The matter
was to be discussed further with the Nunciature, the present truce
was to be upheld, and, besides, the Fuhrer had quashed 7,000 proceedings
against monks. Germany was paying out to the Catholic
Church over a billion a year, and had done other things as well for
the truce. If the principle "politics to the State, spiritual care to
the Church," were strictly observed, an understanding would gradually
be achieved. The Fuhrer did not desire, however, to speed these
things up in any way and reach a temporary solution which could
not last. The main trouble was that the Catholic Church had been
MARCH 1040 909
active in German politics for decades and so far had not been able
to drop t his rota completely. Not until these matters had been ,conir
plctely clarified, and the developments clearly showed that the respective
spheres of interest were actually beginning to take shape,
would the conditions be met for a new constructive effort and the conclusion
of an agreement with the Church.
Finally the Duce requested the Foreign Minister to convey his most
cordial regards to the Kiihrer.
The atmosphere throughout the conversation was one of marked
friendliness and cordiality.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.
SCHKTT>T
No. 670
F1T/27T
The Foreign Minuter to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOOT UROKNT Foreign Minister's Special Train.
No. 10 of March 12 March 12, 1940.
Keceived March 12 1 : 20 p. m.
For the Führer only-
1
The second conversation with Mussolini was very cordial.
Tho Duce shares the Führer's opinion as to the common destiny of
Germany and Italy. Italy therefore stands unalterably and firmly
on the side of Germany. Any doubt as to this attitude would be
an insult to Italy. The Duce said that Italy will enter the war on the
side of Germany; if necessary, he would offer provocation. In accordance
with the Führer's instructions, I did not for the moment go
into the all-important question as to the time of Italy's entry into
the war, but reserved this for the Führer's personal conversation
with the Duce. This has been set for the Brenner Pass the early
part of next week, if the time is agreeable to the Führer. I shall
arrive at : 37 this evening.
4 I should be grateful if you would let
me know whether I am to report this evening or tomorrow morning.
ElBBENTROP
The distribution list on this document was crossed out, Indicating that it
was not to have th* normal circulation In the Foreign Ministry.
*
Ribbexttrop's draft of this telegram (FIT/276) gave the time as 10: 37 p. m.,
and Wefzsfcefcer's copy (582/ML085) was corrected to read 10: 37 p. m.
910
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 671
F1S/427-4-S6
Memorandum *by a Member of the Foreign Minister^ Personal Staff
BSRX.XN, March 12, 1940.
CONVERSATION OF THE FUHKKK WITH UKUK Cox.m Ross ON MARCH 12,
1040, FKOK 12 NOON TO 1 p. M.
Present : Senior Counselor Hewel.
Colin Ross opened his? remarks by telling the Führer that during
his recent world travels he had concerned himself mainly with three
problems :
1) How can the United States of America be kept out of the war?
2) How can Japan be kept in our rump, or rather, how can the
threat of her entry into the war be turned into a strong political asset
for us?
3) How can we make the best ideological use of the German-Russian
Pact throughout the world ?
With regard to this last point he f Colin Ross] then pointed out that
heretofore Germany had been looked upon as the bulwark against
Bolshevism, that is to say, as defender of the bourgeois world against
Bolshevism. Actually, through her pact with Russia, she had neutralized
Bolshevism and paved the way to it more understanding attitude
on the part of socialist movements in the world.
Upon a request by the Führer, Colin Ross then reported that at the
time of the Czech crisis a European war would have been extremely
popular in America, There, was actual disappointment that France
and England had not struck, and hundreds of thousands of Americans
would have gladly gone to Europe to take part in th war. But when
England and France did not do anything, a feeling of disgust with
old Europe developed in America so that there is today a greater lack
of interest in Europe than there was a year ago. It was in this
atmosphere that he [Colin Ross] undertook his propaganda trip and
was able to have success with his lectures. He reported that an imperialist
tendency was prevailing today in the United States. To the
Führer's question whether this imperialist tendency did not strengthen
the desire for the Anschluss of Canada to the United States and thus
produce an anti-English attitude, Colin Ross replied that this was
not the case, since Canada's Anschluss to the United States was not
an. acute problem. The American expected that sooner or later the
Anschluss would come about automatically, and even today the border
between the two countries represented hardly an. obstacle. The Americanization
of the southern, most important, part of Canada "was
advanced to such a degree that there was no question of a division
MARCH 1940 91 J
between niitioimlit ies f im voJkixcfon Sinne] as we in Europe knew it.
The greatest techniail diliiculty in a union of Canada and the USA
was raised by I he Province of Quebec which had remained completely
French in nationality. The Americans feel that in case of a union
this could *erve as a precedent for the formation of other compact
commtmit ies, such as u German one. Although the American is gradually
abandoning his ix*IUf that a national community can be created
by education, independent of race and nationality (theory of the
melting pot ) , nevert heless, any organization on the basis of nationality
within the great American political community is still repugnant to
him.
Colin Ross explained as follows the strange fact that hatred
against Germany is so extremely strong in America, even though,
for geopolit ieal reasons^ England ought to be considered as the enemy
of the United States: For a very long time, America has been governed
by a kind of Anglo-Saxon aristocracy which looks upon those
of different race -including the Germans as something inferior and
at the same time sinister, and which knows how to keep down always
those, immigrants of different race. An additional factor is the monstrous
power of Jewry, directing with a really fantastic cleverness and
organizational skill the struggle against everything German and National
Socialist. This organization, the ramifications of which extend
into the reiuoteM corner, has succeeded in defaming everything that
is ** fascist" to such a degree, that no one in America dares to defend
it openly, although the idea of National Socialism often meets with
a distinct sympathy and understanding; that is to say, in public opinion
and particularly in society, National Socialism has been branded
as culturally destructive, barbaric, and cruel. The American, who
essentially has very little ZMleourage^ obeys this unwritten law
slavishly. Colin Ross cited numerous examples from among his own
acquaintances, showing how people with the greatest good will toward
us were taking an anti-German position in public, partly because of
indolence*, partly because of the fear of boycott in business or social
life. Even good Germans and people with National Socialist sympathieK,
for instance, subscribed to the Jewish fund, because they
would suffer economic and social defamation if they did not do so.
Hatred tint I fear of everything German was also based on the fact
that the Americans knew the English in their good as well as in their
bad aspects. They fought against them and the English have lost
one position after the other; on the other hand, the Americans have
done business with them and are convinced that they do not have to
be afraid of England. But they don't know Germany; to them,
Germany represents something strange and sinister which they therefore
oppose.
912
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Colin Boss then talked about Roosevelt whom he believes to be an
enemy of the FCihrer for reasons of pure persona! jealousy and also
on account of his personal lust for power. His [Roosevelt's] principal
objective is to be re-elected and he employs every possible means
for this purpose. After his re-election he would undoubtedly have at
his disposal so much power in his country that he then would be able
to lead the American people into war, whenever he wanted. He had
come to power the same year as the Fuhrer and ho had to wutch the
latter carrying out his great plans, while he, Roosevelt, hemmed in by
a tremendous domestic resistance, had not reached his goal* He too
had ideas of dictatorship which in some respects were very similar to
National Socialist ideas. Yet precisely tins realization, namely, that
the Fuhrer had attained his goal, while he had not, gave to his pathological
ambition the desire to act upon the stage of world history as the
Ftihrer's rival.
Colin Ross then attempted to present .some ideas in order to familiarize
the Fuhrer with those elements in the life of the United States
which are good and strong and akin to us- The German share in the
life and work of America, as well as the proportion of German blood,
is very considerable and can't be disputed away. He then iohi something
about his lectures and characterized them as successful with regard
to their effect. He furthermore discussed anti-Semitism which
is very strong in America and which is a matter of course in certain
circles j again, however, it is balanced by the American's indifference
referred to previously.
To exercise influence upon these matters from Germany is hardly
possible. To see that as many Jewish emigrants as was possible
should get to America was really the best method since opposition
against undisputed Jewish domination of the sphere of culture and
communications as well as of business was bound to arise sometime
or other* In this connection, he spoke of the necessity of coming out
with a positive solution of the Jewish question. The moment Germany
would promote a constructive solution of this question, as for
instance, by assigning a large area for settlement by Jews, anti-Semitism
in America would awaken from its dormant stage and the Americans
who in their hearts want to get rid of the Jews would support
wholeheartedly this attempt to solve the Jewish question. The
Fuhrer showed great understanding for this argument, but said the
Jewish question really was a space question which was difficult to
solve, particularly for him, since he himself had no space at his disposal.
Neither would the establishment of a Jewish state around
Lublin ever constitute a solution as even there the Jews lived too close
together to be able to attain a somewhat satisfactory standard of
living. "Wherever more than 70 people per one square kilometer were
MARCH 1940 913
living together life was difficult and hemmed in, and the world crisis
which we were facing today was caused by the urge of nations to pour
out of over-populated spaces and into those of sparse population.
Since the toginnings of history, those migrations of peoples have
been accompanied by great ruthlessness and cruelty which could not
be helped. He, too, would welcome a positive solution of the Jewish
question, if only he could indicate a solution; this, however, was not
possible under present conditions when he had not even sufficient space
for his own people.
In conclusion,, Colin Ross stated that after long study he had
reached the following conclusion. If Germany succeeded in convincing
the Americans that it was in accordance with our German and
National Socialist principles that the Western Hemisphere belonged
to the Americans (since4 in the contemporary world large spaces were
being1 formed on the basis of geopolitics such as, for example, the
Soviet Union as ruler over the western Asiatic space, the union of
(Titnest* and Mongols in East Asia under Japanese leadership, and the
union of central Europe under German leadership), then the Americans
could develop very much understanding for our struggle since
they would, after all, derive a clear profit from it. He had worked
out a map on which he had marked in, from north to south, the English
spheres of influence against the United States. If an American
should see this map and should, moreover, hear that in Germany's
view the Western Hemisphere should belong to the Americans, America
automatically would take a position directed against England.
It. was his great desire to be active and to work in this direction and he
was waiting for an instruction by the Führer in order to continue his
work in this special field of his*
( 'olin Ross also told of tho difficulties he had had in America, of the
interpellation made in the House of Representatives and of the sentence
passed ngiiinst him by the Dies Committee at a time when he had
already left America. He told the Führer that he was now forced
to take up the fight against this, which was also in the interest of the
n in 113* (iornmn friends over there who had suffered defamation at the
hands of the same elements in America. He requested the support of
the Foreign Ministry in this mutter.
The Führer instructed me to tell the Foreign Minister to take steps
so thuf Herr Colin Ross may receive every possible assistance from the
Foreign Ministry.
The Führer invited Herr Colin Ross to lunch for Thursday. After
Herr Colin Ross had taken his leave, the Führer remarked that Colin
Ross was a wry intelligent man who certainly had many good ideas.
HEWEL
914
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No, 672
B19/B0030G2-6&
Mittixter in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
MOST URGENT IlKf-HINKI, March U^ 1940 8: 10 p. 111.
No. 120 of March 13, 1040 Received March 143 : 30 a. m.
With reference to telegram No. 1 IT of March 13. J
The sudden peace [Blitzfriedc\ concluded in Moscow will have farreaching
consequences for Northern Europe: 2
1) Russia will in future dominate the Gulf of Finland and the
central portion of the Baltic Sen, and has definitely improved her ntrategic
position on land vis-it-vis Finland by taking1 possession of the
Karelian Isthmus, the gateway to Southern Finland, with wide (two
groups garbled) and acquiring access* to Northern Finland through
the Kandalaksha-Kemijarvi railroad*
2) Kussia has strengthened her position vis-&-vis Sweden by the
annexation of Hango, which is like a pistol alining at Stockholm, as
well as through the future direct railroad connection between Russian
Karelia and Kiruna, which will bring the Swedish ore mines within
easy reach at any time.
3) The Scandinavian countries have shown themselves too weak to
help Finland in her fight against a great power, In Finnish eyes,
orientation toward Scandinavia has thus failed the test of lire.
4) The neutrality of the Scandinavian countries lias proved itself,
inasmuch as the Western Powers did not dare to violate it by marching
through them.
5) The League of Nations has again produced only paper decisions
and suffered a defeat in Finland.
6) The Western Powers did not get beyond attempts at military
intervention and could not have given decisive, help to the Finnish
Army. Confidence in the Western Powers, especially England, is
shaken.
7") Germany has caused deep disappointment in Finland and incurred
hatred in many circles, because, of her attitude in the Russo-
Finnish conflict, and her press and radio. Political realists, however,
are becoming aware that actually only two great powers, Germany
and Russia, have any influence in the Baltic region and thai a correct
orientation toward both is of vital importance to the Finnish nation*
1 Not printed (B19/B003561). a A translation from the Russian text of tho treaty signed on Mar. T2, 1040,
between the USSR and Finland is printed in JtoriYi DotMtnvnts on Foreign Policy,
selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1U53), vol. in, pp. 421-4J24. A
translation from the Finnish text is in Finland Reveal* Her A&crrf
pp. 00-08.
MARCH 1940 915
8) Since it is not to be expected that the Finns will resign themselves
deiinif t*ly to the new boundary, and since it is uncertain whether
the Russians regard the peace as an interim phase or temporary measure,
further tension in the Baltic region must be anticipated. But
spread of the Great Powers'1 War into that region has been prevented.
BLTJCHER
No. 673
$051/601193-200
Memorandum by an OffiriaJ of the Economic Policy Department
BERLIN, March 13, 1940.
e. o. W VIII a 494.
MK, SUMNTKR WKIJLES* MEMORANDUM*
Th memorandum contains only the already tiresomely familiar
general principles of Hull's trade policy and no new constructive
ideas. These principles are as follows:
1. ATI intelligently repainted trade between nations is the indis-
]H*nstihl basis not only of economic prosperity but also of international
peace.
2* Satisfactory trade between nations presupposes, on the one hand,
iulcquuUt access for every country to the raw materials of the world,
and, on the other, the possibility of exporting the surplus of domestic
production at profitable prices and on equal terms for all.
3. Foreign trade is by its nature multilateral, not bilateral. Discriminations,
excessive tariffs, quotas, and foreign exchange controls
art* trade restrictions that are harmful to trade itself and to the living
standard and economic well-being of peoples, result in enmity and
conflicts, and jeopardize peaee among the nations.
4. The reconstruction of a sensible system of trade requires the
gradual elimination of these barriers, guarantees against discrimination,
the general application of the most-favored-nation principle,
and a reform of the monetary and credit systems with a view to restoring
the multilateral functioning of trade.
The prospects for the future position of the United States in international
trade have deteriorated considerably since the time when
these principles, which Hull has restated in countless variations, were
discussed with the German Government,2
'This IH the memorandum handed to Goring by Welles on Mar. 3 (see document
N>. Ttt>. ami to Weizsaeker by Kirk on Mar. 5 (see document No. 643,
ftiiote I). The text was released to the press on May 3 by the Department
of State with th* statement that it had appeared in excerpts and variously translated
fo\fK in tin* KurojM'HU IKVHN. It is printed in Department of State, Bulletin,
t40. vol. H, i>. 4
916
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1. The efforts to establish a self-sufficient and totalitarian economy
will, as a result of the war, receive added impetus in many countries, to
the disadvantage of the United States* Simultaneously, progress will
be made in *' Ersatz"' products*
2. In addition to Germany, another large part of the world includ*
ing England and France bus gone over to foreign exchange controls
and a controlled economy as a result of the war. There is reason
to assume that even those countries, whose experiences with a controlled
economy have not yet been an favorable as ours, will have to
retain it for a time even after the war. A return to an economy free
of foreign exchange controls probably would presuppose that the
United States relinquish its gold in some way or other and place a considerable
portion of it at the disposal of other countries. It. is conceivable
that certain countries do not even desire a return to the gold
standard-
3. Closed trade areas in which American trade will lose ground
stand out more clearly than heretofore : the British Empire with its
sterling bloc satellites (such as Argentina and Uruguay) ; the Far
Eastern yen bloc; Germany and the countries with whom she has
clearing arrangements, and finally Germany/Russia. Europe as a
whole, hitherto the best customer of the United States, will lose its
importance as a purchaser with no other countries taking its place.
The United States' strenuous efforts to secure flu* Latin American
market efforts which were resumed at the outbreak of the present
war are circumscribed by the fact that the United States cannot
absorb enough goods from those countries. Complaints to that effect
were already heard at the Foreign Trade Convention held in New
York in December. Firms which had eagerly plungod into the South
American market have already withdrawn again. Credit terms, far
from becoming easier, have even become more stringent.
Nor has the present war, in contrast with the World War, brought
about any increased purchases by England in the United States. On
the contrary, England, for financial reasons, has had to restrict in
favor of the Empire her purchases of goods which the United States
would like to sell. The Anglo-American commercial treaty has for
that reason already lost some of its importance. Any considerable
decrease in the foreign trade of the United States would l>e doubly
felt in view of the continued difficulties of the domestic economy.
4. The United States is increasingly concerned about its gold holdings;
in 1937 they amounted to "only" 50 percent and at the end of
1939 to more than 75 percent of the world gold reserve (17.7 billion
dollars). The increase during 1030 amounted to .l billion dollars.
MARCH 1040 917
This can bo accounted for chiefly aside from the flight of capital to
the United States by the fact that a large part of the American
export surplus had to be paid for in gold: a development which according
to Hull's theory of trade is most unsound and undesirable.
American financiers are already resigned to characterizing as insoluble
the gold problem with its attendant danger of uncontrollable
credit expansion and devaluation of the gold. A reduction of tariffs,
if it could be put through at all, would conjure up problems of another
kind. A return of the hoarded gold to normal circulation would not
improve the position; nor, in all likelihood, would a tax on gold imports.
There are ut present very few incentives and opportunities
for investing American capital in foreign loans* Reducing the price
of gold, in itself an effective solution, would be costly, resulting in
losses for the Treasury, confusion in the rates of exchange, and impairment
of tho export trade.
In a .speech before the students of Yale University on January 31>
1040, regarding the contribution to be made by the United States in
the reconstruction of European economic life, Assistant Secretary of
State Adolf A. Berta, Jr. made the following significant statements; a
"
, . . . wt* shall be &Muiing goods which we produce in abundance
to places \vluro they are needed. We may, and no doubt will, hope
that we shall In* paid for them sometime; but we will know that, paid
or not , human suffering must be relieved. We shall find that the trade
by whirh the world lives has to be reestablished; and if there is no
working capital f o start it moving again, we shall find ourselves helping
to rot up u considerable part of tne world in business again. . .
* **
"It seems fant ant 10 today to suggest, for instance, handing over some
of our accumulated gold as a free
^ift
to reestablish international
eunvnry, to let other nations set their houses in order, and thereby
reestablish trade and normal life. But this may not seem nearly so
fantastic a few years hence. It seems impossible today to thint of
using thi) enormous and yet untapped resources of the Federal Reserve
system as a means of rebuilding the shattered life of another continent
; but when the time actually comes and we are faced -with that
contingency, we may find that the idea looks more like an immediate
necessity than a fairy tale. . , ."
DAVIDSEN
1 Th" quoted imwmgea which follow are not retranslated from the German bnt
are taken from the original English text of the Berle speech as published in Department
of State, BuUetin, 1940, vol. n, pp. 139-142,
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No, 674
265/172206-07
The Ambassador in Twrkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST XIBGENT ANKARA, March 14, 1^40 9 : 30 p. m.
No. 159 of March 14 Received March 154 : 45 a. m.
In a detailed discussion with the Foreign Minister I stated that in
view of the changes in the genarnl situation due to conclusion of the
peace 1 it was imperative for Turkey to re-examine her relations with
the Reich. For months wo had made every effort to improve the
political atmosphere, too, by concluding an economic agreement. But
under his direction all of the negotiations were being drawn out to an
intolerable degree, and so I would have to have recourse to the intervention
of the President in order to determine whether Turkey did
not have every reason precisely at this time to improve her position
with Russia and ourselves if she seriously desired to resist the increasing
pressure from the Western Powers.
The intention of the Western Powers to intervene in the Finnish
conflict had removed the last doubt that if necessary the Allies would
also ruthlessly disregard Turkish interests.
Saracoglu hud told me repeatedly that Turkey would deliver chromium
only in return for completion of our deliveries of heavy war
material. I would ask my Government whether it was not willing to
do something in this direction if in return it could receive a formal
statement from the Turkish Government to the effect that the latter
would defend its neutrality even with force of arms, against the Entente,
should the latter attempt to draw it into n conflict, against its
will.
Saracoglu, very decidedly disturbed by the proposed audience with
the President, assured me immediately that the guarantee questions
would be discussed at once and that the tradu agreement would be
settled in principle by the end of this week. AH far s the suggested
statement was concerned, he could assure me that Turkey would never
permit herself to be drawn into a conflict unless her interests were
affected in terms of her commitments. Nor was there any secret
agreement, as that would be incompatible with the constitution. He
therefore saw no difficulty in making such a statement to us, in so far
as it would be morally compatible with the friendly relations with
the Western Powers.
Since the Minister's position is very insecure today as a result of
the development of the situation, he would probably be glad to do
everything to improve relations with Russia, in particular. Accord-
* See document No. 672.
MARCH 1940 919
ingly this would be the moment to place him face to face with definite
decisions which, if he should not wish to take them because of his
personal ties with the Entente, might perhaps lead to his resignation.
On that account I would suggest that I b authorized to pursue the
matter, so that he would be compelled to put it before Inonii. In
return we might consider delivery of several heavy batteries.
To be sure, Saracoghi denies that pressure by the Western Powers
is increasing and that the visit by the air force generals 2 has any
other significance than a departmental conference. But we have every
reason to believe that the first point is not true.
PAPEN
*<*ol. Kulule. tin* military and air attach**, Jn a telegram sent Mar. 9
(205/172202), had reported the arrival in Ankara of Gen. Jaunand, French Air
Foree <*hief In Syria, and of <*en. { Air Marshal Sir William] Mitchell, in charge
of British air ftiree** in the Near Bant,
No. 675
103/112073 76
The Foreign Minister to the EtribasHy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No, 476 BERLIN, March 14, 1940.
For the Ambassador personally,
Pleaso call on lif. Molotov and inform him about my trip to Rome,
as lu^ requested.1 I wonkl ask you to tell him approximately the
following:
L I hut! ttlmuly in formed Ambassador Shkvartsev in a general way
on Wednesday evening regarding the purpose and nature of my visit,
2
but 1 also wish to inform M, Molotov through you.
4 On Mr. II, Sohulenburg had sent to the Foreign Ministry the following telegram
: "Ttay Mol<*t iv a.^ked me to inform him as soon as possible about the
Foreign Minister's trip to Home.11 (103/1V2072)
*A unsigned xuetntiramluiu. of this conversation of Mar. 13 (F13/438-444)
gives miliKttinf ially the snine ftcc*<>niit as paragraphs 2 to 7 of the telegram printed
here. In mhlitlon It <*uiitaliis the following:
* irrh* Foreign Minister awktHl the Ambassador whether he knew Helphand,
the Soviet I'tiurw*
920
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. In view of the close and friendly relations existing between
Germany and Italy, it was natural that the statesmen of both countries
should from time to time discuss th .situation and current problems
resulting therefrom. That was the occasion for this meeting
also.
3. The result of my conversations with Mussolini ami Count Ciano
could be briefly summarized by saying that the National Socialist
and Fascist Governments were in complete agreement regarding the
fact that the Western plutocracies wanted to destroy Germany and
Italy, but that the two authoritarian .states were firmly determined
to combat this will to annihilate. While Germany was now actively
waging war, Italy was assisting her with all the resources at her
disposal that could be used at present. This kind of cooperation oor-
"Tlie Foreign Minister replied that lit* did not wish to MI teak about this at the
moment, but that be had not understood why Ambassador Uorclkin had been
recalled o quickly, and that in the intervals of wood Italo-HiiHHian relations
he had regretted the recall. But he winhed to talk to tin* Ambassador about this
at some later time, for at present, when he had no clear view of the hash* for
the worsening of relations, it would be xiiuwitable to tiiHcuHN it. The Duce desired
improved relations and regretted that there wan no ambassador in Uome,
as he could act differently from a charu* d'affaires. The Foreign Minister then
paid he would also, through Ambassador Count von der Schulenhurg, inform MM.
Stalin and Molotov of the DUC<'M wishes. The JUtiee clearly wanted better
relations, and surely Hu&aia too would have no fundamental objection. He,
the Foreign Minister, would gladly assist in the question of reestablishing
relations, if there was anything to be done.
"The Ambassador then returned to the question of Helphand ; he believed that
he understood it quite clearly.
"The Foreign Minister declared that he \\ould take no position on it lit the
present moment, but only say it was regrettable that the two Htaten <*ould
negotiate in Home and Moscow not through fully accredited ambassadors but
only through charge's d'affaires, who did not have the opportunities* that were
open to ambassadors. Within a reasonable period he would sjnnik to M.
Shkvartsev about it. He hoped it would be possible to clear away the disagreements.
The Duee had been the ilrst to recountae the Soviet State. There
were no substantial differences between Italy and HiiKsla, hut on the contrary,
the two States were economically complementary ami there were not even any
political differences. Germany would he worry if passing annoyance over an
incident could prevent reestablishinent of friendly relations.
"The Ambassador declared he had clearly understood all this and would report
to his Government about it. To the Foreign Minister's question about
GoreUcin, the Ambassador to Rome, he could say that the latter bad visited him
twice in Berlin, en route to and from Rome.
"To the Foreign Minister's question, whether the occasion for <3orulkln's
recall had been the demonstration in Home for Finland, the Ambassador replied
that he could not formulate the answer and would have to obtain clarification by
asking Molotov. He could, however, sum up by pointing out that two great
questions were involved, the improvement of the Soviet Union'n relations with
Italy and with Japan.**
The files also contain an undated draft (F 18/228 -221) of a 'VHvate and confidential"
letter by Kibbentrop for Sch-ulenhurg regarding Helphand, written
as a supplement to the telegram printed. This letter was evidently not eat,
for a message to the same effect waw included in a telegram of Mar, 21 by Uibbentrop
for Schulenburg (see vol. ix).
MARCH 1940 921
responded in every respect with the agreements existing between the
two countries.
4. A particular point in the discussions had been the question of
the Italian coal supply, which, as was known, had entered a new
stage an u result of Britain's interference with shipments of German
coal by ea. In an agreement with Italy,
8 the sea route had now been
replaced by the land route.
5- I hud also once more explained to the Duce the relationship between
Germany ami the Soviet Union, stating, in fact, that this relationship
was fort unately growing closer and closer and that a definitive
and firm basin hud lieen created for this both through the political
arrangements of lust year and the trade agreement of this year.
4
Mussolini had agreed with these statements of mine in every respect.
6. In this connection 1 had expressed my regret over the fact that
relations between Italy and the Soviet Union had not recently undergone
u similar favorable development. Germany regretted this the
more since Mussolini on his own initiative, even before our recent
arrangements with the Soviet (iovermuttnt, hud espoused the view
that it would l*e well to improve relations between Germany and the
Soviet I'mon. 1 was unable also to detect any real conflict at all between
tin* interests <>f the two countries that could stand in the way of
a restoration of good relations. Mussolini had stated at the time that
he would he very happy if Italo-Soviet relations improved again. He
had pointed out that Italy had at the time been the first of the former
Allied Powers to nvognixo the Soviet Government, and had stated
further that, in accordance with his basic attitude, he had already
given instruct ions that certain economic questions pending between
Rome and Moscow should be handled in us positive a sense as possible.
At the same time, to be sure, Mussolini had mentioned that it
had IHUU the Soviet Government which had unexpectedly recalled its
Ambassador from Rome. Hut from everything the Duce had told
me on this subject I had no doubt that Italy was anxious for a restoration
of pood relat ions with the Soviet Union and that she was prepared
to do her share.
7. I hail finally explained our viewpoint on the Finnish question
once more to the Italian statesmen in the manner familiar to the Soviet
Government, at the same time stressing especially the fact that
cur attitude on this question had been determined exclusively by German-
Soviet friendship.
1 8w
922
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
8, Regarding my visit to the Pope,* it might bo said that this was
purely and simply an act of courtesy on which w hud msolved after
the Curia had at various times expressed to us a desire for greater
harmony in our relations. The conversation had not exceeded the
bounds of general discussion of the relations between National Socialism
and the Catholic Church. I hat! said in this connection that in
principle we considered a settlement and clarification of the relations
between Germany and the Curia possible, provided the Catholic
Church, in contrast to the present conduct of its clergy in Germany,
refrained from every form of political activity. Initiation and preparation
of a basic understanding would require considerable time,
however, and in the given situation would have to he postponed until
later. At the same time I had also taken the opportunity to explain
to the Pope our new relations with the Soviet Union. 1 had left no
doubt in the Pope's mind that it was a question of a final reorganization
of our relations on a firm basis, and that we hoped to consolidate
these relations further* Moreover, both parties were fully agreed
that neither would interfere in the internal affairs of the other,
For your information and guidance in your conversations, I am
adding the following :
We are, of course, interested in an improvement of Italo-Rusnian
relations. I would therefore ask you to emphasize especially the foregoing
statements on this point in my Koine conversations, ami at the
same time ascertain whether and to what extent a desire of this kind
is entertained on the Soviet side also.
A telegraphic report is requested.*
The Foreign Minister
See document No. tJttB.
Document No. 084*
No. 676
78S8/B570836
The International Committee of the Red Grow to the High Command
of the WeJmnacht
Central Agency for Prisoners of War.
GBNKVA, March 14, 1940,
For the Casualties and Prisoners of War Branch.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is receiving from
various sources, including the Italian Red OOSH in Rome, a report to
the effect that the camp for Polish prisoners of war at Kozielsk
(Smolensk district, USSR) is to be broken up. It is said that the
prisoners will be brought to Germany.
MARCH 1940 923
No Russian report about this is available at present, and the International
Commit toa of the Red Cross would be grateful if you would
kindly staUi whether the above report corresponds to the facts.1
Yours, ate.3
1 TlilH communication was sent to the Foreign Ministry from the OKW on
concprniiij; I'oliHh primmer of war camps in Russia Starobielsk,
QMlushkov, Shcpetovku, un others whether exchanged to Germany
or #til! existing. We have many left era to transmit." The OKW requested an
answer from th* Foreign Ministry to both inquiries.
On Apr. tJ, the Foreign Ministry sent telegraphic Instructions to the Consulate
la Geneva t<> inform the International Red Cross that, BO far as was known
in Berlin, "the Soviet prisoner of war camps in Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostashkov,
Sltepetovka, HIM! others still exist." (7N83/E570838) a Signature illegible.
No. 677
S7B8/K04I7G 71
Mrmoraiulurn by Amlwiwador Ritter
BERLIN, March 15, 1940.
Representative* Buburin today told me the following:
1. Almost 4 weeks have elapsed since the conclusion of the Agreement,
but in the armaments field only a few small firms have thus far
replied to the inquiries of the Trade Mission. Only a single major
it oni, i.e., five Messersehmitt aircraft, have reached the actual negotiation
stag**. IU requested that some pressure be put on the firms
concerned to #et them to reply to the offers and be prompt in closing
contracts. In this connection he referred to article 6 of the Economic
Agreement.*
I fold M. Babarin that I could not take any action upon complaints
of a gi'iu'rul nature; he should send me a list of the firms in question
by Sat unlay morning. He replied that it w>uld be a very long list
if ht were to name all the iirms concerned, and that he would cite only
the principal firms,
"2. In the industrial field the chief difficulties were with regard to
ships and coal. Negotiations had now been in progress for 5 months
regard inp the, ships, and for 2 months regarding the coal. The
pace of the* negotiations made a far from favorable impression in
Moscow. When he culled on the Ministry of Economics, he was told
there that action would be taken with respect to the coal firms. And
when he conferred with the coal syndicate, he was told that the
decision lay with the Ministry of Economics. He would ask us in
* Document No.
924
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
particular that the coal negotiations be expedited. The Soviet
Government had resumed delivery of petroleum products, but it was
getting no steel tubes. Thus far not a single ton of coal had been
delivered. Moscow wanted to know in particular when the first
phosphate ship bound for the Kola Peninsula would bring coaL At
the I. Q. [Farben] he had been told that the first ship which was to
load phosphate had left, but without coal, the reason being that they
wanted the ship to sail as quickly as possible and that on that account
there had been no time to send it to Rotterdam.
Regarding the question of the ships, 1 pointed out to Babarin that
the Soviet Government itself had repeatedly changed its mind about
deliveries, so that the negotiations always hud to be started over again.
With regard to the coal I pointed out to him that no wishes for large
coal shipments had been expressed until the final stage of the negotiations.
The first price demands hud been made in ignorance of the
general price basis. Meanwhile the prices asked by Germany had
been reduced. Apart from this, however, I had to cull his attention to
the interrelation between the petroleum prices demanded by the Soviet
and the coal prices demanded by us. If the Soviet Government took
no account of our basic schedule when setting the prices for petroleum,
neither would we be able to do this for couL I took the occasion to
inform AL Babarin that Rumanian petroleum prices had meanwhile
been reduced to one-third of the former rates. If th Soviet Government
accepted the former prices as decisive at that time, the, present
prices would have to be decisive for the new prices now, Bubarin,
tried to extricate himself by saying that ho was in a diilU'ult position.
The negotiations relative to petroleum were conducted in Moscow,
those on coal, here. Regarding petroleum we would have to talk to
Moscow. The prices asked by the Soviet Union for petroleum were
the same for all countries, namely, the Constanta base rate,
3. With regard to the ships, Babariu gave, the following details:
An assurance had been given by the Ministry of Kconomics with
regard to the motor vessel Jlf#;/jf/, but the North Gemma Lloyd re-fused
to sell the ship. A similar situation existed with regard to the
Pallatia (a sister ship of the MtSnicia). The ships in both instances
were cargo-passenger vessels. The prices a>kt
MARCH 1940 925
could not, of course, venture any opinion on this because the price of
a plant depended on its capacity. Babariu had no accurate information
on this matter, either; he spoke of a capacity of 10,000 tons.
No. 678
2183/471714-17
Foreign Minuter Biblt^nfrop to Field Marshal G-oring
BERLIN, March 16, 1940.
I)K\K FIKM> MABHHAI.: In pursuance of our telephone conversation
on March 8 * I have had another detailed report made to me on the
progress of the latest discussions with the Rumanian Government concerning
the regulation of German-Rumanian economic relations.
Since the promise was obtained from the Rumanian Government in
the Agreement of December 21, ltKJ9,
2 that it would see to it that Germany
obtained 11*0,000 tons of petroleum products a month in any case,
ut first for a year, the main question at the discussions held at this time
was to translate into practice the promi.se likewise given by the Rumanian
(lovernment last December, namely, to deliver the petroleum
ut u fair prices". This proved to be very difficult, as the Rumanian
(lovornment stated at first that it was unable to prevent the entirely
disproportionate increase in the petroleum prices. We insisted that
the petroleum l>e made available to us at prewar prices, with at most
u small increase; otherwise we would sell a corresponding portion of
the German exports which are vital for Rumania with the same large
increase in price with which the Rumanian petroleum is now encumbered.
On this basis for negotiations an agreement has now been
reached according to which petroleum on the one hand and war material
on the other will be calculated approximately at prewar prices.
So as to guarantee that there is no interruption in deliveries, this
agreement has been put into operation first of all for an amount of
about ^00,1)00 tons of petroleum, effective from March 1. With this
amount the available means of transportation can probably be fully
tit iiizcii up to about the middle of May. In the meantime a number of
other questions, especially with regard to assuring the grain supply,
will bo dealt with in the new negotiations of the two governmental
committees starting on March 18 in Bucharest, and in this connection
an agreement will be concluded on the direct exchange of war material
for petroleum for an entire year.
* No word of thl
926
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Since the petroleum prices in Rumania have risen several hundred
percent over the prewar period, the guarantee of the prewar price represents
a very considerable gain for the German national economy.
Moreover, so far it has always been possible in the negotiations with
Bumania to secure as much petroleum as could lie removed with the
available means of transportation. During the period when the Danube
was ice-bound there was still enough available under old contracts
for transportation by rail. The arrangement for exchange of petroleum
for war material was then reached in time to have sufficient quantities
on hand for the greater transportation facilities available after
the Danube would be open again. Since there is already fundamental
agreement between the German and the Rumanian Governments on a
continued exchange of petroleum for war material for the coming year,
the supply of petroleum at moderate prices has thereby been assured
for a considerable period ; especially as the Rumanian Government has
given assurance time and again that it will keep its promise to
make available up to 130,000 tons of petroleum a month.
The negotiations having proceeded in the manner just described,
I believe it must be stated that they turned out entirely satisfactorily
and fully safeguard our vital interests in deliveries of petroleum, and
that the establishment of the petroleum price on the prewar basis represents
another very considerable advance.
The problem of the rate of exchange was of no importance during
these negotiations; in particular the fact that in December we requested
and obtained at least a partial adjustment of the rate of exchange
of the reichsmark did not occasion difficulties of any sort during
these negotiations. On the contrary, the gain on the rate of exchange
which we obtained benefits us to the full extent precisely when
the petroleum prices are established on the prewar basis. I would
be particularly grateful to you if you would give an explanation to
this effect to the offices which you informed incorrectly in this matter.
A really serious difficulty in assuring our petroleum and grain purchases
results from the fact that the value of our increased imports
from Rumania, even calculated at prewar prices, is very considerably
higher than the value of our exports to Rumania, e. g,, in the past year.
Since the beginning of the war our negotiators have been trying to
bridge this gap with all conceivable means, such as acceptance of advance
payments, credit operations, etc. They will try with every
possible means to assure our vital imports from Rumania also in the
future, without too great additional claims on Germany's productive
capacity for purpose of exports.
With best regards and Heil Hitler !
VON RlBBENTROF
MARCH 1940 927
No. 679
44
by an Official of the Prussian State Ministry
V. P. 5M>/5 g KARINHALL, March 16, 1940.
CONFERENCE ON SFAIN UNDER THB CHAIRMANSHIP OP THE FIELD
MARSHAL
Present : Static Secretary Korner
Under State Secretary von Jagwitz
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat
Herr Bethke
Ilerr Bernhardt
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Dr. Gritzbach
Ministerialdirigent Marotzke
lifter ia : 45 Minister Dr. Clodius
Ministerialdirigent Nasse
Under Stfita Secretary von Jngwitz gave a brief account of the historical
development of Rowak and the subsidiary of the Hisma, and
Sofindus concern in Spain. Then Under State Secretary von Jagwitz
commented on the Protocol and Agreement * concluded by Ministermhiirektor
Stautsrat Wohlthat, Head of the German Delegation,
with the* Spanish Government; he regarded it as disadvantageous to
Germany in so fur us the relative quantities of goods to be traded were
scaled to the unfavorable level of German-Spanish trade in 1935,
and furthermore because it contained no binding and clear-cut arrangements
with res|Kct to the volume of trade and the form of the
Agreement ; on the contrary, owing to the looseness of the Agreement
it was left to the discretion of the Spaniards to deliver goods as they
saw fit. Moreover, no account had been taken of the wishes of the
Reich Ministry of Economics, which were aimed at curtailing deliveries
to the enemy powers. The adverse consequences of the loose
form of the Agreement had already shown themselves in
1 ) t he failure of the Spaniards to release specific commodities, especially
wool, and
sJ) the conclusion by Spain of a more favorable agreement with
France.
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Wohlthat replied to this that under
the Protocol of December 22, 1939, the present arrangement was intended
merely for the duration of the war and was only a transition to
the projected comprehensive trade agreement between Germany and
1 I>i>rumont No. 4S2.
928
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Spain after the war. Agreements more far-reaching than the present
could not be concluded owing to the current conditions of international
traffic between Germany and neutral Spain. To extract more was
impossible because the war-caused difficulties of delivery and transportation
permitted no positive commitments; such commitments,
moreover, would also have reacted to Germany's disadvantage since
we were likewise unable to make positive promises about deliveries.
The Protocol reaffirmed the Secret Agreement concluded in 10H7 with
the Spanish Nationalist Government; furthermore, the Spanish Government
promised to maintain the basic accord of July 1030 together
with all obligations arising for the Spanish Government, also in connection
with the war debts, until such time as a comprehensive trade
agreement is concluded with Germany. Finally, both Governments
refer explicitly in the Protocol to the provisions of the Secret Treaty
of Friendship under which each contracting party undertakes in the
event of warlike involvements with a third power to avoid anything
that could redound to the advantage of the enemy or the disadvantage
of the other party.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Protocol, all German claims existing
prior to the negotiations in the summer of 1039, as well as the results of
the negotiations in the, summer of 1039, have been assured for the duration
of the present war and the period thereafter until conclusion of
an economic agreement after the war.
After the end of the present war, negotiations would be entered into
with respect to both the volume of trade and the relative proportion
of trade in conformity with the schedules of commodities annexed
to the Protocol. The commodity schedules represent the wishes of
both Spain and Germany. Conclusion of the Agreement was necessary
because Spain had previously committed herself to conclude) an agreement
with Germany first of all. One could not pass up this opportunity.
After the end of the civil war it had therefore been necessary
last summer to negotiate with the Spaniards. Similarly, we could
not have disregarded the Spaniards' wish for negotiations last November.
The Spaniards had intended to build up their economy after the
civil war in collaboration with Germany, and they adhered to this
purpose. If we had not negotiated, it would have givm the Spaniards
the right to come to terms with other powers. That would have left
us the losers. As regards the possibilities of transport during the war,
several plans had been elaborated and were now being carried into
effect (blockade runners, etc.).
Minister Dr. Clodius confirmed that every possible pressure was
being brought to bear also by the Foreign Ministry to obtain the
largest possible quantity of commodities from Spain* To the suggestion
of the Field Marshal that the Secret Agreements concluded with
MARCH 1940 929
Spain during the civil war ought also to be invoked, Minister Dr.
Clodius replied that this would be attended to. Pressure would also be
exerted to get a Spanish commission to come to Germany now so as
to wind up the recognition of debts.
Under State Secretary von Jagwitz thought it was necessary to return
the* Sofindus concern to Herr Bernhardt's direction as promptly
as possible. With his knowledge of Spanish conditions, Bernhardt
was to try to got as much as possible out of Spain through the Sofindus
organization. The Sofindus concern, by the way, was being run efficiently,
The losses suffered by some of the subsidiaries in Spain as a
result of bad investments, etc., had been liquidated. An investigation
into the efficiency of management of the subsidiaries mentioned had
been derided upon by the advisory council of Eowak in which the
Reich Finance Minister was also represented.
Minisiorialdirigent Nasse stated that according to the latest reports
of the trust company the management and accounting of the enterprises
in Spa in had given no cause for serious complaints. The defects
which had become evident in individual companies should be rectified
immediately; however, on this point the Reich Finance Minister was
also of the opinion that the sound enterprises should be preserved and
the unprofitable ones be disposed of as quickly as possible in order to
avoid further losses.
Under State Secretary von Jngwitz stressed once more that these
questions hud already been settled in the advisory council of Rowak^
and that he was also in close touch with the Reich Finance Minister in
order to assure prompt financial settlement.
In conclusion the Field Marshal gave out the following directives:
L On the basin of the Agreement concluded by Staatsrat Wohlthat
with the Spaniards, with which no fault was to be found, we should get
all we ran in essential commodities, especially raw materials, e. g.,
wolfram, t in, mercury, and wool, from Spain. The system for breaking
through the blockade mast be further developed, as also the possibility
of bringiiifr valuable raw materials to Germany by air.
CJ. The implementation of the commercial policy measures, as decided
by the Committee on Commercial Policy?
will remain in the
hands of the Head of the Delegation, Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat
WohHImt, who will conduct the necessary interdepartmental confer-
B. The enterprises of the Sofindus concern established in Spain with
Reich funds will remain under the supervision of Under State Secretary
von JagwiU in the Economics Ministry under the terms of the
powers now vested in him. The enterprises must be examined in order
to ascertain whether they can operate profitably in the long run.
Under State Secretary von Jagwitz, in cooperation -with the advisory
council of Rowak-Hisma, especially the Beich Finance Ministry, will
accordingly take the necessary steps to liquidate unprofitable enterprises
in particular. The enterprises must be operated in accordance
930
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Trith sound business practices with the object of producing a high rate
of profit.
4. Whenever matters which nvust be dealt with by Staatsrat Wohlthat
in implementing the Agreement touch the interests of the Rowak-
Hisma-Sofindus concern and where commercial policy interests so
require. Staatsrat Wohlthat and Under State Secretary von Jagwitz
will adjust in consultation with one another any conflicting views that
may arise.
5. Herr Bernhardt will immediately leave for Spain. He will
resume direction of the Sofmdus concern for the purpose of ensuring
the development of this concern in accordance with sound buRiness
practices and investigating the profitability of the separate enterprises.
He will be suoject to the directives of Under State Secretary
von Jagwitz in his capacity as chairman of the advisory council of
Bowak,
As director of Hisma and the Softndus concern he mutft, like, any
other private businessman, safeguard their economic interests and refrain
from any political activity. Representation of Germany's polical
and commercial interests rests exclusively in the hands of the German
Embassy in Madrid.
Bernhardt must keep in close touch with the* Gorman Embassy and
keep it constantly informed on all basic problems within bin field of
activity. The German Embassy, by the same token, will extend to
Hisma and the Sofindus concern every assistance due it as a firm that
is owned by the Reich.
It must be enjoined upon Bernhardt that the German economic
positions which have been established in the economic life of Spain
and which will be of value also in the future must be maintained and
if possible expanded in accordance with the principles of sound business
practice.
The special position which the Rownk-HxHma-SofimluR concern has
occupied in the past is vu>t intended to be permanent. The concern
must conduct its business like any other private firm. Herr Bernhardt
is charged with putting the enterprises of the Snftmlus concern
on such a firm basis as to enable them to play a lending part in the
Spanish economy of their own accord.
6. Minister Dr. Clodius will direct the issuance of a passport to
Herr Bernhardt entitling him to travel to Spain.
MAROTZKE
No. 680
25./172208~0&
The State Secretary to tin* Emlaxxy in Turkey
Telegram
SECRET BERLIN, March 17, 1940.
For the Ambassador personally.
I. What can be put at the disposal of the Embassy in the economic
field is not enough to induce Turkey to offer us political concessions
MAHCH 1940 Q3J
of the kind under consideration in addition to the necessary economic
quid pro quo, although it would perhaps suffice for a measure of improvement
in the political atmosphere. In particular, it is still impossible,
to consider the delivery of heavy guns. Delivery of ships,
too, is warranted only under special conditions; a separate instruction
on this will follow.5
Furthermore we hardly believe that Turkey is willing to make a
formal statement that she would resist if the Western Powers should
try to draw her into the conflict against her will.
II. It is also questionable whether we are interested at present in
any attempt to dissipate the active distrust of Turkey which continues
to exist in Moscow and the distrust of the Soviet Union which exists
in Turkey, by actively promoting a direct rapprochement between
the. two Powers. For the present therefore, the only thing that can
be done is to bring1 about a gradual improvement in German-Turkish
relations through economic agreements on a moderate scale, an appropriate
press policy, and similar methods,
WEIZSACKER
1 See (ItM'tinwnt No. 081.
No, 681
4531/10144245
AfrtnvratutuM. by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
BERLIN-, March 17, 1940.
After the matter hud been presented to him on March 16, the
Foreign Minister #ave his approval for delivery of the three ships
to Turkey pursuant to the Führer's directive, provided that Turkey
delivered chromium ore in payment of a considerable portion of the
equivalent of the ships (that is, not only for the balances still due).
It is therefore no longer necessary to approach the Führer again.
I have informed the State Secretary orally.
1. To be, submitted to Ministerialdirektor WiehL
li. To Minister Moraht, with the request that he have corresponding
instructions sent to Ankara 1 with reference to the political telegram
of March 1G*
GLODIUS
eegram No. 155 of Mar. 28
932
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 682
4O&S/E067401-O4
The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry
TVlegram *
ISTo. 862 of March 17 Osi-o, March 17, 1940.
Received March 19 8 : 00 p. m.
1*01. VI 737.
1) The radio address of Foreign Minister Koht and the speech of
Finnish Minister President Ryti before Parliament a are regarded here
as the severest rebuke the small neutral countries ever administered
to the Western Powers, particularly England. It is stressed that both
statesmen said that the Western Powers, which in the first # months
of the Russo-Finnish conflict did practically nothing to aid Finland,
only started conversations which were conditional in form and concerned
inadequate assistance to boot at a time when help would in
any case have been too late to count for much. According to the statements
made by Koht and Ryti, the view prevails here generally that
the tactics of the Western Powers in the last 2 weeks before the conclusion
of peace amounted to an avoidance of open military intervention
in behalf of Finland, at the same time as the prows of the two
countries, particularly that of France, was loudly proclaiming the
readiness of the Western Powers to intervene, and tho attempt was
also being made to conceal by certain preparations the lack of a will
to intervene.
2) The opinion always held by Foreign Minister Koht, which I
reported several times, is thereby confirmed; namely, that the Western
Powers, and especially England, hardly honestly desired open
military intervention in behalf of Finland ; mainly because they did
not want to get involved in a war with Russia, they avoided an open
violation of Sweden's and Norway's neutrality, and regarded landing,
transit, and assistance operations as difficult and problematical. It
was the desire of the Western Powers until the very last, as Koht indicated,
to get Sweden and Norway to intervene in the light and thus
-cut off Germany's supplies from both countries.
3) Since the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish conflict, it is no longer
assumed here that the question of a landing by England and France
in Norway could become acute in the near future. Among other
things, the statements of Chamberlain in the House of Commons on
March 13, to the effect that England had never thought of violating
Swedish and Norwegian neutrality, are being cited in support of this
view.
1 Actually sent as a letter.
a Excerpts from these speeches of March 14 and 15, respectively, appear in the
T^mes (3U>ndon) , for Mar. 15 and 16.
MARCH 1940 933
4) On the other hand, it is recognized here that German ore imports
from Swodn and German navigation to Murmansk are still a thorn
in the side of the Western Powers, and that the great defeat that
England and France Buffered as a result of the settlement of the Russo-
Fiimish conflict, which took place against their will, might be a real
factor in causing the Western Powers to close the loophole in the
blockade which is represented by our ore transports along the Norwegian
roust-, and which is of extraordinary importance to Germany.
Indications of any kind that the Western Powers are determined to
take such measures are, as yet lacking, and it is doubted, particularly
since the conclusion
934
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The San Francisco press carried lon# friendly articles with the Duke's
picture, emphasizing his statement concerning Germany** secure position
and confidence in victory. At the steamer's arrival the mayor,
the chief of police, and the Red Cross were represented ; thereafter the
mayor paid the Duke an official visit. The chairman of i he San Francisco
World Exposition offered the Duke, for the Keich Government,
a favorably situated pavilion for the German exhibit free of charge;
a separate report
2 is being made on this.
2. The American Government, Congress, and the American Red
Cross maintained cool restive with reference to the Duke's visit and
tried to sabotage it. Nevertheless, it was possible to make the DukeTs
visit to the Nation's capital a considerable success considering the
pro-Allied attitude of wide circles here. The Duke arrived in Washington
on March 14. The visit with President Roosevelt, scheduled
for the morning of March 15, was canceled because the President was
indisposed. In the afternoon a luncheon was held with many influential
American newspapermen. In the evening I arranged u banquet,
with 100 prominent personalities of the Red Cross, the Government,
Army, Navy, and the Diplomatic Corps, as well as a reception the
next day, which was attended by almost 1000 persons. Consequently,
the President of the American Red Cross, Norman Davis, could not
avoid giving at least a very small dinner in his own home. On the
17th the Swedish Minister gave a small luncheon, and in the afternoon
there were big memorial exercises at the Embassy for the war dead and
a reception for the German colony. Shortly before the Duke's departure
for New York, President Roosevelt, probably partly us a
result of influence exerted by persons confidentially in touch with the
Embassy, arid also owing to the. favorable impression left by the dignified
reception accorded Simmer Welles in Berlin, decided to receive
the Duke although he was still indisposed. During
MARCH 1940 935
visit to the Nation's capital will contribute toward assuring the success
of the further course of the trip as well. In all probability it will be
possible to prevent the planned Polish and Czech demonstration of
protest.
_A written report will follow.4 THOMSEN
Not found
No. 684
The A mhtwxad&r in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MBCKKT Moscow, March 18, 1940 4: 30 p. m.
No. 5;iO of Mnzrh 18 Keceived March 18 5 : 50 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 476 of March 14.1
Your instruct ions have been carried out. Molotov asked me to express
his especial thanks to the Foreign Minister for the extraordinarily
interest ing- information which was important for the Soviet Government.
Tim Soviet Government was, of course, keenly interested
in being informed regarding the relations between two such large
confers of power as Germany and Italy. Molotov then explained
f hut the Soviet Government was not at all to blame for the deterioration
in relations with Italy. He commented quite bitterly on the attitude
of the Italian Government and the Italian press toward the Soviet
l*n ion nl closed with the following statement: The Soviet Government
was glad that Italy showed understanding for Germany's
political attitude untl gave Germany her support. Mussolini's words
regarding his readiness to work for an improvement in relations with
the Soviet Union were encouraging, to be sure, but concrete proof was
as yet lacking that Italy was seriously determined to alter her rela-
I ions with t he Soviet Union ; consequently the Soviet Government was
for the present adopting an attitude of waiting.
Despite the indiilVrenca displayed, I have the impression that the
Soviet (tovernment will gladly avail itself of any opportunity which
may uriM* to normalize its relations with Italy.
2
SCHTTLEJSTBTTRG
, .^.^
not*- in Ribtwntrop's handwriting: "Mackensen. Ribbentrop
MIW Si'liuU'iihur*'* telegram after his return from the Hitler-
MtissnMni romvrHiitliHw at the Brenner, Mar. 18 (see vol. ix), and ordered that
!h< fliuil pariiffrnph hr callwl to Maekensen's attention. For Mackensen's
m of Apr, t
APPENDICES
Appendix I
Vndvr titcte RwretQry Hencke to Helmuth Laux
JANXJABT 28, 1941.
HKUR LAVX: I enclose the wretched article. I have tried to meet your
s but I don't know if I hiive succeeded. As a rule I am more inclined to
a miter Htyle. Anyhow you will change what doesn't suit you, I am of course
ready nt any time to take on any further corrections myself. How about the
promfwed i ilet u n* ?
With ronlial greeting;* and He!! Hitler,
Voting etc. HENCKB
j Enclosure]
The INiiinh State 2ia St'ptcinhcr U7 15W1J, and was successfully completed only 2
day* later
On Soptwitlwr ^*J, liKtt, our MiniKterial j>e UuHHia. The queHtioii, which of us were designated to accompany
him, with MKIU aiiH\virey the fact that an official of the Protocol Department
went it round in the mtin and collected the passports of those concerned. I was
iiAturuUy very i denned when he came to me too. The first flight to Moscow, in
AUKUH!, in which I had partU'ipnted, wan HUH vivid in my memory as a great
experience. I looked forward to a second trip to Russia with quite special
excitement,
Immediately* right in the train, there began the by no means simple technical
prepanitlotiH for mich a trip. I, for example, received from Under State Secretry
UIMIH, wh
im t* take cure of gathering and liriiiffinff all files, doc?nments? and maps which
might he umd during the |m*ceengH, our comrades in Protocol, among many
other tiling had to take care of the readiness of the two planes, and, as far as
poxKibli*, also make arraiigeient for allotting the Foreign Minister's time in
Moscow, The telephone and radio traffic, always lively during moves of the
UinlHt*rii frI, now reached Its peak. From all stations conversations with
939
{H} M 65*
940
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Berlin and Moscow were hold, Kven today 1 marvel that during our Hhort
stops our telephone oftMals always mantiKw! tt* make rout art with Mimrnw.
About 8:30 a. m. on Spteniier ^7. the ftrnt War Sucriflrt* Sunday, the relatively
small hand of "Russia-liters" gathered at Ttw|wlhof airport. Shortly
before 9:00 arrived the Foreign MiiHtt*r, who during th*' nlhl had h*Ul a
number of political conversations* and wnnetiuentlj had only n \t*ry brief rest.
A few minutes later the Condor plane, (fwnzmark* \\hirh the Kflhrer had a^ain
placed at Herr von Ril)htntrop*s di^pownl, t*ok off. The otht*r plan** with part
of the staff had already loft 3 hours earlier. Hardly were wo in th< air hefore
office routine resximed, just as in the WIHwlinHtrnww* or the npwial train. The
Foreign Minister worked as usual. lie spoke with Shkvartwv, the Soviet
Ambassador, w&o flew with us to Moscow, re**eiv**l ri*jMrtn from hln colleagues,
and had files brought to him. Tht- typewriter*! of both the t*Mtofcraph 4 rj* with
us ran almost without cease. had
lived as I for over years in the Soviet T'nlon a a German foreign reprrsentative
must be singularly impressed by this spectacle, for until the August visit
of the Foreign Minister the swastika flag- had probably never been hoiftted on a
Soviet building. Until then tht* Ruawliin people had aeen the
APPENDIX I 941
Berlin the Foreign Minister drove shortly before 10:00 p. m. to the Kremlin
for the first conversation with Stalin and Molotov. No matter how often, there
is a unique and mysterious attraction to entering the stronghold of Soviet power,
with all its bizarre towers and walls. In the dark of evening and in the expectant
mood in which w found ourselves, this had an extraordinarily powerful effect.
At the Kates of the Kremlin a vory strict check was made. No car was admitted
whose aumlwr had not previously heen reported to the Kremlin commandant.
Our earn, to In* mire, were speedily cleared, but even so they had to stop a,
moment, so that the officer of the guard could assure himself that all was
in order.
We stopped before the building occupied by the Chairman of the Council of
People's Ckmnnl8ar8. At the entrance stood a colonel, who led the Foreign
Minister up a small stairway through long passages to Molotov's own outer
office. In the wimple bare room whose furnishings consisted basically of a large
writing table, with a number of telephones and a leather sofa, we were received
by Iht* two aiden of the. Chief of the Soviet Government; we already knew them
from Au&ust* A few moments later the door to Molotov's office opened. Stalin
and Molotov went toward Herr von RIbbentrop and greeted him most cordially.
The convernation, in which the only others participating were the German
AmbuHKador and Counselor of Embassy Hilger as interpreter, lasted 3 hours.
We others wnited in the aides* room in case we should be needed. Since conversation
with the aideit did not ilow readily, we spent the time reading the latest
liiiHHian newi**pe,rs drank "Narsan," an excellent Caucasian mineral water,
und Hinokeci many strong Russian cigarettes. When our chief took his leave of
Stalin and Molotov, about 31 ; 00 a. in., his expression showed that he was satisfied
with the outcome of the conversation. We then drove from the Kremlin back to
tht* Aiiibttaudor*8 residence Here the Foreign Minister dictated his report
to the IHihrer ; about 4 : 00 a. m. I, as one familiar with the place, took it by car
to tln e*de room of the Embassy for forwarding.
Tht* forenoon of September 28 waa devoted to preparing for further negotia-
Uoim. The Foreign Minister did not have time to see the sights of Moscow, much
UK be would have liked to. There was hardly time for a short drive around
the rity. The second eonvenwt Ion with the Soviet statesmen began at 3 : 00 p. m.
it dealt mainly with deliberations on the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship
Treaty. That afternoon we came in a rather large body to the Kremlin,
for ulrendy the technical work could begin. Near Molotov's office two rooms
were net aside an our headquarters; the one, normally used by Soviet funetionrh*
M an a dining room, nerved the cartographers; the other, the stenographers.
Between these office** and the conference room there was much coming and
Koine. I iH'raonally had to supervise entering the new boundary on the maps
ami frcqwntly had to fetch new instructions from the Foreign Minister or
Under State Secretary Onus r to aid in interpreting. Molotov's aides always
watched u with ftiightiy dubious glances whenever we went through the anteclmniiwr
into the office of their lofty chief. Obviously this did not conform to
the strict rules prevailing otherwise In the Kremlin, especially when it was a
mutter of acceHH to Stalin or Molotov. In this case, however, in the interest
of exi>edlfiou8 performance of our work an exception was made.
In Molotov ' large, unpretentious, and simply appointed office beside a long
creen table covered with maps stood the Foreign Minister, Stalin, and Molotov.
The course of the new boundary was agreed upon and in this connection it was
thoroughly considered how best to harmonize the interests of the two States
with those of the local populations. The boundary, at first sketched In great
sweeps, was made more and more precise by use of maps, etc., until finally- it
was settled. During this tis&e, many changes and consultations were of course
42
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
necessary. The draftsmen had no eany time* keeping their entrie current.
The greatest care had to be f**k<*ra hen*, for later* In urtuitiiy tnarkinic the
boundary on the ground, the slightest error- -or ev**n too ltiuvy a line might
be important. When at last full agreement wns reiiohwl, I pretM'nted to the
Foreign Minister and Stalin the draft map for iiiitiiiiinK. Htatltt Hlgned his
name in lam* letters and asked Jocularly, "1 my Mltftmture *lt*iir enough for
you?" Later, by the way, this map was placed under #IJIHM it* \attiahl< archival
material by the Soviet Government ; It forms the ttrincliml ami Inviolable basis
for the practical job of setting the htmmlary.
The negotiations were interrupted by a utato banquet whirl* Mo! German delegation
had to prepare for the night eaIon. Herr von RIbhentrop accepted a
Government invitation for a short visit to the Grand Opera. Hi* had time only
to see one act of Tschaikovaky's "Swan I^ake" ballet. Kven this brief taste
was enough to convey to him an imprenalon of the high Quality of the famous
Russian art of dancing, which ftn
APPENDIX I 943
made a lasting impression on rne. Things had now gone so far that the
document could be prepared. One of us stood at each typewriter dictating the
texts, while others collated and revised. Finally about 5 a. m. Minister Schnurre,
Senior Counselor Kordt, Counselor of Embassy Hilger, and I were able to give our
Foreign Minister and M. Molotov the German draft for signature. Stalin observed
this ceronumy with obvious satisfaction. Simultaneously with the
Gorman-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty there was signed a joint Peace
Appeal of the German and Soviet Governments. The third agreement set forth
the mutual obligation once more to develop to the maximum economic relations
and trade between the two countries.
After the signature Stalin and Molotov withdrew with cordial words of
farewell from the Foreign Minister, whose day's work, however, was not yet
done. Waiting for him at the German Ambassador's residence were representative**
of the local German colony and members of the Embassy, with whom he
rwimittwl an hour and a half more. The Germans in Moscow were naturally
very proud that they could be the first to congratulate him on the successful
outcome of the negotiations. This had created for them too a new basis for
their work in the Soviet Union,
The forenoon of September 29 was taken up with receptions. The Foreign
MiniNter *ww newsmen among others, and had a conversation with the Italian
AtiibaKsador. Wo all met with Count von der Schulenburg and the members of
the KnilwHsy owe more before our column of cans left about 12:15 p. m. for
the airport. Here we again met People's Commissar Potemkin and leading
Bovit't }HkrHonaw*K who had come to see us off. About 12 : 40 the motors of the two
German planes* begun warming up; a few minutes later Moscow could no longer
IH* wen. With us w< took an experience of historical importance, a wealth of
fntWHtlnj: impressions !
After a nhort utop at Ktelgsberg Grens&mark landed again at Tempelhof airport
about p. m,, or after hardly 57 hours' absence. The Foreign Minister's
uwond trip to Moscow wa over*
UH effect H wort* not long in coming. In a few months the agreed German-
Soviet boundary wan laid out on the ground by a mixed German-Soviet comtniKHion.
In nmnequewe of the exchange of notes on economic questions important
wononik* iigiwinentH were reached which were of great value to both sides.
If KO far the <*rman-Soviet declaration of September 29, which expresses a
vdnh for the end of the war, has not had the desired effect, the blame for this
attach*'* not to the treaty partners, but solely to the rulers in England and
Kranw, who do not want peace. The French people have already had to pay
for this ftt'iwoU'HH and deluded attitude of their old government by the greatest
in their history. For the first time in nearly a thousand years England
e** war in her own country. The blows she must take will be ever
harder, and not too distant is the day when England also will bitterly regret
act having accepted the Pfibrer's repeated offers of peace and the German-Soviet
Peace Appeal.
Appendix II
ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'
DECEMBER 1, 1939
FOBKIGN
Itlirihentrop
{<*) Secretariat: Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul)
Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. Sonnlelthner
(6) Personal Staff: Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Likus
Counselor Dr. Baron SU<*eagrac*ht von Moyiand
THK STATE SEWUKTAKr OF TUB KOEKIOH MIWITT
Frelhorr von WelxxUrker
Secretariat: Counselor Dr, Siegfried
(Counselor von
Azutnrat
THE HFAD OF THID
IN THK KOK&XON
State GkKTPtttry B. W. Hohle
STATE SECEETAHY FOR HMKCIAZ*
W. Kepplcr
K>U SPEX'IAJ.
Dr. Hitter*
Attacked: Minister Htonlohr
Minister Miner
Counselor Mackttbcn
1 This organization plan lum lmn\ trarwlatiMi and condcnwd from a
APPENDIX H 945
PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT
Diplomatic Corp* in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with
tho Ktihrer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, decorations:
Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Krciherr von Dornberg
Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem.
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT
Director of Department:
Deputy Director:
Director for Adininiwtration:
Director for Budget and Financial Affairs:
Hpocial duties:
Pern, H Organisation of the foreign service,
training for the foreign service,
personal data of higher officialn,
of honorary consuls,
uxpcrtM, etc., information center:
Pern, M Pornonal data on other officials and
employees, organization and
efficiency of the working of the
Ministry;
IVm.
946
Pol. II
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Pol, Ilia
Pol. Illb
Pol. IV
Pol. V
Pol. VI
Pol. VII
Pol. VIII
Pol, IX
Pol. X
Pot XI
Pol. M. C.
Pol. Grenz
Western Kuropo (Groat Britain,
Ireland, British jxwweMHionst
unless dealt with duowhen*
France North Africa, Morocco,
Tunis Belgium, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Luxembourg) ;
Spain, Portugal:
Vatican:
Albania, Bulgaria, (!reec% Italy
(Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia,
Rumania, H ungary :
Special duties;
Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviot
Union) :
Scandinavia and Baltic Statim
(Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania):
Near and Middle Kant (Kgypt,
Afghanistan, Arabia, (Vylon,
Cyprus, Palestine, Hyria, Turkey,
India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan)*
East Asia and AuHtralia (Japan,
Japanese mandated tcrritori***,
China, Manchukuo, Mongolia,
French Indochina., Siam, fttrait*
Settlements, Malay States,
Netherlands Ka$tt Indies, Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand,
South Sea territories):
America: North America (United
States with poswenmonH except
Philippines Canada, Mexico),
Central and South America,
Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic:
Africa (except Morocco, Algeria,
Tunis, Italian poBseamonH,
Egypt, Sudan), mandate and
colonial questions:
War guilt questions:
Matters connected with German
property seized in the United
States, German-American Mixed
Claims Commission:
Frontier treaties and other technical
questions concerning Reich
frontiers, which are the subject
of negotiations with foreign governments:
Senior Oounst'lor von Rintrim
Frrihcrr Marvon
BilHrHtein
r Dr. Schw^ndeinanii
( *otins(*lor Dr. Haidlen
<.'oun,sior Dr. Hcinburg
Mininter Dr. Kinonlohr
8cnitr Counselor I>r.
Hch!ip
Hinior (N^tnHttlar Dr. von
Gnmdlwrr
i-viK(felt>r Dr. von
Dr. Knoll
Senior <^ Freytag
Senior Counselor I>r.
Hielfeld
Senior Counselor Dr. von
Sohmieden
Senior Counselor Dr.
Hoediger (Conrad)
acting
Senior Counselor Dr.
Roediger (Conrad)
APPENDIX II 947
ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)
Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl
Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius
Section for liaison with War
Kt'onomy Staff:
W I
W H
W IHa
W Hlb
W Hie
W IV
W V
W VI
W VI!
General section for questions concerning
economics and finance.
Commercial and forestry attache's;
German customs law, technical
preparation of commercial
treaties:
\Ve8t<*rn and Southern Europe (except
Great Britain and Italy):
Belgium, including colonies and
mandated territories ; France, including
colonies, protectorates,
and mandated territories; Luxembourg,
Netherlands, including
colonies:
Switzerland; Portugal, including
colonies; Spain, including colo-
Southeast Kurope (except Rumania):
Protectorate, Slovakia:
Hungary, Yugoslavia:
Bulgaria, Greece:
Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia
and Albania; Rumania:
Near and Middle East (.Afghani-
Htan, Kgypt, Arabia, Cyprus,
Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjor-
an, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen) :
Kawtom Kurope (Soviet Russia,
Kntowa, Latvia, Lithuania, former
Poland) :
Northern Kurope (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
economic questions affecting the
Antarctic) ; whaling:
Great Britain, British Dominions
(oxcept (Canada), and British
colon I{*H. General questions of
commercial and economic warfare:
Kat Asia (China and Hong Kong,
Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines,
Hiarn, South Sea territories):
Senior Counselor (unassigned)
Dr. Dumont
Consul General Doehle
Senior Counselor Sabath
Counselor Dr. Baron von
Maltzan
Counselor Schtiller
Minister Moraht
Senior Couxxselor Dr. Hudeczek
CounselorAdamovie-Waagstatten
Counselor Dr. Busse
Counselor Dr. Junker
Counselor Dr. Ripken
Minister Dr. Schnurre
Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg
Senior Counselor RUter
Senior Counselor Dr. Voss
948
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
W Villa
WVIJIb
W IX
W X
W XI
W XII
North America (Canada, United
States, Mexico) Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Haiti; alno Liberia:
South and Central America (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chita,
Colombia, Gottta Rica, Kcuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Porn,
El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela)
:
Shipping (including care of crews
and passengers of German
ships in neutral fount rum):
Reich Office for Foreign Trade
(economic newt* and information
service; chambers of commerce
abroad) :
Raw material**, defense industry,
liaison for control of German
ships in neutral ports:
Transport (except matters relating
to deliveries) :
Senior Counselor Dr. Da
Secretary of legation Dr.
Pamporrien
Senior Counselor Dr* Bleyert
Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
Senior Counselor Dr. BJBHO
Minister Dr. Martiun (direct
ly Htttxrtxiinate to the
Director of the Department)
(It)
Director of Department; Under State Secretary Dr. Oman
Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Alhrocht
B I
R 3
R II
R III
1. International law, cooperation
in conclusion of treaties. Arbitration,
Permanent Court of
International Justice:
2. Bamc questions on laws of war
and neutrality; general qu<8~
tions on 8oa warfare:
3. I^egal questions on offrnKcw
against the laws of war; liainon
with the International Committee
of the Red Cross:
Conduct of the war on merchant
shipping:
Diplomatic law, extraterritorial
rights. Customs matters affecting
German and foreign
diplomats. War damage questions
:
Nationality. Constitutional and
administrative law. Kccieslafttical
law. Penal law:
Dr. l*ohnnann
(Johiinn CSftorg)
Counselor Dr. Ix>hmann
(Johaxm CJeorg)
Counselor Ciiknthrr
Senior Counselor Dr. Bicd-
Iwr
APPENDIX II 949
R iv
R V
II VI
R Via
H VII
R VIII
R IK
Special aaxnenta
1. Compulsory military service.
Compulsory labor service:
2. Exemption from military service
of Foreign Ministry personnel,
replacement personnel:
3. Prisoners of war at home and
abroad, interned armed forces
personnel, enemy aliens in Germany,
Germans in enemy countries:
Labor law. International Labor
Office, Police:
Pa&sport Office:
Vina Office:
Consular jurisdiction in matters of
civil law:
Mattain connected with inheritance
:
Amtrian legal matters. Austrian
state treaties. Legal questions
emanating from the Sudetengau:
PaHHportti, welfare, refugees, penftioiui.
Entry and residence permits.
Extradition:
1. Consular law. Consular treaties:
International finance;
Patent and copyright law:
4. Kneiny and neutral property in
Germany. German property in
enfiiny and neutral countries:
5. Former Czechoslovak representation
in the Reich. Adjustment
of Czechoslovak state
tr^atien to the German treaty
Senior Counselor Dr. Settle
Reform of consular law:
Setttaxtumt of citizenship questions:
Senior Counselor Rfcdiger
(Gustav)
Counselor Reimke
Consul (unassigned) Dr.
Bergfeld
Senior Counselor Dr.
Schwagula (acting)
Counselor
Dr.*
Dr.
Senior Counselor
Schwagula
Senior Counselor
Kraneck
Senior Counselor Dr.
Schiffner
Minister (unassigned) Dr.
Kraske
Consul General (retired)
Dr. Vassel
CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)
Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowskl
Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Riihle
Kult. A *
Position of German national
groupB abroad and of minorities
in the Reich:
Kult, B Economic questions relating to
nationality. Resettlement of
Volksdeutsche:
Senior Counselor
Lorenz
Dr.
Senior Counselor Grosskopf
950
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Kutt. E
(Kult.
Nf)
(Kult. E.
Rf. Zv.)
Kult. Gen.
Kult. H
Kult. K
Kult. B,
Kult. B
Emigration and repatriation. Settling
abroad. German* in tha
Soviet Union:
Counselor Dr. Kundt
General cultural policy:
Financial affairs of the department:
Internationa! relation** In the* field
of the arts:
Radio questions:
German educational system
abroad. Foreign educational
systems:
Kult* Spr. Drive for spreading German language
abroad:
Kult. U University affairs. Exchanges and
guest professorships. Scholarships
for foreigner* in Germany :
Kult. V Treaties and agreements in the cultural
field:
Kult. W General scientific relation** with
foreign countries and foreign
learned organizations. Congresses
and exhibitions:
NEWS SEHVICK ANI> PKESR DEPARTMENT (P)
Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul)
Deputy Director: Minister Braim von Stumm
Counselor Dr. Stolzmann
Consul Count von Bethusy-
Hue
Counselor Dr. Kolh
Senior Counselor Ituhle
Comweior Dr. Wolf (Gerhard)
Conmtl Aeldert (acting)
Counselor Dr. Hchaafer-
Utinirlin
CounK*klr Dr. Pfteiderer
Counselor Dr. Roth
P gen.
Special
duty
German
press
PI
PII
PHI
PIV
P V
Organisational and administrative
questions. Personnel:
Southeastern questions in general:
England, Ireland, Honth Africa,
British possessions not assigned
elsewhere, Netherlands, Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia,
Slovakia:
France and possessions: Belgium,
Luxembourg:
Spain, Portugal, Vatican, Italy
(Albania, Ethiopia, Libya),
Switzerland:
Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ku~
mania, Slovakia, Hungary:
Eastern Europe (Poland, the Soviet
Union) :
Counselor Dr. Krttmnier
Minister (tmaBmgiied) Dr.
Kirchholto*
Attache* Lohse
Hecretary of legation Dr.
Winnmann
Attach^ Dr. Achenhach
Secretary of Legation Dr.
Plataer
Counselor
Minister (unaaigned) Dr.
Bchwdrbel
Counselor Dr. Staudacher
APPENDIX H
P VI Seandinavia and the Baltic States:
P VII Near and Middle East (including
British India):
P VIII Kant Ania, Australia, New Zealand,
Netherlands East Indies, Thai-*
land, Philippines:
P IXa United States, Canada:
P IXb Central and South America, Pan-
American affairs:
P X He.ading of the foreign and domes*
tie press, archives:
P XI Oral and written reporting on the
press:
P XII News service, radio transmission
Ciorman periodicals :
P XIII Foreign journalists:
P XIV German eolonies:
INFORMATION DKPAKTMBNT
Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg
Deputy Director: Oounelor Dr. Hahn
Special General planning:
Procurement and evaluation of refHirtu
and other material usable
for propaganda (German origin) :
Military reporting and propaganda
Inf, I
Inf. I!
Inf. Ill
Inf. IV
Inf. V
News release and feature article
service (foreign press):
Maas propaganda:
Propaganda direction (Supervision
of the propaganda activity of
internal Gorman agencies) :
Liaision office for radio:
Liaison office with Ministry of
Propaganda and the Dienststelle
Ribbentrop:
Secretary of Legation Dr;
Schlemann
Minister (unassigned) Dr;
SehwSrbel
Prince von Urach
Dr. Sallet
Consul General (unassigned)
Dr. Soehring
Werthmann (acting)
Dr. Schacht
Referent Kleinlein
Senior Counselor Dr. Jahncke
Dr. Blohm
ffWF.)
Counselor Dr. Rahn
Counselor Dr. Kastner
Consul (unassigned) Baron
von Tucher
Consul Dr. Seelos
Consul von der Damerau-
Dambrowski
Volkers
Counselor Dr. Schiwner
Secretary of Legation
Buttner
8?icrAL SECTION FOB GERMANY
Information for foreign missions about important Counselor Dr. Schumburg
internal political events. Policy toward the
Jews. Racial policy, Anti-Comintern questions.
International police cooperation. Emigre*
aff&iin. Flags. National hymns:
952
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
SPECIAL PAKTT SECTION
Business between the Foreign Ministry and the, Senior ('ousmeior Luther
departments of the NSDAP (excluding the
sphere of the AO and liaison with the Security
Service and the Gestapo). The Party Rally,
Visits abroad by prominent persona in the
State and Party,
Appendix III
LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED
Th following tiihli* ! German file from which each document has
t*H* d<*rivw*iy rtItiil tupit1
^, have hwn filmed consecutively under a single serial
number; thtw* nro markod !y an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given
a Hii!>iiXf>nu*ntury to enrUi'r onea ; those are cases where re-examination of the file
in fiut'Hliim Indira tiMi that additional lilming might be useful to scholars or, as is
niort* of((*n tht* fiim t where in the proctes of editing for publication the editors
wished to {innide n Him record of documents of lesser importance to which
referewe* npfit'ttWHl la the documenta selected.
Film KrrM
51
5tt
54
04
W
lit
100
Ktit
Hi
115
116
of
State Sieewtary : Norway,
Under HUte Secretary : lIHles on Visits of Foreign Statesmen.]
State Beeretary: Soviet Union.
Under State Secretary: Soviet Union.*
lUwttitHteiie Itlbljentrop : Confidential Reports.
Under State Secretary ; Naval Warfare,
Btiite ftvrvtary: Poland.
State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Non-Diplomatic
Btnte tU*cretnry: Uruguay; Ecuador; United States of America
- Brazil.*
Secret Files of Paul Schmidt
Htate Secretary : Hungary,
Heich Fon*ig Minister: Palestine.
Hfate Secretary: Eire.
Untler State Secretary: Eire (Veesenmayer).
Ktitte Secretary : Turkey.
Grimm Embassy in Italy : Mackensen's Papers.
Stute Secretary : Russia.
Ktate Secretary : Sino-Japanese War.
Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Latvia;
Luxembourg; Memei; Austria.*
Belch Foreign Minister: Africa; Albania; Danzig; Estonia;
Croatia**
953
954
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Film Serial
Number* Title of File
119 Head of the AusIanOsorganisaUon : Yugoslavia; Italy.*
121 State Secretary: Franco-German Relations*.
124 State Secretary : Political Correspondence of the State Secretary
with Officials of the Foreign Service, vols. 7-10 (194O-
1041).
127 German Embassy in the Soviet Onion : Political Relations of
the Soviet Union with Germany.
130 State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
141 State Secretary : Belgium.
143 State Secretary: German-American Coiuiular Kxohatige; Internment
of Ships and Arrest of H?amen by Countries of
Central and South America ; the sam* by U. S. A., also Iteprisals
; South America.*
157 Pol. VIII; Political Eelations of Japan with Russia.
166 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of
Rusuhi with Manehukuo, Slno-Jajianene War*
Under State Secretary: Military Putsch in Tokyo, February
1930.
German Embassy in Italy; Secret Papers (Japan-China-
Manchukuo).*
109 State Secretary : Rumania.
171 German Embassy in the Soviet Union; Political Relations of
the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
173 State Secretary: Netherlands; Netherlands Indies.*
174 State Secretary: Japan.
175 State Secretary: Rumania.
176 State Secretary: Mexico.
183 State Secretary : Switzerland.
191 State Secretary : China.
198 Economic Policy Department (Clodlus) : Japan, vol. 2.
205 State Secretary; Sweden.
215 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Internal Politics of
the Soviet Union (Military, Naval, Air) ; Political Relations
between Germany and England (Encirclement Policy);
Political Relations of Germany with the Baltic State**; Pollticai
Relations of Germany with the Balkan States (Bulgaria,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania) and Turkey; Huaslan Policy
(Emigrants) ; International Political Problem** Bolshevism,
Socialism.
217 Reich Foreign Minister : South Africa.
226 Pol. VIII : China Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
230 State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
233 State Secretary : Argentina.
247 State Secretary : Denmark.
259 State Secretary : Anglo-German Relations.
266 State Secretary : Turkey.
276 German Embassy in the Soviet Union; Schulenburg*s (personal)
Political File.
314 Dlenststelle Rlbbentrop: Personal Data (Germans),
319 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) ; Sweden, vol. 5.
321 State Secretary; I4tfcuanla.
APPENDIX III 955
Film Serial
Number* Title of File
322 Beonomic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain, vol. 8.
323 State Secretary : I*atvia.
324 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain, vol. 9.
331 tlnder State Secretary: Protectorate.
8535 Gorman Embassy in the Soviet Union: Special Files on Relations
of Germany with other Countries; War (War with
Poland).
861 German Kmbassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations
between the Soviet Union and England (English Encirclement
Policy, Guarantees, English-French Negotiations for Treaties
with tin* Soviet Union, Turkey, etc.), vol. 2.
306 German Smbaasy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of
the Soviet Union with Italy.
888 Pol. V: Political Relations of Russia with Germany.
406 State Secretary : Estonia.
407 Under State Secretary : Occurrences involving the Soviet Union
and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
4W State Secretary: Foreign Propaganda Press.
420 ISerman Kmbassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of
the Soviet Union with the Northern States Finland, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, Aland Q\iestion, Finnish Islands.
440 State Secretary: Greece.
4555 State Secretary : Political Correspondence of the State Secretary
with Officiate of the Foreign Service, vol. 5 (1939).
456 State Secretary : The War 1039, vol. 4.1
4CI* State Secretary : The War 1939, vol. 5.
472 State Secretary : Political Correspondence of the State Secretary
with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 6 (1939).
476 State Secretary : The War 1939, vol. 6.
State Secretary: The War 1939, vol. 7 [1940].
State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 7
UftW).
UH> German ICmbasH.v in Spain : Reports from Spanish Representatives
Abroad.
506 State Secretary : Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 8
525 Stat* Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 9
(1940).
540 State Secretary: Africa.
582 State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, vol. 2.
683 State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, vol. 1.
585 State Secretary : Bulgaria.
591 I*ol. IV : Hesettlement Question, South Tirol.
4J17 State Secretary : Afghanistan.
644 Political Department: Treaties, Soviet Union, 1939-1941.
* Beftixmlng with Oct. 1. 1030t the "Poland" series in the State Secretary's
fill* was renamed "War." Corresponding to each volume in this "War" series
w a supplementary volume of a still more secret classification. These volumes,
according to notations on the covers of the regular "War" series, were kept in an
Iron box < Ja**e**. Neither this box nor its contents have been found. It is
known, from cross-references in the files, that the Kassette contained papers on
peace moves not found elsewhere.
956
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Film Serial
Numbers
723
800
838
903
967
1044
1085
1132
1137
1138
1205
1228
1308
1328
1360
1370
1379
1809
1496
1560
1070
1671
1602
1025
1671
1703
1700
1719
1725
1751
1764
1779
1780
1703
1795
1807
1821
1822
Title of File
Beferat Partei (Inland I) : Western Europe* Political Affairs.
Under State Secretary : Poland-Danzig.
Under State Secretary Hencke: Personal, MONCOW 1930-1040.
German Legation it* Rumania : Set-ret Papon* -Kconomlc, March
1859
German Kmbaasy In Italy : Secret Painr.
German Kmbawsy in Italy : Secret Pus>erw.
Ministerial^ rektor Kilter: Belgium.
Under State Secretary : I>oenmerU on the Outbreak of the War.
Ambassador Hitter: German-Soviet ICconomle Agreement
War Material ami Secret Matter**.
AmbaHsatior Hitter: MOHCOW Negotiation* Decwnhcr 10f 103-
February 1041); Material** on the German Soviet Economic
Agreement of February 11 t 1U4UK
Pol. I M : War between Germany and KitKlaiid, Krnneo, and
Poland* voL 2.
Political Department : Political AffairB KuHHia.
German Embassy In Spain: {Kconontic FilHj.
Pol. V: I'olltieal Relations Uetw**!i H*t^hin
APPENDIX III 957
Film Serial
Numbtirs
18(50
3903
2(KX>
2CXK)
2
958
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
film Serial
2874
2898
2901
2014
2973
2&0&
$027
3028
3085
3051
3072
307(5
3077
3081
3118
3447
3471
ai518
86&T
3687
3712
3781
Ii782
8783
:*868
3882
4031
4041
4063
4143
4191
4218
4353
4447
4448
4457
4450
4461
4463
4467
4469
4475
Title of Pito
Economic Policy Department CWiehl) : tuxembour&.
PoL VIII: Political Relations of Japan with Germany.
Economic Policy Department (OloiUus) : Sweden.
Economic Policy Department (Wtohl) : Sweden, vol. 2.
Pol. VI II : Political Itetatioiu* between China ami Japan,
German legation in Norway : Noack.
Pol. IX: United States of America Questions of Neutrality.
Pol. IX: United States of America Heads of State and their
Families.
German Embassy in Bpain : The War.
Pol. IV : Rumania Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties, vol. 5.
Cultural Policy Department: General Secret Papers,
Supplementary to 2000.
Economic Policy Department (Wlehl) : Norway.
German Legation lit Norway : AMmark Affair,
German legation in Norway : Record** on HeHi^'tlng Norwegian
Territorial Waters.
Uerraaa Legation i Norway : Military Occupation of Norway.
Vol. VIII: Political Relation** between Japan and the United
States of America.
Economic Policy Department : Denmark.
Pol. H: French I>ipluiimti<- and <'oimulur lU'preacntation
Ahmad ttxctjt in <5inimtiy) ( ami vic* virKa.
Bconoxuic Policy Department (ClotUun) : Xcirwuy.
Supplementary tu l7iW, liHKi.
German Ix^ition in Norway : Becret Papern Altm&rk Affair,
Germain Legation in Kmmmia : Scnrret l*ai hrH.
Supplementary to 2002.
Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : UuH.sia. vol. IS.
Economic Policy lH*partmi*nt (WichH: ItuHHla. vol. 14.
Economic I^licy l>tpttrtnnt (OiodiuH) : Spain.
Supplementary tt> 322, 824.
Economic' Policy Oeitartm
APPENDIX III 959
Film, Serial
Number*
4491
4407
4512
45&1
453S
4535
4537
52:54
r>5!SO
55(58
5570
0520
epartment, IVb: Italy, Raw Materials and
Goods Coal* vol. 2.
Koonomic Policy Department : Secret Papers, Trade in War
Material Rumania.
Kconornie Policy Department : Secret Papers, Trade in War
Material Greece.
Economic Policy L>epartraent : Secret Papers, Trade in War
Material Yugoslavia.
German Legation in Rumania : Rumania, Foreign Policy.
Kiconomic Policy Department : Treaties 1, Afghanistan.
Kconomie Policy Department : Secret Papers, Trade in War
Material Afghanistan.
HJt'onomic Policy Department: Secret Papers Trade in War
Material Netherlands.
Kk*onomic Policy Department: Treaties 1, Italy, vol. 1.
Partei Dieasrtstellen : APA, General, 1935-1942L
Legal Department: International Law, Law of War Internment
of [Polish] Army Personnel in Neutral Countries in
connection with the War of 1939, Russia.
Supplementary to 160.
Supplementary to 2422.
Lej?ul Department : International Law, Law of War Neutrality,
United States of America.
Kconomic Policy Department, lib: Trade, Great Britain
Security of German Exports via Neutral Countries.
Bupplementary to 2997.
Supplementary to 2993.
Supplementary to 2810.
Supplementary to 100, 174, 1703.
Supplementary to 226.
Supplementary to 100.
Supplementary to 2898.
Pol. VIII: Japan Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
Pol. VIII: Japan Ministries.
Leeal Dei>artment : International Law, Law of War Naval
Warfare, vol. 3.
Economic Policy Department, VI : Sweden, Trade.
ffieonomlo Policy Department (Clodius) : Rumania.
German Legation in Yugoslavia: Secret Political Papers
Yugoslavia's Attitude toward Germany from Sept. 1, 1939;
Deliveries by Both Parties.
German Ix -nation in Luxembourg: Keports.
German Le^ntfon in Luxembourg; Secret Diary of Radowitss.
Supplementary to 582, 1571, 1848.
960
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Film Serial
lumbers Title of File
8332 German Embassy in Italy: Secret Z*apers Ley-Cianetti
Meeting.
8338 Pol. I M : War between Germany and Kittfluml, Krittu*e, and
Poland, vol. 3,
8336 German Embassy in Italy : Propaganda Material.
83ii7 Economic Policy Department (t*lomO : German-Italian ICconoxiiie
Negotiation* < Telegraphic ItpiKirtw),
8338 Economic Policy Department, JVb: Italy, Haw Materials ami
Good** roal, vol. S.
8389 Supplementary to 4tS#5.
8342 German Embassy in Turkey: Economic Negotiations-"Turkln-
German Keonomlc Relations.
8344 Le#al Department: International l*aw tonv if War Naval
Warfare, vol. 4.
8351 Economic Policy I*eprtiefit, I!a : B**lHn Trul Treaty Rtv
latlon with Germany (IJet^lan Oovernxnontal Committeen).
8354 Economic Policy l^partment lift r Luxembourg, Kinunrlal
Matters.
8373 l>sttl Department: International Law, 3Law of War Naval
Warfare, voK 8.
8374 Economic Policy 3Ck*partin^ntf Ha; Notherland, Trade
Colonies.
8388 I^egal Department: International I^aw, I^aw of War L&w of
War 17, Grtnw: Arret and Sinking of Greek Merchant
Ships by Germany.
8429 JEconomic Policy I>epartment, 3Xb: TraiSe 12> Trad<* Helationa
between England and Uumiia.
8434 BJconomie Policy Department 2.
8485 Supplementary to 185*>, 1860, 40(8*.
8486 Pol. I: league of Nations Administrative and Technical
Questions, Organisation of the league He<*retariat,
8487 Pol. I : League of Nations Twentieth Session.
8488 Supplementary to 1625.
8489 Supplementary to 2121, 45S1.
8490 German Embassy in Turkey : Change of Oertnnn Prime Rules
la the European Conflict.
8493 Supplementary to 8342,
8496 Economic Policy Department, IVb: Kumania Trade ISA,
Ooverrwtnental Committees.
8497 Supplementary to 5566,
8498 Economic Policy Department: Treaties 8, Yugoslavia, Secret,
War Materials.
8511 German Legation in Estonia; Political Relations of Estonia
with Soviet Russia,
8512 Supplementary to 1751.
8514 Supplementary to 1807,
8517 Supplementary to 2401, 4497.
APPENDIX III 961
Film Serial
Number* Title of File
&r>18 I*egal Department, Appendix: International Law, Law of
War Law of War 5, German Prize Rules.
&r>19 Legal Department: International Law, Law of War Law of
War 4, Naval Warfare (also Prize Law), General and
Germany.
8520 Economic Policy Department, lib: Trade 11A, No. 8, Effect of
British Naval Warfare on German Trade, Black List
ar
)21 Legal Department: International Law, Law of War Law of
War 8, Neutrality, Uruguay.
8522 Legal Department: International Law, Law of War- Law of
War 4, Naval Warfare (also Prize Law), General and
Germany, vol. 6.
8ft2& Supplementary to 1205.
8524 Economic Policy Department, IXb : Trade 11A, Effect of British
Naval Warfare on German Trade with South America.
a*S25 Pol. IX: Ibero-America, Political Relations of Central and
South American States with Germany.
8526 Economic Policy Department (Glodius) : Afghanistan,
8527 Cultural Policy Department, Treaties: Instruction and Graduates
of Afghan Schools in Germany.
8528 <"*uttural Policy Department, Treaties: Arranging for German
Instructors for the Technical Institute at Kabul, etc.
8520 Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 1, Iran
German-Iranian Trade,
8580 Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 5, Afghanistan
Economic Agreements.
8531 Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 4, Afghanistan
Construction and Transport.
ar S2 Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 3, Afghanistan
(Secret) Appointment of German Air Instructors and
Piirchatw of Training Planes.
8533 Pol. Ill: Afghanistan Personalia, Statesmen, Diplomatic and
Consular Representatives Abroad.
8534 Kconomic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 2, Afghanistan,
Trade Agreements.
8Ti85 Supplementary to 2122.
RrS8 Supplementary to 644.
8589 Navy Archives : OKW Directives.
B18 Htate Secretary: Finland, vol. 1.
ItIO Slate Secretary: Finland, vol. 2.
Kl t F2, F3, F5, F6, F7, F8, FtO, Fll, F13, P14, F15, FIT, F18, F19: German
Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's
Secretariat. (See the General Introduction to this series
which was published in vols. I-IV.)
Appendix IV
LIST OF PERSONS l
ABB, General Nobwyuki* Japanese Prime Minister, August 2& 198&-Jani*ry 14,
1940, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Augtmt ii&8eptraber 28, 1000.
AJJBA and BKEWICK, Duke of, Jacob Maria del Pliar Carlos Manuel Pita-Jams**
Btuart, Spanish Ambassador In Great Britain* 10&MtM&
ALFXERI, Dino, Italian Minister for Popular Culture, 10Sti~Iftfi9; Ambassador to
the Holy See, 1U80-1040; member of the Faeit Grand Council
AI/TRNBXJRG, Gfinther, Minister, Head of Political Division IVb in the German
Foreign Ministry, UKiH-ltttth Director of Information Department, Itttt-
1041,
ANF0SQ, Pilippo, chef de cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister,
AMANTJLLAH KHAN, Amir of Afghanistan, 1919-1020; forced to abdicate; iivedi
in Burope after 1920.
ABfcETQiANu, Coimtantlnk Rumanian Minister I'reaicient* Beptnnlw*r-"Novemher
1939.
ARITA, Hudiiro, Japanese KorHgn Minister in the Konoye ami Hiramima CabinetJB,
October 10;iHAugust ISKiW, ami in Yonai OaMnH, JttiHiry-Jtxly 1940.
ASOHMANN, (Jottfriod, Mniister. IMr^otor of the !*nw Department of the ilerinan
Foreign Ministry, la'KMttrtO; on KiMxMal nHHi|cnm<*iit at The Hague and Bru&
sete, lOIU^imo.
ATTOLICO, Bernardo, Italian AmhaHKador in Germany,
AXIEITI, Giacinto, Italian Ambassador in Japan,
BABARIN, Evgeny, Trade Representative in the Soviet Krnbaj in Germany.
BADEE, Mahmud, Iranian Mininter of Finance,
BALBO, Italo, MarshaU Italian Governor General of Libya, 193.V1040.
BASTIANINI, Giuseppe, Italian Amban^aor in Great Britain, 10.HU 104<).
BAUMBACH, Norbert* Captain, German Navy, Naval Attach^ in the (34nan ICmbassy
in the Soviet Union, 1933-1041.
BKAVEEBKOOK, William Maxwi41 Aitkent Baron, Britinh Mininter for Aircraft
Production, 1040-1941.
BECK, Josef, Polish Foreign Minister, 1032-1939.
BBHRKNDS, Hermann, SH-Ob
APPENDIX IV 963
Anthony J. Drexel, American Ambassador in Poland, 1937-1939.
BISMARCK, Otto Christian, Prince von, Deputy Director of the Political Department
of the Herman Foreign Ministry, 1936-1940 ; from April 1, 1940, Counselor
of Kmbassy with rank of Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
Bi.ttciiKK, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland, 1935-1944.
BOCOHINX, Arturo, Chief of the Italian police.
BOHUC, Ernst Wilbelrn Hans, Gauleiter, Head of the Anslandsorganisation of
the Nazi Party, 1933-194,r
>; also State Secretary in the German Foreign
Ministry, 1937-1941.
BONNKT, Gwrgt's, French Foreign Minister in the Daladier Cabinet, April 193&-
Kftptember 193$); Minister of Justice, September 1939-March 1940.
BORAH, William, United States Senator from Idaho, 1907-1940.
BOEIS III, Kin* of Bulgaria, 1918-1943.
IWrricHKR, Frieclrich von, German General, Military and Air Attach** in the
United States, 1933-1941.
BftAtiCHXTBGH, Walther von, German General, Commander in Chief of the German
Army, 2938-1941.
BRXXTSR, Curt, German Minister in Norway, 1939-1940.
BBttciaMKXKfiv Kduard, Cotinnelor, an ofBcial of the German Foreign Ministry,
liX$8~1940; a member of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, 1939.
Bt?uiTT, William r.. American Ambassador in France, 1936-1940.
ciiwANTK, Vhi'o von, German Minister in Belgium, July 1938 ; Ambassador,
OctoZwr m**8~194(>.
RCKHARDT, Carl J. Swiss professor, League of Nations High Commissioner
in Danalg, 19&7~19&9; President of International Committee of Bed Cross,
R, Leopold, Captain, German Navy, Head of the Foreign Intelligence
Branch in the OflSee of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the
OKW, 1038-1945,
Richard Antent British Conservative M. P. since 1929; Under Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, 193&-1941.
OAIXXSAN, Sir Alexander, Britten Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affair**, 1938-1946.
OALJNTESCU, Armand, Rumanian Minister of the Interior, 1937-1939 ; appointed
MiniHter President, March 1939; assassinated by Iron Guardists, September
21 f 1939.
OANARIH, WHhelm, German Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence
ami
964
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
CINOAB-MAKKOVKJH, Aleksander, Yugoslav Foreign Minister. l*3f>~1041.
Cfcoiuus, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy lN*p**rtntnt of the German
Foreign Ministry, 1087-21M&
COBURO, Duke of (Leojxrid Karl 40.
DE VALKEA, Kamon, Prime Minister of Klre and Mininter for Kxtoriuil Affairs,
19S7-1048.
DIKCKHOFF, IIan Ileinrieh, KScrman AtnbaHn!or in the llnltwi Stafe f May
19,'W ; reoallst ; on spt'<-ial aKHignment in the Foreign Minlntry, 1038 1D43.
D5NIT2, Karl, Admiral, Commander in Chief, Submarine Ann, <*orman Navy,
1930-1043.
DOENBEBG, Alexander, Freiherr von, MiniHter, Dirl943.
B3N, Anthony, British Conservative M. I>. nine*** 15)2;i; Hi*retiiry of State for
Foreign Affairs, 1935-1 !)3K; Kr War, January-D*H^mbor 1040.
ERBACH-SCHONBERG, Viktor, PHnz zu, Gorman MiniHtcr in (lriH*cs
KEDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, (orman MlulHtor In Hungary, li>:$7 11)41.
BRKKO, Juho Kljas, Finnish Minister of Fort'ijp Affairs, UKJ8- ia'$l>
d'Affaires in Sweden, December 10ft&-March X0-IO,
FABEICIUS, Wiihelm, Gorman Minister In Rumania, 11)36-1041.
PEANOO T BAHAMONE, Francisco, Chief of State, President of the Government,
and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Kow in Spain from October
1936.
FBANgors-PoNOET, Andr4, French Ambassador in Italy, November lft38~l$MO,
FEICK, Wilhelm, German Minister of the Interior, 1933-1843.
^BticKE^ Kurt, Captain (later Admiral), German Navy; Chief of Operations
Division, Naval Staff.
FROHWBIN, Hans, German Minister in Estonia, 3036-1040.
FUNK, Walter, German Minister of Economics, 19S7-1945; President ot the
Reichsbank, 1939-1945.
GAJTBNCU, Grigore, Rumanian Foreign Minister, December 193&-OTune
APPENDIX IV 965
GAMKI.IN, Maurice Gustnve, French General, Vice President of the Conseil Su-
Itfriour do la Guerre, 193J5-1940; Allied Commander in Chief, September
10ft$>-May 1940.
GAXJB, PrhHlrifh, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign
Ministry, 1923-5943.
GKKB, Dirk Jan d<% Netherlands Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, August
HKttKStoptcnibttr 1940.
GKORUK VI, King of Groat Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond
tho Seas, 1WW-1962.
GKQRC9KH, Alphonse Jacques, French General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
2035-2 &3i); Commander in Chief of the French Armies in the Northeast,
2U8&-2940.
Max Ixo, former Belgian Minister of Finance and economic expert.
s, H. Ililnrov, Turkish Ambassador in Germany, September 27, 1939-1942.
A modcii, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Foreign
Minintry.
Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Heichstag, 1932-1945; Minister
President of Prussia arid Reich Minister for Air, 1933-1945; Commander
in Chief of tho* Luftwaffe, 1935-1945; Commissioner for the Four Year
Plan, 1030-104B.
GKBW, Jotwph Clark, American Ambassador in Japan, 1932-1941.
Krich. ChU'f of Staff Office of the Minister President of Prussia
irinK). and head of the Press Department for the Four Tear Plan,
GKOHIIA, Fritx, German Minister in Iraq, 1932-September 1939; accredited also
to Haudi Arabia, February 1939, on special assignments in the Foreign
Ministry, 1030-1942.
Wernor von. Head of Political Division VI in the German Foreign
Ministry, mO-l$>45,
, i'hriBtiiin, Swedish Foreign Minister, 1939-1945.
- V, K!n of SwtKlen, 1907-1950.
VII, KiriR of Norway, 1905.
HABICIIT, Tli^oclor, I>eputy I^irector of the Political Department in the German
K<>rttfcn Ministry, witli title of Under State Secretary, 1939-1940.
XIAcHx. Ktuil, I*r; President of tlie German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
1W HM5.
IlAKtiN v Wiljazn, QuIslin^'B representative in Germany, 1939-1940.
HAM>F.H, KrniiK, German General, Chief of the Army General Staff, December
b
966
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
HEMPJSL, Eduard, German Minister in Kite, 1037-1945.
HENCKK, Andor, Senior Counnelor, < Chairman, German Delegation, <*erman-
Soviet Mixed Commission on Itorder Questions, Ortolwr IIMit-Aprll 15)40.
HBNTIO, Georg Werner Otto, Senior rouiwelor,, I load of I'olltlral Divinlon Vll
in the German Foreign MInitry, UKI7-ltt>.
HERTZOG, James Barry M., South Afriean politician and general ; Prime Minister,
1924-1113$; MiniHter of External Affair*, lU'JT ltt:tt>; leader United South
African National Party untilmm
HESS, Rudolf, German National BoHalint leader, metntier of the Nni l*nrty from
1020; Chairman of the rentrat CNimmltlee of tl Party from HK*2 ; Hitler's
Deputy, 1830-1941; member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1WW HKl.
HESSK, Prince Philip of, son-in-law .
HEWEr,, Walther, Senior Co\inHelor, p*rsonal reprewentative of tli Foreign Minister
with the Führer, 3038-1&4R.
HETDKN-RYNSCH, Bernd Otto, Freiherr von der, official in Political IMviwion I
of the <*erman Foreign Minitryt lO^CKIfHO,
HmYDiutoH, Keinfaard, BB-<5ruppenffihrer Cliief of the Heeurity Pollci* and of the
Security Service.
HJXGKR, Guatav, Counselor of legation, 103TI tJKIt>, <*one!or of KmtmHxy,
1041, in the German Kmbassy in the Soviet Union.
Helnrich, ReichsFührer-SS and Chief of the Herman Poliet
1945; Heieh CommiHsiir for the Consolidation of the <3erman
Community, 1030.
, Count KHchiro, Japanese Prime Minister, Jainiary 4 AitRtifit 2H,
HxB8CHF&u>, H. M., dire<'tor of the department of comment* and Uiduntry In the
Netherlands Ministry of Kcosoniic Affairn.
HITLER, Adolf* Chancellor of the German Reich* January HO, lOftA; Fiilirer and
Chancellor, 19S4-1945; Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, t!:t-lJ>45.
HOKK-BET-IHHA, t^eslie, British liberal and liberal National M, P., 102^-10415;
Secretary of State for Wart May 1037-January 1040.
HOBTHY DE NAQYBANYA, Miklo, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, 1U2Q-1044.
HOST VKNTURI, Giovanni, Italian Minister of Communication*!.
Hxrrx, Oordell, American Secretary of State, 1933-1044.
), Ismet, General* President of the Turkiwh Renublle, 103H 1XJ5O.
S:, Bberhard von, Official of the AuHlandHorKanimition of the NS0AF;
Under State Secretary and Chief Foreign Currency Hepnrtment i the
Ministry of Economies; memher, General ieration Office and Oj>en*tionB Staff of the
OKW, Aufi^ist 39S0-1945.
KANIN, Kotohito, Prin<*e, Field Marshal, Japanese Army, Chief of Htaflf,
1940.
Kismsx, Wilhelm, General, Chief of the OKW, m*l8-1045.
, Joseph P., American Ambassador in Great Britain, January
Novemher 1040.
Manfred, Freiherr vont Free Corps and BA leader; Head of I>iviion
Prrsonal-Naehicuvks in Personnel and Administrative Department of
the Foreign Ministry, 1930-1040; appointed Inspector of German diplomatic
mission** in the Balkans, I)e<*eml>er 30, 1039 ; Minister In Slovakia, 1040.
KIOSSEIVANQV, Oeorgl, Bulgarian Minister PreBlcie.nt and Foreign Minit**r, 10S5-
1940.
KIRK, Alexander Comstock, American Counselor of Embassy and Charg$
dTAffaires in Germany, 1939-1041,
APPENDIX IV 967
KLJEFFBNS, Eeleo Nicolaas van, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs,
1939-1946.
KIJBIST, Peter, Specialist for Kastern Europe in the Dienststelle Bibbentrop.
KNATCiijitTLL-HtTGESSEN, Sir Hughe M., British Ambassador in Turkey, 1939-1944.
KORNEK, Paul, State Secretary and permanent deputy to Go'ring as Commissioner
for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1045, State Secretary, Prussian State Ministry,
1W&-1045.
K<>STBING, Krnfit, Lieutenant General, Military Attache, German Embassy in the
Soviet Union, lJ):i,r>-1941,
KOIIT, Halvdan, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935-1941.
KQNOYK, Prince Puxuimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, June 1937-January 1939;
Mlnintor of State without Portfolio in Hiranuma Cabinet, January-
August mm
Koitivr, Krich, Senior Counselor, Foreign Minister's Secretariat in the German
Foreign Ministry, 1938-1041.
KOBDT, Theo, (Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Great Britain,
m'l8~m*ii> ; in the Legation in Switzerland, 1939-1945.
K, Huns Ulrich von, (German Minister in Latvia, 1938-1940.
I.U Hans Anton, Counselor of the German Embassy in Turkey, 1936-1943.
u'u, Haburn, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February
1U41.
Otto, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International,
1931-14*43; Head of the Finnish People's Government at Terijoki,
; Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Finno-
Soviet Socialist Republic and Vice President of the Supreme Council
of the USSR, 1040.
I,AMMKRS, Hans, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934-1845, with the rank of
Btate Secretary, 1984-1*)37, and Reich Minister, 1937-1945; member and
Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
, George, British Labor M. P. for Bow and Bromley, 1922-1940.
, Otto, German Minister in Uruguay, 1938-1942.
LOFOU> in, King of the Belgians, 1934-1951.
I*ETt Robert, Rei, George Ambrose, 1st Baron Lloyd of Dolobran, Chairman of the British
Council.
L&OYI> GEOBOB, David, British Liberal and Independent Liberal M. P., 1890^-1945 ;
Prime Minister, 1910-1022,
MACKKNBKN, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy, 1938-1943.
MAOIHTRATI, Count Massimo, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Germany,
1934; ComiKelor, 1936-1940; Minister in Bulgaria, 1940-1943.
, Ivan Mikhailovich, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932-1943.
, !>ani*l F.f South African Nationalist Party leader, member of the South
African Parliament.
Georges* French Minister of Colonies, Daladier Cabinet, April 1938-
March 104O; Reynaud Cabinets, March-June 1940.
MAWNKHHKIM, Baron Carl Gustaf Emit, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish
Army*
MABAB.YK, Jan Garrigiae, Czechoslovak Minister in Great Britain, 1925-1939.
X, Ren6, French Ambassador in Turkey, 193S-1940.
968
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
MAVROUDIB, Nicholas Under Secretary of State la tfie Circle Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 11)30-3941.
MEISSNEB, Otto, Chief of the German Prenidentiii! Chancellery, 19H4 HM5; State
Minister with the rank of Heleh Minlater, ltt7 11H5.
MENBMENCiotu-u, Num&n, AmbaBHador ; i&K*retary General of tin* Turklnh Foreign
Ministry, 11*37-1042.
METAXAS, John, General Greek Mliitater President, a too Foreign Miniftter and
Minister of War, Navy and Air, ifttO-lSMI.
MIKOYAN, Anastas Ivaiiovleh, People'w Ooimni#ar for Foreign Tnule of the Hoviet
Union, 1&38-1040; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars,
MJLCH, Erhard* General, State StHrwtary in th Hoich Air Ministry, iaUt-1044;
Inspector Genera! of tn* Luftwaffe. UKttJ 14M5.
MOHB, Otto Carl, Director In the Danish Foreign Miniatry.
Moixxrov, Vyacheslav MikhaliovU-h, C'hulrmnii of the Onau'il of !*OOIU**M Commissars
of the Soviet Union, 1U3O- 11*41 ; I*eI**V CunBelor of Ix>Kiitioii t Uentrnn I^e^ittion in
Norway, 193&-194O.
NETTHAUSEN, Franss, Consul General and Director of the German Travel Office
at Belgrade, Special liepreHentutlve in YugoKluvia for the Kour Year Phtn.
NEUKATH, Constantin, Kreiherr von, Reich Minister and Pr**Hitlet of the He**r't
Cabinet Council, February 4, m*tK~May HH5; Kelrh Prutwtor of Bohemia
and Moravia, 19S9-194IJ.
NOACK, Ulrich, German historian attached to the I^wttion in Norway.
NoMiinA, Klchisaburo, Admiral, Jaimm^e Foreign Minister in cnliini*t of CJeneral
Abe, September 1939-January 1U4C).
NYE, Ck^rald P., United State Senator from North Dakota, 11*2^11*45.
NYGAABDSVOJLD, Johan, Norwegian Prime Minister, 10S5-1IM5.
OSHIMA, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Anibasa45.
OTT, Bugen, German Major General, Military Attache in Japan, lti34-lf)Sft;
Ambassador in Japan, ISSB-liN^.
OUMANSKY, Constantino Alexandrovich, Soviet Axnbassadtir in the United States,
1939-1941.
PAASIKIVI, Jafco K., Finnish Minister in Sweden, 1930-1940; Chairman of Finnish
delegation for negotiations with the USSR, 3930; Minister wit&orat
Portfolio, 193&-1940 ; Chairman of Finnish peace delegation Sa Moscow, 3,040.
PAPEN, Franz vont German Ambassador In Turkey,
APPENDIX IV 969
PABTANI, Alberto, Italian general, Under Secretary of State for War; Chief of
the Italian General Staff, 193&-1939.
PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934-1941.
PTAIN, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France, Ambassador in Spain, 1939-1940.
PXBELOT, Hubert. Belgian Minister President, February 1939-1945; Minister of
Foreign Affairs, April 1939-September 1939.
PXTTMAN, Key, United States Senator from Nevada, 1911-1940; Chairman of
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
PLKSSBN, Johann, Baron von, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Italy,
11133-1943.
POTEMKIN, Vladimir Petrovich, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union, 1037-1940.
QUISLING., Vidkun, Norwegian politician and official; leader of the Norwegian
Nasjonal Samling party.
RAix>wiTS5, Otto von, German Minister in Luxembourg, 193&-1940.
KAKI>KH, Krich, Grand Admiral, Commander in Chief of German Navy, 1935-1943.
HAftTiKifl, Stasys, General, Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian Army.
KKXCHKKT, Huns Joachim, Ritter von, Secretary of Legation in German Embassy
in Italy, m'*H~1040; Counselor of Legation, 1940-1944.
ItKNUKL, Georges British Minister in Bulgaria, 1938-1941.
KKNTHK-FINK, CecU von, German Minister in Denmark, 1936-1942.
RKTNAUO. Paul, French Minister of Finance, November 1938-March 1940;
President of the Council of Ministers, March-June 1940; Foreign Minister,
March-May 1040.
Pv Joachim von, German Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-1945.
r, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany, 1937-1945.
KN, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria, 19391941.
HIIKN, Georg, Counselor, head of Division IIIc in the Economic Policy Department
In the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
RITTRR, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign
Ministry, 1D8W-194&
RISSA KHAN PAHLKVE, Shah of Iran, 1925-1941.
ct, Colonel, German Military Attache" in Finland, Estonia, and [Latvia.
Y MOKKNO, Juan Conte de Casa Rojas, Director General of Political Affairs
and Treaties in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1939-1940.
Kx>KVKi/r, Franklin Dt'lnno, President of the United States of America, March
4, in&l-April 12, 1945.
Alfred, lleichsloiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the
NS1>AI>
, I0:t;j-104r> ; deputy of the Ffihrer for supervision of spiritual and
ideological trniningr of the NSDAP, 1934-1945.
, AusutUo, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1936-1941.
RYTI, Hysto Ileikki, Governor of the Bank of Finland, 1923-1945; President of
Finland, 1040-1944.
BARACOGMT, ttttkrfi, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.
SARHAUT, Albert, French Minister of the Interior, April 1938-March 1940.
SAVCHKNKO, G. K., General of Artillery, Soviet Army.
SAYIIAM, RHlk, Minister President of Turkey, 1939-1943,
, Hjalmar, President of the Reichsbank, 1923-1939, Reich Minister without
Portfolio, 1937-1943.
r, Haiw-Wilhelm, director of the department for Northern Europe of the
Assenr>oiitisohes Amt of the NSDAP.
KEPsrrusaa, Hilger, Freiherr van, Counselor; official in German Foreign
Ministry, 1926-1944.
970
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
SoHMii>rt Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter In the German Foreign Ministry,
1023-1945; attached to the Korelisn Mlni8ter" Secretariat from
SCHNIEWINP, Otto, Vice-Admiral; Chief of German Naval Staff
tunff}, 1338-1941.
SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of !>iv talon W IV In tin* Economic I'olley Department
of the German Foreign Ministry* 1W3JV-I04CK
ScHtrorNBURG, Friedrleh Werm*r, Count von iRn MinlHtor, May HMH Ch-tabor IJKtti.
o SU&KR, RastiOn, bnither-ln-iaw of Giu*ri Franco. Hpunlnik .Minister of
the Interior, January- ia*iH-aii* AmhasniKior in Ori*at Britain, UtflK I1HI.
SHIRATORI, Toshio, Japanem* Anil>aHatir in Italy, I >iH**RttMr
SKKVATSKV, Aleksander A., Bt^Iet Amlaf4Hador In Grn
November 1940*
SIEGFRIED, Herbert Iiudwljr, Oounm^lor, O(R*iat of UK* SiTitarlat f>f the State
Secretary In theUennun ForHgn .Ministry. IIKIT-IIHH,
SIMON, Sir John, British Liberal and Liberal Natioiml M. !. l$m 10-4O ; leader of
the Liberal National Party* Ism-lfMO; fhaneelhir KH5.
&KIBPA, Knasyn, Lithuanian Minister In Germany, Fetirury H*:tu July 104O.
SMBJND, Hans, German MlniKter in Iran, ItiCUS-JittO.
SMETONA, AntunuM, lreHitltnt f Uithtianla, lt*%s 1040.
Kdwurd, Marshal of INhtitd, InsiM*4*tor eii4*rnl of the Army,
SPAAK, l^auMIenrl, Belgian Minlttter of Foreign AflTalrw, H<|ititilHr
STAJUIN, Jo8tf Vistjarionovleh, General Se<'retwry of the Central <'uminitte of
the Coxninunlt Party of the Soviet Union; memlter f the l*lifburo and
Orgburo, 1D22-10S8.
STAHMS Ileinrioh, in charge of Far Baatern quei^tioim in the DlenntntoUe Rlbbentrop.
KTUHBEB, Kberhara von, Cierman Ambfisftador ixx Bjmin, I037-1043.
STOICA, Basile, Rumanian Ambaanador In Turkey, 1037-1^40,
SUKTHJNB, M,, Director General for Foreign Commerce In the Ik*I*?ln
of Foreign Aflftiirs.
SviNHUFVtm, Pehr Eviud, Finnish KtatcHmnn, President of Finland,
SZTOJAT, Donae, Major General, Hungarian MlniHter In ilermnny,
TAWNEB, Vain5, Finnish Minister of Finance, !HKi7--2ttft)t Foreign Mlitiitter, December
1080-Uarch 1940.
TATARESCU, George, Rumanian Ambassador In France, IttSS-lftiO; Minister
President, November 1030-July 1&40.
TAVISTOCK, Hastings William 8ac*kvU!e Kusell, Marqueni* of, Pln<'e 1MO
of Bedford.
TA-XXOR, Myron C., American lawyer and hnslnensmun, personal
of President Roosevelt to the Holy See, 1$>3&~104
APPENDIX IV 971
TIPPKLSKIRCH, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, 1935-1940; Minister, 1940-
1941, in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
TOGO, Shigenorl, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1938; in the Soviet
Union, 1938-1940.
TWABDOWHKI, Fritz von, Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department of
the German Foreign Ministry, 1930-1939; Director, 1939-1943.
UNIJ&N, Osten, Swedish delegate to the League of Nations and advisor on international
law to the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
UuitftYs, Juozas, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.
VANIIKNXZKKG, Arthur, United States Senator from Michigan, 1928-1951.
VANSITTART, Sir Robert, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary,
11)38-3041.
VOKOSEUI.OV, Klement Efremovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union; People's Comxntatitur
for Defense, 1034-1940; member of the Politburo.
WALBHK, Joseph Patrick, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs
of Biro, 1022-1046.
WAX.TKK, Ministerialdirektor, in charge of the department of customs and trade
|M>licy in the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
WAN<* UHXNU-WKX < 1888-1044), Chinese political leader; head of a Chinese
Central Government approved by Japan.
WAIU.IMONT, Walter, Colonel (later General), Chief of the National Defense
Department in the Operations Office and Operations Staff in the OKW,
1U3K-1044.
WttXftKACKKR, Ernst, Frelherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry,
1988-1943.
WRM.KB, Suznner, American Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.
WKNNINOK&, Ralph, Lieutenant General, Air Attache) in the German Embassy in
Belgium, accredited also to the Netherlands.
WJSYUAND, Maxiine, General, Commander in Chief of French Forces in the eastern
Mediterranean, 1939-1940.
WXKD, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden, 1933-1943.
WIKHI,, IBmil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the
German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1944.
WU.HKX.MZNA, Queen of the Netherlands, 1890-1948.
WIIJSON, Hugh Ii., American Ambassador to Germany, 1938-1940, recalled to the
United States for report and consultation, November 14, 1938, and did not
return to his post.
WINPSOK, Duke of, Major-General, General Staff British Army in France,
WOKKUANN, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign
Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, 1938-1943.
WOXILTHAT, Helmut, Prussian State Councilor, Ministerialdirektor for special
assignments in the Four Year Plan, on economic mission in Spain, 1939, and
in charge of negotiations for German-Rumanian commercial treaty, 1939.
Woooarwo, Harry Hlnes, American Secretary of War, 1936-1940.
WXJOKJMAA, Aarne, Finnish Minister in Germany, 1933-1940.
YONAI, Httsumasa, Japanese Prime Minister, January-July, 1940.
ZKCH-BUHKKBSKODA, Julius von, Count, German Minister in the Netherlands,
1928-1940.
&KKLIK, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933-1940.
ZIKMKE, Kurt, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Beich Protector
of Bohemia and Moravia, September 1939-January 1941.
Appendix V
GLOSSARY
OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS l
AA, AuswUrtiges Amt
Abwehr, counterintelligenee* the Foreign
Intelligence Service of the
OKW
Amtsrat, a grade in tin* German AP concerned
with German nationals living abroad
AussenpolitischcH Amt, foreign aiTairs
office of the NHDAP; hwult'tl by
Alfred Uosenberg
Auswartiges Ami, Gorman Foreign*
Ministry
BrigadeFührer, SA and SS rank
almt to Hrigndier G*n<*ral
Biiro RAM, <>ffi<*iM>f tlu*
Buro St.S^ office of tlu State Stawtary
Chefsache, top SiHT^t military
Deutsches Auslandsinatitut, v*r name for
German njnrntion ngninnt Denmark
and Norway In April HMO
Kommandoache top secret
military
gchcimc KcichKHachc, top Hi^^r^t
Gchcimrat, Privy Otuuoiior, title confornnl
on high ovcrnnsnt olllcials
prior to 11)18
K KdoH gchclinc Kommandomtche
j? RH, gi'hcitnp Hcichnwachc
Gntp|M*nfishr<*r, SA and HB rank,
equivalent to Major Qcnornl
K, Kulturponii*u>h< Alttcilung
Kapitiin zur Sec, <3**ruutn naval rank
iHiUivnlont t< Captain in th Navy
Kulturpolitirtchc Ahteiiung (Kult.),
<'uitura! Policy Dojiartinont
LantU'Uffruppe, NSDAP organisation
fnr n foreign country. <*otro!i*d by
the AufthindsorKauisiitiort, headed
by a f^indcKgrupptnltc*r
lender of an
Marincoberkricgsgcrichtsrat, a nonniilitary
legal official of the German
Navy with
APPENDIX V 973
Ministerialrat, Ministerial coxmselor,
a grade in the German Civil Service
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,
National Socialist German
Workers' Party, the fiill title of
the Nassi Party
NSDAP, Nationalsoziali.stische Deutflche
Arbeiterpartei
Obergebietsfuhrer, Chief District
leader, a rank in the Hitler youth
whose holder might occupy the post
of District Leader in the Hitler
Youth, or that of Office Director in
the Reich Youth Office
Oberkommando des Heeres, High
Command of the Army
Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine,
High Command of the Navy
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High
Command of the Wehrmacht
OberregierunKsrat, a grade in the
German Civil Service
OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres
OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Ortsgruppe, subdivision of an NSDAP
Kreis or district, headed by an Ortsgruppenleiter
Ortagruppenleiter, head of an NSDAP
Ortsgruppe
Pers^ Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung
Personal- und Verwaltungs-A b t e i -
lung, Personnel arid Administrative
Department of the Foreign Ministry
Pol., Politische Abteilung
Politische Abteilung, Political Department
of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided
according to geographic
areas, each designated by a Roman
numeral, e. g., Pol. IV (see appendix
II)
R, Rechtsabteilung
RAM, Reichsaussenminister
Rechtsabteilung (Recht.), Legal Department
in the German Foreign Ministry
Referat Deutschland, also Sonderreferat
Deutschland, special section for German internal affairs in the
Foreign Ministry
Referent, drafting officer, expert, specialist,
competent official
Regierungsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service
Reichsamtsleiter, a principal official in the Reich office
of an NSDAP organization
Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
Reichsbahn, the German State Railways
Reichsbahndirektor, an official of the German State Railways
Reichsdeutsche, Reich Germans, i. e., those Germans, who were Reich subjects,
used usually with reference to those living outside the frontiers of
the Reich (see Volksdeutsche)
ReichsFührer SS, Commander in Chief of the SS
Reichsgruppe Industrie, Reich Group Industry, an official organization for
the control of German industry
Reichsleiter, highest NSDAP rank
Reichsmark, the unit of German currency
Reichsminister, Reich Minister; any member of the Reich Cabinet but in
Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister
Reichsorganisationsleiter, director of the Party Organization of tbe
NSDAP (the title of Dr. Ley in the Party organization)
RM, Reichsmark ; Reichsminister
SA, Sturmabteilung
Schutzstaffel, elite corps of the NSDAP, used for military and police
purposes
SD, Sicherheitsdienst
Sicherheitsdienst, security service ; intelligence
and counterintelligence agency of the SS
SS, Schutzstaffel
Staatssekretar, the highest career official
of a Reich Ministry
Stabsleitung, personal staff of the
head of a central department in the NSDAP
St. S., Staatssekretar
Sturmabteilung, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
SturmbannFührer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major
Unterstaatssekretar, Under State Secretary
974
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
U. St. S^ Unterntaatssekretar
Vbd., Volkerbuud
Volkerbund, League of Nations
Volksdentsche, ethnic Germans, i. e.,
persons belonging to the German
cultural community living outside
the frontiers of the Heich and not
Reich subjects
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, (VOMI),
central agency for problems concerning
Volksdeutsche ; formed as the
Biiro \on Kurseil in 193tf, renamed
and placed under SS-ObergruppenFührer
Lorenx in HKJ7 ; dirtH*te covertly
thc^ political agitation of German
minorities
VoIkspruppenfiihrunK, leadership of a
Volksgruppe or German national
group outside the Reich
W, WirtsehaftHpoiltiBi'he Abteilung
Wchrmachtfuhrungsamt, Wehnnaeht
Operations Staff, an office in the
OKW engaged in operationH planning
Wehrwirtschaftsstab, War Bcouomj
Staff, a division of OKW, title
changed In 1930 to WehrwirtHehaft*
nnd HUstungsamt, Military Economy
and Annaimnt Office
Weseriibung, Wewriibung Slid, Woserubung
Nord, cover name for Ger
man *>ix*ra lion against Denmark and
Norway in April li>U). Weserlihung
Slid referred to the occupation of
Denmark and Weseriitnmg Nor*! t<
the attack on Norway
Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Kco>
noini
J